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 Civil War Commanders and Units    
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Steve Clements
Toronto, ON, Canada
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E-7 Sgt First Class
Moderator
Posts: 374

Lee
Posted on: 11/7/2016 10:47:44 AM
Just finished Harsh’s “Taken at the Flood”. Harsh makes a very strong case that the finding of the ‘lost order” had very little to do with the outcome of South Mountain and Antietam. Basically argues that even without Mac having access to #191, that Mac and the AoP were moving much more quickly than what Lee had expected.

I do buy into this….and in fact, am pretty sure that I have read (somewhere) that the finding of the Lost Order actually slowed down the progress of the AoP. That the finding of the Lost Order really spooked Mac. That if Lee had a large enough army to split it into four pieces (five actually, although Mac wouldn’t know that), then the individual pieces had to be very, very large, cuz Lee would not be insane enough to split a small army up into four separate fragments.

On a different thread, I argued with John P. about the Wilderness. I think that I wrote that I thought that Lee was crazy to attack (on the 5th) Grant’s entire force with barely half of his army up (five divisions…out of eight, although Grant and Meade assumed nine, their intelligence was not able to tell them that Pickett was held back near Richmond). In fact, these five divisions (two in one corps, three in another) were separated from each other, Hill had two on the Orange Plank road, and Ewell had three on the Orange Turnpike. With a huge hole between the two corps, that Grant attempted (with Burnside…yeah, right…) to exploit on the 6th.

Going back to Harsh for a moment….he makes a strong case that:

1) Lee badly underestimated how quickly the AoP would come after him in western Maryland. Very badly. Lee assumed that the AoP was so demoralized, that it would take weeks for the AoP to get its act together. Not that the AoP moved particularly quickly, just that Lee “assumed” that it would take several weeks for it to move at all!!! Personally, that sounds more like wishful thinking….

2) That Lee just assumed that the garrison at Harper’s Ferry (which he initially thought only numbered around 3k men) would abandon H.F., and just run right into the arms of Jackson or McLaws. And that the whole thing would only take a couple of days…and that the ANV would be “reunited” by the 12th. As we know, as late as the 15th, Lee had his back to the Potomac, and had a whopping total of three badly depleted divisions of infantry with him. Maybe 15k men at best. The other six infantry divisions, bleeding men with every mile, straggled to Antietam during the 16th and the 17th. And if it wasn't for A.P. Hill's five brigades......Lee's right would have totally collapsed (he already didn't have much of a centre).

And that Lee thought that his army could roam all over hell’s half acre without food or shoe.....maybe this was his worst miscalculation.

Even after the 17th, Lee desperately wanted to slip by the AoP....and move up the Hagerstown Road. And stay in Maryland. Asked Jackson if it was possible. Even Jackson said "no". During the 16th to the 18th, Lee had Stuart protect a different ford (Williamsport??), so that even if the ANV did have to backtrack across the Potomac, there would still be a protected ford for the ANV to use, to re-cross back over the Potomac, and back into Maryland. So that the campaign could be continued. Yeah, right.

IMO, it is hard to not look at the Maryland campaign and not conclude that Lee was on major drugs.

Then look at Seven Days, Second Bull Run, and Chancellorsville. Especially Second Bull Run and Chancellorsville (Lee took some big chances to achieve Gaine's Mill etc., but at least his army was numerically close to what Mac could bring to the table...such was NOT the case at Chancellorsville). And the third day at Gettysburg. And then the first day in the Wilderness. With the exception of Fredericksburg, where Burnside was so cooperative….Lee ended up taking almost unbelievable risks in virtually every campaign and every battle that the ANV fought in, right up to and including the Wilderness.

s.c.

jim brinton
Harper's Ferry, WV, USA
top 50
E-4 Specialist


Posts: 74

Re: Lee
Posted on: 11/7/2016 2:21:32 PM
Steve,
Haven't read Harsh's book, but completely agree with your assessment. Lee thought both Harpers Ferry and Martinsburg would be evacuated because it would have been the proper thing to do with 12000 troops completely cut off from Washington. Mac recommended it, Halleck wanted to wait.
I think Lee would have had all the intel he needed on the Ferry's dispositions. The locals were mostly Southern sympathizers and Confederate prisoners were interrogated there and routinely paroled, and of course, Jackson commanded there in '61.
I think Mac's plan to storm Cramptons Gap and then proceed to the relief of Harper's Ferry was doabled. He just picked the wrong General to lead the 9th Corps.
A book you might like, if you haven't already read it, is "Before Antietam" by John Michael Priest.

JB

Phil andrade
London, UK
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E-9 Cmd Sgt Major
Moderator
Posts: 2241

Re: Lee
Posted on: 11/19/2016 8:49:28 AM
According to those close to him, Lee did appear to lose equanimity in the Maryland Campaign .

Hadn't he sprained his wrists in a fall from his horse ?

That doesn't sound so very bad, but it was, apparently, excruciatingly painful and might well have tipped him into a frame of mind that compounded his agitation .

IIRC, he had to stay in an ambulance and try and issue orders from there.

I wonder if he felt that a major opportunity had been lost at Second Mannassas ; perhaps he was hell bent on taking outrageous risks before his initiative passed away.

Regards, Phil
---------------
"Egad, sir, I do not know whether you will die on the gallows or of the pox!"

"That will depend, my Lord, on whether I embrace your principles or your mistress."

Earl of Sandwich and John Wilkes

Steve Clements
Toronto, ON, Canada
top 20
E-7 Sgt First Class
Moderator
Posts: 374

Re: Lee
Posted on: 11/20/2016 11:29:57 AM
Hi Phil,

Quote:
Hadn't he sprained his wrists in a fall from his horse ?

That doesn't sound so very bad, but it was, apparently, excruciatingly painful and might well have tipped him into a frame of mind that compounded his agitation .

IIRC, he had to stay in an ambulance and try and issue orders from there.


Lee's frustration (with his injury, and his inability to ride a horse etc.) is mentioned numerous times in Harsh.

In retrospect, Lee failed to appreciate just how severe the straggling (post Frederick) of the ANV had been. Arguably, his inability to move around contributed to this.



Quote:
I wonder if he felt that a major opportunity had been lost at Second Mannassas ; perhaps he was hell bent on taking outrageous risks before his initiative passed away.


I would agree with this assessment. I think that Lee had a clock in his head. He (IMO) believed that the South had to win the war quickly, if it was to succeed in its drive for independence. As a result, Lee felt justified in taking rather massive risks....

