The Confederate Railroad and
the Prolonging of the Inevitable
by Phillip Muskett
The American Civil War was the first war to include the use of railroads to
move troops to a threatened point effectively. The Confederates used railroads
frequently throughout the war, taking advantage of their interior lines, to
move troops quickly from point to point; specifically the Battle of Chickamauga
was decided by the railroads. The Confederacy defeated several Union armies in
this fashion throughout the war. Confederate Lieutenant General James
Longstreet performed the largest of the troop transfers; his movement from
Virginia to Georgia helped secure a Confederate victory at the Battle of
Chickamauga. General Longstreet used a Confederate rail system that was in dire
need of repair. Railroads were kept alive by robbing other rail companies of
their tracks throughout the South. The railroad was a revolutionary tool, and
effectively used by both sides.
The Confederates were perhaps the most effective at using the railroads
throughout the war. In July of 1861, Confederate General Joseph E. Johnston
moved his army sixty miles from Harpers Ferry, Virginia to Manassas, Virginia,
via the Manassas Gap railroad. General Johnston was able to reinforce
Confederate General P.G.T. Beauregard and defeat the Union army under Major
General McDowell decisively at the Battle of First Manassas. During the summer
of 1862, Confederate General Braxton Bragg moved much of his Army of Tennessee
from Mississippi to Tennessee by rail. This move outflanked Union Major General
Don Buell, thwarting Buell's attempt to capture Chattanooga, Tennessee. General
Bragg was then free to move into middle Tennessee and ultimately into Kentucky.
This move pulled the Union army out of eastern and middle Tennessee,
temporarily. The Confederates had proven that the use of the railroad system,
in conjunction with their interior lines, enabled them to quickly mass troops
and attain victory. September of 1863 the Confederates would attempt their
largest transfer of troops by rails.
Confederate Lieutenant General James Longstreet commanding the First Corps of
the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia was a man of ambition. In February of
1863, General Longstreet wrote friend and ally, Senator Louis T. Wigfall, that
he "desired to go west".[1] Longstreet felt he and the troops of the First
Corps could remove the Union forces from Tennessee. Confederate General Robert
E. Lee had other plans for General Longstreet. General Longstreet would spend
the spring of 1863 in southeastern Virginia rounding up supplies for the Army
of Northern Virginia, and attempting to force a Union army out of Suffolk,
Virginia. During this time, General Longstreet was able to look at the
strategic situation of the war and perfect his plan to change the fortunes of
the war in Tennessee and Mississippi.
The strategic situation was not going well for the South during 1863. Union
Major General U.S. Grant and his army were threatening Vicksburg, Mississippi;
the fall of Vicksburg would cut the Confederacy in half, "removing the lungs of
the Confederacy."[2] The Union Army of the Potomac, though larger than the
Confederate Army of Northern Virginia, was recovering from wounds recently
received at the Battle of Chancellorsville, but was still a menace to the Army
of Northern Virginia in central Virginia. In middle Tennessee, Union Major
General William S. Rosecrans, commanding the Union Army of the Cumberland, was
idle and had no visible intention of performing any offensive movements.
General Longstreet felt his plan contained an opportunity to remove the Union
threat out of middle Tennessee. This would relieve the pressure on the
important rail and manufacturing center at Chattanooga. The ensuing campaign
General Longstreet envisioned would possibly cause Union General Grant to
abandon his siege of Vicksburg.[3]
General Longstreet called on Confederate Secretary of War, James A. Seddon, to
discuss his plan and tell him how his plan would resolve the war situation.
Longstreet suggested sending General Pickett's and General Hood's divisions
west to reinforce Confederate General Braxton Bragg's army. The Confederate
President, Jefferson Davis, could not be persuaded to order these movements,
forcing General Longstreet to return to the Army of Northern Virginia. Upon
rejoining the Army of Northern Virginia, Longstreet suggested that General Lee
transfer troops from the Army of Northern Virginia out west to relieve the
pressure they faced. Due to the strength of Union Major General Joseph Hooker's
Army of the Potomac at that time, General Lee disapproved. General Lee had
gained the initiative due to his victory at Chancellorsville and he refused to
relinquish it. Rebuffed again, General Longstreet turned his attention to the
upcoming Gettysburg campaign.
