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Giulio Douhet’s Command of the Air: Designing the Principles for Cyberwar in the 21st Century
Giulio Douhet’s Command of the Air: Designing the Principles for Cyberwar in the 21st Century
by Holly Senatore

This piece will demonstrate that the theoretical basis for counter cyber offense is innately related to the conceptual argument proposed by the early air war theorist, Giulio Douhet (1869-1930). He foresaw the offensive use of aircraft/ bombers strategically employed in warfare to aim at the psychological, moral, and physical destruction of the enemy’s homeland in order to bring about swifter end to combat. In the World War II Pacific Theater, in 1945 General Curtis Lemay successfully utilized Douhet’s teachings and helped to facilitate the surrender of the Japanese Imperial Forces. This piece will secondly explore an overall methodology for forming a cyber- strategy (the end goal) as it relates to the argument espoused by this early air war theorist who presaged the vulnerabilities of government, economic, and civilian institutions caused by air attacks. The means of implementing and executing this goal would loosely be based upon the US Intelligence Cycle. Since cyber threats are also offensive in nature, the cyber strategy posed in this discussion would counter these threats by creating a counter cyber - offense strategy based on denial and deception, and strategic deflection. Theoretically, this strategy can be accomplished by enacting the steps of the Intelligence Cycle in reverse.[1]

In the 1920’s, Douhet forecasted that the aircraft would be the chief weapon employed in the next war, arguing that airpower would render the army and the navy obsolete because aircraft naturally had greater means of conveyance and had the ability to attain “command of the air.” Air operations directed at the sources as opposed to the manifestations of an enemy’s strength, would restore the decisiveness to warfare and would engender more humane results overall.[2] These attacks against an enemy’s specific material resources (bottle-neck targets) in tandem with attacks on their morale with the intent of spreading terror and panic could potentially bring the enemy’s war- making capability to an expedient halt: such targets represent objectives of least physical resistance but also of least moral resistance.[3] Douhet based his substantiation of air- war doctrine off of these enumerated factors: modern war allows for no distinction between combatants and noncombatants, successful offensives by surface forces are no longer possible, and the advantage of speed and elevation in the three dimensional arena of aerial warfare makes it impossible to take defensive measures against an offensive aerial strategy. The proper defense against such attacks, according to Douhet, is to maintain an offensive arm. These factors will support the prevention of an enemy from flying and enable a force to attain “command of the air.”[i]

Douhet further stressed that these principles were written primary for the geographic position of his home country, Italy. Interestingly, Douhet overtly rejected the applicability of his theory to “An English, American, or Japanese naval force operating in the Atlantic or Pacific Ocean.[4] Naturally, my first thought is of our own situation and the eventuality of a possible conflict between Italy and some one of her possible enemies. I admit that the theories I expound have that in the background, and therefore should not be considered applicable to all countries. In all probability, if I were specifically considering a conflict between Japan and the United States, I would not arrive at the same conclusions. To offer a general recipe for victory, applicable to all nations, would be downright presumption of my part. My intention is simply to point out the best and most efficient way for our country to prepare for a probable future war.”[5]

Command of the Air is tantamount to the principles behind Information Superiority. Cyberspace represents the nervous system of an industrial country. To attain information superiority for cyber defense means to deny enemy ability access to invade US information networks. Just as command of the air meant denying the enemy ability to fly, the United States must utilize cyber- measures to maintain information superiority by denying the enemy in the same way. “We must have information superiority: the capability to collect, process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting or denying an adversary's ability to do the same.”[6]

Information superiority includes the ability to predict and prevent enemy threats or attacks through both cyber defense and cyber offense. Douhet, who stressed the need for offensive operations, stated “Victory smiles upon those who anticipate the changes in the character of war, not upon those who wait to adapt themselves after the changes occur.”[7] In conjunction with the necessity of denying the enemy the ability to collect, process, and disseminate information, a means of accomplishing this is to utilize the Intelligence Cycle in reverse. The logic behind this is to provide a thorough strategic guide for researchers and analysts. Before the analysts can begin operations or planning methods they should ascertain what the end goal is and the means used to accomplish it. A possible means to support information superiority is found within the Intelligence Cycle, which seeks to establish proactive security goals to further prevent enemy breaches or control of our vital infrastructures while providing the guidance to disable enemy threats to it.

The use of the Intelligence Cycle in reverse already has a basis for formulation Conventional wisdom espouses that the traditional Intelligence Cycle should follow these predetermined overall steps: requirements, planning and direction, collection, processing and exploitation, analysis and production, and dissemination.[8] In assessing ways to approach overall strategy as the first step, they will be able to more clearly evaluate relationships and levels of communication between political, social, and economic groups or factors in the cyber realm and how or why this is relevant to an overall objective. Douhet appeared to have inherently understood the value of utilizing dissemination as the first step in air warfare to theoretically cause panic and a collapse of morale of the enemy. “A people who are bombed today as they were yesterday, or are told they will be bombed, and see no end to their martyrdom, are bound to call for peace at length.”[9] It potentially follows that if an overall cyber strategic plan is developed at the beginning of operations based on previous disseminations of material, this will also allow for greater flexibility and shifts as the requirements are subject to alteration. If analysts become too focused on targets of attack before they understand what the overall strategy is, relationships between targets, and intended outcomes will remain unclear as expressed below.