However, that Lee even thought for a minute, on the 18th/19th, that he had the ability to re-enter Maryland and keep the campaign going, strikes me as being almost completely separated from any sense of reality.

In attempting to gauge the number of infantry that Lee had available, post the 17th, Harsh noted that there were at least six brigades that had 250 or fewer men. That s brigades with less than 250 men, not regiments! The ANV had been almost completely bled dry....even contemplating an offensive with an army so shattered strikes me as sheer madness.

s.c.

Steve Clements
Toronto, ON, Canada
top 20
E-7 Sgt First Class
Moderator
Posts: 374

Re: Lee
Posted on: 11/20/2016 11:32:54 AM

Quote:
Steve,
Haven't read Harsh's book, but completely agree with your assessment. Lee thought both Harpers Ferry and Martinsburg would be evacuated because it would have been the proper thing to do with 12000 troops completely cut off from Washington. Mac recommended it, Halleck wanted to wait.
I think Lee would have had all the intel he needed on the Ferry's dispositions. The locals were mostly Southern sympathizers and Confederate prisoners were interrogated there and routinely paroled, and of course, Jackson commanded there in '61.
I think Mac's plan to storm Cramptons Gap and then proceed to the relief of Harper's Ferry was doabled. He just picked the wrong General to lead the 9th Corps.
A book you might like, if you haven't already read it, is "Before Antietam" by John Michael Priest.

JB
--jim brinton


Hi Jim.

It was Franklin and the VIth corps that were sent to open Crampton's Gap. And Couch's IV corps division (although it arrived to late to provide assistance).

The IX corps was assigned to clear out Fox and Turner's Gap. Hooker's division fought at Turner's. Reno's division (and Reno was killed...) took Fox's Gap. I am not a expert on South Mountain, but I think that Hooker's and Reno's men fought pretty well.

As an aside, prior to his death, Reno had earned (it is my understanding...) a very good reputation. One has to wonder what impact that a living Kearney, a living Reno etc. could have had on the AoP in '63 and '64.

s.c.

scoucer
Berlin, Germany
top 5
E-9 Cmd Sgt Major
Posts: 1849

Re: Lee
Posted on: 11/20/2016 1:56:27 PM

Quote:
As an aside, prior to his death, Reno had earned (it is my understanding...) a very good reputation. One has to wonder what impact that a living Kearney, a living Reno etc. could have had on the AoP in '63 and '64.

s.c.

--Steve Clements


I've always believed that Kearny could have led the AoP.

Trevor
---------------
`Hey don´t the wars come easy and don´t the peace come hard`- Buffy Sainte-Marie

Some swim with the stream. Some swim against the stream. Me - I´m stuck somewhere in the woods and can´t even find the stupid stream.

John R. Price
Wilkes-Barre, PA, USA
top 25
E-6 Staff Sergeant
Posts: 325

Re: Lee
Posted on: 3/14/2017 2:10:01 PM
Steve,

If everything was to be done strictly by the book the war would have been over in 62. The only chance the Confederacy had was to know when to throw the book out the window and go all in. I think Lee did better at the knowing than anybody then alive had any hope to.
---------------
A battle long forgotten by our country in a war never understood by our country.
"to satisfy our endless needs and justify our bloody deeds, in the name of destiny and in the name of God"


littlepowell
SC, USA
top 25
E-6 Staff Sergeant


Posts: 344
http://www.scourgeofwar.com/
Re: Lee
Posted on: 3/14/2017 9:37:29 PM

Quote:
Steve,

If everything was to be done strictly by the book the war would have been over in 62. The only chance the Confederacy had was to know when to throw the book out the window and go all in. I think Lee did better at the knowing than anybody then alive had any hope to.
--John R. Price


Yeah I was going to say something along those lines.. This is what made Lee the brilliant general that he was. One would think he was on drugs for taking the risks that he did. But I'm reminded of the quote from Bob Marley 'You never know how strong you are until being strong is the only choice you have.' There was nothing to lose, risks had to be taken, and Lee was the man with the prowess to do it.
---------------
http://www.scourgeofwar.com/ - Historical tactical combat games for PC.

Steve Clements
Toronto, ON, Canada
top 20
E-7 Sgt First Class
Moderator
Posts: 374

Re: Lee
Posted on: 3/14/2017 10:10:40 PM

Quote:
Steve,

If everything was to be done strictly by the book the war would have been over in 62. The only chance the Confederacy had was to know when to throw the book out the window and go all in. I think Lee did better at the knowing than anybody then alive had any hope to.
--John R. Price


I assume that you are arguing that the North would have/should have won the war by '62?

I don't agree.

Let's start with the west - as I believe you are generally a proponent of the argument that the war was won in the west.

Post Shiloh, the Halleck/Buell combination was not going to win ANY war....and by the late summer of '62, a series of Confederate armies (in the west) were taking the war to the North. No, the war was NOT going to be won, at least not in the west, in 1862.

What about in the East? Well, if Joe Johnston had been wounded at Seven Pines, maybe. But I am doubtful. Little Mac - even with significant numbers on his side - was not going to win the war in front of Richmond. At least I don't think so. His tactics were simply way too timid. The one major offensive battle that he did fight (Antietam) was a "one corps at a time" mess. These type of tactics were not going to defeat Bobby Lee and the ANV. Especially when their backs were to Richmond...

And once Jackson joined with Lee, the numbers (between the AoP and the ANV) were pretty close to even. And we had one member on this board, several years ago (Mike?) that made a pretty good argument that, due to the different ways that the two armies counted bodies, that the Confederates may actually have had a numerical advantage during Seven Days. So there is no way that Mac was going to take Richmond/seriously defeat the ANV during Seven Days.

Post Seven Days, let's assume that Second Bull Run does not happen. Little Mac brings what is left of the AoP back to in front of Washington, and joins up with Pope. I just cannot see either Pope or Little Mac defeating the ANV of Lee, Jackson and Longstreet...given that the AoP would have to be on the offensive. Yes, they would have had a numerical advantage....but they would have also had to attack the ANV...and we saw how well that worked in the spring of 1864, when Grant had a 2:1 advantage in numbers.

IMO, the combination of Malvern Hill (a useless fight, from the vantage point of the ANV), Second Bull Run and Antietam just about bled the ANV dry. If just about anyone other than Mac had been in charge of the AoP on Sept. 18th, maybe the war would have been over. Cuz on the morning of the 18th, Lee was down to arguably fewer than 30,000 effectives, including maybe fewer than 25,000 infantrymen....

I think that one could argue that Lee's aggressiveness bled the ANV semi-dry during 1862, and at Antietam, did almost bring the war to a conclusion. At least in the East....

