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tom ryan
Bethany Beach, DE, USA
Posts: 1187
 | | After Gettysburg by Robert J. Trout | | Posted on: 1/24/2013 2:10:06 PM | Reading this new book with the subtitle "Cavalry Operations in the Eastern Theater July 14, 1863 to December 31, 1863." Chapter 1 is "From the Potomac to the Rappahannock" and covers the period after Lee's escape across the Potomac until both armies arrive in the Rappahannock vicinity.
This roughly two-week period has received very little coverage, even though it is generally considered a part of the Gettysburg Campaign as many OR reports indicate.
If anyone was frustrated with the slow pace and lack of energy behind the pursuit of Lee's army after the Battle of Gettysburg, things get no better, and, if anything, are even worse during this timeframe. Meade's wait-and-see approach to what Lee was going to do is duplicated once the AoP finally crosses the Potomac in pursuit, and every opportunity to engage Lee goes awry for one reason or another.
As with the post-battle pursuit, it is difficult to pinpoint what is going on and why a greater effort is not put forth to take advantage of opportunities to isolate and engage parts of Lee's army. Also, as with the Battle of Gettysburg, Meade wrote little to explain his plans and objectives, which leaves everyone in the dark and opens up a lot of room for speculation. For example, in his report on the campaign, Meade devotes two brief paragraphs to the entire two-week period, and says nothing other than Lee managed to escape once again (OR, 27, I, 118). It is stated so matter-of-factly, that there is an urge to give Meade a shot of adrenalin.
I haven't read much beyond this first chapter; but, already knowing the history of the Bristoe Station and Mine Run Campaigns, there probably will not be any startling revelations in Trout's rendition.
Tom Ryan
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| Rick Schaus
Capon Springs, WV, USA
Posts: 1577
| | Re: After Gettysburg by Robert J. Trout | | Posted on: 1/24/2013 5:24:25 PM | While this issue may seem more appropriate for another forum, it does have a definite connection to the Gettysburg Campaign.
Since Meade uas unable, after Gettysburg, to engage the ANV north of the Potomac, it meant, as he was well aware, that he would have to campaign against the ANV in Virginia, and this was part of that effort.
This is an exchange of correspondence, 18-19 September, 1863, from Halleck to Meade, and the President to Halleck.
President Lincoln’s message to Halleck is one of my personal favourites of the war in the East.
” WASHINGTON, D. C.,
September 19, 1863.
Major-General MEADE:
GENERAL: Yours of 3 p. m. of yesterday is received.
It is my duty to point out to the generals commanding the several armies in the field the objects which the Government wishes accomplished, and to assist as far as possible in attaining those objects. But unless directed to do so, I never attempt to direct a general when, where, or how to give battle. He must decide such matters for himself. No one else can do it for him. I have no idea of playing the part of an Austrian ruler.
You are left free to exercise your own judgment on this subject. In regard to Richmond, I do not consider it of any very great military importance, nor as the objective point of the Army of the Potomac. Your objective point, in my opinion, is Lee's army, and the object to be attained is to do it as much harm as possible with as little injury as possible to yourself. If Lee holds a position too strong to be attacked, and he cannot be turned by maneuvering, then his outposts and detachments can be attacked, his communications threatened by raids, or the supplies of the adjacent country collected for the support of our army. The accomplishment of any or all of these objects will necessarily depend upon circumstances which may daily and almost hourly change, and can properly be judged of only by the general in the field.
I gave you in my last a general outline of the condition of our affairs in the south and west and what we have to do there. As soon as the re-enforcements sent to Bragg can be spared, they will probably return against you. Whatever you can do should be done while they are absent. If you really think that nothing of importance can be accomplished, then it seems to me that it will be as well to withdraw your army to some point nearer Washington. In regard to lines of operations, I can see no advantage in a change to Aquia Creek. Indeed, I do not think that line as favorable as the one you are moving on.
I had written thus far when I received the inclosed letter from the President. Please keep me advised of your general plans. I fear that General Rosecrans will be hard pushed.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
H. W. HALLECK,
General-in-Chief.
[Inclosure.]
EXECUTIVE MANSION,
Washington, September 19, 1863.
