Sun Tzu and the Overland
Campaign of 1864
by Richard Podruchny
This particular work looks at comparing the Overland Campaign of 1864 against
Sun Tzu's six strategic principles that were extracted from the, "Art of War"
by Mark McNeilly through his work, "Sun Tzu and the Art of Modern Warfare." The
six principles that will be used are; win all without fighting, avoid strength,
attack weakness, deception and foreknowledge, speed and preparation, and
shaping the enemy.[1] By looking at this campaign and using these six
principles, we will be able to see how the commander's of both the Army of the
Potomac and the Army of Northern Virginia strategic principles compare or
contrast to Sun Tzu due to their Napoleonic schooling in warfare. This will
provide the reader a great example of how well or how poorly these two schools
of thought coincided with one another that spanned thousands of years and miles
apart.
The first principle that we will look at is, "Win all without fighting;
achieving the objective without destroying it."[2] This particular campaign
occurred during the third year of the War Between the States, where hostilities
have been in effect, already violating this first principle of Sun Tzu. For the
Union, their strategy for the Virginia Campaign of 1864 was the destruction of
the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia. That being said, the main objective
of the Union being the destruction of the Confederate army also violates Sun
Tzu's first principle, since the Union appears to be following a war of
attrition, which is what the Civil War has become in the Eastern Theater at the
onset of the Overland Campaign.[3] For the overall commander of all Union
forces, Lt. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant, this campaign was one of the most crucial
campaigns of the war, since it was an integral part in his overall plan to
defeat the Confederacy. This overall plan that Grant envisioned was to have all
Union forces advance simultaneously in all theaters, capitalizing on the
North's superior manpower and material resources.[4] This concept, if executed
properly, would not provide the Confederates time in order to shift troops to
needed locations if all of the Union armies were in a coordinated advance. The
focus of this coordinated advance would be Lt. Gen Lee's Army of Northern
Virginia where the Overland Campaign was meant to bleed Lee's army in a
campaign of attrition where Grant knew that Lee would not have the manpower
available to replenish what would be lost in battle. Through this strategy, we
can see the first blatant violation in the first of Sun Tzu's six principles,
as well as the hundreds if not thousands of miles of railroad infrastructure
that will be destroyed during this campaign.[5]
Now that we have a broad idea as to what Grant wants to execute on a strategic
level, we can now drill down and see what he proposes to do within the Eastern
Theater. His plan for the Eastern Theater called for three major armies to
conduct mutually supporting advances. Grant would order MG Franz Sigel's forces
to move south through the Shenandoah Valley, defeat the Confederate forces
there and remove the Shenandoah Valley as a source of supply. Next, Grant would
also order MG Benjamin Butler's Army of the James to advance up the Virginia
Peninsula between the James and York Rivers toward Richmond. This movement by
Butler was expected to have mixed results since Butler's army had the
possibility of capturing Richmond, while at a minimum, Grant hoped it would
divert a significant number of Confederate forces away from his main advance.
This main advance would fall on MG George Meade's Army of the Potomac, which
was to engage the Army of Northern Virginia. The instructions that Grant gave
to Meade was essentially that wherever Lee goes, he will also go. This
particular order by Grant was a significant one because it was a drastic
departure to previous campaigns where Richmond was the target versus the main
Confederate force in the field.[6]
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Figure 1 Grant's Plan for the 1864 Campaign[7]
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To further explain the Union strategy, Grant wrote a letter to MG Henry W.
Halleck, who was the U.S. Army's Chief of Staff, which outlines Grant's overall
strategy for the upcoming campaign season. In the letter, Grant requests
additional troops, which is not from a standpoint of him possessing inferior
numbers but from a possibility of going into siege operations against Richmond.
