Giulio Douhet’s Command of the Air: Designing the Principles for Cyberwar in the
21st Century
by Holly Senatore
This piece will demonstrate that the theoretical basis for counter cyber offense
is innately related to the conceptual argument proposed by the early air war theorist,
Giulio Douhet (1869-1930). He foresaw the offensive use of aircraft/ bombers strategically
employed in warfare to aim at the psychological, moral, and physical destruction
of the enemy’s homeland in order to bring about swifter end to combat. In the World
War II Pacific Theater, in 1945 General Curtis Lemay successfully utilized Douhet’s
teachings and helped to facilitate the surrender of the Japanese Imperial Forces.
This piece will secondly explore an overall methodology for forming a cyber- strategy
(the end goal) as it relates to the argument espoused by this early air war theorist
who presaged the vulnerabilities of government, economic, and civilian institutions
caused by air attacks. The means of implementing and executing this goal would loosely
be based upon the US Intelligence Cycle. Since cyber threats are also offensive
in nature, the cyber strategy posed in this discussion would counter these threats
by creating a counter cyber - offense strategy based on denial and deception, and
strategic deflection. Theoretically, this strategy can be accomplished by enacting
the steps of the Intelligence Cycle in reverse.[1]
In the 1920’s, Douhet forecasted that the aircraft would be the chief weapon employed
in the next war, arguing that airpower would render the army and the navy obsolete
because aircraft naturally had greater means of conveyance and had the ability to
attain “command of the air.” Air operations directed at the sources as opposed to
the manifestations of an enemy’s strength, would restore the decisiveness to warfare
and would engender more humane results overall.[2] These attacks against an enemy’s
specific material resources (bottle-neck targets) in tandem with attacks on their
morale with the intent of spreading terror and panic could potentially bring the
enemy’s war- making capability to an expedient halt: such targets represent objectives
of least physical resistance but also of least moral resistance.[3] Douhet based
his substantiation of air- war doctrine off of these enumerated factors: modern
war allows for no distinction between combatants and noncombatants, successful offensives
by surface forces are no longer possible, and the advantage of speed and elevation
in the three dimensional arena of aerial warfare makes it impossible to take defensive
measures against an offensive aerial strategy. The proper defense against such attacks,
according to Douhet, is to maintain an offensive arm. These factors will support
the prevention of an enemy from flying and enable a force to attain “command of
the air.”[i]
Douhet further stressed that these principles were written primary for the geographic
position of his home country, Italy. Interestingly, Douhet overtly rejected the
applicability of his theory to “An English, American, or Japanese naval force operating
in the Atlantic or Pacific Ocean.[4] Naturally, my first thought is of our own situation
and the eventuality of a possible conflict between Italy and some one of her possible
enemies. I admit that the theories I expound have that in the background, and therefore
should not be considered applicable to all countries. In all probability, if I were
specifically considering a conflict between Japan and the United States, I would
not arrive at the same conclusions. To offer a general recipe for victory, applicable
to all nations, would be downright presumption of my part. My intention is simply
to point out the best and most efficient way for our country to prepare for a probable
future war.”[5]
Command of the Air is tantamount to the principles behind Information Superiority.
Cyberspace represents the nervous system of an industrial country. To attain information
superiority for cyber defense means to deny enemy ability access to invade US information
networks. Just as command of the air meant denying the enemy ability to fly, the
United States must utilize cyber- measures to maintain information superiority by
denying the enemy in the same way. “We must have information superiority: the capability
to collect, process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while
exploiting or denying an adversary's ability to do the same.”[6]
Information superiority includes the ability to predict and prevent enemy threats
or attacks through both cyber defense and cyber offense. Douhet, who stressed the
need for offensive operations, stated “Victory smiles upon those who anticipate
the changes in the character of war, not upon those who wait to adapt themselves
after the changes occur.”[7] In conjunction with the necessity of denying the enemy
the ability to collect, process, and disseminate information, a means of accomplishing
this is to utilize the Intelligence Cycle in reverse. The logic behind this is to
provide a thorough strategic guide for researchers and analysts. Before the analysts
can begin operations or planning methods they should ascertain what the end goal
is and the means used to accomplish it. A possible means to support information
superiority is found within the Intelligence Cycle, which seeks to establish proactive
security goals to further prevent enemy breaches or control of our vital infrastructures
while providing the guidance to disable enemy threats to it.
