Battle of Antietam
McClellan's 'Phony War'
by Kevin S. Lacey
In contrast to the sea of trouble engulfing the Confederates in the West,
events in the East during the first few months of 1862 had been relatively
quiet.[20] While some Union critics claimed that General Halleck moved
too slowly, General McClellan seemed reluctant to move at all.
When he first arrived in Washington in July of 1861 amidst the chaos that
followed First Bull Run, McClellan at once became the center of attention. By
some "strange operation of magic", he wrote his wife Ellen, "I seem to have
become the power in the land."[21] He was feted by Washington society and
fawned over by the politicians.[22] McClellan certainly seemed to be the
man of the hour. Indeed, soon after replacing General McDowell after the
disaster at First Bull Run, McClellan had reorganized the Army, restored its
morale and forged a magnificent fighting machine.[23] He appeared to be
off to an excellent beginning.
Major General George Brinton McClellan was a man apparently marked for
greatness. Born in 1826, McClellan entered the University of Pennsylvania when
13 years old, and was accepted to West Point two years later. Although at 15 he
was the youngest member of his class, McClellan excelled and graduated second
in his class in 1846.[24] Commissioned a brevet second lieutenant,
McClellan was posted to an elite unit, the newly formed Company of Engineer
Soldiers. He fought in the Mexican War under both Zachary Taylor and Winfield
Scott; his performance was solid, but not exceptional. McClellan did, however,
return from the war firmly wedded to the idea that civilian soldiers were of
questionable value and volunteer officers all but useless; he also managed to
acquire malaria that returned with him as well.[25]
After the Mexican War, McClellan served in a variety of posts. While in
Washington in the mid 1850s he made a favorable impression on Secretary of War
Jefferson Davis who selected him as one of three members of a military
commission dispatched to Europe to study the latest military trends. In Europe,
McClellan witnessed part of the Crimean War, and later wrote extensively about
European armies. Shortly after returning from Europe, McClellan resigned his
commission as a captain, and went to work for the Illinois Central Railroad
where he cultivated business and political connections.
Within a month of the Confederate attack on Fort Sumter, the governors of Ohio,
New York and Pennsylvania vied with each other for George McClellan's
services.[26] Governor Dennison convinced McClellan to take command of
Ohio's forces with the rank of Major General of Volunteers. Immediately after
assuming command, McClellan, like everyone else, found himself in need of
virtually everything. He informed General Winfield Scott, "I find myself … in
the position of a Commanding Officer with nothing but men – no supplies or
arms."[27] In the beginning Scott had little to spare but sympathy, and even
McClellan's request for staff officers went unfulfilled. [28]
While he labored in Ohio, McClellan's meteoric climb, aided by his friends in
Washington, continued unabated. Scott placed him in command of the Department
of the Ohio, which initially included Ohio, Illinois and Indiana. On May 14th,
he was elevated to the rank of Major General in the regular army. Now only the
venerable Scott outranked the 34-year-old, and as yet untried, McClellan.
In the summer of 1861, McClellan was vaulted into national prominence when he
overpowered a vastly outnumbered force of Confederates at the battle of Rich
Mountain in West Virginia. This battle, observed one of McClellan's generals,
was "among the minor events" of the war and would merit little or no attention
but for the fact that, as a result of his victory, McClellan was appointed to
command the Army of the Potomac.[29]
Lincoln must have had some sense of relief and satisfaction as he watched the
reorganization of the Army of the Potomac from the mob that had fled from
Manassas into a large, well-disciplined army. Lincoln's young commander
maintained a rigorous work schedule, his attention to detail was prodigious,
and his organizational skills soon reaped visible benefits as the army rapidly
regained its morale. But along with all his impressive and undeniable
organizational and leadership skills, McClellan also possessed other, less
enviable, characteristics; and as these gradually became more apparent many in
Washington, including Lincoln, must have begun to have second thoughts about
the "Young Napoleon."
McClellan was intolerant of criticism. He held Lincoln, and most politicians,
in contempt and attempted to dictate policy to the President.[30] His
conduct toward General Scott, which had recently bordered on sycophancy when he
was campaigning in West Virginia, now vacillated between petty disrespect and
active insubordination, and it was McClellan's machinations that forced Scott
into retirement.[31] McClellan was also incapable of delegating anything
but the most mundane tasks, and in the process of working to rebuild the army,
nearly destroyed his own health.[32] But all these character flaws, paled
to insignificance when compared to McClellan's shortcomings as a field
commander.
