| |
| Page 2 of 3 (Page: 1 2 3 ) |   |
|
| texasbob
Texas Hill Country, TX, USA
Posts: 622
 | | Re: The letter not sent | | Posted on: 7/22/2010 11:27:58 AM | Tom,
If Butterfield was an advocate for the BMI to Meade, I would be surprised were Meade not skeptical if not hostile toward it.
---------------
Cheers y'all,
And with full respect for all who fight the fight against obfuscation, the sowing of confusion, deception, falsification, fabrication, and other intellectual dishonesties,
texasbob
|
| tom ryan
Bethany Beach, DE, USA
Posts: 254
| | Re: The letter not sent | | Posted on: 7/22/2010 12:11:29 PM | Bob, that is a point worth making. Given Meade's, shall we say, lack of respect for Hooker and knowing that Butterfield was in his position by appointment from Hooker, it stands to reason that Meade would be skeptical of Butterfield if he touted the BMI.
Unfortunately, there is not a lot of info available on how this played out during the campaign, but there were a couple of instances where Meade asked Butterfield to get reports from the BMI in order to plan operations.
I would have loved to see Meade's face when the BMI sent him a complete order of battle for Ewell's corps by divisions and brigades with names of commanders and the size of each unit. That is rather spectacular intelligence right in the middle of the battle.
Sorry to say, however, there is no evidence that Meade asked for more intel on the other two corps just like that one.
Regards, Tom
|
| texasbob
Texas Hill Country, TX, USA
Posts: 622
| | Re: The letter not sent | | Posted on: 7/22/2010 12:48:20 PM | Butterfield's conduct on July 1 was surely a factor too.....but showing this awaits another article.
---------------
Cheers y'all,
And with full respect for all who fight the fight against obfuscation, the sowing of confusion, deception, falsification, fabrication, and other intellectual dishonesties,
texasbob
|
| Jim Cameron
North Bellmore, NY, USA
Posts: 940
| | Re: The letter not sent | | Posted on: 7/22/2010 1:45:44 PM |
Quote:What we don't know (or at least I have never seen) is whether Hooker clued in his corps commanders about the BMI. If during the battle is the first time Meade started getting input from the BMI it would not be surprising that it would be looked at as just another piece of intel. We now know that the info produced by the BMI was pretty good but that's 20-20 hindsight. Meade had other sources for intel and no real time to evaluate the quality of each one so Sharpe was just another piece of info without anything to show conclusively that his stuff was usually the real goods.
Wayne
--Wayne Wachsmuth
There was also the factor that there was considerable hostility to the BMI within the cavalry, if not outright obstruction of its ability to gather intelligence. To what extent might Pleasonton have added his own negative spin on the BMI to Meade's willingness to accept what the BMI was telling him at face value?
---------------
Jim Cameron
Every time I go to Gettysburg, I learn two things. Something new, and, how much I still don't know.
|
| Karl
DE, USA
Posts: 456
| | Re: The letter not sent | | Posted on: 7/22/2010 2:04:11 PM | If I may add to what has already been said and what I was alluding to about the BMI being in it's infancy in many ways.
Tom you said...
"Unfortunately, there is not a lot of info available on how this played out during the campaign,..."
My guess would be because of the factors cited above including and most importantly from the traditional ways of gathering info.....the cavalry.
That there was another entity ( called What?...the BMI) that competed more or less for the attention of what was, how should we say, gathered, its no wonder there was not a lot on the record.
In my mind its the same as why we never saw the REAL official reports that flat out told it like it was.
"With all due repsects, we really sucked today."
You never saw that written.
And you probably didn't get much praise for the BMI getting it right for the opposite reason.
"We moved with alacrity and could have had a better position to launch an assault had we paid more attention to the info gathered from the BMI."
They weren't going to write that anywhere either.
The truth lies somewhere in the middle I'm sure.
They had it along with their other sources but, well, you know.
Politics is politics.
I can see the report now.
"We should have listened to the BMI as they had a really good handle on the fluid nature of the ANV movements but I listened to my cavalry instead."
;-)
Regards,
Karl
---------------
|
| Rick Schaus
Capon Springs, WV, USA
Posts: 504
| | Re: The letter not sent | | Posted on: 7/22/2010 2:11:04 PM | Hi,
My feeling is that Meade was probably unaware of, or at best vaguely aware of the existance of the BMI.
It should not, though, have taken either Butterfield or Patrick long to brief Meade on its operations.
Meade was critical of Pleasonton's intel gathering efforts, and should have looked to the BMI intel to fill in the gaps.
With Stuart out of the picture, prior to the battle, it was much easier for BMI operatives to both gather and send intel to their bosses, who would get it to Sharpe.
I think that part of the problem was that Meade, and Hooker before him, did not want to hear the intel Sharpe was providing, especially in regards to the strength of the ANV.
It would be difficult for Meade to plead caution if he outnumbered the ANV, especially when operating in friendly country.
As long as he was outnumbered he could be cautious,argue for reinforcements and plan for a defensive battle, as opposed to aggressively seeking battle with an opponent inferior in numbers.
VR, Rick Schaus
|
| Wayne Wachsmuth
Shippensburg, PA, USA
Posts: 269
| | Re: The letter not sent | | Posted on: 7/22/2010 7:40:27 PM | And anyone bothering to read the volumes of message traffic from mid June on will see everyone and their second cousins telling everyone that they have an address for that the ANV has three corps with at least 30'000 men per corps. Now we get one source that says they have fewer. If it's in YOUR lap who ya gonna believe?
Wayne
|
| tom ryan
Bethany Beach, DE, USA
Posts: 254
| | Re: The letter not sent | | Posted on: 7/22/2010 9:44:45 PM | Meade's first report about the size of Lee'a army, which he considered reliable, came from citizens in Hagerstown who meticulously counted the men in regiments as they passed through town. The report said the entire army was not more than 80K. Details included that regiments aveeraged about 400, with some as low as 175. A count of artillery was 275 pieces, very close to the actual number. Meade was impressed with this report, and forwarded on to Halleck in Washington. Later (July 4), Couch sent Meade a similar report with "reliable information" from Hagerstown that Lee's army totaled no more than 80K.
