The Success of Napoleon
by Richard Podruchny
On the European continent, no one would have imagined that the rise of the
"Little Corsican" would have perpetuated a conquest that would involve the
entire European continent. This article will take a look at how and why
Napoleon Bonaparte was as successful on the battlefield as he was. We will also
see how Napoleon efficiently utilized the weapons and technology on hand that
would formulate his strategy and tactics, which would result in his domination
of Western Europe.
To begin looking at how Napoleon came to dominate Western Europe, we will start
with what was inherited from his predecessors. Overall, the technology during
the Napoleonic era was relatively unchanged. For the infantry, their small
arms, such as the musket and bayonet changed very little.[1] The artillery arm,
however, went through some major renovations prior to Napoleon's rise to power.
Under the direction of Inspector General Jean-Baptiste Varvette de Gribeauval,
these innovations have been described as the foundation of the military
achievements of Revolutionary and Napoleonic France.[2] The innovations that
Gribeauval implemented were that artillery pieces were now made with
interchangeable parts, which was suitable for mass production; gun carriages
were built to a standard model; the mobility of the guns was improved by
harnessing the horses in pairs instead of in file; hardwood axles replaced
heavy iron ones; and accuracy was improved through the introduction of the
"tangent sight," which is a graduated brass measure that enabled the gunner to
sight the gun on a target. The greater mobility of the artillery would be one
of the most defining improvements, since it would make it possible for the guns
to accompany divisions.[3]
Through these relatively small number of improvements, Napoleon essentially
mastered Europe with the weapons and equipment that was available. This means
that Napoleon simply made more efficient use with what was on hand. As was
mentioned previously, Napoleon improved upon the potential of division
formations. Napoleon essentially borrowed the divisional formation from Count
Jacques de Guibert, who was the author of his Essai General de Tactique and
Defense du Systeme de Guerre.[4] He stressed the need for greater mobility and
advocated the use of divisional formations. It was through the use of
divisional formations that Napoleon revolutionized strategy. Armies would now
be composed of detachable parts that could engage the enemy alone until the
rest of the army came up in support, which consisted of both infantry and
artillery.[5] Divisions could also be used in encircling or flanking movements,
while on the defensive, the division could be used to prevent these offensive
maneuvers. This type of formation can now take the advantage of parallel roads
and be able to concentrate immediately before making contact with the enemy. As
a result of implementing divisional formations, generalship was made more
complicated and staff work became more important, as well as the need for
highly detailed maps that would need to show terrain features and road
networks. It was through this type of generalship that Napoleon would
demonstrate his genius, since he was essentially his own chief of staff and he
was able to effectively direct operations of his armies, where others would
have failed.[6]
Even though Napoleon had implemented the use of divisional formations, armies
during this time period would drastically increase in size due to conscription.
These conscription based armed forces in France would number over a half a
million men.[7] In order to effectively command these large numbers of troops,
Napoleon would implement permanent army corps within the French army. This
organizational unit became essential for administration and command and
controlling these large numbers of troops. The corps formation would be
utilized similarly as the division, which it would be a combined arms
organization composed of infantry, artillery and cavalry. The cavalry would be
responsible for conducting reconnaissance for the entire corps and would also
have its own divisional organization within the corps. Even though the corps
made it easier for Napoleon to direct his forces, the division would still
remain as the major tactical unit within the French army.[8]
As mentioned previously, conscription became the reason for such a drastic
increase in the number of troops. However, conscription came about from the
French Revolution, which is where a new type of army emerged. In this new type
of army, the aristocratic monopoly on officer commissions was removed, which
paved the way for a new kind of officer. These new officers were the former
Non-Commissioned Officers of the old royal army and they quickly transformed
into a competent professional officer corps. Now that the aristocracy no longer