Foremost among McClellan's problems was his inability to accurately estimate
the size of the enemy force confronting him across the Potomac. Without any
objective evidence McClellan constantly overestimated the size of the
Confederate Army.[33] In early August, he wrote to Scott that he believed
Beauregard's army numbered approximately 100,000 men and by October the numbers
had inflated to "not less than 150,000 strong, well drilled and equipped"
troops.[34] He confessed to his wife that he could not fathom why
Beauregard did not attack.[35] It was not at all difficult for McClellan
to justify his inactivity having deluded himself that he was heavily
outnumbered.
As the summer months waned, so did McClellan's popularity. Lincoln was
concerned, yet remained patient, while in the cabinet there was growing
hostility toward McClellan.
Finally, in early March 1862, some eight months after taking command, McClellan
at last advised Lincoln of his plan to take the offensive. The plan called for
the transport of the entire Army of the Potomac by sea to Urbanna, from where
it would march on Richmond.[36] Fearful of engaging what he believed to
be a numerically superior Confederate Army, it is understandable that McClellan
would search for an alternative to the over-land route.
McClellan was mistaken if thought that the politicians who had been simmering
over his inactivity would view his plan with approval. While Lincoln must have
been somewhat relieved that his general was at last proposing some form of
offensive operations after so many months of inactivity, he was not enamored of
the plan, which he considered far too risky. Ironically, having prodded
McClellan for months to move, the Lincoln administration was now concerned that
his plan would uncover the Capital, rendering it susceptible to a swift
Confederate attack. McClellan was surprised and predictably offended at the
criticisms of his operation, and argued that Washington was, indeed, safe from
attack.[37]
McClellan continued to press his case, and eventually Lincoln reluctantly
agreed. But he consented only with conditions, and foremost was Lincoln's
insistence that McClellan leave sufficient troops to ensure that Washington
would be "entirely secure" from attack.[38] McClellan was willing to do
this -- indeed, he had little choice in the matter – and he and Lincoln even
agreed on the number of men that would be necessary: 40,000 in defense of the
city, with another 25,000 near Manassas.[39] The problem arose over which
soldiers around Washington would be considered when calculating these
numbers.[40]
Footnotes
[20] Compared to the military activity west of the Appalachians, the Eastern
Theatre appeared comatose. However, there were exceptions. In early April,
McClellan's good friend Brigadier General Ambrose Burnside captured Fort Huger
on Roanoke Island in an amphibious invasion and followed it the following month
by seizing New Berne. Burnside's expedition and victories made a greater
impression on public sentiment. Elisha Hunt Rhodes wrote in his diary that the
army was "rejoicing" over Burnside's exploits and he added a wish that Burnside
would join the Army of the Potomac someday for "I should like to serve under so
gallant a soldier." Rhodes, Robert H. All for the Union: The Civil War Diary and
Letters of Elisha Hunt Rhodes (Orion Books, 1991), pp. 54 & 59.
Unfortunately, he would soon get his wish. The only other action in the East
was at Ball's Bluff, a small affair that occurred in early October, and which
was blown completely out of proportion do to the fact that the commander of the
Union troops, Col. Edward Baker, was a friend of Lincoln and a former Senator
from Oregon. Hattaway, Herman & Jones, Archer, How the North Won, A Military
History of the Civil War (University of Ill. Press, 1983), pp. 81-82.
McClellan, however, used this disaster as support for his inactivity, claiming
that it demonstrated the army's un-preparedness. Ibid.
[21] Sears, Stephen W., Ed. The Civil War Papers of George B. McClellan,
Selected Correspondence 1860-1865 (Ticknor & Fields, 1989), p. 70.
Emphasis in original. McClellan's expressed belief that all, including the
Commander-in-Chief General Winfield Scott, deferred to his judgment was wrong.
Scott had wanted Lincoln to bring Halleck from the West to take command.
[22] Sears, Stephen W., Ed. The Civil War Papers of George B. McClellan,
Selected Correspondence 1860-1865 (Ticknor & Fields, 1989), p. 71;
Sears, Stephen W. George B. McClellan, the Young Napoleon (Ticknor &
Fields, 1988), pp. 95-96.
[23] McClellan's skills as an organizer are well documented, and even his
harshest critic would not dispute them. Philippe, Comte de Paris "McClellan
Organizing the Grand Army" in B&L, vol. II, pt. 1, pp. 112-113. Glatthaar,
Joseph T. Partners In Command, The Relationships Between Leaders In The Civil
War (Free Press, 1994), pp. 58-59; Sears, Stephen W. George B.