It appears that he feels that his present force will not be adequate enough to
maintain both offensive and siege operations. Grant wants the focus of the war
to turn to operations in Georgia for the capture of Atlanta and the destruction
of LG Joseph E. Johnston's Army of Tennessee, as well as the destruction of the
Army of Northern Virginia. In other words, nothing should be happening in the
other theaters unless it is in direct cooperation with the maneuvers that have
already been stated. Grant also states in his letter that orders need to be
given to those remaining theaters that nothing should be attempted until the
Confederacy is subdued east of the Mississippi River.[8] By focusing the
Union's attention on the Confederacy's two major armies in the field and
rendering them ineffective, Grant feels that the rest of the South will
capitulate and finally end the war. From this line of reasoning, it appears
that through fighting the Confederacy's main armies in a concerted effort,
Grant may be able to subdue the rest of the South without further conflict,
which falls in line with Sun Tzu's first strategic principle.[9]
As for the Confederacy, the Overland Campaign became part of a defensive
strategy that was more the result of necessity than of choice. At this point of
the war, the Southern strategy seemed to be to exhaust the will of the people
in the North with the hope the President Lincoln would lose the presidential
election in the fall of 1864.[10] Even from the beginning of the war, the
Confederacy adopted a defensive strategy, which can be called a strategy of
attrition.[11] This strategy adopted a standpoint of winning by not losing,
which meant by wearing out a better equipped enemy and compelling him to give
up by prolonging the war and making it too costly. By comparing this with the
Northern strategy, the South would also violate Sun Tzu's first principle by
seeking a war of attrition. Unfortunately, two factors prevented President
Jefferson Davis from carrying this out except in a limited fashion; the first
being the demands by the state governors, congressmen and citizens for troops
to defend every potion of the Confederacy. This led to dispersing manpower so
thinly that Union forces broke through at several points in 1862. The second
factor was the temperament of the Southern people, where the populace did not
want to wait to be attacked but to take the fight to the enemy. From these two
factors, an offensive-defensive strategy was adopted. Through the use of
interior lines, the Confederacy could be defended by concentrating dispersed
forces and it offered the opportunity to go on the offensive, as well as even
to the extent of invading the North.[12] Another factor that can be considered
as to why the Confederacy lacked a unified strategy was that President Davis
refused to appoint a commander-in-chief and he retained that mantle of command
for himself.[13] This meant that all of the Confederacy's fielded armies would
report directly to him. With that being said, President did not issue an
overall strategic plan for the year of 1864. This would have a dramatic impact
on the Eastern Theater where there was no unified command system to coordinate
the efforts of Lee's army with the forces under MG John Breckinridge in the
Shenandoah Valley and MG Pierre G. T. Beauregard's forces protecting Richmond,
southern Virginia and northern North Carolina. Due to the amount of respect
that President Davis had for Lee, Lee would often indirectly provide the needed
coordination for all Southern efforts in Virginia. Now at this point of the
Civil War, Lee had been defeated in his two attempts to invade the North, and
now, Lee was committed to a strategic defense that was intent on wearing down
the North's resolve.[14] Even though he would be on the defensive, Lee had no
intention of remaining passive and relinquishing the initiative. Instead, Lee
intended to launch tactical and operational level attacks when the opportunity
presented itself.
Now that we have seen how well or how poorly either the Confederacy or the
Union performed against Sun Tzu's first strategic principle, we can now focus
on the second principle, which was, "Avoid strength, attack weakness; Striking
where the enemy is most vulnerable." For this portion, we will focus on the
Union army, breaking down their strategic and operational level decisions. At
the strategic level, we can see that the North's strategy is in line with Sun
Tzu's second principle provided that by coordinating their operations they will
overwhelm the South, since the South is now being pushed simultaneously and
cannot utilize their interior lines to focus against one Union threat at a
time. This can be seen where MG William T. Sherman's Army of the Tennessee has
now begun its advance on Atlanta, Sigel's force advancing down the Shenandoah
Valley, Butler's force advancing on Richmond and Meade's Army of the Potomac
advancing on the Army of Northern Virginia. This coordinated offensive goes
hand-in-hand with Sun Tzu's second principle while the North is now taking full
advantage of the South's lack in manpower.[15]
At the operational level, Sun Tzu's second principle was being followed at the
campaign's onset, since Grant was avoiding Lee's entrenchments in the Mine Run
vicinity, which would force Lee's army out in the open.[16] For the Army of the
Potomac, according to Meade's chief of staff BG Andrew Humphreys, they depended
upon a quick start to the campaign, which meant by setting the entire army in
motion at midnight on May 4, 1864.[17] By doing so, the army might move quickly
beyond the Rapidan River the first day of operations and it would be able to
pass out of the Wilderness and possibly turn Lee's right flank before a general
engagement took place.[18] Through this maneuver in the Wilderness, Grant
negated his strength in numbers and placed himself in an exposed position that
Lee would exploit. By opting to go through the Wilderness, Grant violated Sun
Tzu's second principle on an operational level.