The use of the Intelligence Cycle in reverse already has a basis for formulation
Conventional wisdom espouses that the traditional Intelligence Cycle should follow
these predetermined overall steps: requirements, planning and direction, collection,
processing and exploitation, analysis and production, and dissemination.[8] In assessing
ways to approach overall strategy as the first step, they will be able to more clearly
evaluate relationships and levels of communication between political, social, and
economic groups or factors in the cyber realm and how or why this is relevant to
an overall objective. Douhet appeared to have inherently understood the value of
utilizing dissemination as the first step in air warfare to theoretically cause
panic and a collapse of morale of the enemy. “A people who are bombed today as they
were yesterday, or are told they will be bombed, and see no end to their martyrdom,
are bound to call for peace at length.”[9] It potentially follows that if an overall
cyber strategic plan is developed at the beginning of operations based on previous
disseminations of material, this will also allow for greater flexibility and shifts
as the requirements are subject to alteration. If analysts become too focused on
targets of attack before they understand what the overall strategy is, relationships
between targets, and intended outcomes will remain unclear as expressed below.
To add clarity and ease of operation to the nature of this unconventional analysis,
one can see that there is already potential for its execution written into the “National
Comprehensive Cyber-security Initiative” complied in 2010. Based upon the model
of the “reverse” Intelligence Cycle, once information based on the threat from cyber-attacks
has been disseminated to both internal officials and disinformation has been disseminated
to outside (potential threats), the next step is to analyze the various aspects
of the information including the intelligence production styles of it by said threats.
This will indicate their strengths and their weaknesses; and what their greatest
targets will be. Once they reveal their biases or objectives, it will allow US Intelligence
officials to process and exploit previous knowledge of these groups as well as current
trends, agendas, or motives of the threat revealed by the analysis of information.
To further solidify how, where, or why the group or individuals operate in cyberspace,
the next step is to collect information through human intelligence after studying
the plausible movements of these groups. Once the movements, beliefs, and behaviors
are determined, one can move on to the last stage; planning and direction. Here
they will decide how or in what fashion the adversary will be defeated.
A primary means to prevent cyber intrusions, and maintain “command of cyber security”
is to effectuate the deterioration in morale of enemy state or non-state actors.
This starts with dissemination; the manipulation of information distributed out,
and the control of what information is emphasized or de-emphasized based upon an
initial assessment of the culture from which the threat emanates. Within this point,
US Intelligence prevention will also be able to integrate denial and deception operations
of its own. These denial and deception themes should also integrate aspects of “Strategic
Deflection” or the means of bouncing an action or responsibility away from oneself
and toward another vulnerability, time, or place. The value in this is that when
an attack cannot be prevented, its effects or the damages it inflicted can be minimized
since the value of striking symbolic targets in the first place is because of the
reaction of the attack. Strategic Deflection will take the attention away from the
attack or threat and place it elsewhere.
Components of the concept of Strategic Deflection are currently present in the 2011
Department of Defense “Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace.” This report stresses
the need for the DOD to mitigate the threats posed to U.S. cyber- based capabilities
through a system of deterrence and the mitigation of known risks (risk is comprised
of vulnerabilities, threats, and mission impact).[11][Footnote] Concurrently, Offensive
Counter Intelligence cyber operations help to identify adversarial tactics and thereby
reduce the effectiveness of their cyber operations.[11]
The reduction of vulnerabilities, as well as stronger communication ties (dissemination
of information) within the Intelligence Community, in tandem with the dissemination
of false information to known or suspected hot beds for these threats, will support
Douhet’s maxim of ‘depriving the enemy of all means of operation.’ Douhet argued
that the only means to defend against enemy offensive capabilities was to go on
the offensive as well, as is required in the cyber-realm by adopting and integrating
methods found in the Intelligence Cycle.
