Battle of Chickamauga - Part 2
by Rick Byrd
The Second Day of Battle - Saturday, September 20, 1863
September 20, 1863, dawned cold and foggy along the banks of the Chickamauga. A
thick frost blanketed the ground. Smoke from the previous day's battle mingled
with fog hanging heavily amid the trees. Polk arose, fully expecting at any
second to hear the boom of cannon which was to open Hill's attack, but all was
strangely silent. Only then did Polk learn that Fisher had been unable to
locate Hill. He was outraged. Polk ordered Captain Frank Wheless to ride forth
and inform Cleburne and Breckenridge that they were to attack immediately. On
the way, he was to inform Cheatham to advance along with Cleburne and
Breckenridge. As Wheless rode across Alexander's Bridge and into the fog, Polk
sat down to eat his breakfast. When Wheless found Cheatham, he discovered that
he was as perplexed as Polk as to why the attack had not begun.
Bragg too, waited anxiously, but in vain, for the sound of battle. He sent
Major Pollack Lee of his staff to locate Polk immediately and find out why the
attack was being delayed. Soon, Lee returned and told Bragg that he had found
Polk casually eating his breakfast. The news that Polk was eating when he
should have been attacking enraged Bragg, and the commanding general decided to
ride forward and have a word with him personally. No doubt it appeared to Bragg
that his subordinates once again had succeeded in defying his orders.
As Bragg set off to find Polk, Wheless found Hill, Breckenridge, and Cleburne
standing around a fire a few hundred yards behind Cleburne's lines. It was now
6:00 a.m. Snubbing Hill, Wheless would only show the orders to Cleburne and
Breckenridge, but he did inform Hill that Polk had been looking for him to
report for over six hours. After reading them, Cleburne handed the orders to
Hill. They said nothing about making an attack at dawn, however. The
instructions were for the attack to be staged as soon as practicable. Hill
informed Wheless that the men were receiving their rations, and that he would
wait until this activity, which would perhaps take an hour, had been completed
before assembling his men to attack. Also, Hill knew of a problem with the
alignment of some of the forces. Cheatham's right was perpendicular to
Cleburne's left, thus making a simultaneous attack along this section of the
line impossible. Hill wrote Polk a brief note saying that he had tried, but had
been unable to find Polk, and that his men were receiving their rations. He
also informed him that the enemy had been constructing defenses throughout the
night, and now occupied a position so strong that he felt it could not be
taken. Wheless took the note, and hurried off.
On his way back to headquarters, Wheless ran into Polk, who was just then
riding to the front. He read him Hill's note, and informed Polk that unless he
went personally to Hill, he felt Hill would not attack for several hours. This
was around 6:45 a.m. Just moments after Polk's departure, the furious Bragg
arrived on-scene. Wheless brought Bragg up to speed on all he had learned. The
two also discussed the news about the enemy constructing defenses in front of
Cleburne's position. Each moment of delay now was a precious gift of time which
the Yankees were sure to take advantage of.
Polk at last had a chance to speak to Hill, when he located him at 7:45 a.m..
Daylight was wasting, and the battlefield was still silent. The agitated Polk
ordered Hill to attack at once, then rode off, for a time, to a location that
remains a mystery. One wonders what Hill's mood must have been when about 15
minutes later, Bragg himself arrived at Hill's location. He berated Hill for
delaying the attack in order to distribute rations. Hill for his part,
truthfully it should be noted, informed Bragg that this was the first he'd
heard of any order which called for an attack at dawn. Bragg also complained
openly about Polk and the leisurely breakfast he had taken, despite being aware
that the attack was not being initiated as planned. He ordered Hill to attack
at once, and rode off.
Bragg knew nothing of the situation relating to the problems with the lines of
Cheatham and Cleburne, and Polk, even at this late hour, had made no effort to
straighten it out. Eventually, Cheatham personally informed the commanding
general of the taint in the placement, and Bragg ordered him in reserve. Polk,
a short time later, ordered Walker northwards in support Cleburne.