At the conclusion of the Battle of the Wilderness, Grant called for another
flanking maneuver around Lee's right flank in the vicinity of Spotsylvania
Courthouse. This move would negate the prepared positions of Lee's army and
force it to react to Grant's flanking maneuver by either fighting in the open
or perhaps forcing Lee to attack the more numerous Army of the Potomac in
prepared positions.[19] By seizing Spotsylvania Courthouse, the Army of the
Potomac would be in a position to separate Lee's army from Richmond,
effectively cutting the Army of Northern Virginia's line of communication.
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Figure 2 Wilderness to the North Anna[20]
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When the Battle of Spotsylvania Courthouse was concluded, Grant continued his
flanking maneuvers around Lee's right flank that eventually led to the Battle
of North Anna River and Cold Harbor. During the Battles of Spotsylvania
Courthouse, North Anna River and Cold Harbor, Grant had his army attack
prepared Confederate positions which directly violate the second principle of
Sun Tzu.[21] However, this coincides with Grant's attrition based strategy that
he will be able to get reinforcements, whereas every engagement would bleed
Lee's army dry. The purpose behind Grant's continuous flanking maneuvers was to
eventually corner Lee's army in Richmond or Petersburg, negating Lee's strength
through maneuver.
From the Confederate's point of view and also beginning at their strategic
level, they would keep in line with Sun Tzu's second principle by staying on
the defensive and remaining behind their fortifications while retaining the
capacity to conduct attacks on a more localized level as the opportunity
presented itself. Lee wanted to avoid going to the battle in the open, since
this is what Grant wanted to take full advantage of due to the Army of the
Potomac's numerical superiority.[22] By doing so, Lee was able to stem Grant's
strategy of attrition and avoiding his strength in numbers by forcing him to
attack prepared positions that negated his strength.
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Figure 3 Beginning of the Battle of the Wilderness[23]
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At the operational level, Sun Tzu's second principle can be seen in action when
Lee attacked the Army of the Potomac in the Battle of the Wilderness. In this
battle, Lee avoided Grant's strength in numbers due to the heavily forested
terrain. On the other hand, Lee attacked Grant's weakness since Grant could not
take full advantage of his superiority in numbers. In the case of the Battle of
Spotsylvania Courthouse, North Anna River and Cold Harbor, Lee was able to
outmaneuver his opponent and only offer battle from prepared positions. This is
yet another example of how Lee was able to avoid Grant's strength in numbers in
open battle and negating that advantage through the use of fortifications.[24]
For these three battles, this was not a case of attacking weakness as it was
avoiding the strength in numbers that the Army of the Potomac possessed. Just
to give the reader an idea of the disparity in numbers between the two armies
at the Overland Campaign's onset, the Army of the Potomac had 121,178 members
of all arms present for duty[25] compared to the 61,953 members of all arms[26]
for the Army of Northern Virginia.
Now that we have seen how Sun Tzu's second principle was related to the
Overland Campaign, we can now focus on his third principle, which is,
"Deception and foreknowledge; winning the information war."[27] This third
principle is broken down into four subcategories; knowing the enemy, knowing
one's own capabilities, knowing the environment and utilizing deception.[28] We
will first examine the Union army, which at this point during the Civil War is
now in its fourth year and the Army of the Potomac has now become very familiar
with Lee and his Army of Northern Virginia since the Army of the Potomac's army
and corps commanders has virtually remained the same except for the additions
of Grant and MG Phillip H. Sheridan. With Grant essentially in direct command
of the Army of the Potomac, he would initially be at a disadvantage since he
transferred from his Western Theater and he would have to discover who among
his corps commanders could be trusted to do their jobs satisfactorily.[29]
For the Army of the Potomac overall, it had been operating in northern Virginia
since 1861 and had become very familiar with the surrounding territory. For
Grant, this was an area that he would have to become more familiar with since