Major-General HALLECK:
By General Meade's dispatch to you of yesterday, it appears that he desires your views and those of the Government as to whether he shall advance upon the enemy. I am not prepared to order or even advise an advance in this case, wherein I know so little of the particulars, and wherein he, in the field, thinks the risk is so great and the promise of advantage so small. And yet the case presents matter for very serious consideration in another aspect. These two armies confront each other across a small river, substantially midway between the two capitals, each defending its own capital, and menacing the other. General Meade estimates the enemy's infantry in front of him at not less than 40,000. Suppose we add 50 per cent. to this for cavalry, artillery, and extra-duty men, stretching as far as Richmond, making the whole force of the enemy 60,000. General Meade, as shown by the returns, has with him, and between him and Washington, of the same classes of well men, over 90,000. Neither can bring the whole of his men into a battle, but each can bring as large a percentage in as the other. For a battle, then, General Meade has three men to General Lee's two. Yet, it having been determined that choosing ground and standing on the defensive gives so great advantage that the three cannot safely attack the two, the three are left simply standing on the defensive also. If the enemy's 60,000 are sufficient to keep our 90,000 away from Richmond, why, by the same rule, may not 40,000 of ours keep their 60,000 away from Washington, leaving us 50,000 to put to some other use? Having practically come to the mere defensive, it seems to be no economy at all to employ twice as many men for that object as are needed. With no object, certainly, to mislead myself, I can perceive no fault in this statement, unless we admit we are not the equal of the enemy, man for man. I hope you will consider it.
To avoid misunderstanding, let me say that to attempt to fight the enemy slowly back into his intrenchments at Richmond, and there to capture him, is an idea I have been trying to repudiate for quite a year. My judgment is so clear against it that I would scarcely allow the attempt to be made, if the general in command should desire to make it. My last attempt upon Richmond was to get McClellan, when he was nearer there than the enemy was, to run in ahead of him. Since then I have constantly desired the Army of the Potomac to make Lee's army, and not Richmond, its objective point. If our army cannot fall upon the enemy and hurt him where he is, it is plain to me it can gain nothing by attempting to follow him over a succession of intrenched lines into a fortified city.
Yours, truly,
A. LINCOLN.”
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VR, Rick Schaus
“Facts are for people who can’t create their own truth”
Bucky Katt
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| tom ryan
Bethany Beach, DE, USA
Posts: 1187
| | Re: After Gettysburg by Robert J. Trout | | Posted on: 1/24/2013 10:28:30 PM | Rick, Lincoln must have read Trout's account of Meade's "pursuit" of Lee after both armies crossed the Potomac. He sounds frustrated also.
Regards, Tom
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| Red Bailey
Prescott, AZ, USA
Posts: 2151
| | Re: After Gettysburg by Robert J. Trout | | Posted on: 1/25/2013 11:50:21 AM | Always difficult to judge the guy in the driver's seat when the two above him are so sure of their own judgments, so careful in their wording to CYA themselves, and yet so reticent to remove General Meade if they had no faith in him. Maybe there was no other general who wanted to assume Meade's position, or perhaps other Generals capable of taking the job just didn't want to take the heat from two such clever and capable superiors. It's easy to sit in judgment at the upper levels, or after the fact, but it's always the guy in the trenches that has to get it done.
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Human action can be modified to some extent, but human nature cannot be changed. ....Lincoln
As usual,
Red
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| tom ryan
Bethany Beach, DE, USA
Posts: 1187
| | Re: After Gettysburg by Robert J. Trout | | Posted on: 1/25/2013 5:52:39 PM | Red,
But wasn't that the problem -- the guy in the trenches wasn't getting the job done. Someone had to make the tough decisions, and like Lincoln methods or not he was the one who had the make the final judgment regarding whether his commanders were up to the job of defeating Robert E. Lee in particular, and the Confederate army in general.
There was a time crunch in play here, and Lincoln was well aware that the natives were getting restless in the North. There was a growing peace movement that was working both openly and clandestinely to bring about a settlement that would allow the South to go its own way.