As the morning wore on, back at the Union left, Thomas was managing to solidify
his Kelly Field position and get some reserves into place. Following the war,
one of Thomas' division commanders admitted that if the rebel attack had begun
at first light as Bragg originally intended, the position would have been
quickly taken. Had this occurred, it seems likely that the entire Army of the
Cumberland would have been destroyed. But not so now, as the yankee's had in
fact been using the time stemming from the delay of the attack to build a line
of low breastworks in front of the Kelly Field salient. Still, Thomas remained
very concerned about the Federal left. He decided to extend the line further
north, where the La Fayette Road intersected with the Reed's Bridge Road. He
called for his final reserve division, that of Negley, to be put into the line
upon the left of his position. Perhaps as an indicator of his anxiety, Thomas
made the imprudent decision of putting the first of Negley's brigades to arrive
immediately into the line alone. This was around 9:00 a.m. He shook out the men
of the brigade from his left flank northward to the intersection, expecting
that the rest of Negley's force would arrive and deploy into line before the
fighting started. He was wrong. At that instant, at 9:30 a.m, the popping sound
of musket fire and the sharp boom of cannon split through the frigid morning
air. The attack which the Confederates had for hours been trying to initiate,
had finally begun.
Breckenridge, who a few years earlier had been Vice President of the United
States, opened the Confederate attack, his left flank following the Reed's
Bridge Road, in the woods to the south. Two of his three brigades were well to
the north of the Kelly Field salient, yet the lone brigade of Negley's
division, which had been put into line by Thomas, was caught unawares in the
advance of the Confederate brigades of Brigadier Generals Dan Adams, and
Marcellus Stovall. Isolated, Negley's men were quickly torn to pieces in the
fury of Breckenridge's attack. Reaching the La Fayette Road, Breckenridge
realized that he was beyond the Union left. This was precisely the prized
position the Confederates had been hoping to gain all along. He faced his two
brigades from the west to the south, on either side of the La Fayette road, and
lead them on an assault that was to crash directly into the left flank and rear
of Thomas's position, which he reached at 10:30 a.m.
In the meantime, Breckenridge's third brigade, commanded by Brigadier General
Benjamin Helm, whose wife was Mary Todd Lincoln's sister, was having a terrible
time of things. His regiments struck west across the Alexander's Bridge Road at
the left of Thomas's position east of the Kelly Field. His brigade was known as
the "Orphan Brigade" due to the fact that it was made up of Kentuckian's who
chose to fight for the Confederacy. It has been noted that Helm was perhaps the
only rebel commander who President Lincoln took a personal interest in, as he
was after all, the President's Brother-In-Law. Helm's brigade separated in the
confusion and white smoke of the battle, with the right elements drifting off
beyond the left of Thomas' line. With the men remaining to him, Helm bravely
assaulted the position once and yet again. At one point he advanced to within
forty yards of the enemy line. Try as he might, however, he could not break
through the Federal position. Remarkably he managed to continue the fight for
over 30 minutes. In a third valiant attempt to shatter the line, Helm was stuck
by a bullet which tore through his right shoulder. The wound was mortal, and
Helm died a short time after he was removed from the field. Lincoln was said to
be visibly aggrieved upon receiving the news of Helm's death.
Meanwhile, Breckenridge continued down the La Fayette Road. The brigade which
he had broken belonged to Brigadier General John Beatty, of Negley's division.
Beatty frantically called for help from the other brigades of the division, but
they could not leave the line to aide him, because the troops which were to
replace Negley's men, belonging to General Thomas J. Wood's division, had not
arrived to relieve them. Wood, who was in reserve to the south on McCook's
line, had been ordered to move to the left at 7:00 a.m., but had not complied
with the order. McCook's line he felt, would have dangerously thinned had he
moved as Rosecrans ordered, and it is possible that this command was a telling
sign of Rosecrans fatigue. Obviously the concern for the left ran high. When
Rosecrans learned of the situation, he sought Wood out personally, and upon
reaching him, yelled at him in front of his troops. Rosecrans lost his
composure, screaming at Wood that his negligence in complying with his orders
had endangered the entire army. He ordered Wood into line at once. Still, Wood
dragged his feet apparently, as it took him some time to get into position in
the Brotherton Field, where upon his arrival, Negley's men were finally freed,
and rushed north to the aid of Thomas.
Meanwhile on the left, Cleburne had opened his attack against the Kelly Field
salient, coming into line just south of where Helm had staged his ill-fated
assault. Due to the confusion created by Polk's negligence overnight, Cleburne,
who had been unaware that he was to attack that morning until the last minute,
had been forced to hastily organize his troops. The attack was not well
coordinated, and many of the troops hit the Federal line unsupported, and
unclear as to what they were actually supposed to do. Some units struck the
position with their flank completely exposed, as they mistakenly believed they
were to strike the line oblique. The result was predictably grim. One of the
brigade commanders on this part of the line, General James Deshler, was struck
directly in the chest by a piece of shrapnel which completely ripped his heart
from his body. Soon Cleburne's men were relegated to taking cover behind trees
and firing into the enemy lines with little effect.
