For Want of a Nail: An Evaluation of the Confederate Ironclad's Construction
History, Service History, Tactical & Strategic Employment
by Larry Parker
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A little neglect may breed great mischief:
For want of a nail the shoe was lost,
For want of a shoe the horse was lost,
For want of a horse the rider was lost,
For want of a rider the battle was lost,
For want of a battle the Kingdom was lost,
And all for the want of a horseshoe nail.
Attributed to Benjamin Franklin
Poor Richard's Almanac of 1757
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Contents
I. Introduction
A. Thesis
B. Background
C. Relative Strengths and Weaknesses
II. 1861 – Lost Opportunities
III. 1862 – Triumph and Disaster
IV. 1863 – A Mortal Blow
V. 1864 – Lost Victories
VI. 1865 – Gotterdammerung
VII. Conclusion
VIII. Index of Confederate Ironclads
1862
A. Triumph at Vicksburg
B. Disaster at New Orleans
C. Hampton Roads – Naval History is Made
1863
A. Counterattack at Savannah
1864
A. Counterattack at Plymouth
B. The Fall of Savannah
C. Titans Clash in Mobile
1865
A. Richmond
B. Charleston
C. Mobile
D. Georgia
E. North Carolina
F. Louisiana
G. Europe
IX. Table of Shipbuilding Facilities Developed by CSA, 1861 - 1865
X. Bibliography
I. Introduction– "A little neglect may breed great mischief:"
A. Thesis.
"He is not impressed with the necessity of building ships." John N. Maffit
entered those prophetic words in his diary following a meeting with Jefferson
Davis shortly after the civil war began. Future Captain of the commerce raider CSS
Florida , Maffit was one of the first United States naval officers to
resign his commission and offer his services to the South. Those ten words make
a fitting epitaph for the Confederate States Navy, and with it, the Southern
cause.
In 1861, the Union Army mustered only 16,000 men. Worse, most of the regular
Army troops were scattered in small garrisons throughout the western
territories. In light of the North's initially weak position, General Winfield
Scott proposed a gigantic siege of the Confederacy. First, the navy would
establish a blockade of the Southern coast. Then, in joint operations the army
and the navy would seize control of the Mississippi River splitting the
Confederacy in two. This strategy would not only weaken the South but also give
the North time to mobilize its enormous resources. Northern forces would then
utilize the inland waterways and other natural invasion routes in simultaneous
and concentric campaigns to further subdivide and eventually crush the South.
His goal was to gain time to raise, train and equip overwhelming Union force
and to minimize casualties in hope of a more amicable restoration. Much derided
in the Northern press, Scott's "Anaconda" plan proved not only sound but also
remarkably prescient. The carnage of the various "on to Richmond" campaigns in
1861, 1862 and 1863 awoke the leaders North and South to the impact of the
rifled musket on the modern battlefield. After three years of great expectation
and repeatedly dashed hopes, President Lincoln finally found a leader in
General Grant with the ability and determination to successfully execute
Scott's much maligned strategy.
For the Confederacy, the only chance of survival lay in a protracted conflict
with eventual recognition by and assistance from England and/or France. Given
the superiority of weapons available over tactics in use at the time, a
decisive land battle leading to quick victory was highly unlikely. Strategic
defensive on land, wearing down the resolve of the North and gaining
recognition from Europe was, consequently, the best hope for Southern victory.
As John Keegan observes in Fields of Battle :
Given the Confederacy's strong natural frontiers, enormous size, and
intermittent connection with the national communications system, there were the
best of reasons for standing on the defensive, guarding the key points of
northern Virginia, the head of the Mississippi, New Orleans, and the Cumberland
or Tennessee rivers, while building up a navy to protect the coastline and
interrupt blockade, and, at the same time pressing by sober diplomacy for
recognition abroad.[1]
Successful execution of such a policy of strategic defensive required
preventing the Union blockade of Southern ports; thereby, allowing the export
of cotton to finance the war and import of vital war materials. For lack of
skilled manpower and industrial capacity, the South could not hope to match the
Union in construction of conventional ships. Success required a revolution in
technology. The Ironclad was that technological revolution. Like the British
with HMS Dreadnought in 1906, the Confederacy with its Ironclads had a
brief window of opportunity in 1861 to negate the Union fleet. Like the German
U-Boats in World War I, with the armies stalemated on land the potential war
winner, the Ironclad, was at sea. In view of her limited resources, a policy of
strategic defensive offered the best hope for Southern independence. The
Ironclad was essential to the execution of that policy.