McClellan, the Young Napoleon (Ticknor & Fields, 1988), pp. 95, en
passim; Sears, Stephen W. To the Gates of Richmond, The Peninsula Campaign
(Ticknor & Fields, 1992), pp. 3-4.
[24] Sears, Stephen W. George B. McClellan, the Young Napoleon (Ticknor
& Fields, 1988), pp. 1-12.
[25] Shortly after arriving in Mexico, McClellan was laid low for a few weeks
with malaria, which he called his "Mexican disease". Sears, Stephen W. George B.
McClellan, the Young Napoleon (Ticknor & Fields, 1988), p. 14.
Volunteer officers were a favorite target of ridicule by the regular army
officers. Trained professionals are apt to look askance at amateurs, but
McClellan took this prejudice to new levels, claiming that the similarities
between a civil and military man were as different as the "climates of
Spitzbergen and Arabia". He even went so far as to write to a U.S. Senator that
the United States possessed well-trained professionals obviating the need to go
"behind the curtain, into country courthouses, & low village bar rooms to
select her generals …". Sears, Stephen W. George B. McClellan, the Young
Napoleon (Ticknor & Fields, 1988), p. 17 and 25.
[26] This stampede by the Governors of three of the largest Northern States to
place their troops under McClellan's command appears odd considering his modest
military record. However, McClellan's military writings had publicized his name
within military circles as well as the general public, he was politically well
connected, and he counted among his closest allies Salmon P. Chase, Lincoln's
Secretary of the Treasury. Moreover, those who met McClellan were invariably
impressed. He looked like a man who knew what he was about and he could inspire
great confidence in those around him. Philippe, Comte de Paris "McClellan
Organizing the Grand Army" in B&L, vol. II, pt. 1, pp. 112-113. Sears,
Stephen W. George B. McClellan, the Young Napoleon (Ticknor &
Fields, 1988), pp. 47-49, 72. . Glatthaar, Joseph T. Partners In Command, The
Relationships Between Leaders In The Civil War (Free Press, 1994), p.
59. Longstreet, James A. "'The Seven Days,' Including Frayser's Farm" in B&L
vol. II, pt. 2, pp. 404-405.
[27] O.R., Series 1 vol. 1, pt. 1, pp. 333-334.
[28] Sears, Stephen W. George B. McClellan, the Young Napoleon (Ticknor
& Fields, 1988), pp. 69-72. In what was to become a trademark
characteristic, McClellan could not, or simply refused to, understand that his
problems were not Washington's only priority, and he had scant patience with
excuses or explanations when his requests went unsatisfied. When advised that
he would, for the most part, have to fend for himself, McClellan wrote to
Governor Curtis of Pennsylvania "the apathy in Washington is very singular and
very discouraging. … I almost regret having entered upon my present duty."
Sears, Stephen W., Ed. The Civil War Papers of George B. McClellan, Selected
Correspondence 1860-1865 (Ticknor & Fields, 1989), p. 19.
Furthermore, although short of staff officers, McClellan was nevertheless
selective of those who sought a position in his command. One supplicant, a
former classmate from West Point, could not even get an interview with
McClellan. Years later, U.S. Grant would write that he waited on two successive
days for an interview, but McClellan never bothered to see him. Grant, U.S. Personal
Memoirs, vol. 1 (The American Classics Library 1992), p. 241.
[29] Cox, Jacob D. "McClellan in West Virginia" in B&L, vol. 1, pt. 1, p.
135. Referring to Rich Mountain as a battle almost seems presumptuous. The
Official Records refer to it as a skirmish, and it involved but a few thousand
men on each side. Casualties were relatively light. McClellan reported only 12
killed and less than 60 wounded. O.R., Series 1, Vol. 2, p. 208. The
Confederates losses were roughly the same, but they also lost several hundred
prisoners. O.R., Series 1, Vol. 2, pp. 264-268. After the battle McClellan
proved himself quite as adapt as Beauregard at drafting inaccurate and
self-serving reports: He referred to the Confederates as "the crack regiments
of Eastern Virginia" that were "well entrenched" and present in "considerable
force". O.R., Series 1, vol. 2, pp. 204-205. In fact, the Confederates were
heavily outnumbered, just as green as McClellan's troops, and they had erected
hasty barriers to try and block McClellan's advance. Cox, Jacob D. "McClellan
in West Virginia" in B&L, vol. 1, pt. 1, pp. 126-148; O.R., Series
1, vol. 2, pp. 264-268.
[30] McClellan's initial negative impression of Lincoln was formed when he
worked for the Illinois Central. An ardent Democrat who actively supported
Stephen Douglas, it is not surprising that he disliked his republican opponent.