At this moment, 10:30 a.m., as Thomas frantically tried to fight off Cleburne's
attack along his front, Breckenridge, with the brigades of Stovall and Adams
straddling the La Fayette Road, arrived in the rear of the position. Union
reserves arrested his advance on the west side of the road, but on the east
side, Breckenridge's men advanced to the tree line bordering the north edge of
the Kelly Field. It was soon a slaughter yard. Men were shot down at an
unbelievable rate. Those not injured ran in every direction, and it appeared
for a time that the assault would totally shatter Thomas's position. Yet the
brave men of Colonel Ferdinand Van Deveer's brigade arrived on the scene in the
nick of time. Moving east, and taking a murderous fire on their left flank as
they reached the La Fayette Road, Van Deveer crossed the road and upon gaining
the field, ordered his men to wheel to the left. An extremely difficult and
deadly maneuver under fire, Van Deveer's men followed the order with great
discipline and bravery. Upon completion, both the rebels and the yankee's
poured volley after volley into each other's lines for several minutes.
Suddenly, and without orders, the German commander of the 9th Ohio regiment,
Colonel August Kammerling, ordered his men to fix bayonettes and charge the
Confederate line. They passed through the lines of the 2nd Minnesota infantry
in their impetuous charge, and were soon joined by these men, the entire
brigade being swept forward in the frenzy of battle. The officers looked on,
blinked in amazement at the spontaneous charge, and hurried along to catch up
with the men. Breckenridge's line melted away, and the men of Van Deveer's
brigade chased them all the way back to the Reed's Bridge Road. The Union left
held.
Interestingly, events may have turned out differently here had Hill taken up
Polk and Walker on an offer they made to him of two divisions, shortly after
Helm's brigade was repulsed, just as Breckenridge was making his way into the
Federal rear. The failure of Helm and of Cleburne's troops to break through the
Kelly Field salient and join forces with Breckenridge, opened a yawning gap in
the middle of his corps. He very quickly developed an obsessive worry about
filling it. Polk and Walker offered Hill four brigades from the Reserve Corps,
but strangely, Hill said he only wanted one brigade, that of Brigadier General
States Right's Gist (yes, that was his real name). Hill heard that Gist had
arrived on the field earlier that morning from Catoosa station. After the
battle, Breckenridge complained that Hill's failure to support the brigades of
Stovall and Adams led to his failure in breaking the Federals from the rear.
Had Hill taken the four brigades offered him, he could have reinforced
Breckenridge and had plenty of men left over to fill the gap in his line. Yet
Hill had heard grand reports about Gist's effectiveness, and insisted on having
his lone brigade instead. Polk and Walker assented to the request.
Gist's men had marched all night following a mission they were assigned to the
previous afternoon behind the lines, and Gist informed Hill that the brigade
was in no condition for an attack. Yet Hill insisted on attacking the salient
again, in the same general area where Helm had met his untimely end. Colonel
Peyton Colquitt, who had been placed in charge of the brigade after Gist was
given command of Walker's corps, rode forward with his men. Yet the Union
position was even stronger now than it was when Helm had made his assault, and
Colquitt quickly met with a similar fate. The brigade was repulsed. Colquitt
was killed. Efforts by the brigades of Colonel Claudius Wilson, and Brigadier
General Matthew Ector to assist Colquitt's men were ineffectual, as was Govan's
attempt, made about this time, to get around the left of the salient and aid
Stovall and Adams. At this point, the Confederates had pretty much fought
themselves out on this portion of the field. Thomas was managing, desperately
but effectively, to hang on.
Although it was beginning to look like it would be a long and tragic day for
the Confederates, the fighting here did have one positive effect, an aspect
that they could not be aware of during the final moments of Govan's failed
attempt to get around the Federal left. The success of Breckenridge had caused
Thomas to consistently call for units to leave the line to the south, along the
La Fayette Road, in the area of the Poe Field and the Brotherton Field, and
rush north to help him in a frantic effort to shore up his position. Captain
Stanford Kellogg, Thomas's Nephew, was dispatched to Brigadier General John M.
