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| littlepowell
Greenville , SC, USA
Posts: 293
 | | Anderson halted near Cashtown | | Posted on: 7/22/2010 1:29:38 PM | On July 1st, I've always wondered why Anderson's division halted near Cashtown while the rest of Hill's Corps marched into Gettysburg to join the battle.
From Hill's official report:
Under the impression that the enemy were entirely routed, my own two divisions exhausted by some six hours' hard fighting, prudence led me to be content with what had been gained, and not push forward troops exhausted and necessarily disordered, probably to encounter fresh troops of the enemy. These two divisions were bivouacked in the positions won, and Anderson, who had just come up, was also bivouacked some 2 miles in rear of the battle-ground.
From another site, I read this:
Despite hearing the heavy boom of artillery fire at Gettysburg, eight miles to the east, Anderson halted for another hour to receive Hill's orders. Then he continued along Chambersburg Pike, finally moving by 1 p.m. Upon reaching the battlefield around 4 or 5 p.m., he occupied a reserve position on the Rebel right. Some Southerners have argued–with good reason–that if Anderson had arrived earlier that day and charged forward, Cemetery Hill would have fallen to the Confederates. Colonel Abner Perrin, who commanded a brigade in Maj. Gen. William Dorsey Pender's division, believed Anderson's three-hour delay cost the Confederates the entire battle.
[Read More]
Does anyone know why he halted? Maybe there was a delay in the orders sent to him? I can't see any reason why Hill would have ordered his division to halt there.
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http://www.scourgeofwar.com/ - New Gettysburg PC game from Norb Software Development.
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| Red Bailey
Dewey, AZ, USA
Posts: 840
| | Re: Anderson halted near Cashtown | | Posted on: 7/22/2010 2:15:12 PM | According to Anderson's later account, his division was halted by orders from General Lee. The "... some 2 miles in rear of the battle-ground" mentioned in Hill's report would place the division in bivouac along the Knoxlyn Road as the Bacheldor maps were later to show. (There are some authors that place Anderson's bivouac along the Herr Ridge road which would not have made sense in light of the time it took Anderson to move forward to South Seminary Ridge during the next morning.)
Anderson later said that he rode forward along the Pike to find out from Lee why his march was stopped. He said that Lee's response was that Anderson's division was his only(?) reserve. (With Johnson's division on the Pike behind Anderson's, followed by Longstreet's two divisions, that doesn't make sense either.)
Perhaps Lee was so concerned about not having Stuart's intel available, that he was being super catious, but that makes no sense either given that Lee was on the attack and could certainly have used Anderson's division to attack C.H. that afternoon, or in place along South Seminary Ridge for dawn the next morning.
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'War is often the result of the failure to reason' - Anonymous
As usual,
Red
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| drushing
melbourne, FL, USA
Posts: 209
| | Re: Anderson halted near Cashtown | | Posted on: 7/22/2010 4:33:19 PM | I agree Red. If Lees plan was to fight on ground of his choosing, and defeat the AOP in detail as they came up, none of the above mentioned reasons/excuses make any sense. Another G-burg mystery.
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| Scott Bowden
Posts: 112
| | Re: Anderson halted near Cashtown | | Posted on: 7/22/2010 4:42:22 PM | Anderson's indolence---and the BS in connection with his indolence---never passed the smell test.
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| littlepowell
Greenville , SC, USA
Posts: 293
| | Re: Anderson halted near Cashtown | | Posted on: 7/22/2010 4:46:32 PM | Yeah, that's what I was afraid of. This is another one of those Gettysburg mysteries that we can only speculate the reasons. I've read many accounts of regiments or brigades being halted for unknown reasons, but this is the only account I know of an entire division. There had to be some reason behind it.
Ha yeah, maybe it was Anderson's laziness.. Wasn't he also pretty lazy in starting his attack on the 2nd? 
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http://www.scourgeofwar.com/ - New Gettysburg PC game from Norb Software Development.
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| Red Bailey
Dewey, AZ, USA
Posts: 840
| | Re: Anderson halted near Cashtown | | Posted on: 7/22/2010 5:19:50 PM | There are reasons for everything, they're just not clear to we moderns who either spend our time second-guessing, or have some agenda to clearly explain those "shadows dancing on the wall of our ignorance."
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'War is often the result of the failure to reason' - Anonymous
As usual,
Red
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| drushing
melbourne, FL, USA
Posts: 209
| | Re: Anderson halted near Cashtown | | Posted on: 7/22/2010 5:33:46 PM | What were Andersons orders for day two? Thanks!!