I think Lincoln showed remarkable patience with Meade, and gave him every opportunity to demonstrate that he was indeed capable of bringing the war to a military conclusion. Despite his bitter disappointment following Gettysburg, Lincoln waited the better part of a year until he realized the handwriting was on the wall.
Meade fundamental problem from my perspective was his reluctance to shed the blood of his soldiers unless he was absolutely certain of victory beforehand. Therefore, he hesitated at every turn, until it became obvious to just about everyone that this arrangement was not working.
By early 1864, Lincoln knew well that he was being challenged for the Republican nomination, and he had a few short months to get done what needed to be done. Fortunately for him, he made the right choice in hiring Grant to oversee the entire military operation, and allowed him enough leeway to get the job done.
This does not mean that Meade was a bad general or a bad person. It meant that Meade had reached his peak as a leader at the corps level, and required specific direction from above to make good at the army level.
I realize this sounds like an oversimplification, yet it is difficult to disprove the basic premise.
Regards, Tom
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| Rick Schaus
Capon Springs, WV, USA
Posts: 1577
| | Re: After Gettysburg by Robert J. Trout | | Posted on: 1/25/2013 7:09:07 PM | I don’t think that either Halleck or Lincoln were micromanaging Meade, quite the opposite, actually.
Halleck told Meade that, as the field commander, he should make the decisions on how best to defeat Lee.
” You are left free to exercise your own judgment on this subject.”
Meade, during the Gettysburg Campaign, had complained about interference from Washington, but now he was asking for guidance in his operations from Washington.
Halleck did reiterate Meade’s standing order to destroy the ANV. Gettysburg had not changed it.
How that would be accomplished was appropriately left up to Meade.
Halleck gave the opinion, reinforced by Lincoln, who was, in fact, the Commander-in-Chief, that Lee’s army and not Richmond, was Meade’s objective.
In correspondence with another GO in October, 1863, Halleck would make the following observation:
” I am very certain that a large detachment from Lee's army has been sent west, and that Meade is greatly superior to him in numbers. Nevertheless, Meade seems unwilling to attack him without positive orders. To order a general to give battle against his own wishes and judgment is to assume the responsibility of a probable defeat. If a general is unwilling to fight, he is not likely to gain a victory. That army fights well when attacked, but all its generals have been unwilling to attack, even very inferior numbers. It certainly is a very strange phenomenon.”
Lincoln was writing to Halleck, not Meade.
Halleck forwarded it to Meade.
A strategy of Meade playing a strictly defensive role with his entire army was unacceptable to Meade’s superiors, and should have also been unacceptable to Meade.
Lincoln’s observations, made to Halleck, I believe, were valid.
If Meade was unwilling to fight offensively, for whatever reasons, then he could remain on the defensive with a smaller force (based on Meade’s own assessment regarding Lee) and part of the AoP could be used in operations in another theater.
I think a sad fact was that Meade was unwilling to conduct offensive operations against Lee, unless he was certain of success (which never seemed to occur), and his superiors were resigned to that fact.
The best they could expect in the East was stalemate.
The victory at Gettysburg had gained Meade some consideration and patience, and politically Lincoln would have to be careful before removing Meade from command of the AoP
There were no other generals in the East who could be expected militarily to do better than Meade.
From Navy Secretary Welles’ entry for 21 September, 1863:
” I expressed surprise to the President at the management and his forbearance, and it touched him. I asked what Meade was doing with his immense army and Lee's skeleton and depleted show in front. He said he could not learn that Meade was doing anything, or wanted to do anything. "It is," said he, "the same old story of this Army of the Potomac. Imbecility, inefficiency — don't want to do — is defending the Capital. I inquired of Meade," said he, "what force was in front. Meade replied he thought there were 40,000 infantry. I replied he might have said 50,000, and if Lee with 50,000 could defend their capital against our 90,000, — and if defense is all our armies are to do, — we might, I thought, detach 50,000 from his command, and thus leave him with 40,000 to defend us. Oh," groaned the President, "it is terrible, terrible, this weakness, this indifference of our Potomac generals, with such armies of good and brave men."