it was more cultivated and populated than the rough terrain of the Western
Theater as well as still being relatively difficult country for maneuvering
armies. The terrain was somewhat flat in this area of Virginia but it was cut
by numerous waterways that proved difficult to traverse due to the abundant
marshes. Another aspect to consider in this area of Virginia was the heavily
forested and dense undergrowth type of terrain that existed especially in the
vicinity of the Army of the Potomac's starting point in the Overland Campaign
that resulted in the Battle of the Wilderness on May 4, 1864. Now further west,
the ground had gentle hills with a few key heights such as Clark's Mountain
that offered a dominating point of observation. As for the various rivers and
waterways, they ran from northwest to southeast and acted as natural barriers,
however, the Union dominance of the sea meant they could use the rivers as
supply routes or lines of communication as long as they remained relatively
close.[30]
As for utilizing deception, the clearest example of this in the Overland
Campaign can be seen when Grant ordered the crossing of the James River. To
make this a successful deception, Grant utilized Sheridan's cavalry to conduct
a raid to cut the Virginia Central Railroad, which would essentially act as a
diversion. Grant would execute this maneuver beginning on the Cold Harbor
battlefield where the troops on his right flank, Lee's left flank, began the
march to cross the James River. By doing so, it would leave the impression on
Lee that Grant was maintaining his current position. To complete the deception,
Grant had MG Gouverneur K. Warren's Fifth Corps establish a blocking position
at Riddell's Shop to protect the maneuver and to deceive Lee into thinking
Grant was making another short flanking maneuver between the Chickahominy and
James Rivers.[31] This maneuver by Grant was the first time in this campaign
that he had truly stolen a march on Lee even though he gained several slight
advantages on his adversary.
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Figure 4 North Anna to Petersburg[32]
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Now that we have seen how the Union army related to Sun Tzu's third principle,
we can now focus on the Confederate army and how they measure up to the third
principle. For the Confederates, they were very similar in circumstances to the
Army of the Potomac; however, Lee would be up against another Union general
that has met with more success on the battlefield than any of his predecessors.
At this point of the war, Lee was well aware of the fighting prowess his
soldiers possessed; however, it would be the performance of his corps
commanders and their subordinates that would set the stage for the outcome of
this campaign. Within the First Corps, its commander was still LG James
Longstreet and he shared a mutual respect with Lee that made him Lee's most
trusted subordinate at the time of the Overland Campaign.[33] For the Second
Corps, its commander was LG Richard S. Ewell who took over this command after
LG Thomas J. "Stonewall" Jackson's death and was his most trusted
subordinate.[34] Lastly, the Third Corps was commanded by LG Ambrose P. Hill
who demonstrated a blemished performance at Gettysburg, as well as having
serious health issues where he was in and out of command on several occasions
in the last eighteen months of the war and even in command, he was often ill
and unable to exercise dynamic leadership.[35]
As for knowing the environment, the Army of Northern Virginia was fighting on
familiar ground. This familiarity was not just due to the four years of war,
but several of its members lived and grew up in these areas. By gaining
enlistments from these areas, it brought a level of familiarity the Army of the
Potomac could not hope to possess.[36]
During the Overland Campaign, Lee found himself not in possession of the
initiative. However, prior to the Battle of the North Anna River, there can be
seen two examples of deception inadvertently used by Lee. The first instance
was Lee's choice of ground along the North Anna River, where this disposition
left the impression that there was only a rearguard protecting Lee's line of
retreat. Due to Lee's location, the Army of the Potomac was divided in two and
at an extreme tactical disadvantage since either side of the army would have to
cross the North Anna River twice in order to reinforce the other.[37] The
second example was Lee's Corps commander's lack of action against the Army of
the Potomac's exposed position. This led Grant to believe the Army of Northern