It was obvious from the report that the citizens were being very conservative in their count, so that the actual figure was surely much lower.
Given reports during the battle from the BMI that Meade had used his entire army on July 1 and 2 except Pickett's division, and used the remainder on July 3 plus some previously used brigades, and from his personal observations of Lee's strength in the field on July 2 and 3, IMO Meade should have had a good sense of Lee's actual strength (or weakness). Recall that Meade was quite taken back by how easily his army repulsed the charge on July 3. This was another telltale sign of Lee's relative weakness.
Yet when Meade testified to the Congressional Joint Committee months later, he told them that Lee's army had over 100,000 men, and that he had derived this information from newspapers and citizen reports.
From my perspective, something doesn't jive here. From reliable eyewitness reports, from BMI interrogations of prisoners, and from his own observation, Meade should have known that Lee had somewhere between 70-80,000 troops at Gettysburg. No competent general would ignore these reatively reliable sources in favor newspaper accounts that were notoriously unreliable.
|
| tom ryan
Bethany Beach, DE, USA
Posts: 254
| | Re: The letter not sent | | Posted on: 7/22/2010 10:08:03 PM | Meade's testimony to the JCCCW on March 5, 1864 was:
"When I assumed the command of the army of the Potomac...I had no information concerning the enemy beyond the fact that a large force under General Lee, estimated at about 110,000 men, had passed through Hagerstown...and through information derived from the public journals [i.e., newspapers]."
So the report he actually received said that Lee's army was no larger than 80,000, but Meade said the report read 110,000???
Of course, one consideration of this inflated figure may have been the result of Meade being under pressure from an unfriendly committee, and he may have been padding the figure in self-preservation. Nonetheless, that does not change the actual report of 80,000, nor does it change the fact that Lee's army was closer to 70,000 at Gettysburg.
|
| Wayne Wachsmuth
Shippensburg, PA, USA
Posts: 269
| | Re: The letter not sent | | Posted on: 7/23/2010 9:56:43 AM | Tom,
We know at this remove that the ANV figures from SOME sources was relatively accurate but at the time Meade had other sources which gave inflated numbers. Meade had no realistic way of knowing which was the correct number so he as a prudent commander would use the larger number.
Wayne
|
| Jim Cameron
North Bellmore, NY, USA
Posts: 940
| | Re: The letter not sent | | Posted on: 7/23/2010 10:34:19 AM | The AOP was also very much spring-loaded to accept the idea of an ANV far stronger than was actually the case.
---------------
Jim Cameron
Every time I go to Gettysburg, I learn two things. Something new, and, how much I still don't know.
|
| tom ryan
Bethany Beach, DE, USA
Posts: 254
| | Re: The letter not sent | | Posted on: 7/23/2010 3:40:36 PM | Wayne,
However, the report from Hagerstown did not say 110K, it said there were less than 80K. So Meade's memory was faulty, or for some reason he was fudging the numbers.
There may have been other reports, but none that carried much credibility. Which reports are you referring to?
At some point, Meade would have to dismiss some of his caution, and address the problem at hand -- Lee's army. The inflated numbers tended to provide him cover -- at least that is the way it appears.
One way he would have found out the truth about the ANV's lowly numbers was by going on the offensive at Gettysburg, Williamsport, or sometime thereafter on up to early 1864.
I know we are not going to agree on this, but I am looking for a happy medium with regard to Meade == and it is elusive.
|
| tom ryan
Bethany Beach, DE, USA
Posts: 254
| | Re: The letter not sent | | Posted on: 7/23/2010 3:54:33 PM | "The AOP was also very much spring-loaded to accept the idea of an ANV far stronger than was actually the case."
So true. One edit I would suggest is that it was the AoP commanders who had this disease. With McCellan and Hooker, the natural conclusion is that this stemmed from character flaws. They both froze in the face of a direct confrontation with the enemy (needless to say one led by Bobby Lee).
That leaves us with the necessity to catergorize Meade in this context. Why did he also have the "inflation" disease, why was he so cautious, what were his fears?
|
| Wayne Wachsmuth
Shippensburg, PA, USA
Posts: 269
| | Re: The letter not sent | | Posted on: 7/23/2010 4:40:00 PM | Tom,
Reading the various messages sent during the ANV advance you will find a good number giving estimate of at least 90,000 men. Now just what kind of commander in Meade's position would disregard thai information and go with the smaller number? If he is going to err in any direction it will be toward the safer side, that's just human nature.
Wayne
|
| texasbob
Texas Hill Country, TX, USA
Posts: 622
| | Re: The letter not sent | | Posted on: 7/23/2010 6:51:20 PM | Hi Tom and Wayne,
Yes, Meade is elusive. I think that part of the reason for this is that having been extremely stressed and tired during the early part of the campaign (especially), his memory was often fuzzy and his statements similar. Another reason, perhaps, is that when it came time, post-battle, to "settle scores" (a way of getting at the truth), he was cautioned off by Halleck and by his own character. Halleck warned him about going after Sickles, which in the long run made Sickles look the hero and Meade rather timid. As for pursuing inept or insubordinate people like Pleasonton, Butterfield and others, I have the feeling (and it IS a feeling, nothing I can prove) that Meade realized that he had made plenty of errors during the battle and that both humility and the unwisdom of getting into a pissing match with these fellows recommended letting bygones be bygones. And perhaps he thought that in some instances these opponents had been right. But he is silent about all of that as far as I know.
While it might be fair to criticize Meade for not being aggressive enough after the battle (I would not rush to do so, however), it should be noted that he was quite aggressive prior to the battle despite believing that Lee had him outnumbered. For example, he told Sedgwick on the afternoon of July 1 that without his 16,000 man corps, Lee would have the AoP outnumbered at Gburg and with Sedgwick's corps things would be about even. Despite knowing that VI Corps would be quite a while getting to Gburg, and despite the Pipe Creek plan, Meade moved aggressively on the afternoon of July 1 to get his army up to fight what he thought was Lee's probably larger force. I don't see character or courage being Meade's problem....but I do think that all the human carnage of the battle had a chilling effect on him. Why is it that Meade is criticized for not pressing for another bloodbath, when Lee, who wanted to avoid one so much that he retreated from the field, draws no such criticism?