had their monopoly, these officers, especially engineering and artillery
officers, needed some knowledge of math and science, which led to giving these
officers some type of formal education that led to the development of military
academies. Another result of the French Revolution would be the emergence of
the "nation-in-arms." The French army was not only moved by discipline but
through ideological and patriotic dedication. The French government and
citizens would support this new national army through the nationalized
manufacturing of war material. This increased industrial production, even
though this was before the full extent of the Industrial Revolution had reached
the European continent, would largely be accomplished by hand rather than
machine in order to support that vast numbers of troops that France and
Napoleon would rely on.[9]
Now that we have seen what Napoleon had inherited through some of the
technological and organizational innovations, as well as through the fruits of
the French Revolution, we can now take a look at how Napoleon utilized these
resources on the field of battle. By taking a top-down approach, we will first
examine the strategic concepts that were refined and employed by Napoleon. At
this level of warfare, the strategic level is where Napoleon would excel. To
make effective use of his army's superior mobility and inspiration, Napoleon
developed two major strategic systems. When he was facing an enemy superior in
numbers, the strategy of the central position was used in order to split the
enemy into separate parts.[10] This was where each could be eliminated in
detail through maneuvering in order to gain the French a local superiority of
force in successive actions by bringing the reserve into action at the critical
time and place. On the other hand, of the French held superiority in numbers,
Napoleon would often use a maneuver of envelopment.[11] By using this tactic,
Napoleon would capture his foe's attention with a detachment of his army, while
the bulk of his army would sweep against the enemy's lines of communication in
order to sever the enemy's links with his bases.[12]
Through these two types of strategy, Napoleon would once again borrow these
ideas from one of his teachers. Pierre de Bourcet, a chief of staff of the
royal armies in both the War of the Austrian Succession and the Seven Years
War, as well as the director of the school for staff officers at Grenoble. He
taught that an enemy could be misled by moves of various units which appeared
to be disconnected, but which were actually part of a unified plan. The overall
aim of this strategy was to compel the enemy to divide their forces and then to
attack them while separated before it could be reinforced. It was through this
philosophy that would form the basis of Napoleonic strategy. Napoleon would
later refine this strategy by accident at the Battle of Marengo in 1800, where
the battle was won for Napoleon by the opportune appearance of a division that
had failed to concentrate prior to battle. Thereafter, Napoleon would often
hold reserves back until the enemy forces were worn out, which was when he
would send in his reserves.[13]
By employing these two types of strategies, Napoleon always looked to ways that
would draw his enemy out to battle. He saw battle as a means to destroying his
enemy's means of resistance. Napoleon's first and clearly defined objective at
the outset of any of his campaign was the enemy's army, which he intended to
destroy.[14] If his enemy did not want to risk battle, he would force them to
do battle through his maneuvering, which would threaten something vital.
Throughout all of his campaigns, Napoleon always sought to seize and retain the
initiative, in order to impose his will upon the enemy. Even when Napoleon was
badly outnumbered, he was still able to outmaneuver his enemies through
marching and maneuvering, in order to employ the bulk of his forces at a
weakened point of the enemy's. It was through Napoleon's focus on the enemy's
armed forces and his ability to exercise quick maneuvering that he would enjoy
most of his successes.[15]
The quick maneuvering and marching ability of Napoleon's armies would form the
foundation in the execution of Napoleon's strategic concepts. When the French
Revolution broke out, the French military logistical system rapidly fell apart,
which proved incapable of providing the logistical support required by the
newly raised French armies. This would evolve into the French army being able
to operate by living off the land and not having to depend upon the magazine
supply system. By living off the land, this would lead to the mystique that the
French army could outmarch every other army in Europe. The French army was not
handicapped by large numbers of supply wagons, which also fed this mystique.