Between April 1861 and April 1865, the South launched over two-dozen Ironclads.
During this same period, the Confederacy laid down or contracted for another
thirty-six Ironclads. This was in addition to numerous conventional warships,
commercial ships and river steamers, blockade-runners, commerce raiders,
gunboats and smaller craft. A prodigious effort by any standard, the extremely
limited shipbuilding and industrial capacity of the South in 1861 makes this
feat even more remarkable. Could this effort have been more successful, even
war winning? Reviewing the construction history, service history and eventual
fate of the Confederate Ironclad fleet will demonstrate the unrealized
potential of the Confederate Ironclad. This paper will examine those
fundamental policy changes and reallocation of resources necessary for a
Confederate victory in the American Civil War.
B. Background.
No review of the Confederate Navy would be complete without mention of the two
primary figures involved in its creation, struggle for survival and ultimate
demise.
Jefferson Davis did not seek the presidency of the Confederate States. A
graduate of West Point, class of 1828, Davis served in the North West from 1828
to 1833, fought in the Black Hawk war and left the army a Lieutenant. Resigning
his commission in 1835, he became a planter, read extensively and eventually
entered politics. Davis took a seat in Congress December 1845 only to resign in
1846 to re-enter military life at the outbreak of the Mexican – American war.
Joining his regiment in New Orleans he succeeded in arming them with the latest
percussion rifles, prepared a drill manual, devised tactics for employing the
new arm and drilled his officers and men diligently in its use. Thanks to his
thorough preparation, Davis added to Zachary Taylor's army one of its most
effective volunteer regiments. He led his well-disciplined command in a gallant
charge at Monterey, 21 September 1846, winning a brilliant victory in the
assault on Fort Teneria. At Buena Vista, his Mississippi riflemen and some
Indiana volunteers, expertly supported by a young artillery Captain named
Braxton Bragg, turned the course of battle into victory for the Americans with
a bold charge under heavy fire against a much larger body of Mexican troops.
Although severely wounded in the foot during this engagement Davis remained on
the field until victory was assured. General Taylor's dispatch of 6 March 1847
makes special mention of the courage, coolness under fire and successful
service of then Colonel Davis and his command. At the end of the war, President
Polk appointed Davis Brigadier General but he declined the commission. Davis
returned from the war a hero and soon re-entered political life. Sent to
Congress in 1847, he was an advocate of compromise in the increasing
factionalism between North and South. Appointed Secretary of War by his friend
in Congress and comrade in arms from the Mexican War President Pierce, Davis
served with distinction in that post. He returned to the Senate in 1857
acknowledged as a statesman in counsel, a leader of the people, ranking among
the most respected of living Americans. Until January 1861 he continued to
fight for compromise introducing a series of seven resolutions he hoped would
appease the factions and preserve the Union. When reason failed, Davis, like so
many others, reluctantly followed his state into secession. Governor Pettus of
Mississippi immediately commissioned Davis a Major General in overall command
of the state forces, a position he earnestly sought and for which he was
eminently qualified. A few weeks later however, Davis became President of the
Confederacy – a responsibility he earnestly shunned. Accepting his fate, Davis
fought for his new country with all the vigor and loyalty he had once given the
Union. Davis devoted most of his time and energy organizing an army. His years
at West Point, service in Mexico and experience as Pierce's very capable
Secretary of War served him well in this work. Unfortunately for the Southern
cause, in times of crisis, this frustrated Major General frequently interfered
with his generals in the field, often changing or countermanding their orders.