Frankly, Antietam was, IMO, about as dumb a fight as they came. Lee's best hope was for a tactical draw (which he got), and for Mac to let him cross back over the Antietam, unmolested. There was simply no reason to fight at Antietam, except maybe stubborn pride.

s.c.

John R. Price
Wilkes-Barre, PA, USA
top 25
E-6 Staff Sergeant
Posts: 325

Re: Lee
Posted on: 3/15/2017 11:54:27 PM
Steve,

The war as it played out in reality was won in the West.

If Joe Johnston wasn't wounded at Seven Pines and Seven Pines ends as it did Johnston would have been ordering a withdrawl within a week. Once Little Mac can get his heavy arty up its just a matter of time until Richmond falls as long as he can defend his position.

But if Joe Johnston is still in command you can't say Jackson will be joining Johnston nor can you say the other reinforcement will either. The relationship between Johnston and Davis is already ruined and Davis doesn't trust him or his judgement.

But it wouldn't be the ANVA of Lee, Jackson and Longstreet because there wouldn't have been a Seven Days and Little Mac wouldn't have fallen back. It would be a ANVA of Johnston, Smith and Longstreet with Jackson being driven out of the Valley because the Valley Campaign would have never happened.

Johnston isn't going to keep on attacking if Seven Pines is a win so the AOP isn't going to fall back to Washington but stay in place within striking distance of Richmond. So when Pope starts south there isn't going to be anything to stop him because Johnston ain't going to throw the book out the window and split his force to the point that he can deal with Pope.

Steve with respect you want Lee to act more like Little Mac but still get the positive results of Lee but still bitch about how bad Little Mac was? If there is no Malvern Hill or Antietam then there will be no Seven Days and Richmond will fall in 62 and the war is over.

---------------
A battle long forgotten by our country in a war never understood by our country.
"to satisfy our endless needs and justify our bloody deeds, in the name of destiny and in the name of God"


Steve Clements
Toronto, ON, Canada
top 20
E-7 Sgt First Class
Moderator
Posts: 374

Re: Lee
Posted on: 3/16/2017 11:42:34 AM
John,

If Johnston is not wounded, you may well be correct. I agree that nothing even close to resembling "Seven Days" would have happened if Johnston remained in command.

As for Little Mac and his artillery...who knows? Certainly, it was not a strategy that Grant chose to employ....and CW artillery seemed to be relatively limited, in terms of what it could accomplish, when on the 'offensive'. And even in '62, Lee was not afraid of digging his men in...


Quote:
Steve with respect you want Lee to act more like Little Mac but still get the positive results of Lee but still bitch about how bad Little Mac was? If there is no Malvern Hill or Antietam then there will be no Seven Days and Richmond will fall in 62 and the war is over.


Hardly the case. The accomplishments of Seven Days gained nothing (but casualties) from Malvern Hill (and yes, hindsight is 20/20).

I am saying that Lee's arrogance (and that is what is see evidence of at Antietam) needed to be controlled. Was Seven Days worth the casualties that the ANV took. Sure, but Malvern Hill - IMO - had little to no chance of success, and was borne out of Lee's frustration at missing a legitimately good opportunity at Glendale. Not unlike my suspicion that Pickett's charge was borne out of Lee's frustration of his army's inability to coordinate its attacks on July 2nd.

And I find no excuse for Antietam. IMO, the war could well have been won - on Sept. 18th - because of what Lee did, not despite what Lee did.

As for the argument that a Malvern Hill, a Pickett's charge, is the "cost" of having a Lee in charge, that may well be correct. But it still does not, IMO, justify an Antietam.

s.c.

John R. Price
Wilkes-Barre, PA, USA
top 25
E-6 Staff Sergeant
Posts: 325

Re: Lee
Posted on: 3/16/2017 3:11:07 PM
Steve,

Grant was never close enough to Richmond to use the heavy arty to interdict the logistics as Little Mac was and again Lee isn't in command.

The accomplishment of the Seven Days was to relieve Richmond from a basic state of siege and to save it as a transportation hub and industrial center of war production not to mention the morale building in the entire Confederacy. And I would also remind that not one battle went as planned.

Fist Lee's preperations at Malvern Hill weren't followed and second he called off the attack but his orders weren't followed. Pendelton, Longstreet and Jackson never took control and got the artillery into action on the two spots of high ground on the flanks to develop a converging fire to challenge the Union positions dominance. When Lee and Jackson, with Davis nearby I'd add, saw it wasn't happening they called off the infantry assault but Prince John's trying to shine from a couple of really bad days is trying to be overly aggressive and his brigades attack before the orders can spread past Jackson's left flank units and DH Hill follows in support. And really Armistead's initial attack isn't really a attack but a driving in of the skimisherrs which uncovers a position close to the ridge sheltered from Union fire.

I see a excuse for Antietam and you mentioned it earlier. Lee had no idea the level of straggling because he was wagon bound having fallen from his horse. He believes that his lose from Second Bull Run is made good by the release from the Richmond defenses of 2 Divisions.(McLaws and Walker right?) Then throw in that he believes he's inside Little Mac's head and can read him like a book. Is ir a risk hell yes but certainly no bigger than trying to secceed in the first place.

I like Ewell's quote about Gettysburg and I would without doubt agree that Lee also made a few.

Edit What you have to understand about Malvern Hill is that both Jackson and Longstreet found the elevated arty positions and pointed them out to Lee. Lee's idea is to fill the positions with batteries placing a converging fire on the Union position. But instead of 10 batteries firing simultainiously from each position no more than 3 or 4 batteries were in action at the same time combined. The Reserve Artillery under Pendleton never came up although he was on the scene. Longstreet's and AP Hill's arty never came up although both were close and Jackson doesn't get more than 3 of his batteries in action although there are at least 15 close. I believe no more that 6 batteries total engaged and more staggard than concentrated.
---------------
A battle long forgotten by our country in a war never understood by our country.
"to satisfy our endless needs and justify our bloody deeds, in the name of destiny and in the name of God"


phil andrade
London, UK
top 5
E-9 Cmd Sgt Major
Moderator
Posts: 2241

Re: Lee
Posted on: 3/16/2017 6:37:38 PM
John,

Your comment that Lee was unaware of the extent of straggling in Maryland has made me think.

I reflect on the fact that at Gettysburg he was also unaware of the amount of punishment that some of the units he deployed for the PPT attack had suffered on Day One.

He exposed his army to great peril on both occasions.

It changes perspective somewhat when we consider that this might have been a function of unawareness, rather than a form of recklessness .