Upon the Confederate defeat at Gettysburg, Longstreet turned his attention once
again to the war in the west. When the Confederate army returned to the banks
of the Rapidan River in Virginia after Gettysburg, General Longstreet again
wrote to Secretary of War Seddon, requesting permission to take his Corps out
west.[4] Longstreet hoped to take command of the army then under the command of
General Bragg, and defeat the Union army in middle Tennessee. General
Longstreet had strong allies in his western command aspirations, to include,
Virginia Senator G.A. Henry of Lexington who insisted to the Senate that, "the
fate of Virginia depends upon the defense of East Tennessee", he asked, "Can't
Longstreet be sent out there?"[5] Senator Wigfall, another powerful ally and
member of the Western Concentration Bloc, spoke on Longstreet's behalf to
Secretary Seddon numerous times. Many politicians agreed, but would not agree
to the move with out Robert E. Lee's consent.
After Gettysburg, General Longstreet had planned to move Pickett's and Hood's
divisions from the south bank of the Rapidan River to Northern Georgia. General
Longstreet modified these plans to reflect the changing strategic situation. He
decided to send Pickett's division to Richmond for its defense while McLaws
division would replace Pickett's division in the move west. The brigades
stationed in Richmond on garrison duty would be absorbed into the movement.[6]
He calculated that two days would be ample time to complete the movement,
provided the Confederacy maintained control of the railroad from Gordonsville,
Virginia to Chattanooga, Tennessee via Bristol, Tennessee. The changing war
situation would not allow this to happen as planned.
In late August 1863, Confederate General Robert E. Lee was called away to
Richmond to discuss strategy with President Davis. The strategic situation was
bleak for the Confederacy as summer changed to fall. Union General William
Rosecran's army was moving through middle Tennessee, threatening Chattanooga.
Union forces in South Carolina where making advances toward Charleston. General
Bragg, in Chattanooga, and General Beauregard, in Charleston, required
reinforcements from Virginia. President Davis requested General Lee to go out
West and take command of the Army of Tennessee. Lee decided it was best to stay
in Virginia and send his First Corps, with General Longstreet at its head.[7]
General Lee would dispatch the two Georgia brigades in General Hood's and
General McLaws divisions to aide the troops in Charleston.[8] This would also
keep the threat of desertions down in these two brigades while serving in their
home state. The brigades assigned to Richmond's defense would take the place of
the brigades bound to Charleston, and General Pickett's shattered division
would protect Richmond.
General Lee delayed his decision until September 6, 1863, when he ordered
General Longstreet to begin his preparations. General Lee ordered the
Confederate Quartermaster General Alexander Lawton, to prepare for the move.
Lawton was a veteran of Stonewall Jackson's Valley campaign and one of
Jackson's top lieutenants until he was severely wounded at Sharpsburg. General
Longstreet began moving his troops to the marshalling areas when he finished
his preparations. General Lee told Longstreet, "Now General, you must beat
those people out in the west," when he returned to the army to bid General
Longstreet farewell.[10]
The first rail cars began arriving at Orange Court House, Virginia on September
9, 1863.[11] The location change from Gordonsville, Virginia to Orange Court
House was necessitated by two factors. Union General Ambrose Burnside occupied
Knoxville on September 3, 1863[12] and Confederate General Braxton Bragg was
maneuvered out of Chattanooga by General Rosecrans. This closed the direct line
to General Bragg and required the transfer of troops over a longer more
circuitous route, through the Carolinas. This would be a daunting task since
the Confederate rail system was unique in that few Southern railroads were
uniform in track gauges.
The last minute change of rail lines caused General Longstreet's corps to have
to travel over sixteen different railroads. The railroads that General
Longstreet used had two different gauges and one bottleneck point for the
switch over. More delays stemmed from Southern cities not allowing railroads to
enter the city limits. Some city officials believed steam engines could spark
causing unnecessary fires as they passed through towns. An example of this gap
was the one at Augusta, Georgia, where there was a gap of less than a half
mile. The men would disembark, march through town, and then reload or wait
until the trains returned from a previous run. At other points, the men would
have to ferry across rivers to reach the other line. These issues posed
problems, and caused serious delays and bottlenecks along the way.
To move his troops, General Longstreet had to rely on the Richmond rail
organizations to organize the different rail systems. The Confederate railroads
were run by an excellent administrator, Major Frederick W. Sim's. He had served
in an infantry regiment that surrendered at Ft. Pulaski and spent time in a
prisoner of war camp before he was released. Quartermaster General Lawton
arranged the movement, while Major Sims, chief of the Railroad Bureau, planned
the route. Lawton described the operation as, "everything turned on the
question of transportation and supply, and it all had to be decided and
performed with telegraphic haste."[13] To minimize bottlenecks, Major Sim's
quickly patched together a circuitous 950-mile route to Chattanooga through
Atlanta. Sim's divided the rail traffic between the Raleigh-Charlotte-Columbia
line and the Wilmington-Florence line.[14] This would put the troops on
parallel tracks until they reached Atlanta. From Atlanta, the Western and
Atlantic railroad was a single line to Catoosa Station. A benefit of
Chattanooga's fall was there was no civilian traffic on the Western and
Atlantic to slow the movement even more.