Furthermore, Davis never fully appreciated the critical role the Confederate
States Navy, especially the Ironclad, would have to play if the South were to
survive. From his landlocked point of view, Davis could not understand the
importance of sea power. Davis was astute enough to appoint his former
colleague in the Senate, Stephen Mallory, Secretary of the Navy but not astute
enough to give him the support he needed to help the Confederate Navy realize
its full potential.
If Jefferson Davis was well suited by training and experience to organize the
Confederate Army, Stephen Mallory was equally well qualified to develop the
Confederate Navy. The Mallory family moved to Key West, Florida in 1820 when
Stephen was nine. From 1830 to 1834, he read the law, specializing in Admiralty
Law and passed the Bar in 1834. Appointed Customs Inspector for Key West in
1833, while still a student, Mallory left that post to take command of a small
vessel in the war against the Seminole Indians in 1836. Returning to private
life Mallory served as county judge from 1837 –1845. At that time, he resumed
his post as Customs Collector at Key West. Elected to the United States Senate
in 1850, Mallory returned for a second term in 1856. Appointed Chairman of the
Naval Affairs Committee in 1853 Mallory became a major spokesman for naval
personnel policy reform, a vocal proponent of naval power and a dedicated
advocate of new technology. During this period, Mallory strongly supported the
Stephens Battery, an early attempt to create a seagoing ironclad warship. Its
design called for an armored casemate and an armament of heavy rifled guns.
Ignored by the pre-war U. S. Navy, the Stephens Battery became the prototype
Confederate Ironclad. Like Davis, Mallory opposed secession. He reluctantly
resigned his seat in the Senate 21 January 1861 after Florida left the Union.
Recognizing his experience, Davis lost no time appointing Mallory Secretary of
the Navy. He was confirmed 4 March 1861. Realizing the enormity of his task,
Mallory, in turn, lost no time organizing the nascent Confederate Navy.
Mallory faced a daunting task. According to the 1860 census the southern
population was 9 million, the northern 20 million. White males aged 15 – 40
numbered 1,140,000 in the south, 4,070,000 in the North. Industrially the
statistics were even worse. The north had 110,000 manufacturing plants of all
kinds, the south 18,000 – 1,300,000 industrial workers compared to 110,000.
Massachusetts alone produced over sixty per cent more manufactured goods than
the entire Confederacy. Pennsylvania produced nearly twice as much. New York
produced more than twice. Only in land area did the south exceed the north –
780,000 square miles compared to 670,000 square miles. However, the north had
22,000 miles of railway to move men and material, the south only 9000. From his
days in the Senate Mallory knew his navy would always be inferior in numbers of
ships. He also understood the South would never be able to match the industrial
capacity of the North. Fully realizing the enormous odds against them, the
former Senator from Florida and Chairman of the United States Naval Affairs
Committee drew upon that experience to quickly develop a five part naval
strategy designed to give the Confederacy a fighting chance. His overall
strategy is summarized as follows:
1. Construction at home or purchase abroad of Ironclad ships for defense of
major ports and inland waterways.
2. Construction or purchase of conventional ships of the line to serve as
commerce raiders. (By preying upon the North's merchant fleet, Mallory hoped to
disrupt or, at least, discomfort the Northern economy and draw off blockading
ships).
3. Arming all Confederate naval vessels with large caliber rifled guns of the
type invented by Lieutenant John Mercer Brooke.
4. Establishment of shipyards and ironworks to support construction goals.
5. Placement of the best people in key positions. A system of promotions and
appointments based on demonstrated courage and merit replaced the United States
Navy tradition of promotion based on seniority.
When President Lincoln called for 75,000 volunteers, President Davis countered
with a call for 100,000, authorized Privateering and began issuing letters of
Marque and Reprisal. President Lincoln responded by proclaiming a blockade of
the southern coast. It soon became evident the North also intended to split the
Confederacy in two with a thrust down the Mississippi culminating at New
Orleans. This necessitated the addition of four more items to Mallory's naval
strategy:
6. Construction or purchase of blockade-runners to export cotton and bring in
vital war materials.
