Shenandoah Valley Campaign of
1862: Maneuver Warfare at its Finest
by Richard Podruchny
The purpose of this article is to present to the audience an outstanding
example of the implementation of maneuver warfare. In order to do so, this
campaign will be analyzed using the elements derived from Robert Leonhard's
work, "The Art of Maneuver." This analysis will focus on how well Lt. Gen.
Thomas J. "Stonewall" Jackson utilized the elements of time, identifying the
enemy's center of gravity, space, and the forces used in his hugely successful
campaign.[1]
For the first element, we will focus on the operational and strategic levels of
warfare within the Confederacy during 1862. At this point of the war, the South
was running out of time since Lt. Gen. Joseph Johnston could no longer trade
space for time and the massing of an irresistible Federal force around Richmond
was imminent.[2] As the defender, Johnston was forced to make a stand with Maj.
Gen. George B. McClellan's Army of the Potomac just six miles from Richmond in
order to gain enough time for Jackson's strategic diversion to take effect. The
longer Johnston could delay, the more time would work toward the Confederacy's
advantage.[3]
As for the tactical level of warfare, Jackson found himself in exactly the
opposite situation in regards to time. Jackson had to go on the offensive
immediately so that he was seen as a credible threat by the Union's
leadership.[4] Jackson's decision to attack Kernstown was undertaken at a
moment's notice, since he was informed that Bank's was sending forces to
eastern Virginia. The rapid forced march and aggressive attack resulted in the
Union leadership convincing themselves that Jackson had been reinforced in
preparation for an assault into the North.[5]
Throughout the rest of the campaign, Jackson's strength rested on his ability
in conducting rapid operations that were based on getting inside his opponent's
decision making cycle. He would shatter his enemy's cohesion by using maneuver
to attack from a position of strength or advantage. By conducting rapid marches
over great distances in relatively short periods of time, Jackson was able to
generate tempo.[6] Jackson utilized his speed into maintaining the initiative
and causing the Federal forces to react to him. In addition to providing
operational security for his force, which was one of Jackson's notable traits,
speed was an essential factor in achieving surprise. In order for Jackson to be
able to execute the maneuvers he envisioned would not have been possible
without the talented map-making ability of Jedediah Hotchkiss.[7] This addition
to Jackson's staff proved invaluable because of the information he provided
Jackson throughout his campaign.
In regards to the campaign overall the best illustration of the potential of
time was seen in Jackson's attack on Front Royal. By exploiting his cavalry
screen and shifting his line of advance through New Market Gap, Jackson was
able to concentrate his force by linking up with Ewell at Luray and achieve
complete surprise the next morning against a fraction of Bank's force.[8] The
total surprise and rapidity of action so completely dislocated Bank's decision
making capability that he refused to believe what had actually happened for
several hours.
Jackson's instincts regarding the relationship between time and space proved
decisive. He demonstrated an uncanny ability to accurately plan for the
transit, reinforcement and logistical sustainment of his force over great
distances. This ability of Jackson was best demonstrated during his withdrawal
up the Shenandoah Valley from Harper's Ferry just in time to evade President
Lincoln's trap at Strasburg.[9]
Now that we have seen how Jackson performed in regards to time, we will now
take a look at how both the Union and the Confederacy identified each other's
center of gravity.[10] For the Union, McClellan developed plans to invade
Virginia, while under pressure from Lincoln, which involved nearly 210,000
troops.[11] Within the region of the Shenandoah Valley, Maj. Gen. John C.
Fremont was given the objective of seizing the important railroad junction at
Staunton and Maj. Gen. Nathaniel P. Banks was poised to cross the Potomac with
the objective of controlling the lower Shenandoah Valley.[12] McClellan would
possess the main army, as well as the main effort of confronting Johnston's
army and taking Richmond. He planned for a landing at Urbanna, which would have
turned Johnston's flank. Johnston chose to fall back from his position at
Manassas that forced McClellan to alter his plan and land at Fort Monroe at the
tip of the Peninsula.[13]
At the strategic level, the Confederate army was the center of gravity for the
Confederacy; however, McClellan appears to focus his attention to the capture
of Richmond. McClellan would have known that Richmond was a strategic strength
for the South both diplomatically and politically as a symbol of national
legitimacy, as well as for its critical transportation and economic value. He
correctly deduced that the Confederates would concentrate their Army to defend
it, allowing him to indirectly attack the Southern center of gravity.