Instead of the army being hampered with how fast or how slow their supply train
can move, now they were able to march as fast as their soldier's legs could
carry them.[16]
To aid in Napoleon's speed of maneuver, his troops traveled light. Coupled with
the increase in mobility from living off the land, the French abandoned the
orthodox 70 paces per minute line of march in favor of a quick step of 120
paces per minute. This simple change would allow the French to march twenty to
thirty kilometers per day. Even though this may seem to be a simplistic change,
but in the days prior to railroads or automobiles, this change was a dramatic
one. However, any army could duplicate France's new doctrine, but it was the
revolutionary ideals of the citizen army and the threat to the survival of
their "New France," as well as the sense of French nationalism that inspired
the French army to perform such feats that were impossible for other armies to
achieve during this time period.[17]
Now that we have seen how Napoleon was able to dominate the strategic arena on
the European continent through strategic refinements, adopted changes in
doctrine and the revamping of the logistical supply system, we can now look at
the modifications and innovations that Napoleon made at the tactical level of
warfare. At the tactical level, we will first examine the foundation of
Napoleon's army, the infantry arm. As a member of the French infantry, an
individual could expect two to three weeks of basic training, which stressed
the use of the bayonet. The Napoleonic foot soldiers were renowned for their
agility, stubborn attacks, as well as the speed of their marches. As it was
mentioned previously, it was this speed and maneuverability that formed the
foundation of Napoleon's successful campaigns. This speed and maneuverability
was due to the lack of baggage that was carried by the French foot soldier,
since they bivouacked in the open and lived off the land.[18]
Now that the French infantry was not weighed down with excess baggage, the
re-introduction of light-infantry was put into practice. The use of skirmishing
tactics and skirmishers in the era of the French Revolution meant that the foot
soldier had to be re-trained to operate as an individual, as well as a part of
a group. Napoleon would often utilize the light infantry or skirmishers to
probe enemy positions or to find and keep the enemy stationary until the light
artillery and larger infantry formations moved in support.[19]
With the re-introduction of light infantry into the Napoleonic army, they would
be combined with a close order column, which would constitute the new tactics
of the Napoleonic infantry. The light infantry or skirmishers would occupy the
enemy in order for the larger assault formations to move up without being too
exposed to the fire of the enemy line. To put this into a clearer perspective,
the Napoleonic regular infantry would perform either role, whether it was in a
skirmishing or regular infantry role.
Now the roles of the Napoleonic foot soldier has been identified, we can now
examine the more renown infantry formations that Napoleon would utilize in his
battlefield successes. One such formation was the column, which was developed
by Lazare Carnot and later perfected by Napoleon. The French infantry column
was an adaptation of the linear system, where the deployment of a number of
linear units or battalions were in depth to provide physical and psychological
weight to an attack, however, individual units could still operate in a linear
formation. The greatest advantage by using this type of formation would rest in
its flexibility and versatility. This formation would permit the commander to
move large numbers of troops over the battlefield with better control and more
rapidly than was possible before. The column formation could operate with ease
in rough terrain, while being able to change formations just as easily. With
the re-introduction of skirmishers, they could be detached without making major
readjustments on the battlefield. While on the battlefield, this formation
could very rapidly convert from two or three rank firing lines or squares and
back to the original formation.[20]
Overall, the French infantry column essentially had two main functions; first,
it could be used to bring troops in close order rapidly to engage the enemy;
second, it could be used as a sustaining force. If the column sent out
skirmishers to start the engagement, it would be used as a replacement pool for
the skirmishers, as well as their immediate tactical reserve. If the column
encountered firm resistance, the column might deploy into lines to carry on the
fight with volleys. Once the enemy wavered, these lines could resume the
advance or they might reduce their front and move forward in column.[21]
With the improvements in tactics and employment of the infantry arm, Napoleon
would also make great use of his cavalry and not just in battle. The French
cavalry would serve as the basis for Napoleon's intelligence collection. His
light cavalry would be sent out well ahead of his army's main body in their
attempt to find the enemy and be able to ascertain their dispositions.[22]
On the battlefield, the cavalry would remain as the shock arm of the Napoleonic
army, with lances and sabers as their principle weapons. Within Napoleon's
cavalry arm, he would still keep the distinctions between light and heavy
cavalry. Now with Napoleon providing his cavalry with artillery and still
utilizing them in great numbers, he would use them in surprise operations
against the enemy's cavalry and infantry, which would prove to be very