"Why," said I, "not rid yourself of Meade, who may be a good man and a good officer but is not a great general, has not breadth or strength, certainly is not the man for the position he occupies? The escape of Lee with his army across the Potomac has distressed me almost beyond any occurrence of the War. And the impression made upon me in the personal interview shortly after was not what I wished, had inspired no confidence, though he is faithful and will obey orders; but he can't originate."
The President assented to all I said, but "What can I do," he asked, "with such generals as we have? Who among them is any better than Meade? To sweep away the whole of them from the chief command and substitute a new man would cause a shock, and be likely to lead to combinations and troubles greater than we now have. I see all the difficulties as you do. They oppress me."”
In a later message from Halleck to Meade:
” WASHINGTON, October 16, 1863.
Major General GEORGE G. MEADE,
Army of the Potomac:
GENERAL: I send herewith a copy of a communication just received from the President.
It was reported last night that some of Longstreet's corps was moving from Strasburg toward the Potomac, and that Jenkins' and Imboden's cavalry were also operating in the Shenandoah Valley. Dispatches from Chattanooga say that none of Longstreet's corps have left for the east. About 3,000 of Longstreet's forces went to Charleston before he went west. These may have returned to Lee. This would reconcile the two accounts.
Very respectfully,
H. W. HALLECK,
General-in-Chief.
[Inclosure.]
EXECUTIVE MANSION, Washington, October 16, 1863.
Major-General HALLECK:
I do not believe Lee can have over 60,000 effective men.
Longstreet's corps would not be sent away to bring an equal force back upon the same road; and there is no other direction for them to have to come from.
Doubtless in making the present movement, Lee gathered in all the available scarps, and added them to Hill's and Ewell's corps, but that is all, and he made the movement in the belief that four corps had left General Meade; and General Meade's apparently avoiding a collision with him has confirmed him in the belief. If General Meade can now attack him on a field no more than equal for us, and will do so with all the skill and courage which he, his officers, and men possess, the honor will be his if he succeeds, and the blame may be mine if he fails.
Yours, truly,
A. LINCOLN.”
I think that the course of events in the East for the rest of 1863, verified their judgment.
If you do not agree, consider what Grant wrote about it in his memoirs:
In the East the opposing forces stood in substantially the same relations towards each other as three years before, or when the war began; they were both between the Federal and Confederate capitals. It is true, footholds had been secured by us on the sea-coast, in Virginia and North Carolina, but, beyond that, no substantial advantage had been gained by either side. Battles had been fought of as great severity as had ever been known in war, over ground from the James River and Chickahominy, near Richmond, to Gettysburg and Chambersburg, in Pennsylvania, with indecisive results, sometimes favorable to the National army, sometimes to the Confederate army;”
(Grant’s memoirs, pp 409)
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VR, Rick Schaus
“Facts are for people who can’t create their own truth”
Bucky Katt
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| Red Bailey
Prescott, AZ, USA
Posts: 2151
| | Re: After Gettysburg by Robert J. Trout | | Posted on: 1/26/2013 9:37:16 AM | Tom and Rick,
Regardless of Meade's real or presumed faults, it was Lincoln's and Halleck's responsibility to either stay with Meade or replace him. I'm from the "The Buck stops Here" school, and I place responsibility the highest with those in the highest posts.
Note that when they finally brought Grant over east, it took him overseeing Meade a long time to finally wear Lee's ANV down at great cost, and into the trenches around Richmond & Petersburg. The fact that Grant never replaced Meade indicates that he accepted Meade warts and all, and/or, there was just no one else better than Meade to run the AOP.
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Human action can be modified to some extent, but human nature cannot be changed. ....Lincoln
As usual,
Red
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| tom ryan
Bethany Beach, DE, USA
Posts: 1187
| | Re: After Gettysburg by Robert J. Trout | | Posted on: 1/26/2013 2:10:02 PM | Red, I think you have touched on the crux of the matter. Grant was willing to sacrifice his troops for the greater good, while Meade shied away from doing that. It was the difference between getting the job done and not getting it done. Give Lincoln some credit. He was willing to accept criticism as long as his commander in the field would fight. Meade would not fight on his own volition, so Lincoln eventually had to replace him.