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| Rick Schaus
Capon Springs, WV, USA
Posts: 504
| | Re: Anderson halted near Cashtown | | Posted on: 7/22/2010 5:55:34 PM | Hi,
If Lee had gone outside the chain-of-command, and personally directed Anderson to act as the army’s reserve, I would expect;
Either Hill and/or Anderson to mention it in their reports.
That Lee, in his report, would probably acknowledge that action.
It should not have required Lee’s personal involvement. He could have sent a staff officer to Hill with the instructions.
Neither report supports the idea that Lee personally directed Anderson to be his reserve.
Hill:
“Under the impression that the enemy were entirely routed, my own two divisions exhausted by some six hours' hard fighting, prudence led me to be content with what had been gained, and not push forward troops exhausted and necessarily disordered, probably to encounter fresh troops of the enemy. There two divisions were bivouacked in the positions won, and Anderson, who had just come up, was also bivouacked some 2 miles in rear of the battle-ground. “
Anderson:
“Upon approaching Gettysburg, I was directed to occupy the position in line of battle which had just been vacated by Pender's division, and to place one brigade and a battery of artillery a mile or more on the right of the line, in a direction at a right angle with it and facing to the right. Wilcox's brigade and Captain [H. M.] Ross' battery, of Lane's battalion, were posted in the detached position, while the other brigades occupied the ground from which Pender's division had just been moved. “
It seems a bit odd that if Anderson is to be the reserve, that he would be directed to send a brigade a mile or more to the right of the line.
If Anderson’s services were required, he would have to move without Wilcox, with about 20% of the division’s strength, or move without him, and Wilcox would have to catch up.
VR, Rick Schaus
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| littlepowell
Greenville , SC, USA
Posts: 293
| | Re: Anderson halted near Cashtown | | Posted on: 7/23/2010 7:43:11 AM |
Quote:
It seems a bit odd that if Anderson is to be the reserve, that he would be directed to send a brigade a mile or more to the right of the line.
If Anderson’s services were required, he would have to move without Wilcox, with about 20% of the division’s strength, or move without him, and Wilcox would have to catch up.
VR, Rick Schaus
--Rick Schaus
Very odd indeed. And it's also odd that no one mentioned why Anderson was held back near Cashtown for 3 hours. Hill, Anderson, Lee could have made a simple note about it: "Anderson was held 8 miles west of Gettysburg because...."
I'd really like to find out more about this. If I had the time and resources, I'd read every single official report from every commander in the Third Corps.
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http://www.scourgeofwar.com/ - New Gettysburg PC game from Norb Software Development.
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| Phil Laino
Shoreham, NY, USA
Posts: 194
| | Re: Anderson halted near Cashtown | | Posted on: 7/23/2010 9:25:37 AM | Little Powell,
Here's something else to wonder about:
In Douglas Craig Haines' excellent article (Lee's Advance Along the Cashtown Road) in Gettysburg Magazine, issue #23, Mr. Haines relates that AP Hill is told to move his whole corps to Cashtown on June 29th. Longstreet was to follow Hill the next day.
For reasons unknown, Pender and Anderson remain in Fayetteville delaying Longstreet's departure.
At daybreak on July 1, Anderson finally leaves Fayetteville passing Hood and McLaws, marching ahead of Johnson's (Ewell) division.
Think about what might have been had Heth, Pender, and Anderson been at Cashtown by June 30th with Hood and McLaws not too far behind.
Regards,
Phil Laino
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"The cataclysmic nature of the fight and the passion of the human mind to build acceptance and to gain vindication, combined to form a new, inclusive reality." Joseph T. Glatthaar
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| Steve F
Hampstead, NH, USA
Posts: 1758
| | Re: Anderson halted near Cashtown | | Posted on: 7/23/2010 10:14:24 AM | It would be interesting to list all instances of breakdowns in ANV command, or instances of poor staff work. This battle seems to be full of ANV communication problems. Most of the "what ifs" are on the ANV side.
Steve
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"Live free or die. Death is not the worst of evils." Gen. John Stark
"I sure wish I lived closer. Have I said that before?" Steve F.
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| Red Bailey
Dewey, AZ, USA
Posts: 840
| | Re: Anderson halted near Cashtown | | Posted on: 7/23/2010 11:45:58 AM |
Quote:If Lee had gone outside the chain-of-command, and personally directed Anderson to act as the army’s reserve, I would expect;
Either Hill and/or Anderson to mention it in their reports.
That Lee, in his report, would probably acknowledge that action.