Regards , Phil



---------------
"Egad, sir, I do not know whether you will die on the gallows or of the pox!"

"That will depend, my Lord, on whether I embrace your principles or your mistress."

Earl of Sandwich and John Wilkes

John R. Price
Wilkes-Barre, PA, USA
top 25
E-6 Staff Sergeant
Posts: 325

Re: Lee
Posted on: 3/17/2017 8:04:05 AM
Phil,

Don't get me wrong not knowing is a mistake but as you point out a different animal altogether.
---------------
A battle long forgotten by our country in a war never understood by our country.
"to satisfy our endless needs and justify our bloody deeds, in the name of destiny and in the name of God"


Steve Clements
Toronto, ON, Canada
top 20
E-7 Sgt First Class
Moderator
Posts: 374

Re: Lee
Posted on: 3/17/2017 2:31:38 PM
John,

I am gonna stick with my thoughts on Antietam, since my original post on this thread came about as a result of my re-reading of Harsh.

Bottom line, It is you who appears to be accusing Lee of acting in a little Mac fashion. For shame -:)

I agree that Lee failed to appreciate the amount of straggling that would occur post Frederick. But it pushes credibility to believe that Lee failed to understand how badly depleted his little army had become when it was sitting on the banks of Antietam Creek.

Frankly, not understanding that his army could not march without shoes and without food is bad enough....and I think that reflects badly on Lee. But Lee had a couple of days to fully comprehend - at Antietam - just how badly depleted his thin little regiments actually were. Not being able to ride is not an excuse.

We are all very quick to criticize little Mac for unwillingness/ inability to make a reasonable estimate of his opponent's strength. Let's not accuse lLee of the same fault. And yes he was in an ambulance....but he wasn't blind and deaf! And had two days - before the 17th- to appreciate the extent to which his armed had simply bled away.

I mean, the whole campaign was based on little Mac needing several weeks to pull the AoP together....and then to move at a snail like pace towards Boonesboro. And yet Lee expected miracles from his own men, in terms of distance covered etc. Lee's planning for Harper's Ferery was, to put it charitably, very, very optimistic. Splitting his army into five pieces, virtually in the face of his enemy, bordered, IMO, on arrogance. And simply ignored the practicalities of the campaign.

As for Malvern Hill, the plan was simply unrealistic - in terms of what might be accomplished. And the execution - as you have noted, bordered on being disasterous.

S.c.




Steve Clements
Toronto, ON, Canada
top 20
E-7 Sgt First Class
Moderator
Posts: 374

Re: Lee
Posted on: 3/17/2017 6:53:45 PM

Quote:
John,

Your comment that Lee was unaware of the extent of straggling in Maryland has made me think.

I reflect on the fact that at Gettysburg he was also unaware of the amount of punishment that some of the units he deployed for the PPT attack had suffered on Day One.

He exposed his army to great peril on both occasions.

It changes perspective somewhat when we consider that this might have been a function of unawareness, rather than a form of recklessness .

Regards , Phil




--phil andrade



Phil,

Just to set the record straight...Lee was not confined to an ambulance. He had an aide assigned to him to help mount his horse, and to lead Lee's horse by the bridle, where ever Lee needed to go.

His bandaged hands were a problem, but they are not an adequate "excuse"...

John R. Price
Wilkes-Barre, PA, USA
top 25
E-6 Staff Sergeant
Posts: 325

Re: Lee
Posted on: 3/19/2017 11:20:59 AM
Steve,

How am I accusing Lee of being over-cautious and by the book?

A big part of the reason for going into Maryland was to feed, shoe and cloth the army. Plus with respect every army in the Confederacy was short of food, shoes and everything else since day one. I would also point out the book says that retreating by a single river crossing in the face of the enemy is one of the most dangerous things to attempt and that the tactical defense doesn't require anything near numerical equality.

Why don't we give a little credit to Little Mac for not taking a couple of weeks and a little more to the find of that bundle of cigars? Given Little Mac's history if he thinks the majority of a army that outnumbers his that he believes isn't split into five parts and is sitting beyond his view on top of South Mountain how long do you think it takes him to attack South Mountain in force?

The plan is unrealistic because it was never put into effect. The plan was to put at least 10 batteries at each high point and have a superiority in number of guns and rate of fire and no more than 6 ever got in action and as soon as that became clear Lee called off the attack.

With respect I think your forgetting how the Confederacy can win the war and its alternatives to Lee. The Confederacy wins by holding points and territory so as to be able to recruit and sustain itself from that base while projecting a perception of stalemate and by inflicting maximum casualties so as to break the political will of the North to continue the fight. Johnston, Bragg, PGTB, Pemberton or Hood going to achieve that better than Lee?
---------------
A battle long forgotten by our country in a war never understood by our country.
"to satisfy our endless needs and justify our bloody deeds, in the name of destiny and in the name of God"


John R. Price
Wilkes-Barre, PA, USA
top 25
E-6 Staff Sergeant
Posts: 325

Re: Lee
Posted on: 3/19/2017 11:32:57 AM
Steve,

He wasn't confined to a ambulance 100% but he wasn't lead around all of the time. AS he recovered he rode but either way he isn't going to be up and down the ranks of marching troops.

Plus from what I've read the large amount of straggling took place before the army crossed into Maryland. If as you were saying a large amount happens "from Frederick" then the majority of those men are going to be captured. It doesn't jive with the quick return to the ranks of the ANVA in the days after the battle when back in VA. Now if your talking Jackson's Harper Ferry force coming up ok but that isn't what I took from your "from Frederick."
---------------
A battle long forgotten by our country in a war never understood by our country.
"to satisfy our endless needs and justify our bloody deeds, in the name of destiny and in the name of God"


Steve Clements
Toronto, ON, Canada
top 20
E-7 Sgt First Class
Moderator
Posts: 374

Re: Lee
Posted on: 3/19/2017 3:35:59 PM
John,


Quote:
How am I accusing Lee of being over-cautious and by the book?


You are not.

What I suggested was that you are accusing Lee of being "Mac like", in that Lee was waaay overestimating just how large his available force was.


Quote:
A big part of the reason for going into Maryland was to feed, shoe and cloth the army.


Important, yes, but Lee's primary goal, IMO, was to pull the AoP away from the forts of Washington, through South Mountain, to someplace where the ANV could meet the AoP (or better yet, a portion of the AoP) on favourable terms. And crush and defeat the AoP.

Which was also Lee's goal in 1863. Draw the AoP away from Washington. Defeat it, preferably in detail.