---------------
Cheers y'all,
And with full respect for all who fight the fight against obfuscation, the sowing of confusion, deception, falsification, fabrication, and other intellectual dishonesties,
texasbob
|
| Scott Bowden
Posts: 112
| | Re: The letter not sent | | Posted on: 7/24/2010 1:03:03 AM |
Quote: They both froze in the face of a direct confrontation with...Bobby Lee.
Hi,
Anyone wishing to gain a full appreciation of the power of Robert E. Lee's personality should never forget what Erasmus Keyes told us about this great man:
“No man could stand in his presence and not recognize his capacity and acknowledge his moral force.”
Regards,
|
| tom ryan
Bethany Beach, DE, USA
Posts: 254
| | Re: The letter not sent | | Posted on: 7/24/2010 7:57:45 AM | This is the beauty of getting everyone's perspective, since we all have our preferences and biases and find it difficult to understand exactly what was going on in Meade's mind and heart. As is perfectly obvious, I tend to fault him for not being as astute in measuring the strength of the enemy. Also, truth be told, my evaluation of Meade during the Gettysburg campaign is colored by his subsequent performance (or lack thereof) as an "independent" army commander up until Grant came east.
Some of the same hesitancies, inconsistent leadership, and measuring the enemy with inexact methodology continue on during this latter phase. My conclusion usually is that Meade stepped up when appointed army commander and did a superlative job of persuing and eventually engaging Lee (albeit almost exclusively while fighting on the defensive).
However, the real test of generalship came when by circumstance Meade was forced to think offensively. That is when, as discussed previously, things started to come apart in terms of Meade's effectiveness (at least by my standards and perhaps that of Abraham Lincoln's as well).
The bottom line in evaluating Meade is the thought about what could have been, rather than recognizing that his heroics at Gettysburg were overshaddowed by what came after.
|
| texasbob
Texas Hill Country, TX, USA
Posts: 622
| | Re: The letter not sent | | Posted on: 7/24/2010 8:45:38 AM | Tom,
Could it be that your bottom line of "what could have been" but wasn't is really the optimum that could have been? And that the worst "what could have been" does not figure in your appraisal? For example, if we take Lincoln's (and evidently your own) view that Meade could and should have smashed the ANV before it crossed the Potomac....the optimum scenario....then Meade comes off rather badly. But if we take the view of the majority of his corps commanders that attacking Lee's position would have ended badly, then he comes off better. I really do not know enough to take even a fuzzy-wuzzy position about Meade after July 3, but I do think that the issue might not be so clear cut as you seem to think.
I also think that you tend to simplify things too much in saying that Meade was fighting "almost exclusively...on the defensive" prior to Gburg. He certainly had orders to defend Balto and Wash, but he also was aggressive in going after Ewell to relieve Harrisburg. Lee's concentration changed the ball game. Once he concentrated Lee became more dangerous, and Meade did not know where Lee was concentrating. This situation accentuated his defensive role (his primary assignment) and undercut his aggressive intentions. His goal after June 29/30 was to (a) determine where Lee was concentrating , and (b) find a battleground that was advantageous to his army and also satisfied his defensive assignment. This makes good sense to me. But note that even in the PCC he holds open the option of going on the offensive against Lee if circumstances permit. Whether offensive or defensive, he wanted to fight a winning battle. And when it looked to him in the early afternoon of July 1 that there was a chance of catching part of Lee's army and destroying it in detail he ordered the bulk of his army to advance. At 6 pm that day he wrote to Hancock and Doubleday that "if we get up all our people, and attack with our whole force to-morrow, we ought to defeat the force the enemy has." To be sure, in saying this he mismeasured time and distance, and "our whole force" was not there in time to attack. Moreover, the position that Hancock and Howard had chosen had only one good point from which to launch an attack: the peach orchard area....and this was at the other end of the battlefield from the key defensive positions. This was a problem. The peach orchard area was a position he could not take and hold until he had sufficient manpower, and this did not occur until late afternoon, at about the time Longstreet attacked. That the Union position was deficient in offensive possibilities was not Meade's fault, but rather that of those who chose it on July 1.
Meade did not like the ground very much. He said as much in his 3 pm July 2 note to Halleck. He realized its defensive advantages, so he said to Halleck that he would stay if Lee attacked him. But he also suggested its offensive limits when he said that if he could not manage to launch an attack he would fall back from Gburg to a better position. This was a cautious and careful man, it seems to me, who realized the great burden that had been placed on him and which he dare not let fall. Defeat was unthinkable. And until Lee was no longer a threat to Washington, Meade was going to do his best to avoid defeat. Defeating Lee north of the Potomac was the optimum goal, but seeing Lee go south of the Potomac satisfied the defensive and primary assignment he had been given and with no risk of defeat. Not heroic, but sensible, I think.
My own take on all this may well be conditioned by some of the idiotic war planning I was familiar with in Europe in the 1960s. When I compare what Meade, thrust into command unwillingly on short notice and plagued thereafter by lack of support from above, if not outright undercutting, was able to do (or avoid), and I compare this with the nuttiness of plans made by teams of geniuses who had great resources and months and years to plan, Meade comes off pretty well.
Cheers,
dissident bob
---------------
Cheers y'all,
And with full respect for all who fight the fight against obfuscation, the sowing of confusion, deception, falsification, fabrication, and other intellectual dishonesties,
texasbob
|
| Karl
DE, USA
Posts: 456
| | Re: The letter not sent | | Posted on: 7/24/2010 11:18:42 AM | Great post Bob.
My sentiments exactly!
Tom, you are way too hard on Meade and I think you do have a bit of a bias as you stated earlier.
It seems that no matter how the realities of the moment are shown, you seem to want to fall back to the BMI info that, to be honest, may have been almost totally ignored.