There were lots of things not mentioned in the reports written by ANV and AOP commanders after Gettysburg for a variety of reasons. Lee and his commanders had a lot on their plate with the re-organization of the battered ANV, and it would have been pointless at that stage of the war to dwell on the negatives.
Quote:It should not have required Lee’s personal involvement. He could have sent a staff officer to Hill with the instructions.
There's nothing abnormal about Lee's wanting to protect his right flank in lieu of not having Stuart and his intel capabilities around. Perhaps the sickly Hill was busy directing his two divisions that were up and fighting, and Lee simply saved time by directly sending his staff officer back down the Pike to instruct Anderson. Lee did the same the next day in stopping Pickett's march at Marsh Creek.
Quote:Neither report supports the idea that Lee personally directed Anderson to be his reserve.
Hill:
“Under the impression that the enemy were entirely routed, my own two divisions exhausted by some six hours' hard fighting, prudence led me to be content with what had been gained, and not push forward troops exhausted and necessarily disordered, probably to encounter fresh troops of the enemy. There two divisions were bivouacked in the positions won, and Anderson, who had just come up, was also bivouacked some 2 miles in rear of the battle-ground. “
Anderson:
“Upon approaching Gettysburg, I was directed to occupy the position in line of battle which had just been vacated by Pender's division, and to place one brigade and a battery of artillery a mile or more on the right of the line, in a direction at a right angle with it and facing to the right. Wilcox's brigade and Captain [H. M.] Ross' battery, of Lane's battalion, were posted in the detached position, while the other brigades occupied the ground from which Pender's division had just been moved. “
Again, after losing the battle of Gettysburg, I doubt that either Lee, or his top commanders would mention negatives about poor performance, or name names about who did what, and to whom.
Quote:It seems a bit odd that if Anderson is to be the reserve, that he would be directed to send a brigade a mile or more to the right of the line.
If Anderson’s services were required, he would have to move without Wilcox, with about 20% of the division’s strength, or move without him, and Wilcox would have to catch up.
VR, Rick Schaus
--Rick Schaus
Rick, look at the Hotchkiss map that Lee had probably memorized by then, and it's apparent the the Knoxlyn Road was the obvious place to move a brigade out 1.25 miles. At that distance Wilcox's brigade was in a good position to cover both the road to Knoxlyn and the Marsh Creek Road - both of which were possible routes to Lee's flank and rear. (Lee had also probably acquired the 1858 Adam's County map which would have confirmed the accuracy of the Hotchkiss map.)
From that location, it was only .4 miles back to the Hereter's Mill Road (Today's Old Mill road) to rejoin the division and move east. There was also the potential for Wilcox's brigade to use the Marsh Creek Road the next morning in leading the division forward to either South Seminary Ridge, or further south, thus giving Lee options for quickly moving Hill to the right, and using Longstreet to attack CH from the center.
Remember, Longstreet's two divisions were following Johnson's, and due to the heavy traffic on the Chambersburg Pike, could not be expected to be up until early on the morning of the 2nd.
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'War is often the result of the failure to reason' - Anonymous
As usual,
Red
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| littlepowell
Greenville , SC, USA
Posts: 293
| | Re: Anderson halted near Cashtown | | Posted on: 7/27/2010 10:52:30 AM | Interesting thoughts everyone, as always.
You might be on to something Red. It could very well be that the commanders were ashamed of Anderson's reasons for halting, and did not mention it in the reports. It could have been something as simple as problems with their supplies, or the hundred other things that could go wrong when trying to move a mass of 7,000+ men.
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http://www.scourgeofwar.com/ - New Gettysburg PC game from Norb Software Development.
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| Red Bailey
Dewey, AZ, USA
Posts: 840
| | Re: Anderson halted near Cashtown | | Posted on: 7/27/2010 12:18:32 PM | littlepowell,
I'll never buy the notion that Anderson moved his division off of the Pike on July 1st without orders. There are questions about his taking five hours on the 2nd to move up to South Seminary Ridge, but I think as always that there were reasons for that. With neither Lee, Hill, or Anderson saying anything about it in their reports, and Anderson only mentioning Lee's order later, it's possible that there was some kind of goof that they didn't want to mention. Lee never discussed Gettysburg's details after the war, Hill was dead, and Richard Anderson didn't publically join in with the postwar lost-causers.
Picture Heth's division first using the Knoxlyn Rd to deploy two brigades (Archer, Davis) south & north along that road. They then started their advance against Buford's cavalrymen. As they advanced across the fields, Brockenbrough and Pettigrew moved up along the Pike in support. The brigade and regimental ambulances & wagons for the two brigades that deployed were probably aligned along the Knoxlyn Road for some time while Heth's four bigades moved east.
