Fredericksburg Campaign of
1862: Maneuver Warfare at its Worst
by Richard Podruchny
The aim of this article is to present to the reader an example of an
unsuccessful maneuver campaign. For this example, we will scrutinize the
Fredericksburg Campaign of 1862. The audience will see this campaign from the
Union perspective where concentration will be placed on how Maj. Gen. Ambrose
Burnside developed his campaign strategy, how he executed the campaign as well
as the maneuvers that followed the Battle of Fredericksburg which resulted in
the "Mud March."
The initial dispositions and the condition of the Army of the Potomac at this
point in the war could have been better. The Army of the Potomac was stationed
in Warrenton, Virginia at this time and on November 7, 1862. Lincoln replaced
Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan with Maj. Gen. Ambrose Burnside due to his
slowness and his failure to accomplish more at the Battle of Sharpsburg.
Burnside was chosen due to the distinction he won in the operations that gained
control of ports along the North Carolina coast, as well as how he led the IX
Corps at Sharpsburg[1]. Keep in mind that even though Lincoln thought that
Burnside was deserving of the post, Burnside accepted but with great
reluctance. Overall, Burnside possessed some critical flaws in his character,
such as being obstinate, unimaginative and unsuited both intellectually and
emotionally for high command. It appears that Lincoln chose Burnside for
command even though he was not the ideal choice but Burnside was the one who
presented the fewest liabilities.[2]
After assuming command of the Army of the Potomac, Burnside faced a very steep
learning curve as to knowing where all of the Army of the Potomac's corps was
located as well as their relative strengths. President Lincoln wanted action
from his new commander and he wanted it immediately and any delay would cause
Burnside's removal as well. Lincoln imposed a plan on McClellan which would
also be expected to be followed by Burnside, which was to chase Lee southward,
moving along the eastern slopes of the Blue Ridge Mountains and remain astride
his lines of supply in order to press Lee to fight if the opportunity presented
itself with the overarching objective of beating Lee back to Richmond.[4]
Burnside was now faced with a difficult choice; he could continue the march
Lincoln firmly suggested despite the obstacle that Longstreet's corps now
posed; he could try to get between the two halves of Lee's army and deal with
them separately or he could devise a new plan of action.[5]
Now that Burnside has taken command of the Army of the Potomac, his strategy
proposal consisted of concentrating his forces along the route southwest
towards Gordonsville to convince Lee that he intended to continue their advance
in that direction. Burnside would then move his army rapidly southeast from
Warrenton to Fredericksburg on the Rappahannock River. Burnside justified this
movement that by shifting to the east, the army would be closer to Washington
and its supply base, as well as being on a more direct route to Richmond and
Fredericksburg stood on the main road midway between the two capitals.[6]
Burnside's aim in this maneuver was to cross the Rappahannock River and take
Fredericksburg before Lee could block him, which would enable him to move
further south and threaten Richmond.[7] In order for this to be successful,
everything depended upon speed. It appears that Burnside even made a
stipulation regarding the seizure of Fredericksburg that as soon as the army
arrived in front of Fredericksburg, the attack should be made.[8] However, the
seizure of Fredericksburg depended upon Burnside's request of thirty canal
boats and barges that were to be loaded with supplies and sent down the Potomac
River to a new supply base at Belle Plain, ten miles northeast of
Fredericksburg.[9] Most importantly in his request was that he receives enough
pontoons to build several floating bridges across the Rappahannock River to
help facilitate his army's speed in crossing the river. These pontoons will
prove to be the lynch pin to Burnside's plan.
With Burnside detailing his plan of action for this campaign, he felt it
necessary to reorganize the Army of the Potomac in order to streamline his
operations. Burnside proposed to reorganize his command by creating three Grand
Divisions with each containing two corps and each with its own staff. The
command of each Grand Division went to Maj. Gen. Edwin Sumner, who received the
Right Grand Division, Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker, who received the Center Grand
Division, and Maj. Gen. William Franklin, who received the Left Grand Division.
In total, Burnside would have control over 116,683 men of all arms within the
Army of the Potomac.[10]
Now that Burnside's overall plan has been identified, he led off the campaign
with Sumner's grand division in the lead, setting off from the Warrenton area
at dawn on November 15, a day ahead of the remaining two grand divisions. Two
days later, Sumner's advance elements marched into Falmouth, situated on the
north bank of the Rappahannock River a little more than a mile upriver from
Fredericksburg. Franklin was able to reach Stafford Courthouse, eight miles
from Falmouth and Hooker halted at Hartwood just seven miles away.[11]
This dazzling display of speed by Burnside demonstrated a radical change from
his predecessor, McClellan. Only in command for less than two weeks, he had
formulated a viable plan, reorganized his army and commenced a campaign and now
his troops stood poised at their first objective, Fredericksburg. Better yet,
Fredericksburg and the heights beyond were held by just four companies of
Confederate infantry, a cavalry regiment and a battery of light artillery.[12]
In comparison, Longstreet's corps was still thirty miles away at Culpeper and
Jackson's corps remained in the Shenandoah Valley.[13] At this point all
Burnside had to do was get his forces across the Rappahannock River quickly and
the town was his, however, this is where Burnside hesitated and lost his nerve
because his pontoons had yet to arrive.