Brannan, whose division was in position in the woods west of the La Fayette
Road, opposite the Poe Field, with an order for Brannan to move north. Reynolds
was in line to the north of Brannan's position, General Thomas Wood was in line
to the south. Brannan, aware that his reserves had been called away to the aid
of Thomas earlier, sought Reynolds advice about pulling out, for obviously his
removal would open a large gap in the line. Reynolds, who was unaware that Wood
had moved up into line to replace Negley, gave his approval that the request be
honored, and he wished Brannan luck. Reynolds already had a great deal of
experience here at Chickamauga fighting with one, if not both, flanks in the
air. At that moment, there was no firing on his part of the line however, and
Reynolds was as concerned as Thomas was about the heavy fighting upon the Union
left. As a precaution, Reynolds sent Kellogg back to Rosecrans to report to him
the danger involved in pulling Brannan out of the line. He wanted Rosecrans to
understand that his right flank would be in the air with Brannan's departure,
and hoped that if there were any extra troops available, Rosecrans would send
them into the line upon his right. Brannan, apparently while Kellogg was still
present, had ordered his brigade commanders to move, thereby complying with
Thomas's request, but then, as Kellogg hurried off to Rosecrans, Brannan almost
immediately countermanded the order, and his division remained in place. Of
course, Kellogg, who was not present when Brannan changed his mind, had no way
of knowing this. Brannan, who it appears got cold feet about leaving the line,
was perhaps waiting to see if Rosecrans had any further instructions for him.
When Kellogg arrived back at Rosecrans' headquarters, now just six hundred
yards to the west (he had at this point left the Widow Glenn house and
established a new headquarters position in an area on a knoll in the southern
sprawl of the Dyer Field), Kellogg hurriedly explained the situation to
Rosecrans, and asked that Brannan be allowed to help Thomas. Rosecrans told
Kellogg to go to Thomas at once and inform him that he was to hold his position
at all costs. He would reinforce him with the entire army if necessary.
Rosecrans was fatigued, and it seems certain that no time was wasted on
exchanging specific details, or extraneous conversation. Aware of Wood's
position south of Brannan, Rosecrans turned to Major Frank S. Bond and directed
him to write an order informing Wood that he was to "…close up on Reynolds
right, and support him". Bond immediately took out a pencil, and drafted the
following order:
|
Headquarters
Department of the Cumberland
September 20 - 10:45 a.m.
|
Brigadier
General Wood, Commanding Division:
The general commanding directs that you close up on Reynolds as fast as
possible, and support him.
Respectfully, etc. |
|
Frank S. Bond, Major
and Aide-de-Camp
|
In an effort to highlight the
urgency of the order, Bond scribbled the word "Gallop", across the page.
Rosecrans did not read the order personally, nor was it necessary (as normally
would be the case) to route the order through Crittenden, Wood's corps
commander, because he was present at headquarters at the time the order was
drafted. Lieutenant Colonel Lyne Starling was told that Wood's order was to
"close to the left on Reynolds, and support him". Rosecrans chief of staff, and
future president of the United States, Brigadier General James A. Garfield,
jumped in to clarify things for Starling. Starling was apparently confused,
because, since there was no firing in that part of the line, Reynolds did not
appear to need "support". Garfield explained to him that the intent of the
order was to fill the gap in the line created by Brannan's withdrawal to the
north. With that, Starling set off to deliver the order to Wood. It is
important to note that Wood was less than a five minute ride away from
Rosecrans headquarters.
As he galloped up to Wood's breastworks, Starling noticed that a steady fire
was coming into the position from Confederate skirmishers to the east, across
the Brotherton field and the La Fayette Road. It was 11:00 a.m. Starling gave
the order to Wood, and as he was reading it, began to explain its intent, but
Wood cut him off. Wood could clearly see that Brannan's division was still in
position on his left, between he and Reynolds. He pointed out to Starling that
there was no gap in the line to be filled. "Then there is no order", Starling
told Wood. Yet this did not suite Wood. As will be recalled, Rosecrans had
hotly berated Wood in front of his troops a short time before that morning for
not obeying the order to come into line quickly enough after Negley was ordered
to the north. Additionally, Rosecrans had sent a written rebuke across the wire
for all to see, following Wood's part in a failed reconnaissance mission on
Lookout Mountain some days before the battle. Being twice humiliated by the
commanding general in front of his troops was enough for Wood. He snatched the
order out of Starling's hand. The order was quite clear, he told Starling, and
he would obey it at once. Wood expressed that he was glad Rosecrans had put it
in writing, as it would be a good thing to have "…for future reference". Before
placing it in his pocket notebook, it is believed that he held the order aloft
and waved it around in front of his staff. He said "Gentlemen, I hold the fatal
order of the day in my hand and would not part with it for five thousand
dollars" (Cozzens, 1992) With that, incredibly and spitefully, Wood ordered his
division out of line.