Railroads across the Confederacy were experiencing shortages in rolling stock.
The railroads where operating under these shortages due to manpower issues.
Rolling stock could not be repaired, as the tracks and locomotives where given
a higher priority on the repair list. Rolling stock was loaned to other
railroads to help out and never returned to original owners. The troops
traveled in all types of modified vehicles; they rode on flat cars, on top of
and in boxcars, and few rode inside coaches. When soldiers boarded the rolling
stock, they immediately modified them. One soldier, Augustus Dickert, a
historian in Kershaw's brigade, described the rail car modifications, "they
were little more than skeleton cars; the weather being warm the troops cut all
but the frame work loose with knives and axes, to view the fine country and
delightful scenery."[15] Moxley Sorrell described the rail cars as "crazy cars-
passenger, baggage, mail, coal, box, platform, all and every sort wabbling on
the jumping strap-iron….[16]
Manpower, metal and slow speeds hampered the speed of the movement. To fix the
problems with metal, smaller lines were robbed of their rails; to solve
manpower issues, exemptions from the draft where given. These evolutions were
not enough. The lack of iron and men could not keep the rails trouble free.
The Confederate government instituted in the spring of 1862 the first draft in
American military history. This, the first of three drafts, called all
able-bodied men between the ages of eighteen and thirty five years old to serve
in the army for three years. There were some exemptions given to railroad
workers but not nearly enough. By August 1862, only five thousand seven hundred
and eighteen railroad employees were exempted. These railroad men were exempted
from conscription, but due to misunderstandings, some officials disregarded the
exemptions and large numbers were drafted anyway.[17] The only people with
outright freedom from conscription were the president of the line,
superintendents, conductors, treasurers, chief clerks, engineers, managers,
station agents, section masters, and two expert track hands for each eight
miles of track the railroad operated.[18] The laborers, porters and messengers
were not exempted and in some respects were the most important. The already
weak railroad systems needed constant maintenance, but without laborers the
repairs could not be made or were slow to complete. Slaves were an option, but
not pursued effectively, and those that did help ran away at the first chance.
Many slave owners along the rail lines refused to send slaves to aide in the
repairs, for fear of losing their investments.
As early as 1861 the Confederate government began looking into the iron
shortage. The Confederates had the ability but not the foresight to make
T-rails, which every train in the country operated on. Instead, the iron that
was produced in the South went to make plating for gunboats.[19] The
ineffective gunboat program was erroneously given priority. Due to these metal
shortages and misguided priorities, not a single rail was produced in the South
after 1861.[20]
Prior to the war, the South had upgraded to thirty-five pound T-rail, from the
defective strap rails. Strap rail is numerous iron strips nailed to wooden
stringers to form a rail. These were of poor quality and often broke. Southern
trains were limited in size because of these rails. In contrast the Northern
lines were using sixty-five pound rails, and running longer and faster
trains.[21]
Due to the types of rail used in the South, the speeds of the engines had to be
slowed for them to pass safely. A trip from New Orleans, Louisiana to Jackson
Mississippi, 157 miles, would take a full day or night.[22] In South Carolina,
for example, the maximum speed for passenger trains was twenty miles per hour.
While freight trains could only travel at fifteen miles per hour.[23] These
speeds would cause General Longstreet's corps to arrive piecemeal. Colonel E.P.
Alexander's artillery battalion traveled 852 miles in 182 hours, at an average
speed of five miles per hour.[24] Colonel Alexander's artillery was still in
South Carolina while the Battle at Chickamauga was fought.
The first committee to look into the iron shortage was the Fontaine Supply
committee, which met on February 5, 1862. They tackled the issues of manpower
and iron head on. Their recommendation to the Confederate government was to
release skilled workers from service in the army to facilitate safe operation
of the rail line. They also recommended that secondary rail lines that were not
needed would be destroyed. The metal from these needless railroads would be
sent to the major lines to keep them running.[25] Confederate President Davis
approved this, causing many small railroads to disappear. Since numerous
problems arose from the first committee, a second committee, the Confederate
Iron Commission, was created. It was created to determine which railroads were
indispensable.[26] They alone were given the power to decide which lines would
be torn up and dispersed throughout the Confederacy. This committee also
attempted to control roving bands of men who robbed rails from operational rail
lines.