The way to understand the nature of the threat is to look at the end goal of the
attackers and not the means of the attack. Their goal will most likely include a
mix of political, economic, or social disruption. To understand the vulnerabilities
of the attacker, the way these factors play into their history should be assessed.
This includes the dissemination of all valuable and pertinent information to the
various Intelligence agencies which focus on certain operational and strategic realms.
Starting with the overall objective, it states, to prepare for the possibility of
major cyber- attacks, America needs a national cyber disaster recovery plan. The
Strategy moves on to suggest the dissemination of information: “A National Cyberspace
Security Threat and Vulnerability reduction program will include coordinated national
efforts conducted by governments and the private sector to identify and remediate
the most serious cyber vulnerabilities through collaborative activities, such as
sharing best practices and evaluating and implementing new technologies. Additional
program components will include raising cyber-security awareness, increasing criminal
justice activities, and developing national security programs to deter future cyber
threats.”[12] The next phase of the program can be defined as analysis and production.
The National Cyberspace Security Awareness and Training Program will educate private
and public companies, government agencies, universities, and individual citizens
about cyber-security. It will further address shortfalls in the numbers of trained
and certified cyber-security personnel. The next priority is for the government’s
active assistance in state and local governments with cyber-security awareness,
training, and information exchange. Lastly, a system of international cooperation
must be implemented to enable the information sharing, the reduction of vulnerabilities,
and deterrence of malicious actors. This includes a plan of action and discussion
of the requirements necessitated to implement the successful communication within
the international community in preventing cyber-attacks on critical infrastructures.[13]
Counterintelligence can play a critical role in reversing the benefits that cyber
operations afford our adversaries. Insider threat detection programs can increase
the likelihood of identifying insider threat activities on our networks. CI collection
and analysis increases our understanding of cyber threats and how to defend against
them.[14]
The reduction of vulnerabilities as well as stronger communication ties (dissemination)
within the Intelligence community will support Douhet’s maxim of ‘depriving the
enemy of all means of operation.’[15] For instance, in addressing the threat of
cyber-attacks, what is currently being focused upon are targets; cyber terrorism,
cyber espionage, cyber-crime, and so forth. Granted, there are players who use methods
such as these who fall through the cracks. Yet, state and non-state actors who are
known or suspected to utilize or fund these types of operations provide a basis
for analysis for the formulation of strategy to prevent their ability to continue
operations.
Dissemination naturally includes denial and deception themes. Denial attempts to
hide key information from your adversaries. Those who write the Intelligence Reports,
do the research, find the various types of material control what information is
communicated or not communicated for that matter to the enemy; denial. Dissemination
also includes themes of deception and disinformation (showing the fake). “Disinformation
is an ugly, difficult word, because no one likes to be fooled. It is used with deliberate
intent to plant information, again, with the hope of achieving either a political
or diplomatic or moral effect, or a military effect. This can often stem from a
plant by an intelligence service that gets published in a sympathetic paper or media,
and gets proliferated. And again, now with the Internet, it can be very difficult
to track and detect when this kind of disinformation goes on.”[16]
National Security efforts should also seek to disseminate misleading information
so that it overwhelms the adversary’s systems; analyze how the enemy utilizes the
information and what key aspects they hone in on; production includes steps to mediate
their intentions and plans, denying them capabilities to carry out their plans,
processing and exploitation includes getting this information to the correct officials
in the defense community to properly interpret enemy motives, actions, and key vulnerabilities.
Collection is the stage in which our officials compile the key facts necessary to
plan and direct a counter operation.
Denial is the attempt to deny one’s adversary key information either about military
forces, leadership, the status of your country, the effect of the adversary's campaign
on your country, on its infrastructure, information systems, or classified information;
it is meant to confuse the enemy and to distort their knowledge of your intentions.