The first brigade commander to pull out and head north up the Glen-Kelly Road
was Colonel Sidney Barnes, followed by Colonel Charles Harker, and finally
Colonel George P. Buell. Buell was apparently the only one who made the move in
protest. He understood that the enemy was present in-force less than 200 yards
in his front, and he was concerned about making such a dangerous move. One
regimental officer even informed Buell that he'd rather be court-martialed than
obey such an order. Just then, a messenger road up reiterating that compliance
with the order was imperative. Buell, with obvious reservation, ordered his men
to withdraw from the line, joining Harker and Barnes on the tragic and
ill-fated march.
The resulting controversy would rage into the next century, until all of the
participants were in their graves. It seems clear that Wood had allowed his
anger with Rosecrans to cloud his judgment. Out of spite it seems, he complied
with an order that he almost certainly understood did not apply to the
situation he was in. Further, in military parlance, the order was technically
contradictory. To "close up on" suggested a movement to the left, remaining in
line, until he reached Reynolds right. "In support of" implied that he was to
pull the troops out of line, and bring them up in support behind Reynolds. To
wait the 10 minutes it would have taken to ride to Rosecrans and request
clarification of the order (it will be recalled that Rosecrans was at this
point just a few hundred yards away) could easily have been done, but no such
request was made by Wood. The commanding general may as well have been on the
moon. Rosecrans bears part of the blame for not reading the order after it was
drafted. Also, Bond should have arguably realized that the order was
contradictory when he drafted it. Yet it seems clear that the lion's share of
the blame goes to Wood. Had he decided to stay put for a time, even if he
thought it against Rosecrans wishes, and although admittedly risking yet a
third reprimand, this seems the most professional and intelligent thing to do.
Yet Wood's pettiness got the best of him. Now, it would get the best of the
Army of the Cumberland, almost destroying Rosecrans' entire force.
Major General Alexander Stewart started his westerly attack shortly before
11:00 a.m., in compliance with orders directly from Bragg, to attack at once.
His three brigades, which moved west across the Poe Field, made up the right
division of Longstreet's wing. As the brigades of Brown, Clayton, and Bate
advance, they pushed across the La Fayette road and engaged Brannan, Reynold's,
and part of Wood's division, the lead elements of which were just now moving
northward from the position they vacated in the Brotherton Field. They managed
to shatter Brannan's right, and pour into Van Cleve's division for a time which
was in Brannan's rear. Yet the gain was short lived. A Federal counterattack
pushed the brigades back to their starting position.
Although Stewart's abrupt attack and repulse rather struck Longstreet by
surprise (Bragg had ordered them to attack personally), he worked expertly and
quickly in arranging the other forces in his wing in a column that was designed
to strike the Federal line in the Brotherton Field. The idea was to assemble
the forces in such a way that a devastating sledge-hammer blow would hit the
Federal center and right with an awesome fury. The divisions of Johnson,
Hindman, Law (formerly Hood's), Kershaw, and McLaws, with that of Brigadier
General William Preston's division of Buckner's corps in reserve, now were
assembled in the woods east of the Brotherton Field it's line extending
southward. Three of the divisions were placed in a single massive column,
poised to strike the Brotherton Field head-on. The Union troops in the
Brotherton Field had no idea that, at that instant, a furious storm of battle
was about to be unleashed upon them, the likes of which most had never seen nor
could even imagine.
Longstreet gave the order to advance, initiating an attack that he would later
describe in his autobiography as "one of the most stubbornly contested battles
of the entire war". At exactly 11:10 a.m., over 11,000 wildly yelling
Confederates stepped out of the chilly darkness of the forest's shade, and into
the brilliant sunshine flooding the La Fayette Road and Brotherton Field. The
greatest part of the force was positioned to strike, in an example both ironic
and extremely unfortunate for the Federals, the exact spot where just moments
before, Wood had spitefully ordered his men out of line.