Early in September 1863, Confederate Lieutenant General Bragg was informed that
Confederate Major General Buckner and his forces would be attached to his
command. Fearing the next Federal move, General Bragg ordered General Buckner
to abandon his post in east Tennessee and join his main army at Chattanooga.
Union Major General William Rosecrans and his Army of the Cumberland were
beginning to threaten General Bragg at Chattanooga and he needed these men
urgently. General Bragg did not know of the particulars of the planned troop
movements from Virginia and how important Knoxville and the Cumberland Gap had
become. Confederate Major General Daniel Harvey Hill wrote "If Bragg knew at
the time of the prospective help coming to him from the Army of Northern
Virginia, it was of still more importance to hold the town, he might have been
in communication with Longstreet on his arrival."[27] As it was, the facts were
not forwarded to General Bragg, and General Buckner carried out his orders.
General Buckner left a small detachment in Cumberland Gap to defend that
strategic point, which was unsupported and exposed to General Burnside's Union
force advancing on that position. These troops surrendered Cumberland Gap
without firing a shot, which secured the left flank of Rosecrans army moving on
Chattanooga.
On September 8, 1863 Lieutenant General James Longstreet began moving his
troops to the railhead south of Fredericksburg, Virginia. Major General John
Bell Hood's division would be the first to go, followed by Major General
Lafayette McLaws' division, then Colonel E.P. Alexander's artillery battalion.
Alexander's battalion would travel overland to Petersburg, Virginia and then
board the trains there. Major General Pickett would be the last to move, but he
would only be traveling to Richmond to replace the garrison troops defending
the town. Major General John Bell Hood was convalescing in Richmond from the
wound he received at Gettysburg. General Hood longingly watched his men travel
south. In a letter to General Longstreet dated June 28, 1875, General Hood
stated "…an appeal from a number of the brigade and regimental officers of my
division. I consented to join them."[28] He rejoined them with his arm
shattered and useless, but ready for duty. John B. Jones would write in his
diary on September 9, 1863, "Troops were arriving all night and to-day (Hood's
Division) for Tennessee, via Georgia Road."[29]
As Hood's troops moved south, it was not devoid of incident. In Raleigh, North
Carolina, Brigadier General Benning's Georgia Brigade wrecked the office of
William W. Holden. Holden's newspaper, Standard, had voiced the
publisher's uncertain war sentiments and the soldiers repaid him for his
writings.[30] The famous Texas brigade fought with local police in Wilmington,
North Carolina, beating and stabbing numerous officers, but no arrests were
made.[31] Colonel E.P. Alexander's artillery suffered what could have been a
major disaster when some horses of the battalion fell from the train, on the
Wilmington and Manchester line, just outside of Kingsville, South Carolina.[32]
Mary Chesnut described the troops passing near Kingsville, South Carolina as
"not one man intoxicated, not one rude word did I hear. It was a strange site,
miles, apparently, of platform cars, with soldiers rolled in their blankets,
lying in rows, heads, and all covered, fast asleep."[33] As each troop train
passed through the many towns along the way, citizens would greet them, passing
out food to Robert E. Lee's veterans, it was almost a festive atmosphere.[34]
Dirckett described the events as "one grand ovation"[35]
Longstreet's veterans began arriving at Catoosa Station in north Georgia late
on September eighteenth. The troops moved to the front as they arrived at the
station. The Virginia veterans on the second day of the battle broke through
the Union lines, ensuring a great victory for the Confederacy.
The transfer of Confederate troops was successful in defeating the Union Army
of the Cumberland. Unfortunately Braxton Bragg did not have the initiative of
Robert E. Lee and the victory was a hollow one. The Federal army was allowed to
fall back into Chattanooga and regroup. The attempted siege that followed was a
complete failure because the Union army was able to use their own railroads to
transfer troops to Chattanooga, combine their western forces and lift the
siege. The Confederate army was decisively defeated there in a series of
battles during November of 1863.