And from what I have read, the ANV was much more aggressive about gathering foodstuffs, forage, cattle, horses etc. during the Pennsylvania campaign of '63. To be fair, a large part of this was Lee's expectation (?) that the AoP would conveniently huddle back in Washington for maybe several weeks, giving Lee time to have lots of fun west of South Mountain, near Boonesboro or Hagersville. Lee was not able to do much of a job of gathering foodstuffs around Frederick. Part of it was lack of time. And part of it was politics, not wanting to piss off the locals too much (the whole "Maryland is gonna join the Confederacy" thing).


Quote:
Plus with respect every army in the Confederacy was short of food, shoes and everything else since day one.


IMO, nothing compares to what the ANV infantrymen had to suffer through after Second Bull Run and on the way to Antietam. And after Second Bull Run means after Seven Days.... Especially after their brief rest period in Frederick. Especially for the units that were involved in the suppression of Harper's Ferry. And especially the divisions under Jackson, that had to march close to 40 miles before arriving on the west side of H.F. Of course, most of the units not involved in subduing H.F. ended up fighting at South Mountain. So less marching, but a whole lotta fighting -:)


Quote:
I would also point out the book says that retreating by a single river crossing in the face of the enemy is one of the most dangerous things to attempt


Agree. Lee was kinda nuts to agree to fight at Antietam, given the likelyhood was that the best outcome was a drawn battle, and then the necessity to retreat back across the Potomac, in the face of the AoP.


Quote:
... and that the tactical defense doesn't require anything near numerical equality


True. During Overland. When Lee's men were often to usually well dug in. Or at Fredericksburg.

However, this was decidedly NOT the case, at Antietam, where Lee's men were generally out in the open...not to mention that most of the fighting on Jackson's front (where most of the casualties, for both sides, were incurred) was very much back and forth. It was hardly just Jackson's men defending a position, but involved multiple counter attacks by various units of the ANV. Even the Sunken Road was not really a "trench"....and offered minimal protection to the defending infantrymen of the ANV.

Steve Clements
Toronto, ON, Canada
top 20
E-7 Sgt First Class
Moderator
Posts: 374

Re: Lee
Posted on: 3/19/2017 3:55:07 PM

Quote:
Why don't we give a little credit to Little Mac for not taking a couple of weeks and a little more to the find of that bundle of cigars?


Okay. Little Mac deserves some credit for not taking a couple of weeks. And the Union infantrymen, who had fought at Seven Days and Second Bull Run, also deserve a lot of credit. They refused to simply cower in the forts of Washington (after Second Bull Run), believing that they had fought well, but had been lead by an incompetent general (Pope). From what I have read, their morale remained pretty high...and they were more than willing to take on the invading hordes of the ANV -:)



Quote:
Given Little Mac's history if he thinks the majority of a army that outnumbers his that he believes isn't split into five parts and is sitting beyond his view on top of South Mountain how long do you think it takes him to attack South Mountain in force?


As I wrote at the beginning of this thread, Harsh makes a pretty strong argument that little Mac actually slowed down after finding the Lost Order. If Lee was willing to split his army into four pieces, (five actually, tho Mac would not know that..), then Mac reasoned that Lee's army really had to be 100k plus. And Mac reacted accordingly....i.e. carefully and cautiously.


Quote:
With respect I think your forgetting how the Confederacy can win the war and its alternatives to Lee.


Well, I am not arguing that the Confederacy was better off without Lee....just that Lee was a tad too aggressive at times, such as Antietam. The North could afford, to a degree, heavy casualties, the South, not so much. Battles such as Antietam, where the best outcome was arguably a tactical draw, should have never been fought.


Quote:
The Confederacy wins by holding points and territory so as to be able to recruit and sustain itself from that base...


Agree. But given Lee's aggressiveness, his belief that the ANV was capable of fighting a battle of annihilation....Lee apparently did not agree with this -:) Lee was not interested in "holding points". He was only interested in attempting to completely destroy the AoP, as quickly as possible. Yes, this was a nice goal...but I am doubtful as to how realistic is was....you and I are both aware how resilient were CW armies. IN the entire CW, the closest that any army came to a battle of annihilation was Thomas vs. Hood in front of Nashville. Unless little Mac was really careless, the likelyhood that Lee could "annihilate" the AoP was very, very low (IMO).

s.c.

Steve Clements
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Re: Lee
Posted on: 3/19/2017 4:03:19 PM
John,


Quote:
Steve,

He wasn't confined to a ambulance 100% but he wasn't lead around all of the time. AS he recovered he rode but either way he isn't going to be up and down the ranks of marching troops.


Sorry. Still don't even remotely buy this argument. Lee was a capable commander. He may not have had an exact body count....but he had to know that, by the evening of the 15th, he had well under 20k men available to take on the rapidly consolidating AoP. That Mac did not attack on the 16th, does not justify the stand that Lee took at Antietam. Unless you are willing to argue that Lee somehow was under the impression that he actually had something more like 55k or 60k men, rather than the 18k he had on the night of the 15th, and the 35k that he had on the morning of the 17th.

And even if he was 100% and on horseback, Lee ain't counting the men by himself. He has to depend on his generals to tell him at least roughly how strong the ranks are....


Quote:
Plus from what I've read the large amount of straggling took place before the army crossed into Maryland. If as you were saying a large amount happens "from Frederick" then the majority of those men are going to be captured. It doesn't jive with the quick return to the ranks of the ANVA in the days after the battle when back in VA. Now if your talking Jackson's Harper Ferry force coming up ok but that isn't what I took from your "from Frederick."
--John R. Price


From what I have read, more of the straggling took place after Frederick...particularly with the various units involved in the siege of H.F. Which was well over half of the army. So, no, most of those stragglers would not likely have been captured. And I have seen estimates that as many as 5k stragglers rejoined the ANV between the night of the 17th and the morning of the 18th. And many of the stragglers from the H.F. campaign would have simply stayed in Virginia, and not been at risk of being captured. So it does jive with the quick return to the ranks of the ANV in the days after the battle....

s.c.



Phil andrade
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Re: Lee
Posted on: 3/19/2017 4:49:08 PM
You have to wonder what possessed Lee to make that stand at Antietam.

Not only offering battle in the first place, but refusing to withdraw until the nineteenth.

His army wasn't entrenched...unless you consider that Sunken Road to be such : and look what a death trap that turned out to be ; no crenellations , just a straightforward line of fire for the Yankees who enfiladed it. Like shooting fish in a barrel.

Union artillery enjoyed the advantage of deploying rifled pieces from dominating terrain ; these inflicted enormous damage, so much so that a rebel surgeon , appalled at the results, blurted out I hate cannons ! .