The Grant-Meade relationship is a whole other story. The key to this relationship is that Meade came hat-in-hand to Grant saying he was ready to resign if Grant wished. Grant recognized Meade's willingness to accept a subordinate position, and decided to use his talents as a fighting general as long as he had proper supervision and guidance. Under these circumstances, the two men were able to work together.
Regards, Tom
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| scoucer
Berlin, Germany
Posts: 2246
| | Re: After Gettysburg by Robert J. Trout | | Posted on: 1/26/2013 5:13:52 PM |
Quote:Red, I think you have touched on the crux of the matter. Grant was willing to sacrifice "his troops" (my emphasis) for the greater good, while Meade shied away from doing that. It was the difference between getting the job done and not getting it done. Give Lincoln some credit. He was willing to accept criticism as long as his commander in the field would fight. Meade would not fight on his own volition, so Lincoln eventually had to replace him.
--tom ryan
Can one really say the AOP were "Grant´s troops" in the same sense as Meade, Hancock, Warren etc. who had been with, led and fought with it since it´s inception ?
Trevor
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`Hey don´t the wars come easy and don´t the peace come hard`- Buffy Sainte-Marie
Some swim with the stream. Some swim against the stream. Me - I´m stuck somewhere in the woods and can´t even find the stupid stream.
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| Rick Schaus
Capon Springs, WV, USA
Posts: 1577
| | Re: After Gettysburg by Robert J. Trout | | Posted on: 1/26/2013 6:04:25 PM |
Quote:Quote: Red, I think you have touched on the crux of the matter. Grant was willing to sacrifice "his troops" (my emphasis) for the greater good, while Meade shied away from doing that. It was the difference between getting the job done and not getting it done. Give Lincoln some credit. He was willing to accept criticism as long as his commander in the field would fight. Meade would not fight on his own volition, so Lincoln eventually had to replace him.
--tom ryan Can one really say the AOP were "Grant´s troops" in the same sense as Meade, Hancock, Warren etc. who had been with, led and fought with it since it´s inception ? Trevor --scoucer
Since Grant was in command of all Union armies, it is correct to refer to the men of the AoP as his men.
Trevor, I understand what you are asking.
Grant had not been associated with the AoP until the Wilderness, and Meade, Hancock, Sedgwick, Warren, and others had.
Grant might be in command, but he was still an outsider.
I would say though, that something else, more significant, and of greater importance occurred, when, after the fighting in the Wilderness ended, Grant issued orders for a night march, and, as Grant’s staff officer Porter, related:
” Soon after dark, Generals Grant and Meade, accompanied by their staffs, after having given personal supervision to the starting of the march, rode along the Brock road toward Hancock's headquarters, with the intention of waiting there till Warren's troops should reach that point. While moving close to Hancock's line, there occurred an unexpected demonstration on the part of the troops, which created one of the most memorable scenes of the campaign. Notwithstanding the darkness of the night, the form of the commander was recognized, and word was passed rapidly along that the chief who had led them through the mazes of the Wilderness was again moving forward with his horse's head turned toward Richmond. Troops know but little about what is going on in a large army, except the occurrences which take place in their immediate vicinity; but this night ride of the general-in-chief told plainly the story of success, and gave each man to understand that the cry was to be "On to Richmond!" Soldiers weary and sleepy after their long battle, with stiffened limbs and smarting wounds, now sprang to their feet, forgetful of their pains, and rushed forward to the roadside. Wild cheers echoed through the forest, and glad shouts of triumph rent the air. Men swung their hats, tossed up their arms, and pressed forward to within touch of their chief, clapping their hands, and speaking to him with the familiarity of comrades. Pine-knots and leaves were set on fire, and lighted the scene with their weird, flickering glare. The night march had become a triumphal procession for the new commander. The demonstration was the emphatic verdict pronounced by the troops upon his first battle in the East. The excitement had been imparted to the horses, which soon became restive, and even the general's large bay, over which he possessed ordinarily such perfect control, became difficult to manage. Instead of being elated by this significant ovation, the general, thoughtful only of the practical question of the success of the movement, said: "This is most unfortunate. The sound will reach the ears of the enemy, and I fear it may reveal our movement." By his direction, staff-officers rode forward and urged the men to keep quiet so as not to attract the enemy's attention; but the demonstration did not really cease until the general was out of sight.”