There are numerous ways that that can be done, from the simplest, such as hiding
in caves, to erecting false buildings, to concealing or hiding information from
intelligence.[17] The US should be capable of this; denial of information or service;
through imposing heavy costs on the adversary by taking down enemy information networks
while also using political, diplomatic, economic, and military means to increase
the costs or risks of a cyber-attack by a cyber- attacker.
Deception techniques target an adversary’s decision-making process. Ultimately,
the intent is to control or manipulate the adversary’s behavior through the false
display of information giving them a distorted understanding of the battle-space.[18]
It is designed to make an adversary believe a reality that is at odds with the truth;
typically accomplished by presenting the adversary with false information. Planning
for deception operations depend on intelligence and security for success. Douhet
stressed how this can be achieved by an air force in war and how they would be able
to achieve maximum results employed by a strong military power; including denial
operations and the attempt to block information used by an opponent to learn the
truth.
The primary aim that Douhet stressed; command of the air, by its nature would create
an environment of denial and deception. Douhet argued that a nation that has command
of the air will have the capability to both, protect its own territory (including
information), as well as cut off enemy auxiliary actions in support of land and
sea operations, destroy enemy naval and land forces, and cut off communication between
them and the civilian population.[19] With the command of the air, a force will
have the complete ability to strike at will, while the enemy has no means of knowing
how or where they will be hit. Douhet argued that, “By bombing railroad junctions,
depots, and other vital objectives, Air Force A could handicap the mobilization
of Army B. By bombing naval bases, arsenals, oil storages, and battleships at anchor,
Air Force A could also immobilize B’s navy. By bombing the most vital civilian centers,
Air Force A would quickly spread terror and panic through the nation leading to
a breakdown of B’s physical and moral resistance.”[20]
Destroying the enemy’s military forces ability to acquire accurate and uniform information
would be maximized by randomly destroying a machine gun arsenal, command and control
nodes, a railroad station, moving trains, or any other highly populated civilian
center. Attacks such as these would not only target the moral resistance of the
population but attacks targeting different regions will confuse the enemy and disrupt
reliable communication lines.[21] These attacks, focused on the civilian population
centers, would be so devastating that the end result would be saving lives. The
civilian population, “driven by an instinct for self-preservation”, would force
her government to sue for peace, thus ending a war quickly.
Douhet understood how damaging the sight of a single plane could be over a city
with a prior knowledge of a neighbor having been attacked; and what the sight of
such an attack aircraft could do towards the use of deception operations. Once the
word was out that a neighbor city was attacked through the use of incendiary and
gas bombing raids, Douhet, foresaw its effects on nearby areas. He predicted that
even without the use of telephones or the radio, word would spread of the paralyzing
effects of one raid conducted against a single city; such a raid; one which had
suspended all functionality in that city. Those who would hear of the raid would
know that what happened in one city could be multiplied by ten, twenty, fifty cities;
a fear which would lead to a complete breakdown of social structure.[22]
The effect of fear, whether rational or irrational, has been proven to be a more
powerful weapon than even the weapon employed by the enemy. If morale is already
in a weakened or fragile state, the ability to compromise it even further becomes
an advantages tool for those employing either air or cyber weapons.
In the same light, cyber terrorism is manipulated as a forum of attack for those
who wish to create social or political change. Cyber terrorism in general, can be
defined as an act of terrorism committed through the use of cyberspace or computer
resources. As such, a simple propaganda in the Internet, that there will be bomb
attacks during the holidays can be considered cyber terrorism. Typically, the mode
of operation is cyber terror through computer based destruction or violence.[23]
These attacks, just as the use of air operations against civilian targets, are aimed
to break morale, and induce fear and panic. : “I compare these cyber- attacks to
having your home burgled and person possessions stolen. There is an irrational and
emotional sense of personal violation even though the crime itself is non-violent
and material possessions can always be replaced.”[24] The person’s sense of security
has been taken away from their current situation and the two-fold effect is that
these persons know they are still vulnerable. The attack has succeeded in many ways
because it has lowered the morale of the target base. The same process was written
upon by Douhet. What is worse for those who have been attacked is the knowledge
that the attacker is still out there. Vulnerabilities like this are so effective
because the attacker targets symbolic targets.