I've seen nothing in the OR's about it, but it seems obvious that Pender's division filed off and deployed along the Knoxlyn Road also and advanced eastwards. Perhaps Heth's wagons had by then cleared the Knoxlyn Road using the Pike and probably the Old Mill Road.
As Pender advanced across the fields, his regimental wagons & ambulances would probably also have waited along the Knoxlyn Road where there was shade and water.
By the time Pender had moved up across the fields to Herr Ridge, and his wagons could follow using the Pike, and probably Old Mill Road, there would have been a developing traffic jam along the Pike with the first of Heth's wounded streaming back west to where corps and division hospitals were established just west of the Marsh Creek bridge.
With A.P. Hill busy with the action ahead, I think that Lee must have been aware of the Pike traffic jam, and the necessity of clearing it to allow Johnson's division to advance along the Pike as quickly as possible to join their Corps (Ewell). That could also have motivated Lee's decision to move Anderson's division off of the Pike, although I think the protection of his right flank was probably Lee's prime reasoning.
Such details were not often mentioned in the battle reports, maybe because they were so common with the problems of moving troops, batteries, and their supports back in that war.
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'War is often the result of the failure to reason' - Anonymous
As usual,
Red
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| ChrisArmy
Knoxville, TN, USA
Posts: 501
| | Re: Anderson halted near Cashtown | | Posted on: 7/27/2010 2:10:00 PM | Red,
If I recall correctly (not near my sources right now) Pender deployed on the Lott Farm.
Regards,
Chris
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"Theories should be as simple as possible, but not more so.".....Albert Einstein
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| Jim Cameron
North Bellmore, NY, USA
Posts: 940
| | Re: Anderson halted near Cashtown | | Posted on: 7/27/2010 2:52:53 PM |
Quote:I'll never buy the notion that Anderson moved his division off of the Pike on July 1st without orders. There are questions about his taking five hours on the 2nd to move up to South Seminary Ridge, but I think as always that there were reasons for that. With neither Lee, Hill, or Anderson saying anything about it in their reports, and Anderson only mentioning Lee's order later, it's possible that there was some kind of goof that they didn't want to mention. Lee never discussed Gettysburg's details after the war, Hill was dead, and Richard Anderson didn't publically join in with the postwar lost-causers.
Is there anything to even suggest that Anderson going into bivouac on July 1 was other than entirely in accord with orders from higher up?
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Jim Cameron
Every time I go to Gettysburg, I learn two things. Something new, and, how much I still don't know.
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| jason
Arlington, VA, USA
Posts: 156
| | Re: Anderson halted near Cashtown | | Posted on: 7/27/2010 3:08:02 PM |
Quote:Quote: I'll never buy the notion that Anderson moved his division off of the Pike on July 1st without orders. There are questions about his taking five hours on the 2nd to move up to South Seminary Ridge, but I think as always that there were reasons for that. With neither Lee, Hill, or Anderson saying anything about it in their reports, and Anderson only mentioning Lee's order later, it's possible that there was some kind of goof that they didn't want to mention. Lee never discussed Gettysburg's details after the war, Hill was dead, and Richard Anderson didn't publically join in with the postwar lost-causers. Is there anything to even suggest that Anderson going into bivouac on July 1 was other than entirely in accord with orders from higher up? --Jim Cameron
In their excellent book Last Chance for Victory, Bowden and Ward suggest that Anderson was derilict in failing to bring his division up to Gettysburg so that they could participate in an attack on July 1.
In support, they cite the following:
(1) A letter from Col. Abner Perrin to South Carolina's governor dated July 29, 1863, in which Perrin said that Anderson was negligent in not getting his division forward. Perrin wrote: "His failure to us was the cause of the failure of the campaign."
(2) A July 8 dispatch from a Richmond Enquirer correspondent that blamed Anderson for moving too slowly and for halting unnecessarily at Cashtown. The reporter further stated that after Lee told him to get going to Gettysburg, Anderson did not move with proper haste and failed to get into position to help attack Cemetery Hill.
Bowden and Ward admit that these sources must be read with caution, but say that the charges "ring with veracity." They say that Anderson's claim that he went into bivouac on Lee's orders "lacks verity for a host of reasons."
(1) His assertion is not supported by a single corroborating witness or suriving orders.
(2) Lee's plan of defeating the AOP in detail was coming to fruition and therefore it made little sense for Lee to order Anderson off the battlefield with several hours of daylight remaining. Such an order they say is contrary to Lee's plan and to his aggressive nature.