Virginia was all but beat, since Lee possessed such formidable defenses, he did
not dare attack. At this point, Grant felt that his forces gained morale over
the Army of Northern Virginia and victory was all but assured. However, Lee
would make Grant pay for his false sense of security at the expense of lives at
the Battle of Cold Harbor.[38]
Now that we have seen how Sun Tzu's third strategic principle was applied to
the Overland Campaign, we will now focus our attention on Sun Tzu's fourth
strategic principle, "Speed and preparation: Moving swiftly to overcome
resistance."[39] Within this principle there are four advantages this principle
provides, which are, "speed is a substitute for resources, surprises and shocks
the enemy, exploits fleeting opportunities, and builds momentum."[40] Once
again, we will begin with the Union army. Due to the sheer size of the Army of
the Potomac at the beginning of the Overland Campaign, with 121,178[41] troops
of all arms compared to the 61,953[42] troops of all arms for the Army of
Northern Virginia, the first advantage of the fourth strategic principle does
not seem to apply. At this point in the war, the Union armies benefitted from
the industrial might of the North, which was in full swing during the fourth
year of the Civil War.[43]
After the Battle of the Wilderness, Grant was able to both surprise and shock
Lee because of his flanking maneuver that led to the Battle of Spotsylvania
Courthouse. The surprise came from Grant's decision to attempt a flanking
maneuver around Lee's right flank, which Lee was accustomed to a withdrawal by
the Army of the Potomac after every encounter.[44] Another aspect of the
surprise can be seen in how fast Grant and Meade were able to set the Army of
the Potomac in motion towards Spotsylvania Courthouse.[45] Another example of
speed and surprise in this campaign was Grant's decision to cross the James
River. Due to the speed and care involved in keeping this hidden from Lee,
Grant was able to keep Lee in the dark as to what he intended to do.[46]
From an operational standpoint, Grant's maneuvers were able to exploit Lee's
weakness, which was avoiding open battle with Grant's superiority in numbers
and saving his army. By doing so and never being able to win a decisive victory
against Grant in this campaign, Lee had to give up territory in order to block
Grant's advances and entrenching his positions every chance he got.[47]
Lastly, the momentum that Grant was able to produce began with his first
flanking maneuver after the Battle of the Wilderness. This simple movement set
the stage for the Army of Northern Virginia's eventual defeat and surrender.
Even though Lee or Grant never won a decisive victory over the other, Grant was
able to build upon this through his subordinates and troops, while instilling
in them a confidence that he would not give up until Lee's army was destroyed
and Richmond captured.[48]
As for the Army of Northern Virginia, the first advantage of speed being a
substitute for resources holds true. However, during this campaign, the speed
the Army of Northern Virginia exhibited was not so much used to destroy the
Army of the Potomac as much as a means to counter Grant's movements. It would
be through the use of speed that would shock Grant. This speed was utilized
very successfully during the days prior to the Battle of the Wilderness where
Lee was able to mitigate the disparity in numbers due to the terrain. After the
Wilderness, it was the speed and luck of Lee's new First Corps commander, MG
Richard H. Anderson that drove his corps on a night march to Spotsylvania
Courthouse and occupying the key cross roads.[49] It would not be until Grant
decided to cross the James River that Lee was able to successfully use the
speed his command possessed to parry Grant's flanking movements.
Now that we have seen how both the Confederate and Union armies compare to Sun
Tzu's fourth principle, the fifth principle will now be addressed. The fifth
principle, "Shaping the enemy: preparing the battlefield," possesses three
aspects that will be highlighted, which are "holding strategic positions,
attacking the enemy's strategy and direct and indirect forces."[50] For the
Union army, the aspect of holding strategic positions was what Grant wanted to
achieve throughout the Overland Campaign. He wanted to be able to execute
flanking movements that would have seized key road junctions such as
Spotsylvania Courthouse, Hanover Junction and Cold Harbor.[51] By doing so, he
would have been able to place the Army of the Potomac between the Army of
Northern Virginia and Richmond, forcing Lee's smaller force to attack.