Bushrod Johnson's men, the lead division of Longstreet's wing, swept across the
Brotherton Field, spilling into the woods to the west, and then out again into
the open expanse of the Dyer Field. Across the field, upon the Confederate
right, Federal batteries began racking Johnson's line, but they were without
infantry support. For a brief time, they held the men of Johnson's division in
check, but soon the guns were taken by a rebel brigade which managed to
outflank them. The fighting for the cannons became hand to hand as the rebels
arrived at the position, with the gunners throwing shells at the Confederates
with their bare hands. Of the 29 guns present on the field here, the
Confederates captured 15.
The rebels on this part of the field gazed westward across an amazing scene,
500 yards deep and nearly 1000 yards wide. The boundaries of the field here to
the west, north, and south, rise slightly in places, more drastically in
others, making what Woodworth has called a "natural amphitheater". Upon the
stage of the Dyer Field, the third act of the Union tragedy had begun. Union
troops ran wildly about, stunned by the suddenness and tremendous fury of the
Confederate attack. Horses rushed, stricken with terror, in every direction.
Equipment of almost every discernable type was strewn across the entire expanse
of the field. The Confederates were quickly rushing upon Rosecrans headquarters
position. General Hood arrived in the vicinity at this point, and urged Johnson
to continue forward. Suddenly, and with no warning, there was a surge of
resistance from the Union forces. Hood was shot in the upper portion of his
right leg. He fell from his horse, and was carried to the rear. Although he
managed to keep both his arm and his life after he was wounded at Gettysburg,
Hood's luck (if you could call it that) ran out at Chickamauga. Although he
survived the wound, his leg had to be amputated.
To the south, Hindman's division was meeting with success as well. In the
opening minutes of the battle, the forces of Davis, which comprised the men
which had been badly chewed up under Heg's command the day before, broke and
ran to the rear, fleeing in a desperate panic. Union efforts to check the
retreat were ineffective, despite the fact that some turned and crossed rifles
with the fleeing troops or struck them with their swords. Here, both McCook's
and Sheridan's forces were routed, except for the brigade commanded by
Brigadier General William H. Lytle. General Lytle was a popular writer and
poet, and had proven himself a very capable commander as well. Lytle chose to
make a stand on a hill north of the Widow Glenn house, in the Dyer Field.
Although he was badly outnumbered, as Hindman's rebels approached his position
in front, and upon both flanks, Lytle gave the order to his men to charge. "We
can die but once…" he shouted, "…this is the time and place". Although
conducted with much bravery and determination the attack was a disaster. Lytle
was shot in the spine, but managed to stay upon his horse, and continued to
ride among his brigade leading them against Hindman's force, until three more
shots struck him, knocking him from his horse. Lytle was most likely dead
before he hit the ground.
Although Wilder's men managed to check for a time the advance of the
Confederate left in the vicinity of the intersection of the Glen-Kelly Road and
the Chickamauga-Vittatoe Road, all was destruction for the Union forces upon
the center-right. The men of Longstreet's wing now began to flood into
Rosecrans' headquarters area. The commanding general and his staff were forced
to flee the field, as shot and shell crashed into the position all around them.
Also fleeing were McCook, Crittenden, and Assistant Secretary of War Charles
Dana, who had been present with the Army of the Cumberland throughout the
campaign. Dana had been dozing under a tree, when he was awakened by the
tremendous noise of the attack. As he awoke, he saw Rosecrans, who was a devout
catholic, crossing himself. Needless to say, he took this as a very
disconcerting sign. As Dana and the general gazed to the east, across the Dyer
field, they could see emerging from the tree line, one steady and unbroken
advance of thousands of Confederates directly toward them. They were quickly
forced to quit the field and literally flee for their lives.
Although Longstreet had orders to wheel left and back the Union troops into
McClemore's cove, he was forced to deal with the yankee position to the north
of the Dyer Road, as those 29 guns mentioned earlier were pouring a deadly fire
into the lines of his forces at that time. The brigades of Colonel John S.
Fulton, Brigadier General Evander McNair, Colonel Cyrus Sugg, and Colonel James
Sheffield collected on this part of the field accomplished the task. The
Federals who were responsible for the wounding of Hood belonged to the brigade
of Colonel Charles G. Harker, of Wood's division. It will be recalled that
Harker's was the first brigade Wood pulled out of the line at the Brotherton
Field, barely 45 minutes before. The men managed to be far enough to the north
so as to avoid being hit by Longstreet's initial attack, and as Wood realized
the gravity of the situation to his back, he created a line with Harkers men
and faced them south, along a ridge.