When one considers that it was a new entity, it's really no wonder that it was relagated to second cousin status.
They had Buford and Pleasonton and Kilpatrick fanned out.
You said...
"I tend to fault him for not being as astute in measuring the strength of the enemy."
For all the reasons stated above that you seem to not want to consider, he had a pretty good idea of where his army stood.
There really wasn't a good opportunity to send a united AOP at Lee until the final day.
He could have tried to attack with pieces of the AOP as they get in the area but I would think that would have been very dangerous.
What you maybe are saying, is that he didn't take the BMI info to heart and that may be the bias you can't seem to overcome here.
Whether he took it as serious as he should have is not the point.
There was never a real opportunity to do much more than he did.
Arguing the facts of the situation is one thing.
Trying to have someone see your point when there is a bias is a no win venture.
With all due respect, your most obedient servant,
Karl
---------------
|
| Karl
DE, USA
Posts: 456
| | Re: The letter not sent | | Posted on: 7/24/2010 4:42:20 PM | I revised my last post above.
Karl
---------------
|
| tom ryan
Bethany Beach, DE, USA
Posts: 254
| | Re: The letter not sent | | Posted on: 7/25/2010 6:29:59 AM | Bob, either I have not explained my thoughts on Meade very well or you are interpreting them too narrowly. Rather than believing Meade should have "smashed" Lee's army after Gettysburg, my concern is that he did not demonstrate sufficient initiative that would lead to the conclusion that he put forth his best effort. As mentioned previously, there were other options in this realm than the mere fact of sending his divisions in a frontal attack against Lee -- altho I continue to blv that was one option. He also could have attempted to forestall the ANV from crossing to safety by placing a force on the south side. He could have placed another force to the north to prevent an escape upriver. They actions, short of a direct attack, would have been tantamount to a seige -- one that Lee could not withstand for long because of the absence of a food supply (a point readily admitted by Lee in his correspondence).
An examination of Meade's orders to his units post-Gettysburg reveals an absence of aggressiveness. Invariably they call for a desire not to bring on contact with the enemy. These orders eviscerated the intent of a reconnaissance in force such as was being carried out by selective infantry and cavalry units. It is difficult to point to a desire on Meade's part to actually engage with Lee and his army.
Then there is the question of attitude on Meade's part. His denigration of his superiors was beneath his dignity. Regardless who was right or wrong about strategy and tactics, his job was to receive orders from Washington and do his best to carry them out sans the accusations of interferrence and lack of flexibility.
Also regarding attitude, his desire to resign in light of a critical evaluation from Lincoln through Halleck was done in pique rather than humility. In other words, he gave the impression that the boss was wrong and he was right. Not a good strategy for continued cooperation and support from superiors (which eventually played out to Meade's detriment).
Regarding my assessment of Meade's defensive-mindedness, it is difficult to interpret his actions once he took command on June 28 as offensive-minded in the pure sense of the word. Looking at his entire body of work from June 28 to July 14 and beyond, a realistic assessment is that he rarely put the offensive on a high priority even though he occasionally spoke of doing so in his communications.
Returning to the idea of whether or not to attack Lee at Williamsport, I find that Meade was dilatory in getting his men to the front in time to interdict Lee's (rather casual) designing and preparing fortifications for his army. The ANV literally took a number of days to explore the ground and outline a defensive position, then took at least another two days to move the three corps from the Hagerstown area into the actual entrenchments -- which they then took more time to enhance these fortifications.
Meade had information in advance what the ANV was up to, but did not demonstrate the urgency and motivation needed to take advantage of this apparent opportunity.
There may be some positivies that I have missed about Meade's post-Gettysburg approach, but frankly they seem overshadowed as described.
|
| tom ryan
Bethany Beach, DE, USA
Posts: 254
| | Re: The letter not sent | | Posted on: 7/25/2010 10:52:18 AM | Karl, my goal is always not to be "hard" or "easy" on anyone, but rather to be factual. In discussing Meade's inflating the size of the ANV, the facts are that the day he assumed command he received a report from concerned citizens in Hagerstown, who had taken the trouble to count the passing Rebel regiments, and to compare notes in compiling as accurate figures as possible. These citizens were not affiliated with the BMI. This report was so detailed that Meade immediately sent it on to Halleck with his endorsement as highly reliable. This report stated that Lee's army totaled less than 80K, and implied perhaps a lot less. For the record, in reality the number of troops that had passed through Hagerstown was a lot less than 70K (66K would be a good estimate). So, as can be seen, the Hagerstown citizens were being liberal in their estimates in order not to undercount the enemy. Nonetheless, what Meade understood was that fewer than 80K had passed through on up into PA. An almost exact report came to Meade a few days later from MG Darius Couch, Dept. of Susquehanna, who had troops operating in the area of Lee's march.
Fast forward to March 1864 and Meade's testimony before the Congressional committee investigating the Battle of Gettysburg. When Meade was queried about the size of Lee's army, he specifically cited a report from Hagerstown citizens, but instead of 80K he claimed they reported 110K.
The above has nothing to do with the BMI. Although it is true that during the battle, BMI reports tended to confirm what the citizens of H. actually reported (though those figures were high), and disagreed with what Meade later claimed.
The other factor which is seldom recognized or discussed is the knowledge about the size and striking power of the ANV that Meade learned, or should have, during the combat over a two-day period. At the end of those two days, he should have had a good sense of how Lee's capability on the field matched the strenght estimates he had received. And, yes, it was hear that BMI reports about Lee using his entire army during those two days should have factored into his equasion. However, I find no evidence that any of this relatively simple diagnostic was taking place.
The conclusion is from review of the record, including both primary and secondary sources, that Meade found it more convenient to allow that Lee had a much stronger army than he actually had. This made his decisions to move cautiously and not to take full responsibility for his actions more palitable to others, and gave him some cover from historical criticism.
I think there were opportunities to do more, but Meade was not up to the task mentally and perhaps physically. However, regarding the latter, since it took six days to get his army into position at Williamsport after he marched from Gettysburg, presumably he had time to get some much meeded rest and to recharge his personal batteries along the way.