For the aspect of attacking the enemy's strategy, the Union was able to address
this aspect very efficiently. They were able to attack the Confederate's
defensive strategy and their advantage of interior lines by coordinating
several operations to begin roughly the same time. These operations were the
advance of Sigel's force down the Shenandoah Valley, Butler's advance on
Richmond and Petersburg and Sherman's advance on Atlanta.[52]
The last aspect, direct and indirect forces, was focused on the Union's
strategic and operational levels. For this campaign, the direct forces refer to
the Army of the Potomac under Meade who would put constant pressure on Lee in
Virginia and not letting him give up portions of his army to reinforce other
threatened areas in the Confederacy as he did with Longstreet's Corps in the
Battle of Chickamauga.[53] The indirect force used in Grant's strategy was
Sherman's Army of Tennessee where Sherman would cut loose from his line of
supply and live off the land while destroying the remaining infrastructure that
supplied Lee's army through Georgia and the Carolinas.[54] Within Virginia,
Grant would also take advantage of using indirect forces operationally, such as
Sigel's force in the Shenandoah Valley, Butler's army operating against
Richmond and Petersburg and Sheridan's cavalry force that would attempt raids
on the Confederate supply line and Richmond itself.[55]
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Figure 5 Battle of the North Anna[56]
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In regards to the Confederates, Lee wanted to focus on preserving his army and
by doing so, he would have to rely on his command's ability to outmaneuver the
Army of the Potomac as well as possessing strategic locations that would force
Grant and Meade to attack his army from prepared positions.[57] Some examples
of this can be seen in the race of Spotsylvania Courthouse, the North Anna Rive
and Cold Harbor. If Lee was not able to retain these key positions, it would
force him to go on the offensive and potentially lose his army. The only way
the Lee was going to counter Grant's strategy was through prolonging the war
and causing tremendous casualties on the Army of the Potomac, which would
result in the North losing its will to carry on the war.[58]
The only potential use of direct and indirect forces used in this campaign by
Lee can be seen at the tactical level in the organization and disposition of
his forces along the North Anna River.[59] Lee called for extensive
fortifications along the river, which would reduce the number of troops to man
this line, and would represent a direct force. This would free up a sizeable
reserve force or indirect force to go on the offensive, taking advantage of the
Army of the Potomac's compromised position of being split in two by the North
Anna River.[60] This attack would have taken advantage of the Army of the
Potomac having to reinforce either flank by having to cross the North Anna
River twice in order to do so. However, Lee was too ill on that particular day
to take command of the operation personally and his corps commanders neglected
to take full advantage of the situation to its fullest extent.[61]
The last principle that will be examined is, "Character-based leadership:
leading by example,"[62] and will focus on both Grant and Lee as the respective
army commander's. This principle is broken down into six categories that will
be applied to Union and Confederate commanders, which include, "character, lead
by example, share soldier's trials, morale and motivation, delegation of
authority, and providing clear direction."[63] For Grant, during the Overland
Campaign, he was essentially triple hated, where he acted as
commander-in-chief, theater commander and army commander.[64] By moving with
the Army of the Potomac, it appears that he did not place much faith in this
army's leadership in keeping the Army of Northern Virginia under constant
pressure. Grant took the aspect of leading by example very seriously, since he
took to the field with the Army of the Potomac, however, he was regarded as a
"butcher" due to the large amounts of casualties n having his troops attack
prepared positions. On the other hand, Grant did share in his soldier's trials
by moving with the troops in the field and by not just giving direction from an
office in Washington. This particular action resulted in respect from his
subordinate commanders within the Army of the Potomac. Throughout the Overland
Campaign, not too much can be said of Grant's morale and motivation ability
except that once the campaign began and that first flanking maneuver was
executed after the Battle of the Wilderness, the entire Army of the Potomac
realized there was no turning back. However, the only aspect that Grant appears
to have partially neglected is delegation of authority, where upon his arrival
to the Army of the Potomac, he would essentially take personal control.[65] In
contrast, he let Sherman execute his own campaign as he saw fit.[66] In the
last category, Grant did provide clear direction at the onset of the campaign
by making it known that his primary objective was the destruction of the Army
of Northern Virginia and all moves and direction would be in support of this
objective.
As for Lee, his character as the South's greatest general was beyond reproach.
Throughout this campaign, Lee always sought input from his subordinates which
made them more apt to be open to their commander, plus having an impact on how
the army was to be employed.[67] By treating his subordinates in this way, it
resulted in a more efficient organization and less enmity toward other
commands.
Throughout Lee's tenure as the commander of the Army of Northern Virginia, he
always remained in the field with his men even while operating in close
proximity to Richmond, sharing the hardships that his soldiers would have to
endure.[68] At this point in the war, the soldiers in the Army of Northern
Virginia could not have been more proud of their commander, since he was able
to defeat virtually every commander that was sent to fight him. Even though the
rations and supplies were not at a desirable level, the men could rely on the
fact that "Marse" Robert would win the day and they all would gladly die for
their beloved leader.
In the aspect of delegating authority, Lee was excellent in letting his
subordinates exercise their own initiative. However, due to the losses his
command structure endured, the talent and initiative was just no longer there.
Lee found himself more and more involved on a tactical level than ever before
and it would take a toll on his health and ability to command the way he
intended.[69] It would be through this difficulty that would not necessarily
impact his ability to provide clear direction to his subordinates but from the
fact that he had to take a more proactive role in ensuring his intentions were
being carried out.