While waiting in Falmouth, Burnside had a choice of three options in continuing
his campaign. First, Hooker suggested crossing at the upstream fords of United
States and Bank's Fords in order to try and sweep behind Lee's left flank while
Fredericksburg was still lightly defended. Hooker wanted to abandon his supply
line and cross at the United States Ford, after which he proposed to march on
Bowling Green and draw provisions from Port Royal. The problem with this course
of action was due to the two day downpour that should have closed any ford, as
well as the approach of Longstreet's corps that might prevent his speedy
advance.[14]
Burnside, on the other hand, would take no such risk since he expected the
pontoons to arrive at any moment. It appears Burnside did not want to accept
the risk of part of his army becoming isolated on the far bank of the
Rappahannock River, which his pontoons would have mitigated this risk. Since
Burnside chose to wait for his bridging material, it did not arrive for a few
more days which gave the Confederates additional time to prepare, so he planned
for a crossing several miles downstream at Skinker's Neck, which was his next
option that was within range of Port Royal and the protection of Union
gunboats.[15] Now, after a week or so, the Confederates began countering
Burnside's move towards Skinker's Neck and this movement proved to be difficult
for Burnside's forces due to the horrible road conditions that existed between
Falmouth and Skinker's Neck as well as his supply base which forced Burnside to
give up on this option too.[16]
Burnside's last option was to bridge the river in the immediate vicinity of
Fredericksburg, which is what Burnside initially proposed to do. He had hoped
to cross into Fredericksburg quickly and catch Lee by surprise which he would
then throw his army between Longstreet's and Jackson's corps that he supposed
held the defenses at Skinker's Neck. Burnside wanted to deploy Sumner's and
Hooker's grand divisions through Fredericksburg and against the heights outside
the city while Franklin's grand division would sweep across the plain below
Fredericksburg.[17]
Due to the time wasted on waiting for bridging material, Burnside resorted to a
plan of attrition which goes against the premise of maneuver warfare. He was
essentially forced to make this poor decision due to the amount of risk
involved in potentially using flooded fords, waiting for bridging material and
the political pressure driving Burnside to carry on the offensive. Overall,
Burnside developed a very sound strategy in dealing with Lee, however, due to
the friction that was generated, Burnside did not effectively deal with the
situations at hand and made the poor choice of attacking Lee head on in his
entrenchments.
Up until the Battle of Fredericksburg, Burnside was performing very superbly as
was mentioned earlier. However, in employing his cavalry, Burnside followed the
precedent that was established by his predecessor who never learned how to
properly use the mounted brigades. Burnside dissipated the cavalry strength
instead of assembling a strong mounted force on the critical left flank to
seize the key terrain along the Rappahannock east of Hamilton's Crossing, from
which Franklin could have more effectively launched his enveloping attack.[18]
Even though Burnside chose to apply the strength of his own force to that of
Lee's, Franklin's grand division did meet with some limited success during the
attack on Hamilton's Crossing. This attack could have actually penetrated
Jackson's lines at Hamilton's Crossing if it had been properly supported. This
would be the only case on this battlefield where strength versus strength
netted any positive results.
After the disastrous loss at Fredericksburg, Burnside remained determined to
renew the offensive in the Fredericksburg area. He resolved to move his army a
short distance up the Rappahannock River, then cross and circle to the south to
get behind Lee, starting on December 30, 1862. The cavalry units would go
first, crossing Kelly's Ford, twenty-five miles northwest of Fredericksburg and
severing the vital Confederate supply routes on two railroads; the Virginia
Central and the Richmond, Fredericksburg and Potomac. Due to the interference
by Lincoln, after receiving word of the Fredericksburg disaster, he needed to
be informed of Burnside's next movement. This would delay Burnside's plan
approximately three weeks. Burnside's idea was sound and it might have worked
since he was able to disengage from Lee without him realizing the Army of the
Potomac was gone. Had this plan been launched around December 30, it could have
worked but due to the winter weather in Virginia, it would effectively halt all
army movement because of the torrential rainfall. Nevertheless, Burnside
elected to go along as planned but because of the rainfall, his movement has
been dubbed the "Mud March" and the Army of the Potomac was forced into winter
quarters.[19]
In this example of an unsuccessful maneuver, the Fredericksburg Campaign is an
excellent case in point of an army commander unable to deal with friction. The
strategy that Burnside developed both before and after the Battle of
Fredericksburg were very sound plans of action. However, his dependence upon
bridging material and his inability to be flexible ruined his chances of
success against Lee. Burnside was presented with some very plausible
alternatives that could have met with victory had he been more decisive in his
actions.