effective. The Napoleonic cavalry would typically be used against the enemy's
infantry that had already been shaken or broken by massive artillery
bombardment or by infantry attacks. Napoleon would demonstrate just how
effective he could use his cavalry on the retreating enemy, which would cause
as much chaos and destruction upon his enemies as possible. As Napoleon would
later find out, the use of his cavalry against fresh infantry formations that
would have the time to form squares would often prove disastrous for the
attacking cavalry.[23]
After looking at how the Napoleonic infantry and cavalry underwent their
renovations during the Napoleonic era, we can now focus upon Napoleon's favored
arm, the artillery. By the time that France was plunged into its revolution,
its army's artillery had been brought up to the latest standards, as well as
its many new gunners and officers being trained in their employment. The French
artillery arm would owe its change in status to Jean Baptiste Gribeauval, who
would standardize all construction and design of the artillery pieces and gun
carriages. This led to lighter, more manageable cannon, better quality barrels
and ammunition. After 1800, the French artillery service would also benefit
from the fact that their new Commander-in-Chief, Napoleon, was one of these
very same artillery officers who had exerted so much influence on revolutionary
fighting. Combined with the sweeping technological and organizational changes
that were begun before the revolution, this would assure that the French
artillery arm was the state-of-the-art for its time. These improvements would
boost morale in a branch of service which already had a long tradition of
professionalism. The end result was more aggressive battlefield tactics and
ensuing success, which ushered artillery away from a supporting position into a
decisive and highly destructive role.[24]
The use of artillery by Napoleon would once again be traced back and perfected
during this era. Even though Napoleon believed that while the infantry was the
main arm of an army and it could not stand up to superior artillery, he would
borrow his ideals in employing artillery from Chevalier du Teil, who was
Napoleon's superior in command of artillery at Toulon, where he had urged that
artillery be concentrated at the point of attack and dispersed along the entire
line. Napoleon would follow this practice and he would use his large caliber
guns to blast a hole in the enemy's line into which the infantry could
penetrate. As time went on, and the quality of French conscripts deteriorated,
Napoleon would increase the proportion of artillery in his armies and he would
rely more and more on bombardment.[25]
Due to the lower quality of conscripts, one of Napoleon's favorite battlefield
techniques was through the use of the Grande Batterie. The Grande Batterie
would be used in the later years during the Napoleonic era. This technique was
essentially the physical massing of artillery fire in support of achieving his
main objective on the battlefield, which would have the effect of blasting the
enemy line to shreds to permit his infantry to advance. Even though Napoleon
had raised the artillery branch from the status of an auxiliary to that of an
equal compared to the infantry and cavalry branches, his use of artillery would
still remain a contributing factor to his successes, however a very potent
one.[26]
During the era of Napoleon, no one was able to match his ability to perfect the
use of weapons, technology and tactics as he did. As we have seen, Napoleon was
not so much the innovator but the borrower, which provided the foundation for
his string of successes on the European continent. The impact that Napoleon
would have can be found through his losses. In his defeats, this is where we
can see how his enemies adapted to Napoleon's war making capabilities. Overall,
the impact on the European continent would be through the emergence of the
"nation-in-arms," which demonstrated the ability to field masses of troops and
dramatically increased production efforts with a nation behind the war effort.
It would be the combination of Napoleon's war reforms and the French nation
behind his forces in the field that would have the greatest resounding impact
on Europe.
Show Footnotes and
Bibliography
Footnotes
[1]. Preston, Roland, Wise. Men in Arms. (Ohio: Thomson Custom Publishing,
2005)
[2]. Preston, Roland, Wise. Men in Arms. (Ohio: Thomson Custom Publishing,
2005)
[3]. Brodie, Bernard and Fawn M. From Crossbow to H-Bomb. (Indianapolis:
Indiana University Press, 1973)
[4]. Internet resource accessed on 22 Dec 06. Napoleon's Strategy and Tactics.
http://napoleonistyka.atspace.com/Napoleon_tactics.htm
[5]. Preston, Roland, Wise. Men in Arms. (Ohio: Thomson Custom Publishing,
2005)
[6]. Dupuy, R. Ernest and Trevor N. The Encyclopedia of Military History. (New
York: Harper and Row, Publishers)
[7]. Preston, Roland, Wise. Men in Arms. (Ohio: Thomson Custom Publishing,
2005)
[8]. Preston, Roland, Wise. Men in Arms. (Ohio: Thomson Custom Publishing,
2005)
[9]. Preston, Roland, Wise. Men in Arms. (Ohio: Thomson Custom Publishing,
2005)
[10]. Dupuy, R. Ernest and Trevor N. The Encyclopedia of Military History. (New
York: Harper and Row, Publishers)
[11]. Dupuy, R. Ernest and Trevor N. The Encyclopedia of Military History. (New
York: Harper and Row, Publishers)
[12]. Internet resource accessed on 22 Dec 06. Napoleon's Strategy and Tactics.
http://napoleonistyka.atspace.com/Napoleon_tactics.htm
[13]. Preston, Roland, Wise. Men in Arms. (Ohio: Thomson Custom Publishing,
2005)
[14]. Green, Jeremy. General Napoleon Bonaparte's Italian Campaign.