Now that we have seen how both Grant and Lee compared to Sun Tzu's sixth and
final principle, the reader will hopefully have a better perception of how this
particular campaign can be analyzed by utilizing Sun Tzu's concepts. By
applying those concepts, one should see that Sun Tzu's concepts relate on a
broader scope of operations, such as on the strategic and operational levels of
warfare, however, during this campaign study, it can also be applied to some
tactical situations yielding some superb insight. Taken as a whole, the reader
should now have a better understanding of how these two schools of thought are
not exactly as far apart as one might think.
Show Footnotes and
Bibliography
Footnotes
[1]. McNeilly, Mark. 2001. Sun Tzu and the Art of Modern Warfare. New
York: Oxford University Press, Inc.
[2]. McNeilly, Mark. 2001. Sun Tzu and the Art of Modern Warfare. New
York: Oxford University Press, Inc.
[3]. McNeilly, Mark. 2001. Sun Tzu and the Art of Modern Warfare. New
York: Oxford University Press, Inc.
[4]. Janes, Gregory. 1986. The Killing Ground, Wilderness to Cold Harbor.
Alexandria, VA: Time Life Books, Inc
[5]. McNeilly, Mark. 2001. Sun Tzu and the Art of Modern Warfare. New
York: Oxford University Press, Inc.
[6]. Dr. King, Curtis S., Dr. Robertson, William G., Lt. Col. Clay, Steven E. Staff
Ride Handbook for the Overland Campaign, Virginia, May to 15 June 1864: A Study
in Operational-Level Command. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies
Institute Press.
[7]. Krasnoborski, Edward J. and Martini, Frank. The History Department at the
United States Military Academy, Department Maps. West Point, NY:
On-line. Available from internet,
http://www.dean.usma.edu/history/web03/atlases/american_civil_war/index.htm,
accessed 22 Dec 07.
[8]. Chambers II, John Whiteclay and Piehler, G. Kurt. 1959. Major Problems in
American Military History. New York: Houghton Mifflin Company.
[9]. McNeilly, Mark. 2001. Sun Tzu and the Art of Modern Warfare. New
York: Oxford University Press, Inc.
[10]. Dr. King, Curtis S., Dr. Robertson, William G., Lt. Col. Clay, Steven E. Staff
Ride Handbook for the Overland Campaign, Virginia, May to 15 June 1864: A Study
in Operational-Level Command. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies
Institute Press.
[11]. Weeks, Dick. 1997. The American Civil War Home Page. Herndon,
VA. On-line. Available from internet, http://www.civilwarhome.com , accessed 21
December 2007.
[12]. Weeks, Dick. 1997. The American Civil War Home Page. Herndon,
VA. On-line. Available from internet, http://www.civilwarhome.com , accessed 21
December 2007.
[13]. Dr. King, Curtis S., Dr. Robertson, William G., Lt. Col. Clay, Steven E. Staff
Ride Handbook for the Overland Campaign, Virginia, May to 15 June 1864: A Study
in Operational-Level Command. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies
Institute Press.
[14]. Dr. King, Curtis S., Dr. Robertson, William G., Lt. Col. Clay, Steven E. Staff
Ride Handbook for the Overland Campaign, Virginia, May to 15 June 1864: A Study
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Simon and Schuster, Inc.
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NJ: Castle Books.
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7. Krasnoborski, Edward J. and Martini, Frank. The History Department at the
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accessed 22 Dec 07.
8. Matloff, Maurice. 1996. American Military History, Volume 1: 1775-1902.
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Copyright © 2008 Richard Podruchny.
Written by Richard Podruchny. If you have questions or comments on this article,
please contact Richard Podruchny at:
podruchnyrmr@aol.com.
About the author:
Richard Podruchny is currently an active duty member of the USAF for the last 14 years.
Over those 14 years, I have been stationed or deployed in the United Kingdom, Turkey, South Korea, Iraq,
Saudi Arabia, Texas, Virginia, and Alaska. As of lately, I'm an instructor for our Combat Targeting Course
where we teach our students, both officer and enlisted, the doctrine and methods through which the Air Forces
wields Air Power. I have been married for the last 10 years and my wife and I have two beautiful children,
an 8 year old daughter and a 5 year old son.
Published online: 03/30/2007.
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