Frederick the Great's
Masterpiece: The Battle of Leuthen
by Birrion Sondahl
Frederick the Great has been described as the embodiment of "the utmost in
military achievement that was possible in Europe in the conditions prevailing
before the French revolution." [1] Of all of his battles, none shows
Frederick's military abilities more than the Battle of Leuthen (December 5,
1757). His leadership before and throughout the battle show his capabilities as
a military commander. The Battle of Leuthen can truly be considered to be
Frederick's masterpiece.
The strategic situation prior to the Battle of Leuthen was one of mixed
fortunes for Frederick. He had just recently won a great victory over the
French at Rossbach (November 5, 1757) that had for the moment secured Prussia
against a French incursion. However, he now had to turn to an equally menacing
threat from Austria. The Austrian army under the command of Prince Charles of
Lorraine and Field Marshal Daun had just recently invaded Silesia. On November
22, 1757, this force had defeated the Prussians under the Duke of Bevern and
subsequently captured Breslau. Under the leadership of the cavalry commander
General Ziethen, the defeated and demoralized Prussian army had marched south.
It was able to meet up with Frederick's victorious army at Parchwitz on
December 2, 1757. With the addition of these forces, Frederick's army now
contained around 35,000 men consisting of "38 ½ battalions of infantry, 133
squadrons of cavalry, and 78 heavy guns, in addition to 98 battalion field
pieces." [2] This force was all that Frederick had to face the Austrians in
Silesia.
The morale of Frederick's army was quite mixed. General Ziethen's men were
uniformly of very low spirits after their retreat from Breslau. In contrast to
this, Frederick's own men were greatly confident after their victory at
Rossbach. Before he could attempt to drive the Austrians out of Silesia,
Frederick understood that he would have to do something to improve the morale
of Ziethen's force. He primarily carried out this task through two methods. The
first of these was through his own personal leadership skills. Dennis Showalter
describes Frederick's behavior in the following, "Account after contemporary
account describes a sick, exhausted monarch moving from bivouac to bivouac,
warming himself at the men's fires, listening to stories and hearing
complaints, promising promotion and reward for future good service. To senior
officers, instead of the expected tirades, Frederick offered fellowship,
implying that future deeds would cancel past misfortunes." [3] He also spoke to
his senior commanders informing them of the situation in Silesia and the
importance of their performance in the days to come. He informed them that he
would consider the recent disaster at Breslau to be, in his own words,
"insurmountable were it not that I [Frederick] place the most unbounded
confidence in your gallantry and courage, in that resolution and love of
country which you have so nobly evinced on so many occasions..." [4] He
reminded these men in the following words that they should, "Bear in mind,
gentlemen, that we shall be fighting for our glory, the preservation of our
homes, and for our wives and children." [5] Frederick concluded this speech
with the warning that, "I shall immediately after the battle dismount and
convert into a garrison regiment that cavalry regiment that does not
immediately, on being ordered, burst impetuously on the foe. The infantry
battalion which, whatever the obstacles, halts for a moment, shall lose its
standards and swords, and I shall cut the facings from its uniform." [6] From
this speech, it is clear that Frederick had faith in his army. It was due to
this faith that he intended to bring the Austrians to battle in spite of the
certainty that he would be outnumbered on the battlefield. Frederick expected
only the best from the Prussian army and a half-hearted effort would not be
acceptable. The second method whereby he improved the morale of Ziethen's force
was through a relaxing of his usually stringent discipline. This allowed "his
veterans of Rossbach to mingle with their fellow soldiers and tell their
stories of victory and plunder." [7] Frederick would later write that these men
"persuaded their comrades [Ziethen's command] to take heart." [8] An increased
ration of food and liquor also did much to improve the spirits of the men. [9]
Content that he had done everything in his power to improve the morale of his
army, Frederick now proceeded to march towards Breslau where the Austrians
awaited his approach.
The Austrian army which faced Frederick was under the command of Prince Charles
of Lorraine and Field Marshal Daun. This force numbered "85 battalions, 125
squadrons, and 235 guns, better than 60,000 men in all." [10] The Austrian
soldiers were quite confident following the capture of Breslau. Prince Charles
fully intended to spend the winter in Silesia living off the bounty of their
recent victories. As Duffy describes, this Austrian army "was not a mob like
the one he [Frederick] had defeated at Rossbach a month before, but a highly
professional force which had three times got the better of the Prussians in
recent combats." [11] Neither Prince Charles nor Field Marshal Daun expected
that the Prussians would attempt to face them in open battle until spring.