Both terrorists and criminals or those who use cyberspace as a forum for their offensive
capabilities, whether acting alone or as part of a government, attack government,
military, civilian, and financial targets to manipulate cyberspace as a forum to
execute their intentions and goals. “Modern multinational businesses employ information
networks to integrate central headquarters distribution systems, and production
lines that are often scattered across multiple countries and continents. The huge
flow of finance is largely dependent on the internet while disruption of these systems
could severely damage the operations of the world economy. In turn, this would contribute
to financial panics, recessions, and even depressions. Attacks on these targets,
(the source of a nation’s strength, not the manifestation of it, could bring the
military might to a halt).
In the information age, some of the structures that constitute the "supporting framework"
of society are likely to be the high technology networks that allow individuals
to communicate, access their money, and be employed. If a symbolic target is attacked
or destroyed it further isolates individuals from the society in which they formerly
felt secure and protected. Thus, they are ideal targets for symbolic violence.[25]
From a related view, Douhet argued that, “By bombing railroad junctions, depots,
and other vital objectives, Air Force A could handicap the mobilization of Army
B. By bombing naval bases, arsenals, oil storages, and battleships at anchor, Air
Force A could also immobilize B’s navy. By bombing the most vital civilian centers,
Air Force A would quickly spread terror and panic through the nation leading to
a breakdown of B’s physical and moral resistance.’
Douhet believed in the offensive nature of airpower, urging his peers to understand
that, “Air attacks aimed at the source (civilian morale, economic centers, and industrial
bases) as opposed to the manifestation of an enemy’s strength (the military), would
restore the deciveness to warfare as opposed to the stalemate of World War I and
would produce a much swifter and humane end to the war.”[26]
Air operations directed against an enemy’s specific material and moral resources
could potentially bring the enemy’s war making capability to an expedient halt.
Those in the air war community called these points ‘bottle-neck ‘ targets because
with relatively little force, an enemy’s resistance and future war-making capability
could be broken if these specific economic and industrial ‘choke points’ were destroyed.
Douhet based his substantiation of air war doctrine off of these enumerated factors:
modern war allows for no distinction between combatants and noncombatants, successful
offensives by surface forces are no longer possible, the advantage of speed and
elevation in the three dimensional arena of aerial warfare makes it impossible to
take defensive measures against an offensive aerial strategy.
Therefore, at the outset of war, a nation must launch massive bombing attacks against
the enemy centers of population, government, and industry all aimed to shatter civilian
morale. In terms of military results, it is much more important to destroy a railroad
station, a bakery, a war plant, or to machine-gun a supply column, moving trains,
or any other behind-the-lines objective, than to strafe or bomb a trench. The results
are immeasurably greater in breaking morale ... in spreading terror and panic than
in dashing it against more solid resistance.
Douhet envisioned both the psychological and psychical consequences of what would
happen if an enemy announced it would attack a target city. Such an attack, should
only occur once because of the risk involved, this also meant that the objective
should be thoroughly destroyed during the mission. “It is possible that one simple
cyber-attack could succeed against a number of organizations and enterprises. Many
companies do not take the time or spend the money to fix well publicized vulnerabilities.”[27]
As well there are also hacking activities directed towards individuals, families,
organized by groups within networks, tending to cause fear among people, demonstrate
power, collecting information relevant for ruining peoples' lives, robberies, blackmailing
etc.
Douhet advocated that aerial offensives must establish aerial superiority, once
having suppressed enemy aerial defenses, offensive forces should carry such out
attacks with such destructive magnitude that they would psychologically crush the
enemy, and that they should specifically target peacetime commercial and industrial
establishments which would offer the least physical and the least moral resistance;
buildings of major importance, private and public transportation centers, and specifically
designated civilian centers. Consequently, the only other viable recourse would
be to sue for peace on the enemy’s terms or to maintain diplomatic negotiations
even if it was not considered productive to the latter belligerent.
In World War II (1939-1945), civilian endurance and industrial strength, under constant
aerial bombardment proved much more difficult to cripple than Douhet had anticipated.