Meade carried out his orders and fought his army well at Gettysburg, and deserves the acclaim he has received. However, there is evidence that he decided on the agenda for the pursuit of Lee's army after Gettysburg, and there was very little the authorities in Washington could do to convince him that his agenda did not coincide with theirs.
|
| Scott Bowden
Posts: 112
| | Re: The letter not sent | | Posted on: 7/25/2010 1:52:57 PM | Tom,
Enjoy your view, but have two questions.
1) You believe Meade should have pushed hard on Lee. Okay. Whose corps would you believe Meade should have assigned the primary role in the counterattack? and
2) If your answer is the Sixth under "Major Sedgwick," then doesn't that answer give Meade all he needs to know on how he should handle the situation?
It is not the best analogy, but the famous quote does come readily to mind:
"Gegenangriff? Mit was?"---General W. Bitterich, September, 1944
Regards,
|
| Karl
DE, USA
Posts: 456
| | Re: The letter not sent | | Posted on: 7/25/2010 4:49:34 PM | Tom
Everything you keep pointing out is information. Its not about the information in my opinion,
it's about the situation at the moment.
It doesn't matter how many troops the ANV Really had. Lee had been beating the AOP with half the guys
that the AOP had for more than a year.
The situation by July 4th was not about intelligence.
It was about doing the best you could and not getting your guys annihilated while you tried to protect Wash and Balt.
Regards,
Karl
---------------
|
| tom ryan
Bethany Beach, DE, USA
Posts: 254
| | Re: The letter not sent | | Posted on: 7/25/2010 5:11:48 PM | Scott, that is a good question. Remember my concern was broader than Meade deciding against an attack that led to Lee' escape. As mentioned previously, he could possibly have avoided the necessity for a direct attack by blocking the two main escape roots (or at least giving it his best shot) -- those being south across the river and north up river toward Hancock.
However, if push can to shove, and Meade decided to attack Lee, he plan of "attack" for the 14th seemed to have some merit -- with the exception it was much too conservative. As you know, the Second, Fifth, Sixth, and Twelfth Corps were selected to conduct a recon-in-force in front of their positions on the battlefield on July 14 this force was to be at least four divisions in size -- each division to be under a general officer (unnamed). These officers were to act "in concert" with each other.
The problem with this "attack" order is that it did not specifically order this force to attack, but only to gain information. A true attack order should have been given, with support units following-up behind these four divisions. The overall commander in this case presumably would be Meade himself, since he did not designate a corps commander to serve in that roll.
If I may digress a moment, this order that Meade issued on July 13 is symtomatic of the lack of aggressiveness he displayed throughout the pursuit. He literally could not make up his mind to order an attack. He fudged and hedged until there was no one there to attack.
But back to your main point about Sedgwick, it appeared that in his plan for the 14th Meade was reserving the overall leadership role to himself, because he chose not to delegate. Perhaps under the circumstances that was a wise choice given the lack of aggressive corps leaders. But Meade as the overall leader did not change that dynamic.
|
| Scott Bowden
Posts: 112
| | Re: The letter not sent | | Posted on: 7/25/2010 6:42:01 PM | Thanks, Tom. I cannot imagine the degree of difficulty Meade was attempting. Because he, as did Lee, understood the capacity of "Major Sedgwick," the alternative to the Sixth leading the attack, calling instead upon four divisions from different corps, all supposedly acting in concert with each other with unnamed cavalry somehow supporting each flank, has expectations that don't seem realistic. Besides, as I mentioned before, other dynamics were in play that affected Federal field commanders' decision-making processes.
Regards,
|
| Red Bailey
Dewey, AZ, USA
Posts: 840
| | Re: The letter not sent | | Posted on: 7/26/2010 12:04:26 PM | Adding the 14th to the previously posted comment about the weather:
Issue 13 of Gettysburg Magazine has a long article entitled: A Meteorological and Astronomical Chronology of the Gettysburg Campaign by Thomas L. Elmore.
In detailing the weather conditions for July 12th, he mentions:
"... a strong downpour in the afternoon rendered the ground unfavorable for an attack. Smoke or haze made it impossible to observe anything from the Elk Ridge Station, ..."
On July 13th: "Morning brought more rain. In the late afternoon, General Lee started taking his men over the Potomac in a tedious march through a violent storm."
"July 14.
When the mist cleared, the Federals finally advanced, but found the works in their front abandoned."
---------------
'War is often the result of the failure to reason' - Anonymous
As usual,
Red
|
| tom ryan
Bethany Beach, DE, USA
Posts: 254
| | Re: The letter not sent | | Posted on: 7/26/2010 12:51:17 PM | Red,
Certainly the weather can work for or against you, and a commander must take that into consideration. The question arises if Meade had ordered the pontoon bridge at Falling Waters destroyed and also sent the 6,000 troops that were positioned at Maryland Heights across the river up to the opposite shore of Williamsport, Lee would not have been able to send Ewell's corps across by wading the river and there would have been no way to get Hill and Longstreet across at Falling Waters if a Union force with artillery was sitting on the opposite bank -- nor would the Rebel wagons and artillery have any place to cross the river once the pontoon was destroyed.
If Meade had prepared properly, the weather could have worked for him instead of against him.
Just some things to consider.
|
| tom ryan
Bethany Beach, DE, USA
Posts: 254
| | Re: The letter not sent | | Posted on: 7/26/2010 1:29:04 PM | Scott, I think the least examined part of the retreat and pursuit historically is what constituted the pros and cons of Meade attacking Lee at Williamsport. The few studies that had covered the retreat in detail (e.g., Brown's Retreat From Gettysburg, a magazine devoted an entire issue on the subject, and Wittenberg, Petruzzi, and Nugent's One Continuous Fight -- that deals with the cavalry actions), none of them really get into the nitty-gritty of how strong the ANV force and fortifications were, snd how a relatively small force attempting to defend nine miles of fortifications and a four mile unfortified flank could withstand a determined attack by a force two to three times its size. Little is said, for example, that the Union force was concentrated in a four-five mile front. Virtually nothing is devoted to a possible flank attack in the unfortified area defended by only cavalry.