Frederick knew that the Austrians were positioned near Breslau. With this
knowledge, he marched from Parchwitz towards Breslau. His first knowledge of
the exact position of the Austrians came when his advanced guard clashed with
that of the Austrians in the town of Neumarkt on December 4, 1757. The
Austrians had set up a field bakery there and held the town with 1,000 Croats
and two hussar regiments. [12] Frederick determined to drive the Austrians out
of the town before they were able to occupy it with a more substantial force.
Frederick understood that if the Austrians were able to place infantry in the
town and artillery on the hills outside of the village, they would have a very
strong position. In order to take the town, Frederick had a portion of his
hussars dismount and batter down the gate. When the gate fell, another regiment
entered the city at a full gallop. Meanwhile a third regiment had traveled
around the outskirts of the town and made an entrance through the Breslau gate.
The Austrians were taken by surprise and those that did not immediately flee
were captured. A total of 800 Croats were captured in this skirmish. [13]
Frederick's advanced guard continued to Kammendorf. The rest of the Prussian
army now advanced and occupied Neumarkt and the other villages in the immediate
area for the night.
As the bulk of his army slept, Frederick made plans for the following day.
Shortly after the capture of Neumarkt, he had received intelligence informing
him that the Austrian army was in a defensive line "which stretched across four
miles of open country from the hamlet of Nippern in the north to that of
Sagschutz in the south." [14] The rear of the Austrian position was anchored by
the watercourse Schweidnitz. With this knowledge, Frederick felt confident that
he would be able to engage them in battle the next day. Frederick's writings
describe the order in which his army advanced on the morning of December 5 in
the following, "It [the army] was preceded by an advance guard of sixty
squadrons and ten battalions headed by the King in person. The four columns of
the army followed at a slight distance, with the infantry forming the two
middle columns and the cavalry, the wings." [15] The ten battalions of the
advance guard were under the command of Major General Heinrich von Wedell. It
was this force which first came into contact with the Austrians. An Austrian
advanced guard of cavalry under the command of General Nostitz had deployed at
Borne. This force consisted of "four regiments of Saxon dragoons and two of
Imperial hussars." [16] It was deployed in such a manner that the left flank
was covered by a woods while the rest of the force was angled back in the
direction of Lissa. As Frederick still did not have a perfect knowledge of the
Austrian deployment, he at first believed this force to be a wing of the
Austrian army. Therefore he had his scouts carefully probe the position to
determine the exact nature of the force. Upon discovering that it was simply a
cavalry force and not a part of the main army as he had supposed, he moved
General Wedell's infantry into the woods on the Austrian left. Once the
infantry were in position, Frederick then ordered the cavalry to charge the
Austrian front. With the support of the infantry attacking Nostitz's flank,
this cavalry charge routed the Austrians. The remnants of General Nostitz's
force fled back to join the main Austrian army. The Prussians captured a total
of five officers and eight hundred men in this attack. In order to "animate the
soldiers by this successful example" Frederick had these prisoners "marched all
along the columns to Neumarkt." [17] This action makes it clear that even after
contact had been made with the enemy, Frederick was still concerned with
uplifting the morale of his men and inspiring them for the conflict to come.
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Figure 1. The Department of
History at the United States Military Academy, "The Battle of Leuthen, The Fix,
5 December 1757" in The Dawn of Modern Warfare. Map. Retrieved from:
http://www.dean.usma.edu/history/web03/atlases/dawn_modern_warfare/dawn%20modern%20warfare%20maps/battle_leuthen_fix.gif:United
States Defense Printing Agency, 2007. This map shows the initial movements of
both armies up to the clash of the advanced guards at Borne.
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Frederick halted the Prussian advance between the villages of Heidau and
Frobelwitz just out of cannon range of the Austrian army. Frederick described
that "From there the Imperial army was so clearly visible that it would have
been possible to have counted it man by man. The Austrian right, known to be at
Nippern, was hidden by the great wood of Lissa, but of the center as well as
the left nothing was out of sight." [18] In their belief that Frederick would
not attempt to attack such a strong force in a defensive position, the
Austrians had made no attempt to conceal their strength. [19] From his position
between the two armies, Frederick could easily discern all the strengths and
weaknesses of the Austrian position. It was clear to him that the key point in
the Austrian line was a knoll upon which its left flank was anchored. From this
knoll, "the ground sloped off in one continual descent toward Nippern." [20]
Frederick with his keen eye for the terrain understood that capturing this
knoll in the south would give him an advantage throughout the battle. He
therefore determined to focus the efforts of his attack upon the Austrian left
flank and this knoll.