As for the Confederates, once Johnston withdrew from his position at Manassas
and took up his new position south of the Rappahannock River, he allowed his
forced to be contained with very few options for maneuver.[14] Now that
McClellan was essentially on Richmond's doorstep, the only maneuver space was
to the north. As President Jefferson Davis' military advisor, Lt. Gen. Robert
E. Lee had to come up with an answer that would relieve the pressure on
Richmond as well as avoiding the potential dilemma of defending Richmond on two
fronts by freezing Maj. Gen. Irvin McDowell's force to the north in the
vicinity of Fredericksburg. Lee felt that both Jackson's and Ewell's commands
could be combined and be able to hit one of the three opposing forces of
McDowell, Banks or Fremont hard enough to alarm the Union high command into
delaying their advance eastward. This line of thought led to Jackson's orders
which were to create the impression of a drive on Washington itself.
With this being the case, it appears that Lee has correctly identified the
Union's center of gravity being President Abraham Lincoln. Lincoln became the
center of gravity since he was controlling and directing all Federal forces.
Lincoln was also sensitive to the will of the Northern people's will to fight
if the capital was overrun. As long as the Confederates could put pressure on
Washington, Lee could count on Lincoln to hold back portions of the Union army
to defend Washington.
With the centers of gravity identified for both the Union and Confederacy, we
will now turn our attention to the element of space where we will look at the
Confederate's overall situation at this point in the war and the Shenandoah
Valley itself.[15] Since Johnston had allowed his army to be backed into a
corner, he essentially lost so much space that he could not maneuver on an
operational level. In order to counter this problem, the Confederacy needed to
regain the initiative, which Jackson was presented the opportunity and was to
capitalize on every advantage offered by his area of responsibility.
Jackson's area of responsibility, the Shenandoah Valley, is a fertile corridor
in western Virginia that is oriented in a southwest direction from the
Potomac to the James River. The Shenandoah Valley is flanked on the west by the
Allegheny Mountains and on the east by the Blue Ridge Mountains. Some of the
significant terrain features in the Shenandoah Valley are the Massanutton
Mountain range that splits the Shenandoah Valley for nearly fifty miles, as
well as the Shenandoah River and its north and south forks that run down both
sides of the Massanuttons and merge at Front Royal. Also within the Shenandoah
Valley reside various gaps, such as Swift Run, Luray, Thornton's, Manassas,
Ashby's and Snicker's Gaps, that allow movement through the Shenandoah Valley's
contiguous mountain ranges.[16]
The military value of the Shenandoah Valley exceeded its importance as the
source of supplies and rations that maintained Richmond. The Shenandoah Valley,
for the South, was a natural invasion route towards the North's key cities,
such as Washington, Baltimore and Philadelphia.[18] Jackson recognized that by
threatening Washington through the Shenandoah Valley, he could attract
Lincoln's attention and achieve his operational commander's intent.
While operating in the Shenandoah Valley, Jackson had to deal with the
disparity in numbers, which he had to mitigate through the use of interior
lines. The New Market Gap served this purpose since it crossed the Massanutton
Mountains in the center of the range. By controlling this key gap, Jackson
could strike at the enemy's rear or flank, as he did at Front Royal, while
protecting the vital escape routes through the Blue Ridge Mountain gaps. In
order for the Federals to control the New Market Gap, they would have to march
completely around the Massanutton Mountains. To counter this possibility,
Jackson would couple this with restricting access to various bridges over the
Shenandoah River in order to separate Fremont's and Shield's forces during the
final stages of the campaign.
The last factor we need to address is the forces that were involved during the
Valley Campaign of 1862. On the strategic level, the Federals owned
approximately 210,000 troops that were threatening less than 70,000
Confederates that were strung out along an arc that extended from the northwest
to the southeast through Richmond.[19] Lee realized that McClellan could slide
anywhere along this front and muscle his way through outnumbering three to one
or ten to one depending where he struck.
As for Jackson's situation, he believed that his soldiers were better fighters
than those of the Union. He recognized that he was badly out-gunned in terms of
combat power when pitted against the Federal forces. Jackson had to rely on the
concentration of mass at the decisive time and place to develop superior combat
power. It would be through the use of maneuver warfare that Jackson would be
able to generate his superior combat power at the time and place of his own
choosing.
In conclusion, the Valley Campaign of 1862 stands out as the prime example of
maneuver warfare. Even though Jackson had his quirks, he was ultimately set-up
for success by Lee who gave Jackson enough authority to carry out his own
campaign as long as he was drawing attention away from Richmond. It would be
through this independent command that Jackson would be able to run circles
around his Federal opponents who were being controlled back in Washington.
Overall, this particular campaign illustrates the necessity of granting your
field commanders enough responsibility in carrying out their own plans to
achieve success on the battlefield.
Show Footnotes and
Bibliography
Footnotes
[1]. Leonhard, Robert. 1991. The Art of Maneuver. Ballantine Books:
New York.
