Unconventional Warfare during
the Civil War
John S. Mosby's campaign for the Shenandoah
by Kryn Miner
Since man picked up a weapon against his fellow being, he has always looked for
a way to defeat his opponent in a more efficient and lethal way. It is our
nature to seek out and exploit the weaknesses of our opponent thus maximizing
our gain verses our risk. It's this thinking that brought about the evolution
of unconventional warfare, or "Special Operations," and the men that mastered
its effective use. From Roman generals like Tacitus to Men like Maj. Robert
Rogers and Sir Thomas Gage history has provided us examples of this. These
visionary men, who possessed the innate ability to see "outside" the realm of
conventional thinking and tactics, developed exceptional solutions to the
unique problems of asymmetric warfare they faced. Challenges such as inferior
numbers, limited logistical systems, constrained conventional wisdom, and
entrenched military dogma all plagued these men as they propagated their
respective fights. Through the use of surprise, speed, audacity, and moral
courage they were able to overcome substantial disparities and claim victory
time and again from the hands of traditionally "superior" forces. During the
years of 1862 through 1865 another such visionary man made his mark on the
annals of the distinguished list of "Special Operators". John S. Mosby, or the
Gray Ghost as he had come to be known, nearly turned the tide of the Civil War
in the Shenandoah Valley and in turn the battle torn state of Virginia.
To truly appreciate the deeds of Mosby we need to understand what made him and
his band of Partisans effective... Home field advantage! Mosby was born in
Edgemont, Virginia on December 6th 1833. He was the child of a well to do farm
owner, Alfred D. Mosby. At the age of six his parents moved the family from his
maternal grandfather's home to the family farm in Charlottesville, VA.[1] As a
child, Mosby led a somewhat privileged life and, as a youth attended school
regularly. As a young man he also attended college at the University of
Virginia at Charlottesville and excelled in the staples of a classic
education[2], eventually going on to practice law.[3] As with many men who
aspire to greatness, one single event had a lasting impact on the man he was to
become. In March of 1853 he shot and nearly killed a man named George Turpin
for an alleged slanderous comment apparently made about the 19 year old
Mosby.[4] Although he was initially found guilty, he was eventually freed for
the offense after serving a short sentence.[5] The act was to have a lasting
effect on Mosby. He saw it as a moral obligation to answer for the unjust
attack on his good name. Later on he would feel the same way towards the Union,
and it's aggression towards his way of life and beloved Shenandoah Valley.
Having had the benefit of growing up in the place he would later conduct
operations, Mosby had the distinct advantage over any adversary. His in-depth
knowledge and working social ties within the community were keys to his
success. This is one of the guidelines used today whenever building an
effective guerrilla force. He knew the terrain and the people. This allowed him
to continually maneuver in and around the occupying intruders at will. It also
gave him a network of intelligence gatherers, and passive supporters to assist
in his operations.
At the onset of the war Mosby had enlisted into the 1st Virginia Cavalry.[6]
This unit was led by a then Col. JEB Stuart. Although Mosby was opposed to the
dissolution of the union he felt a moral obligation to stand and defend his
native home of Virginia.[7] Although only a private upon his enlistment Mosby
quickly became a shining star in the unit and quickly drew notice of its
commander. This relationship would eventually blossom into one of unwavering
trust and commitment, on both parties. This again is a major factor in the
application of Mosby's type of unconventional campaign, "undying loyalty to
your mission, your commander and his intent."
By June of 1862 Mosby was a full Lieutenant operating on Stewart's staff as his
adjutant.[8] He was continually selected to conduct various scouting parties
and reconnaissance missions for Stewart. One such mission was across federal
lines and proved to be the capstone to Mosby's burgeoning career. He had
discovered a hole in McClellan's line that allowed Stewart to ride 1200 cavalry
in behind the union army's line.[9] This action forced McClellan to retreat
back along the VA Peninsula[10] and secured Mosby's reputation as a trustworthy
officer. Shortly after this action Mosby was captured by union troops and then
paroled. This was a grievous mistake the Union would regret for the next three
and a half years.[11] He felt that the biggest vulnerability of the Union was
its underbelly. The Union combat and field trains were ripe targets that begged
to be attacked. He said, of the Union supply system, "A small force moving with
celerity and threatening many points on a line can neutralize a hundred times
its own number."[12] In this statement he had, in essence, stated a focal point
of the theory of "Relative Superiority."[13] This theory states that; a small
force given proper mission parameters and using speed, surprise and violence of
action can defeat a larger, numerically superior force within a given span of
time. Eventually Mosby's ability to conduct small scouting parties and raids
with resounding success earned him the opportunity of his career.