By the way, not sure what you mean by "Major" Sedgwick. Is that a non-endearing term, or does it have a specific reference?
You are on target questioning the force selection Meade used for the recon-in-force. I gave it a plus almost strictly on the justification that Meade was actually appearing to take an offensive action -- regardless how incompatible the force elements were and how ill-defined the leadership was.
Upon further examination, your point is well taken that Meade's action plan seems unrealistic.
Having said that, it does not seem logical that Lee could have fortified nine miles of a defensive position so strongly in such a short time that various points were not vulnerable to a sustained attack.
And there is always more than one way to skin a cat. Why did Meade plan to send cavalry across the river in the first place? Conceivably if he had followed through, a large force could have spanned the river above the ANV position then recrossed below that position at the Harper's Ferry RR bridge and gotten into the rear of their entrenchments.
This is what I mean by too casual a dismissal of Union attack possibilities in the existing accounts. Too bad you and Bill Ward did not include the retreat in your study Last Chance For Victory. I feel comfortable that you would have examined the possibilities in greater depth, and at least settled the question of feasibility of a Union attack against Lee's position.
Now, at least from my perspective, we are left with general observations and speculation regarding what would have occurred.
|
| Rick Schaus
Capon Springs, WV, USA
Posts: 504
| | Re: The letter not sent | | Posted on: 7/26/2010 1:59:57 PM | Hi,
The following is an excerpt from an article in the latest issue of “North and South” Magazine:
The title is; “The Grand Design”, and it was written by Donald Stoker.
Stoker is Professor of Strategy and Policy for the U.S. Naval War Collage’s program at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California.
His most recent work, from which the article is drawn, is The Grand Design: Strategy and the U.S. Civil War.
”As Lee’s campaign unwound, Lincoln removed Joseph Hooker as head of the Army of the Potomac and replaced him with a tough Pennsylvanian named George Gordon Meade. In a three day slugfest, Meade proceeded to defeat Lee’s army. Strategically, what is perhaps most critical is what happened after Gettysburg. In typical Union fashion, Meade let a great opportunity slip through his fingers. Union cavalry destroyed the Confederate bridges over the Potomac and the high waters prevented Lee’s army from crossing. Lincoln prodded, cajoled, whipped, and begged, but Meade would not attack Lee’s mangled force. In the end Meade missed a chance to destroy Lee’s army, a clear element of Confederate strength. Lincoln believed that such a blow landed against the South, combined with Grant’s capture of Vicksburg, would have ensured a Union victory.”
VR, Rick Schaus
|
| texasbob
Texas Hill Country, TX, USA
Posts: 622
| | Re: The letter not sent | | Posted on: 7/26/2010 2:30:58 PM |
Quote:Hi,
The following is an excerpt from an article in the latest issue of “North and South” Magazine:
The title is; “The Grand Design”, and it was written by Donald Stoker.
Stoker is Professor of Strategy and Policy for the U.S. Naval War Collage’s program at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California.
His most recent work, from which the article is drawn, is The Grand Design: Strategy and the U.S. Civil War.
”As Lee’s campaign unwound, Lincoln removed Joseph Hooker as head of the Army of the Potomac and replaced him with a tough Pennsylvanian named George Gordon Meade. In a three day slugfest, Meade proceeded to defeat Lee’s army. Strategically, what is perhaps most critical is what happened after Gettysburg. In typical Union fashion, Meade let a great opportunity slip through his fingers. Union cavalry destroyed the Confederate bridges over the Potomac and the high waters prevented Lee’s army from crossing. Lincoln prodded, cajoled, whipped, and begged, but Meade would not attack Lee’s mangled force. In the end Meade missed a chance to destroy Lee’s army, a clear element of Confederate strength. Lincoln believed that such a blow landed against the South, combined with Grant’s capture of Vicksburg, would have ensured a Union victory.”
VR, Rick Schaus
--Rick Schaus
Thanks, Rick.
This certainly seems to settle it. The whole campaign stripped of complexities and boiled down into an eight-sentence, easy-to-swallow stew, all potatoes, carrots, onions, celery, and a chunk of stew meat with no hot chiles to cause reflux. No questions unanswered.
Maybe there's a basis for a new Civil War board game here: someone would draw the name of a CW battle from a pot and then the players would compete to see in how few sentences they could describe that battle. "I can sum up Shiloh in three sentences!! Wait, I can do it in two!!!!" There could be a special California version where the players would have to inhale from the pot before answering. That would draw Willie in but keep Bill away.
Well, at least we now know how the current regime in Washington sees the Gettysburg campaign. It's about time!!
---------------
Cheers y'all,
And with full respect for all who fight the fight against obfuscation, the sowing of confusion, deception, falsification, fabrication, and other intellectual dishonesties,
texasbob
|
| Scott Bowden
Posts: 112
| | Re: The letter not sent | | Posted on: 7/26/2010 2:39:35 PM | Thanks, Rick, for posting that. His Meade-bashing is a very commonly-held view, to be sure. However, I wonder if Professor Stoker has ever been asked, to borrow a few of his words, the following:
and just what part of Meade's "mangled force" would have set about "to destroy Lee's army?"
Regards,
|
| tom ryan
Bethany Beach, DE, USA
Posts: 254
| | Re: The letter not sent | | Posted on: 7/26/2010 3:18:51 PM | Rick and Bob,\
This is exactly my point stated elsewhere. Stoker generalized what should have been done to destroy Lee's army, just as others have generalized why this could not possibly been done!
Where are the details from either viewpoint?
In rereading Brown's account of the pursuit, it is evident that the AoP, with a minimal sense of urgency during the march to the river could have caught up with Lee's army prior to their entry into the hastily build fortifications. The explanation or excuse usually points to the difficulty of the march in poor weather conditions, etc. However, six days is a long time to take to reach a point when an equivalent march was made in two days prior to Gettysburg.
Something to think about.