In 1942, another prominent air war theorist of the time who extrapolated many of
his ideas from Douhet, was Alexander De Seversky. He remarked, “It has been generally
assumed that aerial bombardment would quickly shatter popular morale, causing deep
civilian reaction, even nervous derangements. On the contrary, it seems that despite
large casualties and impressive physical destruction, they can take it, provided
they have the will to fight and the necessary patriotism.”[28][Footnote] Alexander
De Seversky fully believed that if airpower could not produce swift decisions through
indiscriminate bombings, than it would produce complete ones through precision bombings.
Alexander De Seversky noted, if civilian morale and vital centers would not collapse
under indiscriminate bombing, with control of the airspace over an enemy’s territory,
precision bombing with carefully selected targets must replace it. The rationale
behind this deduced, “ The will to resist can be broken in a people only by effectively
destroying the essentials of their lives- food, water, shelter, light, sanitation,
and the rest.”[30]
Douhet’s threefold theory of airpower 1. Command of the Air, 2. Suppression of enemy
defenses 3. Offensives conducted by Bombers against undefended civilian populations
and civilian morale were utilized in World War II in the Pacific Theater in 1945
by General Curtis Lemay.
In November 1944, before General Lemay took command, bombers, which took off from
newly acquired bases at Guam, Tinian, and Saipan in the Marianas, were being used
in daytime, high-altitude, precision attacks against Japan's larger cities. Yet,
the B-29’s encountered Japanese fighter opposition. In January 1945, Brigadier General
Curtis Lemay took command of bombing operations in the Pacific.
Shortly after taking command, General Lemay began experimenting with night low-level
raids and incendiary bomb loads. Lemay’s tactics proved to be very effective. Japan
was more vulnerable at night because of its lack of night fighters and manually
operated anti-aircraft artillery. The switch from high explosives to incendiaries
enabled the B-29s to destroy the war industries that had been largely dispersed
into private homes and small shops scattered across the major urban areas.
Giulio Douhet believed that “by bombing the most vital civilian centers, it could
spread terror through a nation and quickly break down their material and moral resistance.”[31]
[Footnote] Prior to the attacks made by General Lemay, in December 1944, ten percent
of the people believed Japan could not achieve victory. By June 1945, the percent
had escalated to forty-six percent, and just prior to surrender, as a result of
the night-time incendiary raids, sixty-eight percent of the population believed
Japan would be defeated. Japanese civilians who believed that Japan would be defeated
attributed their feelings to the constant air attacks.[31]
An integral component of the air war against Japan was its blow to Japanese morale.
By using incendiary bombs at night on Japan's key urban areas, Lemay successfully
applied Douhet’s airpower principles: the control of airspace; suppressing Japanese
air defenses; and attacking the enemy's center of gravity.[32] “We underestimated
the ability of our air attack on Japan's home islands…By July 1945, the weight of
our air attack had as yet reached only a fraction of its planned proportion, Japan's
industrial potential had been fatally reduced, her civilian population had lost
its confidence in victory and was approaching the limit of its endurance, and her
leaders, convinced of the inevitability of defeat, were preparing to accept surrender.
The only remaining problem was the timing and terms of that surrender.”[33]
Douhet believed that the vastness of the sky made defense against airpower nearly
impossible, which is substantially the same dilemma that proponents of a strong
cyber defense are facing. The air war theorists argued that the best defense was
a good offense. In the same capacity, cyber defenses are taking on more offensive,
preventive roles.[34] In the same capacity, for those who utilize cyber-war, either
to attack cyber systems specifically or who use cyberspace as a conduit to attack
other systems (banking, weapons, etc.) their offensive capabilities are proving
to be much more menacing than any current defensive systems.