The failure of the Confederate government to inform Braxton Bragg that General
Longstreet was coming to reinforce him via the Knoxville rail line was a costly
mistake. General Bragg, in need of troops to turn back General Rosecrans,
unwittingly abandoned Knoxville, sealing off the quickest route from Virginia
and costing the Confederate forces valuable time. This caused Longstreet to
detour through numerous other states, and cross multiple rail lines delaying
the movement. Longstreet's artillery did not arrive in time and would not have
been critical to the battle, due to the terrain the battle was fought in. Key
infantry units, arriving piecemeal, were strung out along the line between
South Carolina and Catoosa Station, Georgia. General Alexander wrote about the
campaign and thought it should have been attempted in "…May under Lee in
person, instead of the unfortunate invasion of Pennsylvania."[36] Alexander may
have been right, but General Lee would have had to learn the attributes of his
new subordinate commanders, plus terrain that was unknown to him. The situation
possibly could have been a replay of the Seven Day's Campaign when General Lee
was learning his new army and its lieutenants. The combination of Confederate
troops and the Confederate railroad system worked together again for a victory.
This probably prolonged the war by a few more months.
Show Footnotes and
Bibliography
Footnotes
[1]. Jeffry D. Wert, General James Longstreet: The Confederacy's Most
Controversial Soldier (New York: Touchstone, 1993), 228.
[2]. James Longstreet, From Manassas to Appomattox, with a forward by
Jeffry D. Wert (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1895. Reprint, New York: Da
Capo Press, 1992), 433.
[3]. James Longstreet, From Manassas to Appomattox, 327.
[4]. Ibid, 409.
[5]. John E. Clark Jr, Railroads in the Civil War: The Impact of Management on
Victory and Defeat (Baton Rouge: Lousiana State University Press,
2001), 81.
[6]. U. S. War Department, The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the
Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I Volume
XXIX Part II (Harrisburg: The National Historical Society, 1971), 706.
(Hereafter referred to as OR.)
[7]. Richard Harwell, Lee, with a forward by James M. McPherson,
Abridgement of 4 Vol. R.E.Lee by Douglas Southall Freeman (New York:
Touchstone, 1997), 349.
[8]. OR. 706.
[9]. Ibid. 700.
[10]. Douglas Southall Freeman, Lee's Lieutenants: A Study in Command, Vol 3,
Gettysburg to Appomattox (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1944),
224.
[11]. OR, 706.
[12]. OR, Volume XXX Pt III, 333.
[13]. John E. Clark Jr, Railroads in the Civil War, 88.
[14]. Allan Nevins, War for the Union 1863-1864. Vol 2, The Organized War
(New York: Konecky and Konecky, 1971), 195.
[15]. D. August Dickert, History of Kershaw's Brigade, Introduction by
Associate Justice Y. J. Pope. Edited by Mac Wyckoff. (Wilmington: Broadfoot
Publishing Company, 1990. Reprint, Elbert H. Aull Company 1899), 263.
[16]. General G. Moxley Sorrell, At the Right Hand of Longstreet: Recollections
of a Confederate Staff Officer, Intro by Peter S. Carmichael.
(Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1999), 189.
[17]. Robert C. Black III, The Railroads of the Confederacy, with a
forward by Gary W. Gallagher (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina
Press, 1998), 129.
[18]. Ibid, 130.
[19]. David L. Bright, Confederate Track, Database on-line. Available
from http://www.csa-railroads.com, Accessed 15 January 2004.
[20]. Robert C. Black III, The Railroads of the Confederacy, 124.
[21]. John E. Clark Jr, Railroads in the Civil War, 48.
[22]. Robert C. Black III, The Railroads of the Confederacy, 31.
[23]. Robert C. Black III, The Railroads of the Confederacy, 31.
[24]. Ibid, 32.
[25]. Robert C. Black III, The Railroads of the Confederacy, 101.
[26]. Margaret E. Wagner, Gary W. Gallagher and Paul Finkelman, ed. The Library
of Congress Civil War Desk Reference. With a Forward by James M.
McPherson (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2002), 352.
[27]. Daniel H. Hill, "Chickamauga-The Great Battle of the West" in Battles and
Leaders Vol 3, Ed. Robert Underwood Johnson and Clarence Clough Buel
(New York: Century Company, 1884-1889, Reprint, Edison: Castle, 1995), 641.
[28]. General John B. Hood, Advance and Retreat, With a new
introduction by Richard M. McMurry. (New Orleans: For the Hood Memorial Fund by
G.T. Beauregard, 1880, reprint, New York: Da Capo Press, 1993), 55.
[29]. J.B. Jones, A Rebel War Clerk's Diary at the Confederate States Capital,
Vol II, (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co. 1866, Reprint, Time
Life Books, Collector's Library of the Civil War), 37.