In order to carry out this flank attack, a key part of Frederick's plan was
that the Austrians not discover his movements to the south. Fortunately for his
plans, a chain of knolls provided a cover for his maneuvers. His army now
wheeled to make a sharp turn to the south masked by the terrain. While the bulk
of the Prussian army was making these maneuvers, Frederick himself rode between
the two armies with his personal contingent of Hussars. As he described later,
"Being between the two armies the King could observe that of the Austrians and
direct the march of his own." [21] He had dispatched other forces to observe
the Austrians' right and center. As Frederick's plan hinged upon the Austrians
remaining in their position until he was able to outflank them, it was
necessary that the Austrian right and center remain in their positions until
the attack began. In addition to using the terrain to hide his movements,
Frederick also ordered a portion of his army to "go through a show of deploying
into battle order" [22] in the north. This force would also secure Frederick's
own left flank while keeping the Austrians fooled as to Frederick's real
intentions. This plan was successful for upon observing the Prussians
deploying, the Austrian commander, Prince Charles, "moved nine battalions from
the reserve northwards to his far right around Nippern." [23] However, the
Austrians were also able to observe some of the Prussian movements to the
south. They misinterpreted these movements as a withdrawal rather than the
maneuver to their south flank that it actually was. [24] When Field Marshal
Daun was told of the Prussian movements to the south, he commented, "These
people are going; let them go." [25] As the German military historian Hans
Delbruck explains, "when the king approached, they [the Austrians] thought it
sufficient to face him in a suitable defensive position. They did not expect
that he would dare to attack them in this position (5 December); they assumed
that he would withdraw, and they would have been content with this result."
[26] Both Prince Charles and Field Marshal Daun had been completely fooled by
Frederick's maneuvers.
After successfully maneuvering the right wing of his army to the Austrian
southern flank, Frederick prepared for the attack. The first part of this
assault consisted of General Wedell's ten infantry battalions. This force "was
supported by a battery of twelve-pounders that the King had stripped from the
ramparts of Glogau." [27] General Wedell advanced in echelon with a distance of
fifty paces between each battalion. Frederick's army was now deployed in the
famed oblique order. This order has been simply described as "the advance of
one wing by echelons with refusal of the other." [28] The right wing was
spearheaded by General Wedell's force and supported to the flank and rear by
General Ziethen's cavalry. The left which had made such a show of deploying in
battle order to confuse the Austrians was supported by a similar force of
cavalry under Lieutenant General George Wilhem von Driesen. From this position,
it would be able to guard a Prussian retreat if Frederick's initial attack were
repulsed or if successful it could easily maneuver to engage in the battle.
Satisfied that his troops were all in order, Frederick ordered General Wedell
to march to the attack.
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Figure 2. The Department of
History at the United States Military Academy, "The Battle of Leuthen, The
Shift, 5 December 1757" in The Dawn of Modern Warfare. Map. Retrieved from:
http://www.dean.usma.edu/history/web03/atlases/dawn_modern_warfare/dawn%20modern%20warfare%20maps/battle_leuthen_shift.gif:
United States Defense Printing Agency, 2007. This map shows Frederick's feint
to the north and the shift of his forces to the south. Also shown is the
Austrian movement of nine battalions of the reserve to support their right
wing.
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The first contact between the two opposing force came when General Wedell's ten
battalions ran into fourteen battalions of Wurttembergers in a wood on the far
Austrian left. The Austrian force was quickly driven out of the woods. The
Austrian cavalry stationed on this flank under the command of General Nadasti
responded with a counterattack. This attack was easily repulsed by General
Ziethen's Prussian cavalry. Moving rapidly, the Prussians were able to capture
the knoll which gave them a commanding presence over the entire Leuthen plain.
By placing a battery of 20 twelve-pounders on this knoll, Frederick was able to
prevent the Austrians from carrying out a successful counterattack. However,
the Prussian attack itself was somewhat blunted when the Austrians seized a
knoll next to the Schweidnitz watercourse. As Frederick explained, "Wedell did
not allow them to stay there for long, and after a longer and more obstinate
fight than the one preceding he forced them to give up the ground." [29] While
Wedell was engaged in this battle, the Prussian cavalry under Ziethen made a
successful charge upon Nadasti's Austrian cavalry opposite them. The Austrian
cavalry was forced to retreat, but so was Ziethen following a well placed
artillery barrage from the Austrian cannons. The Austrians had now been forced
from their initial positions and were falling back upon the village of Leuthen.