7. Increased emphasis on Confederate built Ironclad vessels to protect vital
ports and European built Ironclads to break the blockading Union fleet.
8. The addition of gunboats and torpedo warfare (naval mines laid in static
fields or delivered by submersibles or torpedo launches) to supplement the
Ironclads.
9. Increased navy interest in costal fortifications, up to this point a
function of the Army, State or local militia.
To implement his strategy, Mallory organized the Confederate Navy into four
offices. These offices were equivalent to the bureaus of the United States Navy
with which he was familiar. The Office of Provisions and Clothing
responsibilities included manufacturing, acquiring and distributing uniforms
and equipment to the Navy. It also acted as Paymaster to all Officers, sailors,
contractors and civilian employees. The Office of Medicine and Surgery saw to
the health of the sailors and set up Naval Hospitals. The Office of Orders and
Detail oversaw the Navy's paperwork, made personnel assignments and set
personnel policies. Lastly, the Office of Ordnance and Hydrography was charged
with design, construction and armament of naval vessels. As the war evolved, a
Submarine Battery Service was added to develop and fully employ torpedo (mine)
warfare. A Secret Service was also added to the Navy Department. This office
was not concerned with gathering military intelligence as its name might
indicate. Its function involved procuring warships and associated supplies and
equipment abroad. Mallory did not favor privateering because it alienated the
English and eroded their support. In an attempt to regulate this segment of the
war effort, Mallory organized all personnel into Regular Navy, Volunteer Navy
or Provisional Navy billets.
C. Relative Strengths and Weaknesses
In 1860, the population of the twenty-three states remaining in the Union
numbered approximately 20 million. The population of the eleven seceding states
was 9 million, out of which 3.5 million were slaves. Two factors mitigate this
huge disparity in numbers. The labor of the 3.5 million slaves allowed a
greater percentage of white Southern males to serve while almost half of the
Union forces were employed in garrisons or guarding lines of supply. Of the
remaining Union forces, almost half served in some logistical or other support
element. Given further reductions for illness, leave, etc. at any given time
only one quarter of the men in blue were actually available for front line
combat. Still it was rare for a Confederate force to come close to parity much
less outnumber a Union force.
Geographically the balance of power was a toss up. The South's 3600 nautical
mile coast line with 10 major ports and 180 inlets, bays and river mouths would
be difficult to defend but equally difficult to blockade. The Appalachian
Mountains gave some protection to Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina and
Georgia. The Mississippi River, her tributaries and numerous other inland
waterways were natural supply lines and therefore tempting routes of invasion.
They were also natural barriers, which in the age of the rifled musket greatly
enhanced defense. The lack of improved roads and limited railway net (only ten
southern seaports had rail connections; of those only six had interstate rail
connections) in the South that hampered strategic movement of troops, supplies
and vital war materials also limited any Union offensives into those areas.
Geographically then victory would go to him who could first, best and most
wisely utilize the natural features of the land.
In 1860, the South produced 3 per cent of the nation's firearms, 6 per cent of
its cloth and overall only 1 per cent of the nations total industrial output.
Granted, it would take some time for the North to mobilize its industrial base.
Despite Herculean efforts, limited manufacturing capability of all types was
one area that would plague the Confederacy throughout the war. Most telling was
the South's dependency upon the North for locomotives, rolling stock, rails,
boilers and steam engines. Only unrestricted trade with Europe could overcome
the deficiency in industrial capacity, especially heavy industry, and skilled
labor.
II. 1861 – Lost Opportunities
When the war began the Union navy numbered, on paper at least, ninety ships.