On January 1st 1863, then Lieutenant, John S. Mosby along with nine confederate
Cavalry troopers from the 1st Virginia set out on a mission to reconnoiter the
upper Fauquier county region and, when feasible, attack pickets and supply
trains in the area.[14] By this time he was sending his intelligence reports
directly to Gen. Stewart's HQ. His actions were an immediate success. As he had
suggested, the attacks were instrumental in containing the Union's progression
through the upper Shenandoah Valley. The war of Mosby's Confederacy had begun.
Over the next twenty eight months Mosby conducted various raids on wagon trains
of supplies and suttlers, encamped Union forces, and various key strategic
targets and personnel located in the area. Each time he would attack and simply
fade into the wilderness. It was this hit and run tactic that earned him the
name "Gray Ghost" among the Union forces that faced him. He had been successful
in killing or capturing over a hundred Union pickets, soldiers and
sympathizers. He also had a knack for penetrating deep into Union lines and
capturing high ranking officers while they slept. This skill was one of his
most potent and useful weapons, Psychological Warfare. It can be safely assumed
that not a single Union officer with any significant importance slept well when
in "Mosby's Confederacy" for fear of being awakened by the barrel of a colt
revolver wielded by Mosby himself. One of the most notable of these kidnappings
was the Fairfax Courthouse Raid on March 9th, 1863 when Mosby captured fifty
eight horses and thirty three Union soldiers, among them Brigadier General
Edwin Stoughton.[15] Lincoln himself commented on the raid, saying "I'm sorry…
For I can make brigadier generals but I can't make horses" in an attempt to
lighten the situation.[16] The raid earned Mosby his Captain's Bars and the
gratitude and acknowledge of General Lee himself.[17] No other Confederate
officer during the war is mentioned more in Lee's papers then John S. Mosby.
Mosby's plan to disrupt the Union Operation at its most vulnerable point was
having some good successes. But, he knew it was time to escalate the campaign
and move towards dealing more crippling blows to the Union.
With the approval of Lee, in 1864 Mosby renewed his campaign after a short lull
during the dead of winter. This time he set his sights on not only the supply
trains of the encroaching Union army but it's supply life line, the network of
railroads they controlled that connected the Army in the west to the Army of
the Potomac and Washington D.C. itself. He attacked rail stations and trains
near Duffield Station, WV; Martinsburg and Winchester; Manassas Gap near
Piedmont, between the Plains and Rectortown; Fauquier; and other key
locations.[18] He continually harassed and forced the Union to commit more
troops to the region with the usual raids on supply trains and outposts. Once
again he focused on a key target within the realm of SOLIC, or Special
Operations / Low intensity Conflict, the systematic targeting of PKI or Public
key Infrastructure. The Union needed these railroads to operate in the region,
and more so to supply Union forces in the west. The simple act of attacking
them forced the Union command to address the issue with an infusion of combat
forces to protect the vulnerable rail system. Mosby did not need to be overly
successful, and in fact was not much of the time, with his raids. He only
needed to force his opponent to react to his actions, with an escalation of
critical manpower and resources. This was the single biggest impact he had on
the war's outcome. Had the Confederate command embraced this and implemented it
on a larger scale across the campaign they could have drastically increased
their chances of a favorable outcome. Although the concept was not new, Lee and
Davis did not realize, or rather accept, the concept of asymmetrical warfare.
Lee's traditional "set piece battle" mindset was not conducive to winning a war
of attrition, which was what essentially the war evolved into. Although he
appreciated Mosby and his efforts, he didn't fully see the potential in them.
This can be noted in his order that all partisan units be disbanded and
assimilated into the regular Confederate forces.[19] Modern historians, such as
Robert L. Kirby, have realized the impact such Irregular efforts could have had
on the war, and have posed the question of why Lee didn't realize the
potential.[20]
In growing response to the Mosby threat Union commanders sought to deploy
several tactics to level the field. Although none were overly effective, the
only one that had any impact on the Gray Ghost's operations was the deployment
of large groups of Union cavalry. In the latter part of 1864 several units of
Union horse were operating in the region. They were assigned the mission of
destroying Mosby and his Rangers. Elements of the 2nd US Cav, New York's 13th
Cav and elements of the Illinois 8th Cav were actively conducting patrols
through the valley. One such unit was under the command of the infamous Col.