Sears, Stephen W., Ed. The Civil War Papers of George B. McClellan, Selected
Correspondence 1860-1865 (Ticknor & Fields, 1989), pp. 58-59. On
August 2nd, just a few days after arriving in the capital, McClellan penned a
long letter to Lincoln instructing the President as to the "unique" nature of
the war, and advising him both as to political and military strategy. O.R.,
Series 1, Vol. 5, pp. 6-8. McClellan's well known war-time correspondence with
his wife were seasoned with insults directed at the President who was described
as "an idiot", a "well meaning baboon" a coward, and the "the original gorilla"
Sears, Stephen W., Ed. The Civil War Papers of George B. McClellan, Selected
Correspondence 1860-1865 (Ticknor & Fields, 1989), pp. 85, 106,
114, 135.
[31] On July 18, 1861, he wrote a private letter to General Scott stating that,
"All that I know of war I have learned from you, & in all that I have done
I have endeavored to conform to your manner of conducting a campaign… It is my
ambition to merit your praise & never deserve your censure." Sears, Stephen
W., Ed. The Civil War Papers of George B. McClellan, Selected Correspondence
1860-1865 (Ticknor & Fields, 1989), p. 60. Yet they soon clashed
after he arrived in Washington. McClellan wrote directly to Lincoln, bypassing
Scott, and indirectly criticizing his strategy. Rejecting Scott's plan for a
concentric attack on the South, McClellan emphasized the importance of the
Virginia theatre and argued that he must have a massive army (over 270,000 men)
to attack and destroy the principal Confederate Army. Glatthaar, Joseph T. Partners
In Command, The Relationships Between Leaders In The Civil War (Free
Press, 1994), pp. 60-62. O.R., Series 1, Vol. V, pp. 6-8. Within a few weeks of
his arrival in Washington Scott was transformed in McClellan's view from his
mentor to a "traitor" or a "dotard", and Scott soon became McClellan's
"inveterate enemy". Sears, Stephen W., Ed. The Civil War Papers of George B.
McClellan, Selected Correspondence 1860-1865 (Ticknor & Fields,
1989), pp.81, 106-107. With justification, Scott complained that McClellan was
keeping him in the dark by intentionally withholding information. O.R., Series
I, Vol. XI, part 3, pp. 5-6.
[32] By the end of August 1861, McClellan was in "a state of exhaustions so
severe" it triggered a recurrence of his "Mexican disease". Sears, Stephen W. George
B. McClellan, the Young Napoleon (Ticknor & Fields, 1988), p. 100.
At the end of 1861, McClellan became seriously ill with typhoid fever. Sears,
Stephen W. To the Gates of Richmond, The Peninsula Campaign (Ticknor
& Fields, 1992), p. 11.
[33] It is not uncommon for a general to exaggerate his problems in order to
obtain more material assistance from his government, but McClellan's letters to
his wife reveal that he subjectively believed his own misinformation. Sears,
Stephen W., Ed. The Civil War Papers of George B. McClellan, Selected
Correspondence 1860-1865 (Ticknor & Fields, 1989), pp. 85-87.
[34] O.R., Series 1, Vol. 11, part 3, pp. 3-4. Beauregard did not command the
Confederate forces in northern Virginia, as he was junior in rank to General
Joseph Johnston who assumed overall command after Manassas. O.R., Series 1,
Vol. 5, p. 9. During this period, the Confederates probably had only around
40,000 insufficiently armed men. Johnston, Joseph E. Narrative of Military
Operations During the Civil War (De Capo, 1990), p. 81. Davis, William
C. Jefferson Davis: The Man and His Hour (Harper Collins, 1991) p. 364.
[35] Sears, Stephen W., Ed. The Civil War Papers of George B. McClellan,
Selected Correspondence 1860-1865 (Ticknor & Fields, 1989), p. 89.
In fact, McClellan had little to fear from the outnumbered Confederates. In
early October, Davis visited Johnston and Beauregard in Centreville Virginia,
to discuss possible offensive operations. Initially, the two generals proposed
an offensive, but informed Davis that the Army would have to be heavily
reinforced (an additional 50,000 men), which would require Davis to literally
strip the rest of the Confederacy for troops. This, coupled with the shortage
of weapons and equipment, rendered the plan little more than a flight of fancy,
and Davis rejected it. The Generals, in turn, had several objections to Davis'
own suggestion that, instead of a large-scale invasion, the army launch small
raids into Maryland. In the end, they all agreed to essentially do nothing.