Show Footnotes and
Bibliography
Footnotes
[1]. Gallagher, Gary W. 1995. The Fredericksburg Campaign. University
of North Carolina Press; Chapel Hill, NC.
[2]. Gallagher, Gary W. 1995. The Fredericksburg Campaign. University
of North Carolina Press; Chapel Hill, NC.
[3]. Krasnoborski, Edward J. and Martini, Frank. The History Department at the
United States Military Academy, Department Maps. West Point, NY:
On-line. Available from internet,
http://www.dean.usma.edu/history/web03/atlases/american_civil_war/index.htm,
accessed April 20, 2008
[4]. Gallagher, Gary W. 1995. The Fredericksburg Campaign. University
of North Carolina Press; Chapel Hill, NC.
[5]. Gallagher, Gary W. 1995. The Fredericksburg Campaign. University
of North Carolina Press; Chapel Hill, NC.
[6]. Stackpole, Edward J. 1981. The Battle of Fredericksburg. Eastern
Acorn Press: Harrisburg, PA.
[7]. Stackpole, Edward J. 1981. The Battle of Fredericksburg. Eastern
Acorn Press: Harrisburg, PA.
[8]. Weeks, Dick. 1997. The American Civil War Home Page. Herndon, VA.
On-line. Available from internet, http://www.civilwarhome.com , accessed 20
April 2008.
[9]. Johnson, Robert Underwood and Buel, Clarence Clough. Battles and Leaders
of the Civil War, Volume 3 The Tide Shifts. Secaucus, NJ: Castle
Books.
[10]. Johnson, Robert Underwood and Buel, Clarence Clough. Battles and Leaders
of the Civil War, Volume 3 The Tide Shifts. Secaucus, NJ: Castle
Books.
[11]. Godrick, William K. 1985. Rebels Resurgent. Tim Life Books Inc:
Alexandria, VA.
[12]. Godrick, William K. 1985. Rebels Resurgent. Tim Life Books Inc:
Alexandria, VA.
[13]. Gallagher, Gary W. 1995. The Fredericksburg Campaign. University
of North Carolina Press; Chapel Hill, NC.
[14]. Gallagher, Gary W. 1995. The Fredericksburg Campaign. University
of North Carolina Press; Chapel Hill, NC.
[15]. Stackpole, Edward J. 1981. The Battle of Fredericksburg. Eastern
Acorn Press: Harrisburg, PA.
[16]. Stackpole, Edward J. 1981. The Battle of Fredericksburg. Eastern
Acorn Press: Harrisburg, PA.
[17]. Gallagher, Gary W. 1995. The Fredericksburg Campaign. University
of North Carolina Press; Chapel Hill, NC.
[18]. Godrick, William K. 1985. Rebels Resurgent. Tim Life Books Inc:
Alexandria, VA.
Bibliography:
1. Gallagher, Gary W. 1995. The Fredericksburg Campaign. University of
North Carolina Press; Chapel Hill, NC.
2. Godrick, William K. 1985. Rebels Resurgent. Tim Life Books Inc:
Alexandria, VA.
3. Johnson, Robert Underwood and Buel, Clarence Clough. Battles and Leaders of
the Civil War, Volume 3 The Tide Shifts. Secaucus, NJ: Castle Books.
4. Krasnoborski, Edward J. and Martini, Frank. The History Department at the
United States Military Academy, Department Maps. West Point, NY:
On-line. Available from internet,
http://www.dean.usma.edu/history/web03/atlases/american_civil_war/index.htm,
accessed April 20, 2008
5. Stackpole, Edward J. 1981. The Battle of Fredericksburg. Eastern
Acorn Press: Harrisburg, PA.
6. Weeks, Dick. 1997. The American Civil War Home Page. Herndon, VA.
On-line. Available from internet, http://www.civilwarhome.com , accessed 20
April 2008.
Copyright © 2008 Richard Podruchny.
Written by Richard Podruchny. If you have questions or comments on this article,
please contact Richard Podruchny at:
podruchnyrmr@aol.com.
About the author:
Richard Podruchny is currently an active duty member of the USAF for the last 14 years.
Over those 14 years, I have been stationed or deployed in the United Kingdom, Turkey, South Korea, Iraq,
Saudi Arabia, Texas, Virginia, and Alaska. As of lately, I'm an instructor for our Combat Targeting Course
where we teach our students, both officer and enlisted, the doctrine and methods through which the Air Forces
wields Air Power. I have been married for the last 10 years and my wife and I have two beautiful children,
an 8 year old daughter and a 5 year old son.
Published online: 05/18/2008.
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