(3) Lee asked Hill if he could continue the battle with elements of his corps and ordered Hill's artillery to fire upon Cemetery Hill.
(4) Why would Lee need a reserve when the only AOP troops that had been encountered that day were dead, wounded or retreating, especially considering Johnson's division would be coming soon.
(5) Anderson's report is silent on receiving orders to go into bivouac. If he had been ordered by Lee to stop short of Gettysburg, he would have mentioned it.
Bowden/Ward say something got messed up between Hill and Anderson, but don't think Lee had anything to do with it. I don't know that I agree, but thought I would offer their thoughts (hopefully I didn't plagarize too much from their book).
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| Jim Cameron
North Bellmore, NY, USA
Posts: 940
| | Re: Anderson halted near Cashtown | | Posted on: 7/27/2010 3:32:24 PM | I'll take that as a "yes" as to suggestions (somebody had to loose Lee's battle for him after all), and a "no" as to there being any actual evidence.
I'm still with Red on this one.
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Jim Cameron
Every time I go to Gettysburg, I learn two things. Something new, and, how much I still don't know.
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| ChrisArmy
Knoxville, TN, USA
Posts: 501
| | Re: Anderson halted near Cashtown | | Posted on: 7/27/2010 3:33:41 PM | Perrin seemed to blame a lot of folks. He also criticized Scales on his left and Lane on his right. Scales (and Perrin's own 14th SC) took the brunt of the artillery attack from Wainwright and in particular Stewart's Battery, Lane on the left was occupied by the Union Cav.
Seems like General Lee could have used some of that knowledge that Perrin had - perhaps before the attack!
I really think Hill was not comfortable in his elevated role as of the time of the battle. I've often wondered what the ANV roles would look like had Ewell and Hill had time to develop as Corp Commanders prior to Gettysburg.
I like LCFV alot - might be a good time for a re-read.
Regards,
Chris
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"Theories should be as simple as possible, but not more so.".....Albert Einstein
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| Scott Bowden
Posts: 112
| | Re: Anderson halted near Cashtown | | Posted on: 7/27/2010 3:34:30 PM | Jason,
Thanks for the post.
Please note that Perrin's letter back home was dated July 29, 1863...not July 2nd.
Regards,
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| Rick Allen
Baltimore , MD, USA
Posts: 735
| | Re: Anderson halted near Cashtown | | Posted on: 7/27/2010 5:11:04 PM |
So, just to clarify things in my mind, it seems like by these choices Anderson did one of two things.
1) He, on his own hook and without higher orders to do so, pulled his advancing Division off the line of march and just decided to park them in the rear.
OR
2) Lee (or somebody on his behalf) issued specific orders to Anderson to do so.
If those are in fact the two choices......(not to say that there may not be others)......I would have to believe that if Anderson did the former, he wouldnt have found himself commanding a Division in the ANV for very much longer. You have to remember, this is like shitting the bed at the Waldorf Astoria.......somebody is going to notice.
I should also add that I dont believe I have ever found a reason to be impressed by RHA.. The guy made one timely march in 64 and other than that, all I tend to see is mediocrity or worse. It's a damn shame Mahone didnt bloom sooner. How well connected was Anderson?
On the other hand, if he was ordered by Lee (or a staffer) to do the latter, to halt as a Reserve, you can hardly blame him for doing so. Just because we have no direct evidence of such a thing happening, is not by itself reason to say that its truth is impossible. Lots of things happened that we dont have records for....and each one of them was probably brought about by some form of order from above.....the fact that we dont have a copy doesnt mean that it couldnt, or didnt, happen.
I dont think it unreasonable that Lee would want to keep a sizeable reserve being that he was operating damn near blind, and the entire battle was not brought about according to his schedule. Being "up" and being "en route" are two very different things.......I dont think it's crazy if Lee saw things spinning out his control and was willing to keep the dice rolling.....with the caveat that he had a five Brigade Division positioned in his rear as a Reserve.
I'm not saying thats what he did, only that I could understand it. It's not "super aggressive", but it does make a little sense even for a super aggressive guy to hedge his bets blind in enemy territory with a range of hills to his front that could be sheltering anything between six kittens and Napoleons Grand Armee.
Guys, I dont pretend to know the truth of it. I really dont. However, if I had to pick...........seeing how things went in the ANV for the rest of the War,... if Richard Heron Anderson had been some kind of tactical genius or a firebrand inspirational commander whose leadership and skill could not be replaced within the ranks of the army, maybe he could have gotten away with it. But in the same vein, I think that if Anderson had really shit the bed and for no reason at all taken 6,500 men off the board without orders to do so, in relative proximity to the CG and on his own hook, in what everyone seemingly realized at the time as being the most critical battle in the War, I dont think he would have been around the next year, much less promoted and kept within the ANV......that would be very unusual for Lee.