P.S. It is apparent that the intel provided by BMI scouts that Lee was laying out a defense line from Hagerstown to the river was insufficient to motivate Meade to press on at a rapid pace to at least attempt to interdict their successful completion and occupation of the entrenchments. Although in his book Brown was obviously not aware of this intel (contained in the BMI files), he clearly points to the fact that such knowledge could have hastened Meade's arrival on site and interferred with Lee's plans. Just another instance that Meade was slow to absorb/accept the information he was receiving on a continued basis.
|
| Karl
DE, USA
Posts: 456
| | Re: The letter not sent | | Posted on: 7/26/2010 6:29:45 PM | I hate to keep agreeing with Bob here lest you think I/We have a collusive agreement to counter any and all "Meade's got the slows" syndrome.
LOLOL
As stated before, Meade had one chance to strike a blow and that was on the 13th.
His commanders said, NO!
Wasn't the weather a little wet and rainy too
From Red's post early in this discussion.
Quote:A factor never mentioned when discussing July 12th through 13th at Williamsport is the Weather.
Issue 13 of Gettysburg Magazine has a long article entitled: A Meteorological and Astronomical Chronology of the Gettysburg Campaign by Thomas L. Elmore.
In detailing the weather conditions for July 12th, he mentions: "... a strong downpour in the afternoon rendered the ground unfavorable for an attack. Smoke or haze made it impossible to observe anything from the Elk Ridge Station, ..."
On July 13th: "Morning brought more rain. In the late afternoon, General Lee started taking his men over the Potomac in a tedious march through a violent storm."
Contrary to what many believe, "want to believe" and feel, there is just not the evidence to support that Meade could have, or even should have done more than he did.
Once again, his army was marching along different routes to arrive at the point where they could have delivered a blow and it very easily could have gone very badly for Meade.
He made the right choice.
I hate repeating myself even though I repeat myself often.
Did I mention that I often repeat myself?
;-)
Regards,
Karl
---------------
|
| Jim Cameron
North Bellmore, NY, USA
Posts: 940
| | Re: The letter not sent | | Posted on: 7/26/2010 7:26:58 PM |
Quote:Red,
Certainly the weather can work for or against you, and a commander must take that into consideration. The question arises if Meade had ordered the pontoon bridge at Falling Waters destroyed and also sent the 6,000 troops that were positioned at Maryland Heights across the river up to the opposite shore of Williamsport, Lee would not have been able to send Ewell's corps across by wading the river and there would have been no way to get Hill and Longstreet across at Falling Waters if a Union force with artillery was sitting on the opposite bank -- nor would the Rebel wagons and artillery have any place to cross the river once the pontoon was destroyed.
If Meade had prepared properly, the weather could have worked for him instead of against him.
Just some things to consider.
--tom ryan
I must admit to never being able to work up all that much of an interest in the retreat/pursuit phase of the battle, and whether Meade should or should not, or could or could not, have attacked and destroyed the ANV before it was able to cross the river. That being the case, generalizations are about all I have to work with.
That said, I have a hard time seeing how, in a stern chase, with no particular advantage in speed or maneuver, Meade was going to get to Williamsport so close on the heels of Lee as to prevent him from digging in. How long did it take the 12th Corps to throw up some very effective defenses on Culp's Hill?
As to crossing a force to block Lee from the far shore, maybe that works like a charm. OTOH, how many examples do we have of similar expeditions that should have been a great success, but which through whatever combination of bungling, poor planning, ineptness, lousy coordination, poor intel, and/or just plain bad luck ended up as a complete fiasco. There's just something about the whole idea of crossing these 6,000 troops over to the other side of a swollen river that leave me feeling very uncomfortable about the outcome. Like the CW version of a WW2 air drop, where after two or three days the paratroopers need to either link up with the ground troops, or they're in big trouble. And were these 6,000 men at Maryland Heights crack, special ops troops?
Tom makes a very reasoned case that Meade could and should have done more, and been more aggressive. One which I do not dismiss. But there's still a part of me that wonders if it was all that cut and dry.
BTW, I recall reading somewhere that the extremely heavy rains during the retreat were actually the remains of an early season hurricane which had come ashore in the Carolinas, and rained itself out over southern PA. I have absolutely no idea whether that's true or not. Does anybody else recall reading that? I imagine it would be difficult to either proove or disprove, although perhaps not impossible given the right research.
---------------
Jim Cameron
Every time I go to Gettysburg, I learn two things. Something new, and, how much I still don't know.
|
| tom ryan
Bethany Beach, DE, USA
Posts: 254
| | Re: The letter not sent | | Posted on: 7/26/2010 7:55:00 PM | Karl,
In management classes the idea is taught that repetition is appropriate when the person(s) you are communicating with is stonewalling the issue, or more specifically, avoiding the truth. So you are following the correct procedure in reiterating what you believe to be correct.
Trouble is, I am uncertain of the truth, so continue to batter the board with skepticism. Some of the evidence points to other opportunities for Meade to conduct offensive ooperations other than on July 13. Until it is demonstrated that any of these other opportunities would be fruitless, I will press on in this (rather lonely) search.
My plea is that you also examine some of these other occasions, and conclude whether there is validity to these possibilities.
Some questions:
What did Meade know and when did he know it about Lee's location and intentions?
Would additional speed of movement and energetic deployment have caught Lee unprepared for an attack?
How rational is it to suppose that Lee's path across the river could have been temporarily impeded or blocked altogether.
Was a seige of Lee's army feasible?
Could the pontoon bridge at Falling Water's been destroyed, or passage across it blocked?
Did it make sense to organize the 20,000 or so troops in Pennsylvania to cooperate in an attack on Lee by pressuring his unfortified left flank?
If Meade had approved support of his infantry for Buford's cavalry on July 9 at Funkstown, would that have been a changemaker?
Regards, Tom (Mr. Skepticism)
|
| Karl
DE, USA
Posts: 456
| | Re: The letter not sent | | Posted on: 7/26/2010 8:42:01 PM | Tom
Before even reading past the first few lines of your post I have to respond.
YES, there were "SOME" opportunities to do "SOME THINGS".
Not much though.
They could have gotten themselves killed pretty easily.
Then what would we be saying about him?