Douhet proposed attacks on civilian (soft) targets would bring about a more abrupt
and decisive end to war than attacks on military targets. It behooves nations that
are aligned together commercially to prevent these attacks. The only means of preventing
the enemy from developing these capabilities except to destroy or deter his ability
to develop these weapons. This will give those in the cyber field “command of the
cyber field” just as Douhet argued that one requires command of the air. Douhet
also argued that airpower would be the weapon of choice in future wars. In the same
regard, belligerents are able to carry out their attacks in the same way that those
who first conceived of air war’s superiority would be able to. It is a strong likelihood
that in the coming decades, the most prevalent form of warfare will be carried out
through cyberspace via cyber-terrorism, cyber-crime, or a host of acts that are
linked together. It is currently a strong probability, that nations such as the
United States have not yet developed a cogent and sound defense against this type
of threat because of the various complexities and nature of the beast itself.
Similar conclusions are currently being made within regards to the military potential
of cyberspace. Many members of the Military community propose that cyber-attacks
war will dominate the conflict therein obviating any need for the use of the army
and the navy.
A potential way to prevent cyber-attacks in the future is by using the Intelligence
Cycle in reverse. Taking what has been assessed of the arguments made by Douhet
in conjunction with its relation to cyber security, a primary means to prevent cyber
intrusions, and maintain “command of cyber security” is to effectuate the deterioration
in morale of enemy state or non-state actors. This starts with dissemination; the
manipulation of information distributed out, and the control of what information
is emphasized or de-emphasized based upon an initial assessment of the culture that
the threat emanates from. Within this point, US Intelligence prevention will also
be able to integrate denial and deception operations of our own. This will not in
itself fully prevent breaches in security, but it will slow down cases of espionage.
Since Foreign Intelligence Services will also need to validate the legitimacy of
information gathered, it behooves the US Intelligence Community to make this type
of validation either impossible or so time-consuming that it gives US Officials
time to react.
Based upon the model of the “reverse” Intelligence Cycle, once information based
on the threat from cyber-attacks has been disseminated to both internal officials
and disinformation has been disseminated to outside (potential threats), the next
step is to analyze the various aspects of the information including the intelligence
production styles of it by said threats. This will indicate their strengths and
their weaknesses; and what their greatest targets will be. Once they reveal their
biases or objectives, it will allow US Intelligence officials to process and exploit
previous knowledge of these groups as well as current trends, agendas, or motives
of the threat revealed by the analysis of information. To further solidify how,
where, or why the group or individuals operate in cyberspace, the next natural step
is to collect information through human intelligence after studying the plausible
movements of these groups. Once the movements, beliefs, and behaviors are determined,
one can move on to the last stage; planning and direction. Here they will decide
how or in what fashion the adversary will be defeated.
Taking what has been assessed of the arguments made by Douhet in conjunction with
its relation to cyber security, a primary means to prevent cyber intrusions, and
maintain “command of cyber security” is to effectuate the deterioration in morale
of enemy state or non-state actors. This starts with dissemination; the manipulation
of information distributed out, and the control of what information is emphasized
or de-emphasized based upon an initial assessment of the culture from which the
threat emanates. Within this point, US Intelligence prevention will also be able
to integrate denial and deception operations of its own. These denial and deception
themes should also integrate aspects of “Strategic Deflection” or the means of bouncing
an action or responsibility away from oneself and toward another person, time, or
place. The value in this is that when an attack cannot be prevented, its effects
or the damages it inflicted can be minimized since the value of striking symbolic
targets in the first place is because of the reaction of the attack. Strategic Deflection
will take the attention away from the attack and place it elsewhere. The reduction
of vulnerabilities, as well as stronger communication ties (dissemination of information)
within the Intelligence Community, in tandem with the dissemination of false information
to known or suspected hot beds for these threats, will support Douhet’s maxim of
‘depriving the enemy of all means of operation.’ Douhet argued that the only means
to defend against enemy offensive capabilities was to go on the offensive as well,
as is required in the cyber-realm by adopting and integrating methods found in the
Intelligence Cycle.
Footnotes
[1]. Requirements, planning and direction, collection, processing and exploitation, analysis and production, and dissemination.