As far as Lee is concerned, it's a mind boggling case of pushing your luck.

What in God's name was he playing at ?

I have read that, in the years that remained to him, he expressed more pride in this battle than in any other that he fought.

You might think that he ought to have apologised for it instead.

But, no sir, he was defiant and unrepentant, and I would love to know why .

Regards, Phil
---------------
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John R. Price
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Re: Lee
Posted on: 3/19/2017 4:53:06 PM
Steve,

But Mac overestimated how large the enemy force was.

Agreed but just pulling the troops of both armies from VA for a significant period adds to the supply situation for the ANVA. The thing is if Little Mac doesn't start a new drive on Richmond very soon after Second Bull Run Lincoln is going to can him and get somebody that will right smack dab in the middle of fall harvest season in VA. Going into Maryland allows the fall harvest to be gotten in and collected to be used that winter.

Hell why stop there Jackson's had fought the Valley Campaign before Seven Days and the rest had marched down then back up the Peninsula and fought at Seven Pines before the Seven Days. And the "nothing compares" is major bull. How about the Atlanta Campaign and then Hood taking the brave few left to ordered suicide at Franklin and a pop gun siege of Nashville where the route of their advance and retreat could be followed by the blood left on the pike from their bare feet marching in the slush. Kinda sounds a lot like Washington's retreat across New Jersey and then Trenton and Princeton. Or Valley Forge. Or how about Greene staying one step in front of Cornwallis. Or even Gates approach to face Cornwallis. They believed they could and believing is a powerful tool in war especially when you keep telling yourself we are doing no more than our grandfathers.

I was saying he was kinda nuts if he didn't because Little Mac would have been way more aggressive.

I don't know that I'd agree with out in the open but I would agree with not dug in. I think they took advantage of the natural cover available such as the "sunken road" while the attacking force is out in the open. Minnimal protection is better than none and is still a force multiplier.

---------------
A battle long forgotten by our country in a war never understood by our country.
"to satisfy our endless needs and justify our bloody deeds, in the name of destiny and in the name of God"


Steve Clements
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Re: Lee
Posted on: 3/19/2017 5:36:57 PM
John,


Quote:
But Mac overestimated how large the enemy force was.


My point - trying to be somewhat amusing - was that - according to your take - both Lee AND little Mac overestimated the size of the ANV.


Quote:
The thing is if Little Mac doesn't start a new drive on Richmond very soon after Second Bull Run Lincoln is going to can him and get somebody that will right smack dab in the middle of fall harvest season in VA. Going into Maryland allows the fall harvest to be gotten in and collected to be used that winter


I agree that Lee's options were not great. He couldn't attack Washington. And if he waited long enough on the defensive, somebody would take the AoP 'south' again. Although, after Antietam, little Mac seemed remarkably reluctant to engage Lee again. But once it was clear that the AoP was NOT going to take weeks to re-group, and once it was clear that taking H.F. was very, very risky ( at least by the method Lee chose), then I think that Lee should have used the entire army to lay H.F. under seige, and if successful, call it a day. IMO, he had nothing to gain by trying to make a stand at Antietam. And a lot to lose....


Quote:
Hell why stop there Jackson's had fought the Valley Campaign before Seven Days and the rest had marched down then back up the Peninsula and fought at Seven Pines before the Seven Days. And the "nothing compares" is major bull.


Nothing compares is major bull?? Well, you are entitled to your opinion...but I do not agree with it. At least in the east, IMO, the ANV was never pushed (again) to the extent that Lee pushed it in August and September 1862.


Quote:
How about the Atlanta Campaign and then Hood taking the brave few left to ordered suicide at Franklin and a pop gun siege of Nashville where the route of their advance and retreat could be followed by the blood left on the pike from their bare feet marching in the slush.


Well, Franklin and Nashville are not the Atlanta campaign....and Hood was simply nuts at Franklin and again at Nashville, IMO. So yes, was the AoT in worse shape at Nashville than the ANV at Antietam? Let's say no one "wins" here...but by comparing Lee at Antietam to Hood at Nashville, I would argue that you are tacitly conceding my point. Both were crazy. Who really cares which one was crazier -:)

Okay, I maybe give a slight nod in the craziness department to Hood at Nashville....but that is damning Lee with faint praise -:) I have no idea what Hood realistically thought he could accomplish...although I would essentially make the same argument for Lee at Antietam...at best, IMO, he could hope for a tactical draw...


Quote:
I don't know that I'd agree with out in the open but I would agree with not dug in. I think they took advantage of the natural cover available such as the "sunken road" while the attacking force is out in the open. Minnimal protection is better than none and is still a force multiplier.


Most of the casualties (during Antietam) were taken on Jackson's front (for both armies). More than half of regiments that Lee had ended up on Jackson's front. And that was very, very much "out in the open", back and forth fighting. And minimal protection, at best, is what the sunken road provided. Eventually, it ended up being a death trap. I don't see it as being much of a force multiplier...

So, bottom line, I disagree that your "defense is worth 2:1 odds" argument holds water at Antietam.

Steve Clements
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Re: Lee
Posted on: 3/19/2017 5:39:49 PM

Quote:
You have to wonder what possessed Lee to make that stand at Antietam.

Not only offering battle in the first place, but refusing to withdraw until the nineteenth.

His army wasn't entrenched...unless you consider that Sunken Road to be such : and look what a death trap that turned out to be ; no crenellations , just a straightforward line of fire for the Yankees who enfiladed it. Like shooting fish in a barrel.

Union artillery enjoyed the advantage of deploying rifled pieces from dominating terrain ; these inflicted enormous damage, so much so that a rebel surgeon , appalled at the results, blurted out I hate cannons ! .

As far as Lee is concerned, it's a mind boggling case of pushing your luck.

What in God's name was he playing at ?

I have read that, in the years that remained to him, he expressed more pride in this battle than in any other that he fought.

You might think that he ought to have apologised for it instead.

But, no sir, he was defiant and unrepentant, and I would love to know why .

Regards, Phil
--Phil andrade


Phil,

Needless to say, I agree with your assessment.

As far as pride in the battle is concerned, I do think that Lee did a masterful job with what he had. I just didn't have much to work with.

s.c.