George A. Custer, who only a year before had made his mark on the war with his
daring Cavalry ride at Gettysburg against the confederate Stewart. Mosby
wrongfully held Custer accountable for the execution of several Rangers and
when engaged by him, held a firm "no parlay" policy towards the Union
troopers.[21]
All in all, the Union campaign to rid the Shenandoah of Mosby and his Rangers
was largely futile. Although they were able to capture or kill Mosby's men in
small numbers, Mosby's command had grown in size and now was comprised of some
779+ men.[22] The Union had unknowingly assisted Mosby by violating a key
tenant of fighting an insurgency. They had alienated the local population and
did nothing to win support within the public opinion for their cause. For every
one Ranger they captured or killed, they inadvertently caused the enlistment of
two more, only fortifying Mosby's influence over the region. Frustrated, Union
commanders began to order the burning of farms and internment of "service" aged
males. All of these responses and their piece meal application did nothing to
garner support for their cause. By mid 1864 Mosby and his men had forestalled
any real measure of response to his campaign. Mosby's biggest enemy was his own
convoluted chain of command that did not realize his potential at the
operational command levels. Although Mosby had by this time, made regular
reports to both Stewart and General Lee himself, he was regarded, by mid level
commanders, as a sideline attraction within the bigger context of the war. A
new Union commander had assumed command of the Army of the Union and was
marching towards the Fledgling nation's capital, Richmond and that was where
the Confederate focus lay. By late November General Sheridan, Union commander
in the region, had come to realize that Mosby was doing more to thwart Union
efforts, with his second and third order effects, than anyone of the
traditional Confederates he currently faced. He is quoted as saying "I will
soon commence work on Mosby… Heretofore I have made no attempt to break him up…
as I would have employed ten men to his one, and for the reason that I have
made a scapegoat of him for the destruction of private rights. Now there is
going to be an intense hatred of him in that portion of this valley which is
nearly a desert. I will soon commence on Loudon County, and let them know there
is a God in Israel."[23] With that statement General Sheridan began to conduct
what was to become the "Burning Raid" in which the Union systematically
destroyed any and every farm, homestead, and potential support asset of Mosby
in the valley. In all more than 2000 families were left homeless and without
food. The destruction was said to be on a biblical scale as observed by Ranger
J. Marshal Crawford.[24] In this slash and burn campaign Sheridan had finally
dealt a substantial blow to Mosby and his Rangers. His response was a key
component in defeating an insurgency. He broke the will of the indigenous
people's will to fight and/or support the insurgent forces. He denied Mosby the
one critical advantage he had over the Union forces time and again, the land
itself and the people who lived there. This effort was bolstered by an influx
of Union forces that occupied, in force, all of the critical assets that could
support Mosby. In this he denied him his intelligence network, logistical
support, and the support of the indigenous community, three critical elements
required in conducting an insurgency such as his. This finally brought about
the second and third order effects Sheridan sought. Mosby was more of a
liability than an asset to the people.
As the war came to a close Mosby had become more of a curse then a blessing to
the people of the Shenandoah Valley. They knew all too well that it was because
of him that Sheridan unleashed his hell on earth and a great deal of animosity
was held on his behalf. The people of the Valley simply wanted their lives to
return to normal and the war to end. Long gone were the sentiments of
Confederate solidarity and independence. To that end, and under the direction
of Robert E. Lee himself, who had just six days earlier surrendered at
Appomattox, Col. John S. Mosby quietly agreed to a suspension of hostilities to
confirm Lee's surrender. In a letter to General Morgan he stated:
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"I am ready to agree to a suspension of hostilities for a short time in
order to enable me to communicate with my own authorities or until I can obtain
sufficient intelligence to determine my future action" [25]
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He eventually confirmed the report and agreed to surrender the command of his
partisan rangers to Col. James Kidd at 11:30 am on the steps of Millwood.[26]
The two then went inside and ate dinner together. Two days later on April 18th,
1865 another meeting was convened to further discuss the surrender. Unlike the
first meeting this one was far less civil and ended in a stalemate of sorts,
with Mosby and his detachment walking away from the "Mexican standoff" that the
meeting caused. Announcement of Union cavalry in the woods caused the meeting
to end abruptly under the threat of a gunfight.[27] On the 21st of April Col.
Mosby ordered a meeting of his men to bid them farewell. He gave a speech in
which he commended them on their service to Virginia and him. After this, the
men signed paroles and officially disbanded the 43rd Bn of Virginia Cav. Mosby
himself spent several weeks eluding capture by Union forces and was finally
paroled by U.S. Grant himself in mid June.[28]
A lot can be said about the 128 pound man that became the "Gray Ghost".
Historians have written volumes regarding the man, his accomplishments, and the
way he went about it. As an amateur historian, I am intrigued as to how this
man, with no formal military education, specialized training, or experience
conducted such a successful long term campaign. Our military spends years
training our junior and senior officers to conduct this type of warfare, and
still only a few are able to grasp its fundamentals, much less it's subtle
nuances that make it effective. We have a saying in the Special Operations
community, "some men pick the job and then some jobs pick the man."I think in
this case, it can safely be said it's both. Mosby proved that, unlike much of
the techniques and tactics of warfare which are trendy and time specific to an
era, the application of unconventional warfare is timeless.