Forty-eight were unfit to go to sea, in extended lay up or in shipyards for
overhaul and, therefore, not immediately available. That left forty-two vessels
in active commission. Of those forty-two, only twenty-four were modern steam
powered vessels. Eighteen of those were on foreign station and would take some
time to recall. This left six modern steam ships and eighteen older sailing
vessels to initially implement President Lincoln's blockade. Other sources
state, of the ninety vessels on the Navy Register in 1861, forty-eight were
unfit and twenty-eight were on foreign station, leaving only fourteen
immediately available for blockade duty. In either case, the Union and
Confederate navies were as close to parity as they would ever come. Within four
years, the Union would purchase 418 warships and construct an additional 208
(including 65 Ironclads). The Union navy would peak at 670 vessels, crewed by
51,500 officers and men, but that was years away. (During this same period, the
Confederacy built or purchased 130 vessels and peaked at 5200 officers and
men.) In 1861, there was a brief opportunity for the Confederacy to seize the
initiative.
Confederate Secretary of the Navy, Stephen Mallory was well aware of this rare
and fleeting opportunity. When established 21 February 1861 the Confederate
navy consisted of the Fulton, an old side wheel steam ship built in 1837 and
laid up at Pensacola for repairs, four captured revenue cutters, three
commandeered slave ships and two small steamers – a total of ten ships mounting
fifteen guns. Even by incorporating the state navies Mallory could not hope to
match even fourteen Union men of war currently ready for duty, much less those
that would rapidly become available. Mallory further realized the Confederacy
could never hope to match the Union in manpower or industrial output.
Therefore, as early as 26 April 1861 he wrote:
I propose to adopt a class of vessels hitherto unknown to naval service. The
perfection of a warship would doubtless be a combination of the greatest known
ocean speed, with the greatest known floating battery and power of
resistance.[2]
On 10 May 1861, Mallory clarified his intentions in a letter to the Chairman of
the House Committee on Naval Affairs stating:
I regard the possession of an iron-armored ship as a matter of the first
necessity. Such a vessel at this time could traverse the entire coast of the
United States, prevent all blockades, and encounter, with a fair prospect of
success, their entire navy. If we cope with them upon the sea we follow their
example and build wooden ships, we shall have to construct several at one time;
for one or two ships would fall an easy prey to her comparatively numerous
steam frigates. But inequality of numbers may be compensated by
invulnerability; and thus not only does economy but naval success dictate the
wisdom and expediency of fighting with iron against wood, without regard to
first cost.[3]
Accordingly, construction of Ironclads began at Norfolk, New Orleans and
Memphis. Almost immediately, the weakness of the Southern economy became
apparent. In a parallel effort, agents were dispatched overseas to purchase
European armored vessels. The French and English were not anxious to sell their
most modern and powerful warships to an untested Confederacy. Negotiations
began for construction of others but the South would have to act quickly before
neutrality laws became an issue
Jefferson Davis did not share Mallory's appreciation of the vital role of sea
power. Davis chose to ignore the critical precautionary statement "without
regard to first cost." The first setback for the infant Confederate navy came
with the first budgets. From April 1861 to August 1862, congress allocated over
$330,000,000 to the army. Less than $15,000,000 was budgeted for the navy. To
make matters worse, the navy did not have direct control of its funds. After
negotiating with contractors at home or agents overseas for purchases, it had
to apply to the Treasury Department for payment. This added layer of
unnecessary bureaucracy was more than inconvenient. The payment delays it
caused would shortly prove critical. In spite of Mallory's best efforts, only
seven Ironclads were laid down in 1861. Of those seven, only the Manassas
, a commandeered privateer, saw action in the opening year of the war.
In addition, at the beginning of the war the Union retained Fortress Monroe in
Virginia, Forts Taylor and Jefferson at Key West and Fort Pickens near
Pensacola. On 29 August, Union forces under Flag Officer Stringham and General
Butler captured Forts Hatteras and Clark closing Pamlico Sound. The Confederacy
lost use of almost two hundred miles of North Carolina coastal waters in this
one action. In September, Ship Island, between Mobile and New Orleans fell to
Union forces. On 7 November, Flag Officer DuPont captured Port Royal, South
Carolina south of Charleston. In the euphoria following First Manassas, the
implication of these defeats was lost on Davis and the Confederate government.