Just chiming in.........I have no damned idea.
Regards,
Rick
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| jason
Arlington, VA, USA
Posts: 156
| | Re: Anderson halted near Cashtown | | Posted on: 7/27/2010 5:15:30 PM |
Quote:
So, just to clarify things in my mind, it seems like by these choices Anderson did one of two things.
1) He, on his own hook and without higher orders to do so, pulled his advancing Division off the line of march and just decided to park them in the rear.
OR
2) Lee (or somebody on his behalf) issued specific orders to Anderson to do so.
If those are in fact the two choices......(not to say that there may not be others)......I would have to believe that if Anderson did the former, he wouldnt have found himself commanding a Division in the ANV for very much longer. You have to remember, this is like shitting the bed at the Waldorf Astoria.......somebody is going to notice.
--Rick Allen
I guess there is another option:
3) Anderson received orders from Hill (as opposed to Lee directly) to remain in reserve and Hill was not acting on behalf of Lee.
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| Rick Allen
Baltimore , MD, USA
Posts: 735
| | Re: Anderson halted near Cashtown | | Posted on: 7/27/2010 5:17:19 PM | Yep. That is exactly the third option I was thinking of, Jason.
Regards,
Rick
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| Jim Cameron
North Bellmore, NY, USA
Posts: 940
| | Re: Anderson halted near Cashtown | | Posted on: 7/27/2010 6:45:07 PM | Which is one reason I put is as "...in accord with orders from higher up."
Take you pick as to who they actually came from, or even, for what particular reason. I just think that it stands more to reason that he did in fact receive and follow such orders.
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Jim Cameron
Every time I go to Gettysburg, I learn two things. Something new, and, how much I still don't know.
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| Red Bailey
Dewey, AZ, USA
Posts: 840
| | Re: Anderson halted near Cashtown | | Posted on: 7/27/2010 6:49:05 PM | On Anderson (From Tagg's Generals at Gettysburg):
"... one of the most liked officers in the Army of Northern Virginia."
"... Anderson lacked the strong, magnetic personality with which the best officers often inspired their men."
On July 1st, it seems that Anderson stopped his march east and rested his division for awhile in Cashtown at around 10 AM. Lee arrived at Cashtown around Noon and did confer with Anderson before riding on to the front.
I recall reading somewhere that only Longstreet seemed to be able to get the best performance out of Anderson back in the Peninsula days when Anderson served under Longstreet.
I'm inclined to believe that Lee did indeed order Anderson off of the Pike later - probably because Hill was too busy with Pender's attack. The fact that Lee did the same thing with Pickett the next day tends to influence me the most.
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'War is often the result of the failure to reason' - Anonymous
As usual,
Red
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| ChrisArmy
Knoxville, TN, USA
Posts: 501
| | Re: Anderson halted near Cashtown | | Posted on: 7/27/2010 7:37:58 PM | Hill addresses it in his report somewhat.... page 607 in the OR... "Under the impression that the enemy were entirely routed, my own two divisions exhausted by some six hours' hard fighting, prudence led me to be content with what had been gained, and not push forward troops exhausted and necessarily disordered, probably to encounter fresh troops of the enemy. These two divisions were bivouacked in the positions won, and Anderson who had just come up, was also bivouacked some 2 miles in rear of the battle-ground."
Lee in his OR on page 318 states "Anderson's division of Hill's corps came up after the engagement" So, it seems that would be the reason - not an order during the engagement.
Regards,
Chris
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"Theories should be as simple as possible, but not more so.".....Albert Einstein
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| Karl
DE, USA
Posts: 456
| | Re: Anderson halted near Cashtown | | Posted on: 7/27/2010 8:41:16 PM | Another brain teaser to be sure.
I know Red mentioned Johnson but if I may add something here that I didn't see addressed.
I know that Johnson was further back, and I also know that Lee was blind as to what he really faced.
But they did know Johnson was coming and I thought the desire was for Johnson to be allowed to reunite with Ewell was he not?
As stated, if the Cashtown Pike to the west was becoming a mess of wagons and troops, and a desire to have the dispositions you want from here on knowing who is where, wouldn't the fact Lee wanted Johnson reunited with Ewell have played a bigger part in why Anderson may have been asked to bivouack?
It's all about choices and decisions is it not?