Show Footnotes and
Bibliography
Footnotes
[1]. Wert, J.D. Mosby's Rangers . Simon & Schuster: New York, NY
1990 – pp. 25
[2]. Jones, V.C. Ranger Mosby, EPM Publications Inc.: McLean, VA 1944
– pp. 20
[3]. Jones, V.C. Ranger Mosby, EPM Publications Inc.: McLean, VA 1944
– pp. 25
[4]. Mosby, J.S. Mosby's Memoirs. J.S. Sanders 2nd Edition: Nashville,
TN 1997 – pp. 8
[5]. Jones, V.C. Ranger Mosby, EPM Publications Inc.: McLean, VA 1944
– pp. 25
[6]. Wert, J.D. Mosby's Rangers. Simon & Schuster: New York, NY
1990 – pp. 28
[7]. Wert, J.D. Mosby's Rangers. Simon & Schuster: New York, NY
1990 – pp. 28
[8]. Wert, J.D. Mosby's Rangers. Simon & Schuster: New York, NY
1990 – pp. 29
[9]. Wert, J.D. Mosby's Rangers. Simon & Schuster: New York, NY
1990 – pp. 29 - 30
[10]. Wert, J.D. Mosby's Rangers. Simon & Schuster: New York, NY
1990 – pp. 30
[11]. Wert, J.D. Mosby's Rangers. Simon & Schuster: New York, NY
1990 – pp. 30
[12]. Wert, J.D. Mosby's Rangers. Simon & Schuster: New York, NY
1990 – pp. 34
[13]. Mcraven, W.H. SpecOps: Case Studies in Special Operations Warfare: Theory
and Practice. Presidio Press: San Francisco, CA 1996 pp. 22
[14]. Wert, J.D. Mosby's Rangers. Simon & Schuster: New York, NY
1990 – pp. 35, 39
[15]. Mackey R.R. the Uncivil War; Irregular Warfare in the Upper South
1861-1865. University of Oklahoma Press: Oklahoma City, OK 2004 – pp.
81
[16]. Ward G. The Civil War, Random House: New York, NY 1994– pp.245,
Inset
[17]. Mackey R.R. the Uncivil War; Irregular Warfare in the Upper South
1861-1865. University of Oklahoma Press: Oklahoma City, OK 2004 – pp.
86
[18]. Wert, J.D. Mosby's Rangers. Simon & Schuster: New York, NY
1990 – Chapt. 13
[19]. Wert, J.D. Mosby's Rangers. Simon & Schuster: New York, NY
1990 – pp. 70
[20]. Mackey R.R. the Uncivil War; Irregular Warfare in the Upper South
1861-1865. University of Oklahoma Press: Oklahoma City, OK 2004 – pp.
18
[21]. Wert, J.D. Mosby's Rangers. Simon & Schuster: New York, NY
1990 – pp. 221
[22]. Wert, J.D. Mosby's Rangers. Simon & Schuster: New York, NY
1990 – pp. 290
[23]. U.S. War Department, The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the
Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, US War
Department, Vol 43, pt. 2 pp. 671-672.
[24]. Wert, J.D. Mosby's Rangers. Simon & Schuster: New York, NY
1990 – pp. 263
[25]. Wert, J.D. Mosby's Rangers. Simon & Schuster: New York, NY
1990 – pp. 282
[26]. Jones, V.C. Ranger Mosby, EPM Publications Inc.: McLean, VA 1944
– pp. 262
[27]. Wert, J.D. Mosby's Rangers. Simon & Schuster: New York, NY
1990 – pp. 286
[28]. Wert, J.D. Mosby's Rangers. Simon & Schuster: New York, NY
1990 – pp. 290
Copyright © 2008 Kryn Miner.
Written by Kryn Miner. If you have questions or comments on this article,
please contact Kryn Miner at:
kminer_rsg@hotmail.com.
About the author:
Born in Ticonderoga, NY Mr. Miner grew up in NYC.
A former member of the U.S. Army's Special Operations community, he is a recognized author and subject matter expert in the field of Force Protection and Anti-Terrorism, with over twenty years in the field. He has written for publications on the topic for several internationally recognized Organizations such as the National Tactical Officers Association.
Holding an AA in Political Science with a minor in history from The State University of NY at Columbia Greene,
and is working towards his BA in History from Fordham University with the goal of a Master's in Military History.
He is a member of the Phi Theta Kappa & Alpha Sigma Lambda National Honor Societies.
He lives in the Hudson Valley with his Wife of 14 years and their 4 children.
Published online: 04/20/2008.
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