Although they had been taken by surprise, the Prince Charles and Daun were now
starting to respond to Frederick's attack. It was now quite clear to them that
they had been taken in the flank by a significant Prussian force. As Frederick
would later write, "The Austrian generals, seeing themselves turned and taken
in flank, endeavored to change their position: they attempted, but too late, to
form a line parallel to the Prussian front." [30] The Austrian right began to
move through the Lissa woods in order to support the beleaguered left at
Leuthen. This force was able to reform into "the semblance of a new line, which
faced south and extended on either side of Leuthen along a frontage of 1,800
paces." [31] The Prussians entered Leuthen itself at around 3:30 PM. The focus
of the battle was now around the Leuthen churchyard which was held by a
Franconian battalion. [32] This church was surrounded by a tall stonewall. This
wall prevent the advance of the Prussians until it was finally breached by a
well placed artillery barrage. The Prussian infantry were now able to storm the
building and drive the Franconians out. Once the church had been taken, what
few Austrians remaining in the town were driven back to the north. The Prussian
forces now faced the newly formed Austrian line which held the hill country
north of Leuthen. [33] This line was located so as to be able to concentrate
fire upon Leuthen itself. The Prussian attack faltered under this intense fire.
With the impetus of the Prussian attack halted, a force of Austrian cavalry
consisting of 70 squadrons under generals Lucchese and Sebelloni moved to
launch a counterattack against the Prussian left. [34] This movement did not go
unnoticed and Frederick ordered the Prussian left, under command of Lieutenant
General Driesen, to advance to the Austrian right flank. [35] The time was now
5:00 PM and darkness was beginning to fall. As the Austrian cavalry formed up
to make their attack, Driesen fell upon their flank and drove them from the
field. Frederick would later simply say of this attack that, "The Imperialists
were dispersed and fled in disorder." [36] After driving the enemy cavalry from
the field, Driesen continued to press his attack into the flank of the Austrian
infantry. At the same time, General Wedell and the Prussian right turned the
Austrian left flank. Under attack from three sides, the Austrians broke and
fled the field. General Wedell's final charge completed the Prussian victory
for Frederick. [37]
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Figure 3. The Department of
History at the United States Military Academy, "The Battle of Leuthen, The
Press, 5 December 1757" in The Dawn of Modern Warfare. Map. Retrieved from:
http://www.dean.usma.edu/history/web03/atlases/dawn_modern_warfare/dawn%20modern%20warfare%20maps/battle_leuthen_press.gif:
United States Defense Printing Agency, 2007. This map shows Frederick's initial
attack upon the Austrian left flank and the subsequent movements of both
armies. Driesen's final charge on the Austrian right is shown while General
Wedell's charge is not.
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The greater bulk of the Austrian army fled back along their line of
communications towards Lissa. Frederick personally led the chase that harried
these men all along their retreat through the Lissa woods and across the
Schweidnitz. Darkness hindered this pursuit greatly as it made it much more
difficult to identify the fleeing foe. Nevertheless, according to Frederick,
"Seydlitz's cuirassiers brought in prisoners in bands." [38] The Prussians
reached Lissa itself between 7:00 and 8:00 PM. Frederick's first action upon
arriving at the town was to send a force of grenadiers to capture the bridge.
This was easily accomplished as the bridge was only held by an insignificant
Austrian force. Frederick placed artillery covering the bridge to prevent any
Austrians from making a crossing and renewing the battle in the morning. The
Austrian army continued its retreat through Lissa and onward to the road to
Breslau. Frederick did not attempt to cross the Schweidnitz at this late hour,
but rather placed his men along its bank with orders to fire across into the
darkness. The reason for this was "as much to keep the terror in the vanquished
as to prevent them from sending troops...to dispute his passage the next day."
[39] The Austrians did not attempt to retake the field the following day but
rather continued their retreat.
Frederick's own writings give the number of casualties in the following,
"Prussian casualties were 1,175 officers and men killed and 5,207 wounded,
making a total of 6,382. The Austrians lost about 3,000 killed, 6,000 to 7,000
wounded, and over 12,000 prisoners, along with 46 colors and 131 guns. An
additional 10,000 Austrians were captured during the pursuit." [40] Modern
estimates place the total number of prisoners as 12,000. [41] The number of
casualties show how intense the fire was during the key phases of the battle.