[30]. Ibid, 41 ; Tucker, Chickamauga, 95.
[31]. Glenn Tucker, Chickamauga: Bloody Battle in the West (Dayton:
Press of Morningside Bookshop, 1984), 95.
[32]. General Edward P. Alexander, Fighting for the Confederacy: The Personal
Recollections of General Edward Porter Alexander. Edited by Gary
Gallagher (Chapel Hill/London, University of North Carolina Press, 1989), 287.
[33]. Henry Woodhead, ed. Voices of the Civil War Chickamauga (Richmond:
Time-Life Books, 1997), 66-67.
[34]. Moxley Sorrel , At the Right Hand of Longstreet: Recollections of a
Confederate Staff Officer, 191.
[35]. D. Augustus Dirckett, History of Kershaw's Brigade, 264.
[36]. General Edward P. Alexander, Military Memories of a Confederate: A
Critical Narrative (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1907, Reprint,
New York: Da Capo Press, 1993), 449.
Bibliography:
Alexander, Edward Porter. Military Memories of a Confederate: A Critical
Narrative. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1907. Reprint, New York:
Da Capo Press, 1993.
_______ . Fighting for the Confederacy: The Personal Recollections of General
Edward Porter Alexander. Chapel Hill/London: The University of North
Carolina Press,
1989. Black III, Robert C. The Railroads of the Confederacy. With a
forward by Gary W. Gallagher. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina
Press, 1998.
Bright, David L. Confederate Track. Database on-line. Available from
http://www.csa-railroads.com. Accessed 15 January 2004.
Clark Jr, John E. Railroads in the Civil War: The Impact on Management on
Victory and Defeat. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press,
2001.
Dickert, D. Augustus. History of Kershaw's Brigade. Wilmington,
Broadfoot Publishing Company, 1990.
Freeman, Douglas Southall. Lee's Lieutenants: A Study in Command. Vol 3,
Gettysburg to Appomattox. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1944.
Harwell, Richard. Lee. With a forward by James M. McPherson. From 4
Vol. edition R.E. Lee by Douglas Southall Freeman. New York: Touchstone, 1997.
Hill, Daniel H. "Chickamauga-The Great Battle of the West." In Clarence Clough
Buel and Robert U. Johnson, eds. Battles and Leaders of the Civil War Vol 3.
New York: Century Company, 1884-1889. Reprint. Edison: Castle, 1995.
Hood, General John B. Advance and Retreat. With a new introduction by
Richard M. McMurry. New Orleans: Hood Memorial Fund by G.T. Beauregard, 1880.
Reprint, New York: Da Capo Press, 1993.
Jones, J. B. A Rebel War Clerk's Diary, Volume II. Richmond: Time Life
Books, 1982.
Longstreet, James. From Manassas to Appomattox. With a forward by
Jeffry D. Wert. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1895. Reprint, New York: Da
Capo Press, 1992.
Nevins Allan. War for the Union 1863-1864. Vol.2 The Organized War. New
York: Konecky and Konecky, 1971.
Sorrell, Moxley. At the Right Hand of Longstreet: Recollections of a
Confederate Staff Officer. With a new introduction by Peter S.
Carmichael. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1999.
Tucker, Glenn. Chickamauga: Bloody Battle in the West. Dayton: Press
of Morningside Bookshop, 1984.
U. S. War Department. The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official
Records of the Union and Confederate Armies. Harrisburg: The National
Historical Society, 1971.
Wagner, Margaret E., Gary W. Gallagher and Paul Finkelman. Ed. The Library of
Congress Civil War Desk Reference. With a Forward by James M.
McPherson. New York: Simon and Schuster, 2002.
Wert, Jeffry D. General James Longstreet: The Confederacy's Most Controversial
Soldier. New York: Touchstone, 1993.
Woodhead, Henry ed. Voices of the Civil War- Chickamauga. Richmond:
Time Life Books, 1997.
Copyright © 2008 Phillip Muskett.
Written by Phillip Muskett. If you have questions or comments on this article,
please contact Phillip Muskett at:
phillipmuskett@comcast.net.
About the author:
Phillip Muskett was born in Gadsden Alabama, enlisted in the Navy in 1986 and retired after 20 years
as a Chief Petty Officer. He Graduated from American Military University with a Masters Degree in
Military Studies/American Civil War in 2007.
He currently works in the DC/Baltimore area and has led a few tours for MHO.
He currently resides in Westminster, Maryland.
Published online: 05/18/2008.
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