The Union gained bases and anchorages necessary to implement an effective
blockade in the event of a prolonged war. In the hubris following First
Manassas however, few anticipated a prolonged war. It was not an auspicious
beginning for the infant Confederate navy.
III. 1862 – Triumph and Disaster
When completed promptly, the ironclads of 1862 served with distinction.
Enduring some of the most brutal combat of the war, they routed or held at bay
Union fleets twenty times their number. Gallant as they were, their careers
were altogether too brief. In addition, the capture of Forts Henry and Donelson
in February and Island Number Ten in April opened the Tennessee, Cumberland and
Mississippi Rivers to Union invasion. Natchez, Vicksburg and Memphis were now
vulnerable to Union attack. The loss of Roanoke Island in February, Fernandina,
St. Augustine, Jacksonville and New Bern in March, Fort Pulaski in April and
Norfolk in May was an unmitigated disaster for the Confederate Navy. Their loss
gave the Union an unbroken chain of bases, anchorages and coaling stations from
Fort Monroe to New Orleans to serve the blockading fleet. Only Wilmington,
Charleston and Mobile remained open to commerce. Most grievous was the loss of
New Orleans. Diplomatically, it discouraged the ambitions of Napoleon III in
Mexico and, with them, possible support of the South. It lifted Northern morale
in a year bereft of major Union victories. Second only to New York in
population, wealth and commerce, the Crescent City should have been defended
with the same tenacity as Richmond later in the war. Instead, the 30,000 troops
raised, trained and equipped in the first year of the rebellion served in
Tennessee and Virginia. Only 3,000 local militia, two incomplete forts and one
immobile Ironclad faced Admiral Farragut in April 1862. For the Confederate
navy, New Orleans' considerable shipbuilding potential would never be realized.
Coupled with the loss of Norfolk, Southern shipbuilding efforts were
drastically set back. Many claim the war was lost on 24 April 1862. The Seven
Days battle in June, Second Manassas in August and Fredericksburg in December
blinded the Richmond government to all this however. On land they still felt
invincible. The loss of a few ships and coastal fortifications, even the loss
of New Orleans, were of little consequence in their view.
IV. 1863 – A Mortal Blow
The loss of so many ports, islands and fortifications along the Southern coast
had three main effects. One, it tightened the blockade making import of vital
war materials more problematic. In 1861 the chances of avoiding the blockade
were 1 in 9. In 1862 the odds dropped to 1 in 7. Now they fell to 1 in 4. Two,
the presence of Union forces in North Carolina threatened the Wilmington and
Weldon railroad, the principal supply line of Lee's Army of Northern Virginia.
Three, the very real threat of raids or invasion by Union forces now stationed
in those areas pushed the Confederate shipbuilding effort inland, fragmenting
and greatly reducing its efficiency. Naval works were established in such
unlikely places as Atlanta, Columbus, Selma, Montgomery, and Charlotte.
Ironclads were constructed in clearings along riverbanks. These ‘shipyards'
consisted of forges requisitioned from local plantations, employing those
blacksmiths and carpenters not yet enlisted in the army. While relatively safe
from Union incursion, these out of the way places suffered from a lack of
transportation connections. Materials, if they could be found, were difficult
to deliver. Vital supplies often sat for months in warehouses awaiting
shipment. Finding skilled labor in remote locations further slowed an already
slow process. Many of the carpenters, ironworkers, machinists and mechanics
desperately needed by the Navy were already serving in the Army. Secretary
Mallory made repeated request for their release. Without Jefferson Davis'
support, those requests were largely ignored. If delayed until late summer when
water levels fell, many vessels were unable to reach their intended area of
operation until the fall rains came. Hence, only one major naval engagement,
involving ironclad the Atlanta , took place in 1863.