You allow Anderson to come thru and Johnson will not be able to join Ewell for a looooooonnnng time.
Just a thought.
Regards,
Karl
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| scoucer
Berlin, Germany
Posts: 507
| | Re: Anderson halted near Cashtown | | Posted on: 7/27/2010 10:58:01 PM | I tend to have a soft spot for "Fighting Dick". I agree with Rick - if Anderson had decided off his own bat that his Division should take a nap,he wouldn`t have stayed a general very long never mind taking over for Longstreet. At Chancellorsville he`d operated directly under Lee so Lee knew what he could do, or not do. For me, I get the feeling that Hill was "not really there" and Anderson was waiting on Hill.
All the Best
Trevor
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`Hey don´t the wars come easy and don´t the peace come hard`- Buffy Sainte-Marie
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| Red Bailey
Dewey, AZ, USA
Posts: 840
| | Re: Anderson halted near Cashtown | | Posted on: 7/28/2010 1:17:20 PM |
Quote:Another brain teaser to be sure.
I know Red mentioned Johnson but if I may add something here that I didn't see addressed.
I know that Johnson was further back, and I also know that Lee was blind as to what he really faced.
But they did know Johnson was coming and I thought the desire was for Johnson to be allowed to reunite with Ewell was he not?
As stated, if the Cashtown Pike to the west was becoming a mess of wagons and troops, and a desire to have the dispositions you want from here on knowing who is where, wouldn't the fact Lee wanted Johnson reunited with Ewell have played a bigger part in why Anderson may have been asked to bivouack?
It's all about choices and decisions is it not?
You allow Anderson to come thru and Johnson will not be able to join Ewell for a looooooonnnng time.
Just a thought.
--Karl
Karl,
It may have been a problem with getting the trains up of both Hill's Corps and Ewell's corps that entered into the equation. Ewell's corps' train was following Johnson's division, and Lee may have wanted to get it up to serve it's corps as soon as possible.
Then there was the problem of A. P. Hill's trains waiting back in Cashtown to replenish Heth and Pender, as well as Anderson's train.
So in addition to watching his right flank, Lee may have felt that getting the slow-marching Anderson off of the Pike would speed up the process of getting Ewell's & Hill's trains up as quickly as possible, as well as getting Johnson's division up for any possible assault on C.H.
It's a shame that 'logistical' problems were rarely mentioned in the O.R.'s. Lee's small staff problem was also rarely mentioned in the O.R.'s. One can only imagine the size and scope of many factors about troops, and battles back in those days, and I doubt that the average veteran spent any time dwelling on such subjects either during, or after, the war.
Chris,
I place the time of turning off Anderson's division from the Pike as being probably 4:30 PM, perhaps later. There was still a lot of fighting going on at the front at that time.
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'War is often the result of the failure to reason' - Anonymous
As usual,
Red
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| ChrisArmy
Knoxville, TN, USA
Posts: 501
| | Re: Anderson halted near Cashtown | | Posted on: 7/28/2010 1:56:12 PM |
Quote:
Chris,
I place the time of turning off Anderson's division from the Pike as being probably 4:30 PM, perhaps later. There was still a lot of fighting going on at the front at that time.
--Red Bailey
True, but then why would Hill and Lee both mention it was after the "engagement" that Anderson was placed in bivouack?
Regards,
Chris
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"Theories should be as simple as possible, but not more so.".....Albert Einstein
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| Red Bailey
Dewey, AZ, USA
Posts: 840
| | Re: Anderson halted near Cashtown | | Posted on: 7/28/2010 1:59:36 PM | Chris,
Your guess is as good as mine. 
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'War is often the result of the failure to reason' - Anonymous
As usual,
Red
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| ChrisArmy
Knoxville, TN, USA
Posts: 501
| | Re: Anderson halted near Cashtown | | Posted on: 7/28/2010 2:50:13 PM | True Red.....wonder if Lee thought later that Anderson may have been able to help take the hill had it been practicable????
Chris
---------------
"Theories should be as simple as possible, but not more so.".....Albert Einstein
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| Scott Bowden
Posts: 112
| | Re: Anderson halted near Cashtown | | Posted on: 7/28/2010 3:49:25 PM | Chris,
The after action reports were so carefully crafted in order to deflect any criticism that the context of the words and how those were written should weigh heavily in any analysis.