I think after that moment the men of the AoP were proud to think of themselves as Grant’s men.
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VR, Rick Schaus
“Facts are for people who can’t create their own truth”
Bucky Katt
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| scoucer
Berlin, Germany
Posts: 2246
| | Re: After Gettysburg by Robert J. Trout | | Posted on: 1/26/2013 6:26:44 PM | Good point Rick - a true turning point. Not a "skidaddle" this time.
Trevor
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`Hey don´t the wars come easy and don´t the peace come hard`- Buffy Sainte-Marie
Some swim with the stream. Some swim against the stream. Me - I´m stuck somewhere in the woods and can´t even find the stupid stream.
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| Red Bailey
Prescott, AZ, USA
Posts: 2151
| | Re: After Gettysburg by Robert J. Trout | | Posted on: 1/27/2013 11:29:16 AM | Grant's postwar evaluation of Meade:
General Meade was an officer of great merit, with drawbacks to his usefulness that were beyond his control. He had been an officer of the engineer corps before the war, and consequently had never served with troops until he was over forty-six years of age. He never had, I believe, a command of less than a brigade. He saw clearly and distinctly the position of the enemy, and the topography of the country in front of his own position. His first idea was to take advantage of the lay of the ground, sometimes without reference to the direction we wanted to move afterwards. He was subordinate to his superiors in rank to the extent that he could execute an order which changed his own plans with the same zeal he would have displayed if the plan had been his own. He was brave and conscientious, and commanded the respect of all who knew him. He was unfortunately of a temper that would get beyond his control, at times, and make him speak to officers of high rank in the most offensive manner. No one saw this fault more plainly than he himself, and no one regretted it more. This made it unpleasant at times, even in battle, for those around him to approach him even with information. In spite of this defect he was a most valuable officer and deserves a high place in the annals of his country.
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Human action can be modified to some extent, but human nature cannot be changed. ....Lincoln
As usual,
Red
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| Scott Brown
MA, USA
Posts: 1406
| | Re: After Gettysburg by Robert J. Trout | | Posted on: 1/27/2013 12:22:37 PM | I'm also left wondering how Trout reconciles any number of entries in Charles Wainwright's diary...
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"All this is pure invention"
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| tom ryan
Bethany Beach, DE, USA
Posts: 1187
| | Re: After Gettysburg by Robert J. Trout | | Posted on: 1/27/2013 1:35:50 PM |
Quote:I'm also left wondering how Trout reconciles any number of entries in Charles Wainwright's diary...
--Scott Brown
Scott, could you elaborate? Tom
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| Scott Brown
MA, USA
Posts: 1406
| | Re: After Gettysburg by Robert J. Trout | | Posted on: 1/27/2013 6:46:19 PM | Sorry, Tom. I was out on the pond today...
Here's one. Pg. 308 of the Stan Clark Military Books edition...
"There were rumors about camp of Meade's removal, Pleasonton, Hancock, and Sedgwick being talked about as his successor. I trust that there is no foundation for them, and that Meade's report of the "Mine Run" campaign, as it is since called, will induce the President to maintain him in his command. Since I have become fully acquainted with the history of this movement, I think more of General Meade than ever; especially of his not fighting." (emphasis in original)
The entry goes on to explain why Meade failed (Wainwright blamed it on French) and explained that there was another, stronger line of works about two miles behind the first, "thus making it a mere victory without actual advantage gained."
I'll post more as time permits, but I'm guessing you've got a copy of this.
Regards,
Scott B.
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"All this is pure invention"
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| Rick Schaus
Capon Springs, WV, USA
Posts: 1577
| | Re: After Gettysburg by Robert J. Trout | | Posted on: 1/27/2013 6:56:46 PM |
Quote:Grant's postwar evaluation of Meade:
General Meade was an officer of great merit, with drawbacks to his usefulness that were beyond his control. He had been an officer of the engineer corps before the war, and consequently had never served with troops until he was over forty-six years of age. He never had, I believe, a command of less than a brigade. He saw clearly and distinctly the position of the enemy, and the topography of the country in front of his own position. His first idea was to take advantage of the lay of the ground, sometimes without reference to the direction we wanted to move afterwards. He was subordinate to his superiors in rank to the extent that he could execute an order which changed his own plans with the same zeal he would have displayed if the plan had been his own. He was brave and conscientious, and commanded the respect of all who knew him. He was unfortunately of a temper that would get beyond his control, at times, and make him speak to officers of high rank in the most offensive manner. No one saw this fault more plainly than he himself, and no one regretted it more. This made it unpleasant at times, even in battle, for those around him to approach him even with information. In spite of this defect he was a most valuable officer and deserves a high place in the annals of his country.