On land, the defeat at Gettysburg ended Confederate offensive operations in the
North. Without an Ironclad to help protect her Vicksburg also fell. Of the two,
the surrender of Vicksburg proved most decisive. As President Lincoln observed
in 1861, "The Mississippi is the backbone of the Rebellion. It is the key to
the whole situation." Control of the Mississippi gave the Union great freedom
of operation. Cut off from the rest of the Confederacy, Texas, Arkansas and
Louisiana could be largely ignored. The loss of troops and supplies from those
areas severely impacted the remainder of the Confederacy in its ability to
continue the war.
IV. 1864 – Lost Victories
The Confederate Ironclads of 1864 also served with distinction keeping vital
ports open until the last days of the conflict. Had they been augmented with
only a few sister ships in the first year of the war, the outcome of the
rebellion might have been considerably different. Time was running out for the
Confederacy, however.
As Mallory observed:
The United States have a constructed Navy; we have a Navy to construct…but
naval defenses of a country have ever necessarily been of tardy growth, and in
this age, when the steam engine is as essential to the warship as her
battery…the difficulties, delays, and expenses of creating a navy are
immeasurably multiplied and increased.[4]
Compounded by the calamities of war, those ‘difficulties' included:
* An underdeveloped, decentralized and fragmented industrial base
* An inadequate, and rapidly deteriorating, transportation system
* A lack of skilled labor exacerbated by a bureaucratic payment method leading
to strikes and short sided army personnel policies, which the Davis government
refused to correct
* A lack of experienced seamen
* An inadequate coastal defense causing
the loss, destruction or transfer inland to less
efficient sites of industrial facilities
the destruction of numerous Ironclads before
completion
* States rights (many states withheld vital troops and supplies)[5]
* Allocation of funds to the Army and Navy
* Poor policy decisions such as the cotton embargo, authorizing privateers and,
even, the location of the Confederate capitol
* An overly aggressive strategy on land. (Lee and a virulent Southern press
persuaded Davis to forego the defensive posture he initially favored)
As a result, many Confederate Ironclads did not survive the prolonged
construction process. Those actually commissioned required fifteen months or
more to complete. Their opponents required six months or less from keel laying
to combat.
1865 – Gotterdammerung
New technology is a double-edged sword. On the one hand it can give a country a
decisive advantage. On the other hand, developing and applying new technology
takes time. For the South in 1861, steam powered, armored warships were the key
to victory but they were not granted the time to develop them. Union incursions
into vital areas resulted in a fragmented construction system. In the case of
the CSS Jackson, her boilers and engines were manufactured in
Columbus; her shafting came from Charlotte, her cannon from Selma, the sights
from Atlanta and the carriages from Charleston. All depended upon an
increasingly unreliable railroad controlled by the army. The army's first
priority, naturally, was delivery of food, uniforms, ammunition and powder to
her units in the field. Skilled labor is also required for new technology.
There too, a short sighted army was increasingly reluctant to release soldiers,
no matter how urgently needed by the navy or how vital to the country. A total
lack of standardization also made completion of Confederate Ironclads in a
timely manner impossible. No two Confederate ships were exactly alike. While
ingenious and necessary, using the boilers from one ship, the engines from
another, the shafting and propellers from yet another and whatever labor was
available meant each ship was unique. Each part required custom fitting. Each
vessel varied drastically in quality. The shortage of such basic items as
oakum, nails and bolts often halted construction. When (if) completed, fitting
out with anchors, chain, line, and other naval supplies could add weeks, if not
months. Officers were plentiful; trained crews were not. The Confederacy proved
remarkably innovative and made great strides in four years but the South ran
out of time. In the case of the Jackson , she never fired a shot in
anger. After two years of effort, just weeks prior to completion, raiding Union
cavalry destroyed her. Resourceful and resolute to last, the Confederate navy
could not overcome the inherent weakness of the Southern industrial base and
the forces arrayed against it. In the end, it was too little, too late.
VII. Conclusion
Excellent records exist on many Confederate Ironclads. Others are extremely
sketchy. Many of the specifications in the index, therefore, are approximate.