Regards,
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| Red Bailey
Dewey, AZ, USA
Posts: 840
| | Re: Anderson halted near Cashtown | | Posted on: 7/28/2010 4:08:25 PM | Lee was right - Anderson's division didn't come up until 'after the engagement' of July 1st - he came up on July 2nd. Lee was either not being explicit in his January, 1864 report and used that generalization, or he was cleverly dodging the question, or he just didn't remember the events clearly. Nothing surprising about that, so we each must choose how we read any statements in the OR's or in the postwar accounts.
I think General Lee was a master at crafting, and/or correcting subordinate's reports with the intention of not creating more dissension than already existed in his army.
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'War is often the result of the failure to reason' - Anonymous
As usual,
Red
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| Scott Bowden
Posts: 112
| | Re: Anderson halted near Cashtown | | Posted on: 7/28/2010 4:58:24 PM | Charles Marshall's description of the entire after-action writing process should be required reading for anyone using the reports.
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| Karl
DE, USA
Posts: 456
| | Re: Anderson halted near Cashtown | | Posted on: 7/28/2010 7:11:06 PM | Red
I would say that it falls more under the category of the ANV not being anywhere near as detailed with their reports as the AOP.
Rick Allen said to me a looooong time ago that Lee's biggest "Issue" was his lack of a staff. Almost none really.
When I think about that now in hindsight, what comes to mind is who was there to do the work of transcribing all that voluminus (sp) amounts of info.
I know Charles Marshall was kept pretty busy but, with verbal orders flying around all over the place and he being "they guy", there weren't any stenographers sitting around to keep track of who said what....when.
;-)
Rick was right on about that lack of staff.
It didn't dawn on me until years later when my learning increased but when I think about it now, I want to add another item to the mix.
Stan gave me his copy of Charles Marshalls book a ways back when we were discussing the Ewell attacking CH thing as a piece of info that I needed to factor into that equation.
My opinion on Marshall and his "take" on Lee and all that is for another thread to be sure.
I do not want to derail this thread.
If nothing else, it solidified in my mind what Rick had been saying forever.
Lee had NO STAFF.
He had a guy or two.
When you get right down to it, it's really true.
Is it any wonder there is no record?
But it also makes you realize the brilliance of R.E. Lee.
The guy could make decisions at drop of a hat and he did have his share of blunders (Gettysburg???), but if he wasn't the guy at the helm they would have needed a real group of people to pull off what he could do with a few guys.
Just my not so very humble opinion, (JMNSVHO).
Cheers!
Karl
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| Red Bailey
Dewey, AZ, USA
Posts: 840
| | Re: Anderson halted near Cashtown | | Posted on: 7/28/2010 8:42:13 PM | Karl,
Don't get me wrong, I've been an admirer of Lee since way back when I first read Freeman's two works. I just don't think that any man, no matter how great, can be always right, or see that 'elephant' clearly from all sides.
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'War is often the result of the failure to reason' - Anonymous
As usual,
Red
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| wesdog1964
eau gallie, FL, USA
Posts: 216
| | Re: Anderson halted near Cashtown | | Posted on: 7/28/2010 8:52:52 PM | Did Stuarts absence have any repercussions on Hills movements on June 30th/July 1st?
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| Red Bailey
Dewey, AZ, USA
Posts: 840
| | Re: Anderson halted near Cashtown | | Posted on: 7/28/2010 9:03:07 PM | I think that Stuart's absence had many repercussions on the march to GB and the battle.
---------------
'War is often the result of the failure to reason' - Anonymous
As usual,
Red
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| Andy B
lafayette, NJ, USA
Posts: 29
| | Re: Anderson halted near Cashtown | | Posted on: 7/28/2010 11:27:54 PM | Personally, I think a lot of these recriminations are based on the assumption that Lee was itching and eager for any opportunity to engage and defeat isolated segments of the AOP, no matter what the logistics. This comes pretty much exclusively from Trimble; a source that always needs to be questioned. Far more reliable and plentiful evidence suggests that Lee's battle plans for his PA invasion were far more cautious and conditional. Specifically that he only intended to give battle if he could choose the ground and his whole army was in attendence. Cashtown seems to be the place he decided on to satify both these requirements. His orders on the 29th to Ewell and Hill seem to bear that out. Both Longstreet and Marshall claim that, either through misconception or impetuosity, Hill erred by going further on the 1st. Hill's biographers, Robertson and Hassler, both exonerate their man by claiming he duly informed Lee of his intentions but their evidence is not convincing. I truely loved LCFV, but I didn't find their attempt to blame Anderson for bivouacking on his own hook too convincing. Like Red I think he had orders from above and I think these orders conform to the cautious state of mind Lee was operating under at the time. Why it took him 5 hours to get to the front the next day is a far greater mystery, but I guess thats another thread.
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