John R. Price
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Re: Lee
Posted on: 3/19/2017 8:14:01 PM
Steve and Phil,

The one point all of us has overlooked is the Northern elections of fall of 62, there outcome and the what if of there outcome had Lee won big at Antietam. Take a look at this short article and I can link others more in depth if you would like.

http://civilwardailygazette.com/election-of-1862-huge-republican-losses/
---------------
A battle long forgotten by our country in a war never understood by our country.
"to satisfy our endless needs and justify our bloody deeds, in the name of destiny and in the name of God"


Phil andrade
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Re: Lee
Posted on: 3/20/2017 3:41:57 AM
Steve and John,

Why did Southerners refer to Antietam as Artillery Hell ?

And, more particularly, who designated it thus : the rebel gunners who stood to it around the Dunker Church ; or the infantry who were shredded by it as the yankee guns kept pounding them from far and wide ?

There is even a story - that some consider apocryphal - that Joe Hooker deployed thirty six field pieces to blast the Cornfield at close quarters, and that the carnage they caused was such that 146 dead rebels were counted in a single line where this fire had raked them.

Such stories lend credence to the claims made by Little Mac about the number of confederate dead that his men counted and buried on the field....claims that are hard to reconcile with the official southern returns.

Lee's gunners themselves meted out plenty of punishment ; but they must have felt themselves to be battling against terrible odds,

In a sense, this artillery preponderance enjoyed by the Yankees at Antietam symbolises the battle. I would bet that the proportion of the casualties inflicted by artillery in this battle exceeded the normal ratio for that war.

I wonder what Lee's artillery officers were saying to him about their prospects as they contemplated the fight ahead.

This was no encounter battle, but a head on slug by two armies that were ready and waiting in position : more like Waterloo than Gettysburg in that regard.

In such circumstances, Lee's resolve is astonishing. It wasn't as if he had to fight there.

Regards, Phil
---------------
"Egad, sir, I do not know whether you will die on the gallows or of the pox!"

"That will depend, my Lord, on whether I embrace your principles or your mistress."

Earl of Sandwich and John Wilkes

Phil andrade
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Re: Lee
Posted on: 3/20/2017 5:02:11 AM

Quote:
Steve and Phil,

The one point all of us has overlooked is the Northern elections of fall of 62, there outcome and the what if of there outcome had Lee won big at Antietam. Take a look at this short article and I can link others more in depth if you would like.

http://civilwardailygazette.com/election-of-1862-huge-republican-losses/
--John R. Price


John,

Sad to say, I tried this link but it didn't land me on a short article : just a website with no indication as to where the relevant piece is to be found .

I think your comment is first rate : you're so right here....Lee tended to predicate his strategy on his reading of the political situation in the North.

He was very canny here, I think.

That might make his hair raising decision to stand at Sharpsburg more understandable, if not justifiable.

Regards , Phil


---------------
"Egad, sir, I do not know whether you will die on the gallows or of the pox!"

"That will depend, my Lord, on whether I embrace your principles or your mistress."

Earl of Sandwich and John Wilkes

Steve Clements
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Re: Lee
Posted on: 3/20/2017 9:46:34 AM
Phil & John,


Quote:
That might make his hair raising decision to stand at Sharpsburg more understandable, if not justifiable.


Absolutely disagree.

Capturing Harper's Ferry and its 13,000 defenders - if that is all that Lee and the ANV did in this campaign - would have been viewed very negatively in the North. So (IMO) that was definitely worth attempting....but arguably with the entire ANV (which is what Longstreet counselled). As it was, a major accomplishment (Harper's Ferry) ended up being overshadowed (at least in the North) by a strategic defeat at Sharpsburg.

Fighting at Sharpsburg only made sense if Lee thought that there was a reasonable chance for a victory. To think that the ANV had a "reasonable" chance for victory, Lee had to believe one of three things:

1) As I believe John has suggested, Lee had to have had a totally unrealistic view of the strength of his little army (especially thinking of the 15th and the 16th). To believe this, one has to accept that Lee and his generals were incompetent, and were completely incapable of having even a basic understanding of their army's strength. Which I do not accept....Lee did take big risks, but I believe that he properly understood the risks that he was taking.

2) That Lee would hold little Mac (and more importantly, his soldiers) in such low regard as to believe that little Mac would leave the ANV alone, give the ANV time to regroup, for a significant amount of time. Clearly, by the afternoon of the 15th, this was NOT the case.

3) That a drawn battle would be fought, but that a bloodied little Mac would lose his nerve and pull back away from Sharpsburg, allowing Lee to continue his Maryland campaign. I guess that you could argue that, based on his history, this is indeed something that little Mac might end up doing. But to gamble the survival of the ANV on this expectation? An awfully big gamble...

Fighting a battle at Sharpsburg, IMO, a battle that could not be "won" by the ANV, would have anything but the type of reaction in the North that Lee wanted to instigate.

s.c.

Steve Clements
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Re: Lee
Posted on: 3/20/2017 9:56:30 AM
Phil,


Quote:
Lee's gunners themselves meted out plenty of punishment ; but they must have felt themselves to be battling against terrible odds,

In a sense, this artillery preponderance enjoyed by the Yankees at Antietam symbolises the battle. I would bet that the proportion of the casualties inflicted by artillery in this battle exceeded the normal ratio for that war.


Richard Slotkin (see my Scott post) makes a strong argument that the Confederate artillery was much more effective, and did more damage, than did the Union artillery.

1) Although the AoP had big, long range guns that could not be reached by anything that the ANV had, they were very ineffective in "covering" an infantry attack i.e. Hooker's/Mansfield's/Sumner's attack on Jackson's flank, or the attack on the sunken road.

2) The AoP's big guns could blast anything on the battle front that they could see, but a) the rolling terrain/east woods/west woods etc. provided a lot of cover for the Confederate infantry (although not for Stephen Lee's artillery near the Dunker Church, which got the piss knocked out of it). Not to mention that, once the battle started (I am in particular thinking of the fighting on Jackson's flank), there was so much smoke that it was very difficult for long range guns to even see their targets.

3) The ANV may have been short of infantry, but it wasn't short of artillery, bringing more than 200 guns to Antietam. And although the ANV short range guns could not match the AoP's long range stuff, it was VERY effective against attacking infantry.

4) Lee and his artillery did a very good job of shifting guns around from one sector to another more threatened sector....so Antietam might have been artillery hell for Lee's gunners, but it really was artillery hell for little Mac's infantry.

s.c.


Steve Clements
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Re: Lee
Posted on: 3/20/2017 9:59:48 AM

Quote:
Steve and Phil,

The one point all of us has overlooked is the Northern elections of fall of 62, there outcome and the what if of there outcome had Lee won big at Antietam. Take a look at this short article and I can link others more in depth if you would like.

http://civilwardailygazette.com/election-of-1862-huge-republican-losses/
--John R. Price


John,

Yes, the Maryland campaign was worth "trying". And H. F. was worth capturing... But both assumed that it would take weeks for the AoP to regroup. By the time that Lee was defending the South Mountain passes, it was time to change plans (IMO), accept the victory at H.F., and get the "hell out of Dodge".