[14].http://www.historynet.com/wars_conflicts/napoleonic_wars/3458936.html?featured=y&c=y
[15]. Internet resource accessed on 22 Dec 06. Napoleon's Strategy and Tactics.
http://napoleonistyka.atspace.com/Napoleon_tactics.htm
[16]. Dupuy, R. Ernest and Trevor N. The Encyclopedia of Military History. (New
York: Harper and Row, Publishers)
[17]. Preston, Roland, Wise. Men in Arms. (Ohio: Thomson Custom Publishing,
2005)
[18]. Internet resource accesses on 22 Dec 06. The Napoleon Series.
http://www.napoleon-series.org/military/organization/c_tactics.html
[19]. Internet resource accessed on 22 Dec 06. Napoleon's Strategy and Tactics.
http://napoleonistyka.atspace.com/Napoleon_tactics.htm
[20]. Internet resource accesses on 22 Dec 06. The Napoleon Series.
http://www.napoleon-series.org/military/organization/c_tactics.html
[21]. Dupuy, R. Ernest and Trevor N. The Encyclopedia of Military History. (New
York: Harper and Row, Publishers)
[22]. Keegan, John. Intelligence in War. (New York: Random House, 2002)
[23]. Internet resource accessed on 23 Dec 06. Napoleon, His Army and Enemies.
http://web2.airmail.net/napoleon/index.html
[24]. Dupuy, R. Ernest and Trevor N. The Encyclopedia of Military History. (New
York: Harper and Row, Publishers)
[25]. Preston, Roland, Wise. Men in Arms. (Ohio: Thomson Custom Publishing,
2005)
[26]. Internet resource accessed on 22 Dec 06. War Times Journal. http://www.wtj.com/wars/napoleonic/
Bibliography
Brodie, Bernard and Fawn M. From Crossbow to H-Bomb. (Indianapolis: Indiana
University Press, 1973)
Dupuy, R. Ernest and Trevor N. The Encyclopedia of Military History. (New York:
Harper and Row, Publishers)
Green, Jeremy. General Napoleon Bonaparte's Italian
Campaign.http://www.historynet.com/wars_conflicts/napoleonic_wars/3458936.html?featured=y&c=y
Keegan, John. The Mask of Command. (London: Penguin Books Ltd., 1988)
Keegan, John. Intelligence in War. (New York: Random House, 2002)
Preston, Roland, Wise. Men in Arms. (Ohio: Thomson Custom Publishing, 2005)
Internet resource accessed on 22 Dec 06. War Times Journal.
http://www.wtj.com/wars/napoleonic/
Internet resource accesses on 22 Dec 06. The Napoleon Series.
http://www.napoleon-series.org/military/organization/c_tactics.html
Internet resource accessed on 22 Dec 06. Napoleon's Strategy and Tactics.
http://napoleonistyka.atspace.com/Napoleon_tactics.htm
Internet resource accessed on 23 Dec 06. Napoleon, His Army and Enemies.
http://web2.airmail.net/napoleon/index.html
Copyright © 2008 Richard Podruchny.
Written by Richard Podruchny. If you have questions or comments on this article,
please contact Richard Podruchny at:
podruchnyrmr@aol.com.
About the author:
Richard Podruchny is currently an active duty member of the USAF for the last 14 years.
Over those 14 years, I have been stationed or deployed in the United Kingdom, Turkey, South Korea, Iraq,
Saudi Arabia, Texas, Virginia, and Alaska. As of lately, I'm an instructor for our Combat Targeting Course
where we teach our students, both officer and enlisted, the doctrine and methods through which the Air Forces
wields Air Power. I have been married for the last 10 years and my wife and I have two beautiful children,
an 8 year old daughter and a 5 year old son.
Published online: 02/16/2007.
* Views expressed by contributors are their own and do not necessarily represent
those of MHO.
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