Davis, William C. Jefferson Davis: The Man and His Hour (Harper Collins,
1991) pp. 363-366. Johnston, Joseph E. Narrative of Military Operations During
the Civil War (De Capo, 1990), pp. 75-77. Williams, T. Harry P.G.T.
Beauregard, Napoleon in Gray (Louisiana State University Press, 1955),
p. 100-102.
[36] McClellan's plan underwent several permutations before it was finally
adopted, not the least of which was the decision to have the army land at Fort
Monroe instead of Urbanna. McClellan's original conception was that, by landing
at Urbanna on the Rappahannock, he would be much closer to Richmond than Joe
Johnston's Confederate Army. By marching quickly he would either capture the
capital or interpose his army between Johnston and Richmond, forcing the
Confederates to attack him. Joe Johnston inadvertently foiled this when he
withdrew the Confederate Army from Manassas south to Orange Court House, in
easy marching distance of Richmond. Johnston, Joseph E. Narrative of Military
Operations During the Civil War (De Capo, 1990), pp. 102-109. Sears,
Stephen W. To the Gates of Richmond, The Peninsula Campaign (Ticknor
& Fields, 1992), pp. 18-19. Glatthaar, Joseph T. Partners In Command, The
Relationships Between Leaders In The Civil War (Free Press, 1994), p.
66. While Johnston's unexpected retreat caused McClellan some anxiety, it was
nothing compared to that suffered by Davis who was not told of the retreat
until after it had already happened. Davis, William C. Jefferson Davis: The Man
and His Hour (Harper Collins, 1991) pp. 410-411.
[37] Lincoln's concern for the capital, so unreasonable in McClellan's narrow
view, was nevertheless quite genuine, and it is surprising that even McClellan
failed to recognize this. Since his election, Lincoln had been led to believe
that Washington was virtually a city under siege, ringed by enemies. On his way
into the Capital, Lincoln literally skulked into the city because of
exaggerated fears of assassination and the general hostility in Maryland; in
April 1861, troops on their way to the capital had been attacked in Baltimore
further fueling Lincoln's feeling of isolation; when Virginia seceded, bringing
the war potentially to his doorstep, Washington was almost devoid of any troops
at all, and Lincoln did not feel any relief until the arrival of units from New
York in April. Oates, Stephen B. With Malice Toward None, A Life of Abraham
Lincoln (Harper Perennial, 1994), pp. 205, 210-213, 233-235. All this
was exacerbated by events immediately following the Battle of First Bull Run in
July 1861, when the Union Army all but disintegrated and descended back upon
Washington like an unruly mob. Davis, William A. Battle at Bull Run (Doubleday
1977), p. 251; Oates, Stephen B. With Malice Toward None, A Life of Abraham
Lincoln (Harper Perennial, 1994), pp. 255-256. What renders McClellan's
failure to comprehend or empathize with Lincoln's concern over the safety of
Washington even more astounding is that fact that his promotion to command
occurred on the heels of this defeat and he witnessed first hand the
disorganization, utter chaos and fear that reigned in the capital. Sears,
Stephen W. George B. McClellan, the Young Napoleon (Ticknor &
Fields, 1988), pp. 94-98. Indeed, McClellan himself actually played upon
Lincoln's fears in his feud with Winfield Scott, claiming that the old
General's dispositions left Washington susceptible to attack. O.R., Series 1,
vol. V, pp. 6-8. Moreover, since the previous summer he had been warning the
administration that the Confederate opposing him number close to 150,000 men.
O.R., Series 1, vol. 5, p. 9. Having done so much to increase the fear and
apprehension in the Capital, McClellan now found it difficult to convince the
administration that the Capital was, in fact, secure.
[38] O.R., Series 1, vol. 5, p. 50.
[39] O.R., Series 1, vol. 5, pp. 55-56.
[40] When discussing the number of troops to be left behind for the defense of
Washington, McClellan included in his calculations the troops that were
stationed in and around the Shenandoah Valley and elsewhere, but he never
bothered to explain this to Lincoln or anyone else. Lincoln interpreted
McClellan to mean that the troops would be in the immediate vicinity of
Washington, and not spread about the surrounding countryside. McClellan's
mistake is that he never fully briefed or discussed any of this with Stanton or
Lincoln. Sears, Stephen W. George B. McClellan, the Young Napoleon (Ticknor
& Fields, 1988), pp. 170-172. Sears, Stephen W. To the Gates of Richmond,
The Peninsula Campaign (Ticknor & Fields, 1992), p. 34.
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Copyright © 2002 Kevin S. Lacey
Written by Kevin S. Lacey.
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