They were advanced upon by reinforcements which Hood had ordered into line here
just before he was wounded. They were the brigades Brigadier General's Benjamin
Humphreys and Joeseph Kershaw. These men, wearing new uniforms and carrying the
square flags of the Army of Northern Virginia, advanced across the upper
reaches of the Dyer Field. They could see Harker's line extending on a hill
running from the northwestern part of the Dyer Field all the way to a lower
rise at the field's northeastern corner. Strangely, the guns of Harker's men
fell silent. In the diminishing smoke of the battle, the yankee's were not
quite sure what they were looking at. Perhaps the approaching troops were men
from Sheridan's or Davis's division moving across the field to join their
position. They waved the Stars and Stripes, the color bearer's standing upright
and in the open upon the hill. Harker and Wood ordered the men to hold their
fire to avoid shooting into what they believed to be other Union troops
(Woodworth, 1999).
As they came within range, Kershaw's men opened a deadly fire upon Harker's
position, and another tremendous fight resumed. This must have given Harker a
very unpleasant shock. As it turned out, the defense of the position was
another lost-cause for the Federals. Kershaw and Humphrey's had outflanked the
position, and Harker was forced to fall back further to the north, to the next
rise which was an open ridge in the vicinity of a home owned by farmer George
Washington Snodgrass.
Already, a small contingent of Federal troops here were gathering to make a
stand. Brannan was present with his division, and so were other brigade
commanders which were rallying troops who had fled in this direction following
the confederate breakthrough to the south. On this part of the field, there was
one ridge that ran east of the house down to the Union left (known as Snodgrass
Hill), and another rising to the west of the home, called Horseshoe Ridge.
General George Thomas was present on the ridgeline that afternoon. He had been
pulling the fresher units from the Kelly Field salient to take position along
the hills and rally those who were retreating through the area. At 12:45 p.m.
Union forces started to stumble upon the ridge in significant numbers and
assemble there. Most of the troops were in very poor condition. They were
panicked, without ammunition, and filled with the expectation that Kershaw's
men would storm the ridge at any moment and drive them from the position. They
were right. Kershaw's men did come, but the Federals managed to hold their
ground. The rebels were reinforced, and tried to assault the position again,
yet once more they failed. Despite the best efforts of the Confederates, it
seemed that the blue-coats along Snodgrass Hill and Horseshoe Ridge were
determined to stand and fight.
The Union was making excellent use of the terrain. Harker's men would fire from
the top of the ridge, and then slip over the back-side of the ridgeline, where
in safety they could reload, as another group of men arrived in line to resume
the fire. The technique worked well, and the spirits of the Federals began to
rise as they witnessed the Confederates being repulsed again and again. The
rebel attacks were badly coordinated, and each successive assault seem to
break-down in bitter confusion as they struck the Union line in piecemeal
fashion. Bragg had counted on Longstreet to coordinate the attacks, and
Longstreet had counted on Hood, who at this moment, was injured and not present
on the field. Although Longstreet was aware of Hood's absence, he made no
effective effort to replace him, thus the Confederate attacks were launched
disjointed and anemic.
Thomas however, who initially was completely unaware of the breakthrough to the
south, and who did not know that the commanding general, along with Crittenden
and McCook had left he field, seemed to be making all the right decisions. He
established a headquarters near the base of Snodgrass Hill, and executed an
effective command there. His reputation as a competent leader and the bravery
he displayed on the field during these moments, helped him to assemble and hold
a defense which covered the Federal retreat and prevented the entire Army of
the Cumberland from being destroyed in detail. Thomas, who was from Virginia,
chose to fight with the Union when the war broke out. His sisters, upon
learning of his decision, turned his picture to the wall and claimed they no
longer had a brother. Still, leaders in Washington were skeptical of Thomas,
and distrustful as to his loyalty. They procrastinated in giving him
promotions, and the saying was common among them to "let the Virginian wait".
Yet following the Battle of Chickamauga, his brave stand against the rebels
would earn him a unanimous respect. Never again would his loyalty to the Union
be doubted. He would forever be known as the "Rock of Chickamauga" for the
determined fight he made upon Horseshoe Ridge.