[2]. Clark, Champ. 1984. Decoying the Yanks. Time Life Books Inc:
Alexandria, VA
[3]. Martin, David G. 1994. Jackson’s Valley Campaign. Da Capo Press:
Cambridge, MA.
[4]. Freeman, Douglas Southall. 1942. Lee’s Lieutenants, Manassas to Malvern
Hill. Charles Scribner’s Sons: New York.
[5]. Martin, David G. 1994. Jackson’s Valley Campaign. Da Capo Press:
Cambridge, MA.
[6]. Leonhard, Robert. 1991. The Art of Maneuver. Ballantine Books:
New York.
[7]. Weeks, Dick. 1997. The American Civil War Home Page. Herndon, VA.
On-line. Available from internet, http://www.civilwarhome.com , accessed 20
April 2008.
[8]. Tanner, Robert G. 1996. Stonewall in the Valley. Stackpole Books:
Mechanicsburg, PA.
[9]. Tanner, Robert G. 1996. Stonewall in the Valley. Stackpole Books:
Mechanicsburg, PA.
[10]. Leonhard, Robert. 1991. The Art of Maneuver. Ballantine Books:
New York
[11]. Johnson, Robert Underwood and Buel, Clarence Clough. Battles and Leaders
of the Civil War, Volume 4 Retreat with Honor. Secaucus, NJ: Castle
Books.
[12]. Clark, Champ. 1984. Decoying the Yanks. Time Life Books Inc:
Alexandria, VA
[13]. Clark, Champ. 1984. Decoying the Yanks. Time Life Books Inc:
Alexandria, VA
[14]. Weeks, Dick. 1997. The American Civil War Home Page. Herndon,
VA. On-line. Available from internet, http://www.civilwarhome.com , accessed 20
April 2008.
[15]. Leonhard, Robert. 1991. The Art of Maneuver. Ballantine Books:
New York
[16]. Clark, Champ. 1984. Decoying the Yanks. Time Life Books Inc:
Alexandria, VA
[17]. Krasnoborski, Edward J. and Martini, Frank. The History Department at the
United States Military Academy, Department Maps. West Point, NY:
On-line. Available from internet,
http://www.dean.usma.edu/history/web03/atlases/american_civil_war/index.htm,
accessed April 20, 2008
[18]. Tanner, Robert G. 1996. Stonewall in the Valley. Stackpole
Books: Mechanicsburg, PA.
[19]. Johnson, Robert Underwood and Buel, Clarence Clough. Battles and Leaders
of the Civil War, Volume 4 Retreat with Honor. Secaucus, NJ: Castle
Books.
Bibliography:
1. Clark, Champ. 1984. Decoying the Yanks. Time Life Books Inc:
Alexandria, VA.
2. Freeman, Douglas Southall. 1942. Lee’s Lieutenants, Manassas to Malvern
Hill. Charles Scribner’s Sons: New York.
3. Johnson, Robert Underwood and Buel, Clarence Clough. Battles and Leaders of
the Civil War, Volume 4 Retreat with Honor. Secaucus, NJ: Castle
Books.
4. Krasnoborski, Edward J. and Martini, Frank. The History Department at the
United States Military Academy, Department Maps. West Point, NY:
On-line. Available from internet,
http://www.dean.usma.edu/history/web03/atlases/american_civil_war/index.htm,
accessed April 20, 2008
5. Leonhard, Robert. 1991. The Art of Maneuver. Ballantine Books: New
York.
6. Martin, David G. 1994. Jackson’s Valley Campaign. Da Capo Press:
Cambridge, MA.
7. Tanner, Robert G. 1996. Stonewall in the Valley. Stackpole Books:
Mechanicsburg, PA.
8. Weeks, Dick. 1997. The American Civil War Home Page. Herndon, VA.
On-line. Available from internet, http://www.civilwarhome.com , accessed 21
December 2007.
Copyright © 2008 Richard Podruchny.
Written by Richard Podruchny. If you have questions or comments on this article,
please contact Richard Podruchny at:
podruchnyrmr@aol.com.
About the author:
Richard Podruchny is currently an active duty member of the USAF for the last 14 years.
Over those 14 years, I have been stationed or deployed in the United Kingdom, Turkey, South Korea, Iraq,
Saudi Arabia, Texas, Virginia, and Alaska. As of lately, I'm an instructor for our Combat Targeting Course
where we teach our students, both officer and enlisted, the doctrine and methods through which the Air Forces
wields Air Power. I have been married for the last 10 years and my wife and I have two beautiful children,
an 8 year old daughter and a 5 year old son.
Published online: 05/18/2008.
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