Losing at Antietam was not going to push the Northern elections in the direction that Lee at al wanted.

s.c.

John R. Price
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Re: Lee
Posted on: 3/20/2017 12:11:53 PM
Steve,

Every battle fought gambles the survival of each army involved no matter the strength or weakness of numbers or resources of either or the positions of either. So much more than pure numbers go into the fight itself and the perception of the outcome. Look at the Northern elections that fall and there is no way in hell that the majority of Northern citizens have your negatives take on this battle nor Lee. The casualties inflicted on the AOP talked a lot louder coupled with prior loss in battle and unpopular acts of the administration and the Republicans lost over 20 seats in the House, a handful in the Senate, 4 state govenors and many seats in state legislatures even with more than a few dirty tricks and redistricting. Without offering battle in Maryland and inflicting major casualties on the AOP who knows if the spin and election results is the same.
---------------
A battle long forgotten by our country in a war never understood by our country.
"to satisfy our endless needs and justify our bloody deeds, in the name of destiny and in the name of God"


John R. Price
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Re: Lee
Posted on: 3/20/2017 12:34:42 PM
Phil,

I'll try and see if I can get a working link for you. Maybe if you would use the phrase "US election of 1862 results" or even "US election of 1862 huge Republican losses" in a search a link to it would come up. Otherwise Wiki has a pretty good article/entry on them.

But I'll see what I can come up with today
---------------
A battle long forgotten by our country in a war never understood by our country.
"to satisfy our endless needs and justify our bloody deeds, in the name of destiny and in the name of God"


Steve Clements
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Re: Lee
Posted on: 3/20/2017 2:14:27 PM

Quote:
Steve,

Every battle fought gambles the survival of each army involved no matter the strength or weakness of numbers or resources of either or the positions of either. So much more than pure numbers go into the fight itself and the perception of the outcome. Look at the Northern elections that fall and there is no way in hell that the majority of Northern citizens have your negatives take on this battle nor Lee. The casualties inflicted on the AOP talked a lot louder coupled with prior loss in battle and unpopular acts of the administration and the Republicans lost over 20 seats in the House, a handful in the Senate, 4 state govenors and many seats in state legislatures even with more than a few dirty tricks and redistricting. Without offering battle in Maryland and inflicting major casualties on the AOP who knows if the spin and election results is the same.
--John R. Price


I do not agree.

IMO, that Antietam was a strategic victory for the North (Lee retreated back across the Potomac) outweighed the Federal casualties taken in the battle. After all, Lee's casualties were almost the same, from an army just a bit more than half the size of what little Mac took to Sharpsburg.

To the extent that the elections of 1862 went poorly for the Lincoln administration, I would argue that this was in spite of Antietam, not because of Antietam. And reflected a generally poor summer for the North, in terms of military success.



Phil andrade
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Re: Lee
Posted on: 3/20/2017 4:57:18 PM
The whole thing's a bit mind boggling ....so much so, that I'll take refuge in a quote from Porter Alexander's history :

From a careful study of all the reports upon both sides, not only of the text but between the lines, I believe that the course of Lee was largely influenced by the hope, and that of McClellan by the fear, of events whose improbability surpassed that of an earthquake.

Regards, Phil
---------------
"Egad, sir, I do not know whether you will die on the gallows or of the pox!"

"That will depend, my Lord, on whether I embrace your principles or your mistress."

Earl of Sandwich and John Wilkes

littlepowell
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Re: Lee
Posted on: 3/21/2017 7:58:16 AM

Quote:
The whole thing's a bit mind boggling ....so much so, that I'll take refuge in a quote from Porter Alexander's history :

From a careful study of all the reports upon both sides, not only of the text but between the lines, I believe that the course of Lee was largely influenced by the hope, and that of McClellan by the fear, of events whose improbability surpassed that of an earthquake.

Regards, Phil
--Phil andrade


Great quote. All of this discussion has made me want to go back and read Sears' Landscape Turned Red. That book does an amazing job of capturing the sheer frustration of Lincoln towards McClellan.. "You MUST ACT!" Lee was well aware of McClellan's timidness, and exploited it every chance he got.
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Phil andrade
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Re: Lee
Posted on: 3/21/2017 8:17:22 AM
Sears is very hard on Little Mac.

I feel a little more circumspect.

In terms of the exchange rate of killed, no other Union general did as well in the East as McClellan.

This is not to excuse his culpability : he was exasperating and a puffed up egotist .

As Steve reminds us, though, he did move more quickly in the run up to Antietam than is generally acknowledged.

Lee rated him as his most able opponent when he was questioned after the war.

Likewise, Grant rated Joe Johnston as better than Lee.

People say - and do - extraordinary things, don't they ?

Regards , Phil

---------------
"Egad, sir, I do not know whether you will die on the gallows or of the pox!"

"That will depend, my Lord, on whether I embrace your principles or your mistress."

Earl of Sandwich and John Wilkes

John R. Price
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Re: Lee
Posted on: 3/21/2017 11:58:35 AM
Steve.

Do you really think the people of the North in the fall of 1862 had available the correct stats on the battle and each army that you do? They saw the longest Northern casualty list of the war of what was the bloodiest day in US history and that had a major impact and the Southern casualty lists weren't printed in the North. They saw Lee safe back in VA ready to fight another day. They saw their territory not safe from invasion. May I use Tet to remind you about perception, spin and political will.
---------------
A battle long forgotten by our country in a war never understood by our country.
"to satisfy our endless needs and justify our bloody deeds, in the name of destiny and in the name of God"


John R. Price
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Posts: 325

Re: Lee
Posted on: 3/21/2017 12:46:54 PM
Phil,

On the home page of the site I gave the link to there is a search box on the right near the top of the page. If you put in "election of 1862" it will lead you to the article I linked.

http://civilwardailygazette.com/
This is the address of the home page
---------------
A battle long forgotten by our country in a war never understood by our country.
"to satisfy our endless needs and justify our bloody deeds, in the name of destiny and in the name of God"


Phil andrade
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Re: Lee
Posted on: 3/21/2017 1:11:24 PM
Thanks, John.

Regards, Phil
---------------
"Egad, sir, I do not know whether you will die on the gallows or of the pox!"

"That will depend, my Lord, on whether I embrace your principles or your mistress."

Earl of Sandwich and John Wilkes

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