Frederick had anticipated this and had actually had his infantry bring along
their ammunition wagons into the battle. The main part of the battle had lasted
no longer than five hours, yet some of Frederick's men had fired over 180
rounds during this time. [42] According to Frederick, "If night had not come on
this battle would have been one of the most decisive of this century." [43] It
is true that the Austrian army had not been entirely destroyed, but it had
still suffered severely in the defeat.
Frederick's tactical success at Leuthen also resulted in a broader strategic
success. Prince Charles and Field Marshal Daun took what remained of their army
and fled from Silesia. On December 20, Frederick had retaken Breslau and
captured an additional 17,000 men who had been left there without support. [44]
Frederick's initial goal in attacking the Austrian position at Leuthen had been
"because he did not want to allow them to spend the winter in Silesia." [45]
The Prussian victory at Leuthen achieved this goal. Considered together with
his earlier victory over the French at Rossbach, Frederick's victory at Leuthen
"probably saved Prussia from extinction." [46] While the war was far from over,
Leuthen was an important step forward and allowed Frederick to continue the
war.
The Battle of Leuthen was an incredible victory for Frederick. General Sir John
Hackett describes the battle as Frederick's "most skilfully conducted battle."
[47] While it is true that some of the credit for the victory should be
accorded to the men who fought and died, the victory would not have been gained
if not for Frederick's brilliant tactical maneuvering. As Fraser so aptly
notes, "Frederick had devised the battle and been in full, personal, control.
He had been captain as well as king and general." [48] A great part of why
Frederick was so successful at Leuthen was due to the moral effect that his
maneuvers had upon the enemy. From the very start of the battle when he fooled
the Austrians into thinking he was going to deploy to attack their right,
Frederick had a moral superiority that offset his numerical inferiority. As the
French military theorist Colonel Ardant du Picq wrote, "Frederick liked to say
that three men behind the enemy were worth more than fifty in front of him, for
moral effect." [49] In the case of Leuthen, it was the presence of Frederick's
army at a point completely opposite where the Austrians expected it that had
such a profound moral effect. Frederick's deployment in the oblique order set
up all the subsequent portions of the battle up until the final attacks of
Driesen and Wedell. The Battle of Leuthen was truly a tactical masterpiece.
Show Footnotes and
Bibliography
Footnotes
[1]. Palmer, R. R. "Frederick the Great, Guibert, Bulow: From Dynastic to
National War" in Makes of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age.
Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1986, pg. 95.
[2]. Frederick II, King of Prussia. Frederick the Great on the Art of War.
Ed. and Trans. by Jay Luvaas. New York: The Free Press, 1966, pg. 235. There
are various discrepancies in the numbers for each side depending on the account
used. These estimates range from 60-80,000 for the Austrian army and from
30-35,000 for the Prussians. I have used the numbers given by Jay Luvaas, the
editor of Frederick the Great on the Art of War.
[3]. Showalter, Dennis. "Calculation and Circumstance: The Leadership of
Frederick the Great" in Leadership: The Warrior's Art. Ed. By
Christopher Kolenda. Carlisle, Pennsylvania: Army War College Foundation Press,
2001, pg. 133.
[4]. Frederick II, King of Prussia. Frederick the Great on the Art of War.
Ed. and Trans. by Jay Luvaas. New York: The Free Press, 1966, pg. 234.
[5]. Duffy, Christopher. The Army of Frederick the Great. Chicago,
Illinois: Emperor's Press, 1996, pg. 268.
[6]. Frederick II, King of Prussia, pg. 234-235.
[7]. Showalter, pg. 133.
[8]. Frederick II, King of Prussia, pg. 235.
[9]. Showalter, pg. 133.
[10]. Frederick II, King of Prussia, pg. 235. Once again I have used Luvaas'
numbers. Christopher Duffy gives the following alternate numbers in The Army of
Frederick the Great, pg. 268: Prussians: 48 battalions, 129 squadrons,
167 guns, total c. 33,000, Austrians: 85 battalions, 125 squadrons, 210 guns,
total 65,000.
[11]. Duffy, pg. 273.
[12]. Frederick II, King of Prussia, pg. 235.
[13]. Ibid., pg. 236.
[14]. Duffy, pg. 271.
[15]. Frederick II, King of Prussia, pg. 236.
[16]. Ibid., pg. 237.
[17]. Ibid., pg. 237.
[18]. Ibid., pg. 237.
[19]. Asprey, Robert B. Frederick the Great: The Magnificent Enigma. New
York, New York: Ticknor & Fields, 1986, pg. 478.