[2]. Peter Paret, Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. 1986) 633
[3]. Giulio Douhet, The Command of the Air (Tuscaloosa, AL: Coward- McCaann, Inc. 1942. New imprint in 1998 by Air Force History and Museum Program.) 22
[4]. Giulio Douhet, The Command of the Air (Tuscaloosa, AL: Coward- McCaann, Inc. 1942. New imprint in 1998 by Air Force History and Museum Program.). 219
[5]. Giulio Douhet, The Command of the Air (Tuscaloosa, AL: Coward- McCaann, Inc. 1942. New imprint in 1998 by Air Force History and Museum Program.) 252-253
[6]. Army Vision: 2010: http://www.army.mil/2010/DEFAULT.HTM
[7]. Giulio Douhet, The Command of the Air (Tuscaloosa, AL: Coward- McCaann, Inc. 1942. New imprint in 1998 by Air Force History and Museum Program.) The University of Alabama Press: 30
[8]. Fas.org.
[9]. Giulio Douhet, The Command of the Air (Tuscaloosa, AL: Coward- McCaann, Inc. 1942. New imprint in 1998 by Air Force History and Museum Program.).276
[10]. Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive: Cyber-security. http://www.ncix.gov/issues/ithreat/csg-v3.pdf
[11]. Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive: Cyber-security http://www.ncix.gov/issues/cyber/index.php
[12]. http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/National_Cyberspace_Strategy.pdf
[13]. http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/National_Cyberspace_Strategy.pdf
[14]. http://www.ncix.gov/issues/cyber/index.php
[15]. Giulio Douhet, The Command of the Air (Tuscaloosa, AL: Coward- McCaann, Inc. 1942. New imprint in 1998 by Air Force History and Museum Program.) The University of Alabama Press:28
[16]. Background Briefing on Enemy Denial and Deception. http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2162
[17]. Background Briefing on Enemy Denial and Deception. http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2162
[18]. Military Deception: Hiding the Real/ Showing the Fake. http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA421609
[19]. Giulio Douhet, The Command of the Air (Tuscaloosa, AL: Coward- McCaann, Inc. 1942. New imprint in 1998 by Air Force History and Museum Program.) 25
[20]. Giulio Douhet, The Command of the Air (Tuscaloosa, AL: Coward- McCaann, Inc. 1942. New imprint in 1998 by Air Force History and Museum Program.) 57
[21]. Giulio Douhet, The Command of the Air (Tuscaloosa, AL: Coward- McCaann, Inc. 1942. New imprint in 1998 by Air Force History and Museum Program.) 126
[22]. Giulio Douhet, The Command of the Air (Tuscaloosa, AL: Coward- McCaann, Inc. 1942. New imprint in 1998 by Air Force History and Museum Program.) 58
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[31]. United States Strategic Bombing Survey, PAC. http://www.anesi.com/ussbs01.htm#taaatjhi
[32]. Major Gregory C. Winn USAF, “Douhet: Still Relevant Today.” http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1991/WGC.htm
[33]. United States Strategic Bombing Survey, PAC. http://www.anesi.com/ussbs01.htm#taaatjhi
[34]. Franklin D. Kramer, Stuart H. Starr, Larry Wentz, Cyberpower and National Security (Washington D.C. National Defense University Press, Potomac books Inc. 2009) 12-15
[i]. Giulio Douhet, The Command of the Air (Tuscaloosa, AL: Coward- McCaann, Inc. 1942. New imprint in 1998 by Air Force History and Museum Program.) 19
Copyright © 2012 Holly Senatore
Written by Holly Senatore. If you have questions or comments on this article,
please contact Holly Senatore at:
hollysenatore@yahoo.com.
About the author:
Holly Senatore was born and raised in San Francisco, California in a military household. Her goal is to teach U.S. Naval History or
Modern Japanese Military History at the U.S. Naval Academy in Annapolis, MD after she finishes her PhD in History.
She has always had a passion for World War II in the PAC theater and in recent years, that interest has expanded to include
relations between America and Japan since the mid-nineteenth century.
Published online: 04/17/2012.
* Views expressed by contributors are their own and do not necessarily represent
those of MHO.
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