When in doubt, I have indicated them as ‘uncertain' or ‘unknown'. In my
research, I found at least partial records on sixty Confederate Ironclads.
Their fate is listed as follows:
Lost due to accident – 3
Surrendered – 4
Captured – 3
Impounded – 4
Destroyed to prevent capture – 20
Never completed – 25
It is interesting to note that only one Confederate Ironclad
was sunk in combat. Although roughly constructed and crude compared to Union
vessels, the Confederate Ironclad was undeniably effective. The impact of just
one Ironclad at Vicksburg, Hampton Roads, Mobile and Plymouth is well
documented. Where they served in squadrons (Richmond, Charleston, Savannah) the
cities they protected held out, in spite of overwhelming Union naval force,
until the last days of the war when taken from the land.
If the Confederacy had fought a war of defensive maneuver on land, conserving
her resources and giving up space for time as Joe Johnston did in the Atlanta
campaign, the price of Union victory might have been too high. The will of the
North was a fragile thing. Without the victories at Gettysburg and Vicksburg,
the election of 1864 could have gone to someone willing to recognize the South.
In conjunction with a strategy of defensive maneuver on land, if Jefferson
Davis had given greater support to the Confederate Navy, without question a
greater number of Ironclads would have been completed and seen action much
earlier in the conflict. Their presence would have prevented or, at least,
delayed opening of the Mississippi to Union invasion; the capture of Vicksburg,
New Orleans, Mobile and the South's other major ports. As far as overseas
commerce was concerned, the average life expectancy of a blockade-runner was
four and one half voyages. Weakening, much less, eliminating the Federal
blockade would have increased the import of vital war materials, no doubt
prolonged the war and made European intervention more likely.
But the outcome of any war is far more than numbers, resources and industry;
all of which the Confederacy lacked. It is also the story of personalities and
politics. Short sighted political decisions, an overly aggressive military
strategy, poor economic decisions (such as the embargo of cotton), unfavorable
manpower and monetary allocations and lack of appreciation for and support of
the navy doomed the Confederate Ironclad as much as any lack of resources,
industry or manpower. Ben Franklin's cautionary tale certainly applies. Stephen
Mallory made perhaps the best assessment of the Confederate navy however:
I am satisfied that, with the means at our control and in view of the
overwhelming force of the enemy at the outset of the struggle, our little navy
accomplished more than could have been looked or hoped for; and if I have ever
felt any surprise connected with its operations, it was that we accomplished so
much.[6]
Footnotes
[1]. John Keegan, Fields of Battle (New York: Vintage Books, 1995),
206
[2]. Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies in the War of the
Rebellion , Ser. II, Vol. II, 51
[3]. Ibid., 67-69
[4]. Report of the Secretary of the Navy to the President, 27 February 1862
[5]. Ironically one of the major causes of the secession would be one of the
major downfalls of the Confederacy.
[6]. Letter from Mallory to Rochelle, 21 May 1867
Bibliography
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Copyright © 2005 Larry Parker
Written by Larry Parker. If you have questions or comments on this
article, please contact Larry Parker at:
 lknpark2004@yahoo.com.
About the Author:
Lieutenant Commander Larry Parker, United States Navy, served as a Surface Warfare Officer, with afloat tours onboard USS De Wert (FFG-45) as
Ordnance & Fire Control Officer, USS Portland (LSD-37) as First Lieutenant, and USS Butte (AE-27) as Operations Officer.
Rotations ashore included Navy Reserve Center Cheyenne, Navy & Marine Corps Reserve Center Denver and Navy Reserve Readiness
Command Region 16 Minneapolis. He retired in July 2000 and taught Navy Junior ROTC until June 2011. LCDR Parker holds a Bachelor's
degree in English and History from the University of Kansas and a Master's degree in Military Studies - Land Warfare from American Military University.
In his free time LCDR Parker pursues a lifelong passion for military history. His articles are the result of extensive research and personal
experience in surface warfare, fleet logistics and amphibious operations.
Published online: 11/06/2005.
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