Now, I am going to read the rest of your post as I didn't want the rest of it to influence what I wanted to emphatically point out.
If there was any sort of opportunity to do "MORE", and I'm sure there was, it certainly does not fall into the realm of the "Perceptions" of those who feel there were.
The funny thing though, is this.
Those who take the stand that you are taking have the benefit of 20-20 hindsight and KNOWING ALL THERE IS TO KNOW about what "Could" have been done.
They didn't have that luxury!
They had a shot up army.
Hungry too!
And no stores on hand.
With orders to watch their left flank lest Lee get around that way.
Which way do we go????????????????????????????
Do I throw all caution to the wind and HURL all my guys (shot up as they were) at Lee from what my signal corps is telling me is his direction?
Keep something in mind here.
Robert E. Lee's masterful retreat had something to do with not GIVING Meade any opportunity to strike him.
Lets see, you said...
----------------------------------
What did Meade know and when did he know it about Lee's location and intentions?
Again, the intelligence!...... Sigh
By the time he knew anything that made him THINK he "really Knew" what Lee was going to do, the opportunity to throw all caution to the wind and hurl your hungry army at him, (and you would have HAD to do that IMMEDIATELY) Lee was too far away to send individual corps's at Lee lest they turn and destroy them in detail.
Would additional speed of movement and energetic deployment have caught Lee unprepared for an attack?
Please see my answer above.
How rational is it to suppose that Lee's path across the river could have been temporarily impeded or blocked altogether.
This was a missed opportunity without a doubt!!!
I had said a long time ago that I thought Hooker's idea of allowing them to cross the Potomac and then seizing the south side so as to block his return was a good idea.
Was that Meade's fault?
How about Lincoln and Halleck?
They didn't like the idea when Hooker proposed it.
This opportunity (lost) is not Meade's fault. He was kinda busy right then.
Was a seige of Lee's army feasible?
WHEN?
Could the pontoon bridge at Falling Water's been destroyed, or passage across it blocked?
Yes!
Please see answer #3 above.
Did it make sense to organize the 20,000 or so troops in Pennsylvania to cooperate in an attack on Lee by pressuring his unfortified left flank?
Of course!
But R.E. Lee had something to do not allowing those pieces of the puzzle to be able to come together in any sort of way that would benefit the AOP.
Again, weren't guys ordered to move and some did and some didn't?
If Meade had approved support of his infantry for Buford's cavalry on July 9 at Funkstown, would that have been a changemaker?
Yup!
Right up to the point that the ANV would turned and moved forther towards the rest of their army and then Lee might have turned his larger force against that detached portion of Meade's infantry.
WHOOPS!
It's just not that easy.
Things could have been done and we would be talking about them today.
Maybe Meade being relieved soon afterwards might have been one, for turning a winning battle at GB into one of getting creamed because of a lack of prudence.
WE would then be discussing how stupid it was that he was so bold right after doing so well in the best position that any army ever occupied during the Civil War.
I don't profess to have the answers but this was biggest collision Ever!
Lee executes the most amazing retreat and pulls it off?
Are you surprised by that?
Look at his track record.
Your most obedient servant,
Karl
---------------
|
| texasbob
Texas Hill Country, TX, USA
Posts: 622
| | Re: The letter not sent | | Posted on: 7/26/2010 8:49:26 PM | Hello, all.
Just a couple points of information I'd like to know about.
Wasn't Meade of the view (gained from some newspaper) that Lee was being reinforced by a substantial force under Bragg? If so, when did he "learn" this and what size force might he have expected?
Was there information available to Meade that the Bragg report was untrue?
Was there not also a report that Lee had received a major resupply of ammunition during the retreat?
Thanks
bob (in an admittedly lazy mood)
---------------
Cheers y'all,
And with full respect for all who fight the fight against obfuscation, the sowing of confusion, deception, falsification, fabrication, and other intellectual dishonesties,
texasbob
|
| tom ryan
Bethany Beach, DE, USA
Posts: 254
| | Re: The letter not sent | | Posted on: 7/26/2010 9:35:21 PM | bob,
The Bragg story popped up on July 4 in a message from Adj. Gen. Lorenzo Thomas to SecState Stanton mentioning that a belief was held in the Rebel army (no doubt learned from POWs) that Bragg was in the vicinity of Manassas with 40,000 troops. A copy went to Meade. Stanton immediately pooh-poohed this story citing the captured letters from Davis and Cooper sent to Lee that Lee's request for troops from VA & NC to threaten D.C. was rejected. Stanton commented that the story "no doubt has been told by Lee to keep up the spirits of his men." These letters were captured by Dahlgren in Greencastle on July 2 and delivered to Meade the next day. For the exchange between Thomas and Stanton see OR, 27, III, pp.525/26. For the captured letters see OR, 27, I, pp. 75-77. They present a most gloomy picture of the outlook for Southern success, and state specifically that no reinforcements can to made available for Lee's army.
The report of an ammunition train on its way from Winchester to Meade came from BMI scouts. There is no evidence that Meade took action to interdict it. The possibility existed to send cavalry across the river to attack this train.
Regards, Tom
|
| Rick Hensley
Rancho Mirage, CA, USA
Posts: 24
| | Re: The letter not sent | | Posted on: 7/26/2010 9:58:45 PM | All,
Allow me, please, not to generalize.
Meade's army was shot to hell. The only corps Meade had undamaged and intact was led by a man who had previously demonstrated he couldn't harm the Confederate army when given the advantages of surprise, numbers and position.
So, as Scott keeps asking the question, I'll answer in my humble opinion. Meade did not have the senior officers nor the formations capable of effective offensive activity, let alone destroying Lee.
Any author like this Stoker guy who makes a bold claim needs to back it up with 'how.' Otherwise, it is just an empty claim.
Respectfully yours from CA,
---------------
"Those who would give up liberty for the sake of security deserve neither."---Thomas Jefferson
"When the people fear their government, there is tyranny. When the government fears the people, there is liberty."---Thomas Jefferson
|
| |
| Page 2 of 3 (Page: 1 2 3 ) | |
|
|
|
|