[20]. Frederick II, King of Prussia, pg. 237.
[21]. Ibid., pg. 238.
[22]. Duffy, pg. 271.
[23]. Ibid., pg. 271.
[24]. Fraser, David. Frederick the Great: King of Prussia. New York,
New York: Fromm International, 2000, pg. 372.
[25]. Frederick II, King of Prussia, pg. 238.
[26]. Delbruck, Hans. The Dawn of Modern Warfare. Translated by Walter
J. Renfroe, Jr. Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 1985, pg. 345.
[27]. Frederick II, King of Prussia, pg. 238.
[28]. Palmer, pg. 101.
[29]. Frederick II, King of Prussia, pg. 239.
[30]. Ibid., pg. 239.
[31]. Duffy, pg. 272.
[32]. Ibid., pg. 272.
[33]. Frederick II, King of Prussia, pg. 261.
[34]. Duffy, pg. 272.
[35]. Frederick II, King of Prussia, pg. 239.
[36]. Ibid., pg. 239.
[37]. Ibid., pg. 240
[38]. Ibid., pg. 240. This was Lieutenant General Seydlitz who had first
distinguished himself during the Prussian defeat at the Battle of Kolin (June
18, 1757). After this defeat, Frederick had tasked him with reforming the
Prussian cavalry. This reformed cavalry had acted in a spectacular manner at
Rossbach (November 5, 1757) which resulted in further promotion for Seydlitz.
Although Seydlitz had played a minor part in the battle itself, his cavalry
were very important in the pursuit.
[39]. Ibid., pg. 240.
[40]. Ibid., pg. 261-262.
[41]. Asprey, pg. 481, Fraser, pg. 374, Duffy, pg. 268. All of these historians
agree that only 12,000 Austrians were captured. It is unclear as to why
Frederick would have overestimated this number.
[42]. Duffy, pg. 274.
[43]. Frederick II, King of Prussia, pg. 240.
[44]. Duffy, pg. 274.
[45]. Delbruck, pg. 370.
[46]. Palmer, pg. 102.
[47]. Hackett, General Sir John. The Profession of Arms. New York, New
York: MacMillan Publishing Company, 1983, pg. 83.
[48]. Fraser, pg. 374.
[49]. Picq, Colonel Charles-Jean-Jacques-Joseph Ardant du. Retrieved from:
http://www.gutenberg.org/etext/7294: Project Gutenberg, 2005.
Bibliography
Asprey, Robert B. Frederick the Great: The Magnificent Enigma. New
York, New York: Ticknor & Fields, 1986.
Delbruck, Hans. The Dawn of Modern Warfare. Translated by Walter J.
Renfroe, Jr. Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 1985.
Duffy, Christopher. The Army of Frederick the Great. Chicago,
Illinois: Emperor's Press, 1996.
Fraser, David. Frederick the Great: King of Prussia. New York, New
York: Fromm International, 2000.
Frederick II, King of Prussia. Frederick the Great on the Art of War. Ed.
and Trans. by Jay Luvaas. New York: The Free Press, 1966.
Hackett, General Sir John. The Profession of Arms. New York, New York:
MacMillan Publishing Company, 1983.
Mitford, Nancy. Frederick the Great. New York, New York: Harper &
Row, Publishers, 1970.
Palmer, R. R. "Frederick the Great, Guibert, Bulow: From Dynastic to National
War" in Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age,
Ed. By Peter Paret. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1986.
Picq, Colonel Charles-Jean-Jacques-Joseph Ardant du. Retrieved from:
http://www.gutenberg.org/etext/7294: Project Gutenberg, 2005.
The Department of History at the United States Military Academy, The Dawn of
Modern Warfare. Mr. Edward J. Krasnoborski and Mr. Frank Martini,
cartographers. Retrieved from:
http://www.dean.usma.edu/history/web03/atlases/dawn_modern_warfare/dawn_modern_warfare_table_of_contents.html:
United States Defense Printing Agency, 2007.
Copyright © 2007 Birrion Sondahl
Written by Birrion Sondahl. If you have questions or comments on this article,
please contact Birrion Sondahl at:
birrion@slewfoot.us.
About the author:
Birrion Sondahl recently completed his degree in Military History from American Military University.
In addition to studying military history, he is an avid freestyle skier. He lives at home
with his parents, three cats, and a flock of chickens in Spirit Lake, Idaho.
Published online: 12/15/2007.
* Views expressed by contributors are their own and do not necessarily represent
those of MHO. |