--Red Bailey
Grant’s assessment of Meade was made based on his knowledge of Meade from the time Grant commanded Meade to the end of the war.
It does not include the time that Meade was in independent command of the AoP.
The situation after Grant assumed command was much different.
Grant stated that Meade had ” drawbacks to his usefulness that were beyond his control”
Meade’s temper was a serious detractor to his ability to work effectively with his subordinate commanders, and Grant did recognize it as a problem that would ”get beyond his control”.
I’m not certain if Grant’s comment below was a positive one:
” His first idea was to take advantage of the lay of the ground, sometimes without reference to the direction we wanted to move afterwards.”
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VR, Rick Schaus
“Facts are for people who can’t create their own truth”
Bucky Katt
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| Rick Schaus
Capon Springs, WV, USA
Posts: 1577
| | Re: After Gettysburg by Robert J. Trout | | Posted on: 1/27/2013 7:02:32 PM | This is Meade’s assessment of Grant:
” Grant is not a mighty genius, but he is a good soldier, of great force of character, honest and upright, of pure purposes, I think, without political aspirations, certainly not influenced by them. His prominent quality is unflinching tenacity of purpose, which blinds him to opposition and obstacles—certainly a great quality in a commander, when controlled by judgment, but a dangerous one otherwise. Grant is not without his faults and weaknesses. Among these is a want of sensibility, an almost too confident and sanguine disposition, and particularly a simple and guileless disposition, which is apt to put him, unknown to himself, under the influence of those who should not influence him, and desire to do so only for their own purposes. Take him all in all, he is, in my judgment, the best man the war has yet produced. When I say this, I refer more particularly to those I have come in contact with, and do not include Sherman, about whom I know nothing but what I see in the papers. I like Grant, and our relations have been very friendly. He has always in words expressed himself most kindly towards me, and I believe does feel so; but his acts, from causes alluded to above, have not been so; but I acquit him of any actual intention of injustice. His coming here has resulted virtually in setting me aside, almost as effectually as if I had been relieved. To be sure, I saw this plainly before he came. He did not see it then, and he don't see it now; there is the difference between us. I over-sensitive, and he deficient in sensibility. There are many things in Grant that call for my warmest admiration, and but few that I feel called on to condemn. He has been greatly over-rated; but I should be really sorry to see him, through a reaction, under-estimated. Let all this be confidential between us. Grant will make use of me or any one else to carry out his views, but he will always do justice to others, though he may often be slow in doing so, and let slip opportunities presenting themselves, because he does not see they are opportunities.”
(24 November, 1864 letter to Henry A. Cram, (Meade’s wife’s brother-in-law), L&L, II)
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VR, Rick Schaus
“Facts are for people who can’t create their own truth”
Bucky Katt
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| Red Bailey
Prescott, AZ, USA
Posts: 2151
| | Re: After Gettysburg by Robert J. Trout | | Posted on: 1/28/2013 4:32:06 PM | Do you think it was possible in the postwar era to moderate one's opinion like with Grant judging Meade in his Memoirs; whereas in 1864 with the war still on, Meade's opinions would be sharper and more vivid?
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Human action can be modified to some extent, but human nature cannot be changed. ....Lincoln
As usual,
Red
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| Rick Schaus
Capon Springs, WV, USA
Posts: 1577
| | Re: After Gettysburg by Robert J. Trout | | Posted on: 1/31/2013 12:26:54 PM |
Quote:Do you think it was possible in the postwar era to moderate one's opinion like with Grant judging Meade in his Memoirs; whereas in 1864 with the war still on, Meade's opinions would be sharper and more vivid?