Currently, Bushrod Johnson was trying to determine how to break the "Rock of
Chickamauga" however. If Thomas could not be beaten by direct assaults,
perhaps the rebels might be able to outflank him? Johnson swung his division
around Horseshoe Ridge in an effort to strike at a position higher up than
where the Federals were conducting their desperate defense. He ran into men of
the 21st Ohio Regiment, and desperate fighting ensued, as alternately the
Confederates were driven back, and then the Federals, several times along this
portion of the ridge. Soon, the men of the 21st Ohio began to run out of
ammunition. Among those that still had rounds, the rapid rate of fire caused
many of the rifles to overheat and jam, and the troops urinated upon them in a
desperate attempt to cool them off so that firing could be resumed.
Johnson's men pressed on, further and further up the hill. The fighting was
desperate and tremendous. The steady push up-hill had fatigued the men. An
overwhelming thirst plagued the troops. The men of both sides realized that
this position was critical, and they fought tenaciously to bring the battle to
a close; Confederate attackers struggling to break through, Union defenders
frantically trying to hang on. Forces of both sides were caught up in the
frenzy and fury of battle, and it seemed that all were willing to fight to the
last man. At last the rebels managed to get around the flank of the Ohioan's,
but just as it seemed that Thomas's last line of defense would be finally
breached, Johnson crashed into the blue-clad troops of General James B.
Steedman's division belonging to Major General Gordon Grangers Reserve Corps,
who rushed into the area southward from Rossville at 2:30 p.m. His timing was
as if he made his entrance on cue in a grand theatrical production. The sound
of battle raging for two straight days demonstrated to Granger that something
very significant must be going on, and despite his orders to hold a gap in
Missionary Ridge, he ordered his troops to move in the direction of
Chickamauga. Granger arrived just in time, and Thomas put him on the flank of
the 21st Ohio, where his two brigades no doubt prevented the annihilation of
Thomas's forces upon Snodgrass Hill and Horseshoe Ridge. The ammunition and
manpower he provided on the field here were precisely what Thomas needed.
Although the battle would rage for the next two and a half hours, the lines
teetering back and forth, the yankees managed to hang on. The fighting was
tremendous, it was a slaughter. Casualties in many units on both sides totaled
over 50%.
Finally, at 5:00 p.m., Thomas received an order from Rosecrans, who was now
making his way back to Chattanooga, to withdraw. Now Thomas would have the
unenviable and very difficult task of trying to get what was left of the Union
forces out of the line under a heavy fire. Indeed, the order actually came at
the worst possible time to effect a retreat. Following the repulse of the
Confederate right earlier in the morning, there had been little fighting in the
position along the Kelly Field salient. Earlier in the day, following the
Confederate breakthrough at the Brotherton Field, Longstreet had urged Bragg to
resume the attack upon the Federal left. Bragg had refused, saying that the men
were simply not ready to go on the assault again. By 5:00 p.m., this had
changed. All along the line of the Federal breastworks east of the Kelly Field,
the divisions of Liddell, Gist, Breckenridge, Cleburne, Cheatham, and Stewart,
sprang to life yet again and opened a furious attack on the position, just as
the Federals were pulling out. To the west, the divisions of Hindman, Johnson,
Preston, Law, and Kershaw were driving the blue-coats from Snodgrass Hill and
Horseshoe Ridge. The rebels in front of the Kelly Field broke through the
breastworks, managed to get a battery into the open field, and fired canister
into the backs of the fleeing yankees. The Confederates cheered at this point
so loudly that the rebel yell could be heard from every point of the
battlefield. Even the wounded, lying over the field in every direction,
strained to raise their heads and give a victorious shout (Some students of the
battle, including Cozzens, maintain that this shouting actually came from the
Union troops in an effort to disguise their retreat). Although most were of the
belief that they had thoroughly annihilated the Federal troops, many yankee
units managed to escape to the north and west intact. Still, the confusion was
tremendous. The rebels took many prisoners, including the brave and exhausted
men of the 21st Ohio. As darkness descended upon the battlefield, the heaviest
fighting drew to a close. Still, sporadic skirmishes continued to erupt
throughout the evening as the defeated Federals pushed their retreat in the
direction of Rossville and Chattanooga.
A foggy mist settled into the area at nightfall, making the withdrawing
Union troops look like ghostly apparitions as they stumbled forward in fear,
agony, and bitter defeat. Corpses, mangled and twisted in every imaginable
position, littered the ground at every step. They were left in place upon the
field where they had fallen throughout the night, as the Confederates were
simply too tired to tend to them.
Copyright © 2001 Richard A. Byrd.
Written by Richard A. Byrd.
Published online: 04/09/2001.
* Views expressed by contributors are their own and do not necessarily represent
those of MHO.
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