--Red Bailey
Absolutely.
”Time heals all wounds”
That’s why the vets of Pickett’s division could greet and shake hands with the vets of the Philadelphia Brigade across the stone wall at the Angle, where 50 years earlier they had been trying their damnedest to kill each other.
Grant, in his memoirs, provided assessments of many of his subordinate commanders, and Meade was one of them, who he had worked closely with, and there was friction in their working relationship.
Meade had died in 1872, and Grant did feel bad about the command arrangement with the AoP, where Meade was basically the chief of staff for Grant, who gave the orders.
I think, that arrangement did, in a way, save Meade, even though it helped cause Meade to exist in obscurity to this day, I think it would have been worse for Meade if Grant had not operated as he did.
What I don’t really care for was Meade’s habit of giving assessments of his superiors, and often, giving the impression that he thought that he was better than they were.
Writing about them to his wife was one thing, but his take on Grant went to his brother-in-law.
Meade was not that good a general to be critiquing his superiors.
Navy Secretary, Welles, in September, 1863, gave what I think is an accurate assessment of Meade:
” …Meade, who may be a good man and a good officer but is not a great general, has not breadth or strength, certainly is not the man for the position he occupies?...
… And the impression made upon me in the personal interview shortly after was not what I wished, had inspired no confidence, though he is faithful and will obey orders; but he can't originate.”
Grant was to provide the leadership that Meade required.
And, speaking of sharper and more vivid.
This rather harsh assessment of Meade came from Assistant Secretary of War, Dana, in a 7 July, 1864 message to Secretary of War, Stanton:
"A change in the commander of the Army of the Potomac now seems probable. Grant has great confidence in Meade, and is much attached to him personally, but the almost universal dislike of Meade which prevails among officers of every rank who come in contact with him, and the difficulty of doing business with him felt by every one except Grant himself, so greatly impair his capacities for usefulness and render success under his command so doubtful that Grant seems to be coming to the conviction that he must be relieved. The facts in this matter have come slowly to my knowledge, and it was not until yesterday that I became certain of some of the most important. I have long known Meade to be a man of the worst possible temper, especially towards his subordinates. I do not think he has a friend in the whole army. No man, no matter what his business or his service, approaches him without being insulted in one way or another, and his own staff officers do not dare to speak to him, unless first spoken to, for fear of either sneers or curses. The latter, however, I have never heard him indulge in very violently, but he is said to apply them often without occasion or reason. At the same time—as far as I am able to ascertain—his generals have lost their confidence in him as a commander. His order for the last series of assaults upon Petersburg, in which he lost 10,000 men without gaining any decisive advantage, was to the effect that he had found it impracticable to secure the co-operation of corps commanders, and therefore each one was to attack on his own account and do the best he could by himself. Consequently each gained some advantage of position, but each exhausted his own strength in so doing, while for want of a general purpose and a general commander to direct and concentrate the whole, it all amounted to nothing but heavy loss to ourselves. Of course, there are matters about which I can not make enquiries, but what I have above reported is the general sense of what seems to be the opinion of fair-minded and zealous officers. For instance, I know that General Wright has said to a confidential friend that all of Meade's attacks have been made without brains and without generalship. The subject came to a pretty full discussion at Grant's headquarters last night on occasion of a correspondence between Meade and Wilson. The-Richmond Examiner charges Wilson with stealing not only negroes and horses, but silver plate and clothing on the raid, and Meade, taking the statement of the Examiner for truth, reads Wilson a lecture and calls on him for explanations. Wilson denies the charge of robbing women and churches, and hopes Meade will not be ready to condemn his command because its operations have excited the ire of the public enemy. This started the conversation in which Grant expressed himself quite frankly as to the general trouble with Meade and his fear that it would be necessary to relieve him. In such event he said it would be necessary to put Hancock in command."
The bottom line, I suppose, is that despite all the good things that Grant said about Meade; Grant, from the start of the Overland Campaign until the end of the war was the de facto CG of the AoP, with Meade, for all intents and purposes, acting as the chief of staff.
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VR, Rick Schaus
“Facts are for people who can’t create their own truth”
Bucky Katt
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