To add clarity and ease of operation to the nature of this unconventional analysis, one can see that there is already potential for its execution written into the “National Comprehensive Cyber-security Initiative” complied in 2010. Based upon the model of the “reverse” Intelligence Cycle, once information based on the threat from cyber-attacks has been disseminated to both internal officials and disinformation has been disseminated to outside (potential threats), the next step is to analyze the various aspects of the information including the intelligence production styles of it by said threats. This will indicate their strengths and their weaknesses; and what their greatest targets will be. Once they reveal their biases or objectives, it will allow US Intelligence officials to process and exploit previous knowledge of these groups as well as current trends, agendas, or motives of the threat revealed by the analysis of information. To further solidify how, where, or why the group or individuals operate in cyberspace, the next step is to collect information through human intelligence after studying the plausible movements of these groups. Once the movements, beliefs, and behaviors are determined, one can move on to the last stage; planning and direction. Here they will decide how or in what fashion the adversary will be defeated.

A primary means to prevent cyber intrusions, and maintain “command of cyber security” is to effectuate the deterioration in morale of enemy state or non-state actors. This starts with dissemination; the manipulation of information distributed out, and the control of what information is emphasized or de-emphasized based upon an initial assessment of the culture from which the threat emanates. Within this point, US Intelligence prevention will also be able to integrate denial and deception operations of its own. These denial and deception themes should also integrate aspects of “Strategic Deflection” or the means of bouncing an action or responsibility away from oneself and toward another vulnerability, time, or place. The value in this is that when an attack cannot be prevented, its effects or the damages it inflicted can be minimized since the value of striking symbolic targets in the first place is because of the reaction of the attack. Strategic Deflection will take the attention away from the attack or threat and place it elsewhere.

Components of the concept of Strategic Deflection are currently present in the 2011 Department of Defense “Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace.” This report stresses the need for the DOD to mitigate the threats posed to U.S. cyber- based capabilities through a system of deterrence and the mitigation of known risks (risk is comprised of vulnerabilities, threats, and mission impact).[11][Footnote] Concurrently, Offensive Counter Intelligence cyber operations help to identify adversarial tactics and thereby reduce the effectiveness of their cyber operations.[11]

The reduction of vulnerabilities, as well as stronger communication ties (dissemination of information) within the Intelligence Community, in tandem with the dissemination of false information to known or suspected hot beds for these threats, will support Douhet’s maxim of ‘depriving the enemy of all means of operation.’ Douhet argued that the only means to defend against enemy offensive capabilities was to go on the offensive as well, as is required in the cyber-realm by adopting and integrating methods found in the Intelligence Cycle.

The way to understand the nature of the threat is to look at the end goal of the attackers and not the means of the attack. Their goal will most likely include a mix of political, economic, or social disruption. To understand the vulnerabilities of the attacker, the way these factors play into their history should be assessed. This includes the dissemination of all valuable and pertinent information to the various Intelligence agencies which focus on certain operational and strategic realms.

Starting with the overall objective, it states, to prepare for the possibility of major cyber- attacks, America needs a national cyber disaster recovery plan. The Strategy moves on to suggest the dissemination of information: “A National Cyberspace Security Threat and Vulnerability reduction program will include coordinated national efforts conducted by governments and the private sector to identify and remediate the most serious cyber vulnerabilities through collaborative activities, such as sharing best practices and evaluating and implementing new technologies. Additional program components will include raising cyber-security awareness, increasing criminal justice activities, and developing national security programs to deter future cyber threats.”[12] The next phase of the program can be defined as analysis and production. The National Cyberspace Security Awareness and Training Program will educate private and public companies, government agencies, universities, and individual citizens about cyber-security. It will further address shortfalls in the numbers of trained and certified cyber-security personnel. The next priority is for the government’s active assistance in state and local governments with cyber-security awareness, training, and information exchange. Lastly, a system of international cooperation must be implemented to enable the information sharing, the reduction of vulnerabilities, and deterrence of malicious actors. This includes a plan of action and discussion of the requirements necessitated to implement the successful communication within the international community in preventing cyber-attacks on critical infrastructures.[13]

Counterintelligence can play a critical role in reversing the benefits that cyber operations afford our adversaries. Insider threat detection programs can increase the likelihood of identifying insider threat activities on our networks. CI collection and analysis increases our understanding of cyber threats and how to defend against them.[14]

The reduction of vulnerabilities as well as stronger communication ties (dissemination) within the Intelligence community will support Douhet’s maxim of ‘depriving the enemy of all means of operation.’[15] For instance, in addressing the threat of cyber-attacks, what is currently being focused upon are targets; cyber terrorism, cyber espionage, cyber-crime, and so forth. Granted, there are players who use methods such as these who fall through the cracks. Yet, state and non-state actors who are known or suspected to utilize or fund these types of operations provide a basis for analysis for the formulation of strategy to prevent their ability to continue operations.

Dissemination naturally includes denial and deception themes. Denial attempts to hide key information from your adversaries. Those who write the Intelligence Reports, do the research, find the various types of material control what information is communicated or not communicated for that matter to the enemy; denial. Dissemination also includes themes of deception and disinformation (showing the fake). “Disinformation is an ugly, difficult word, because no one likes to be fooled. It is used with deliberate intent to plant information, again, with the hope of achieving either a political or diplomatic or moral effect, or a military effect. This can often stem from a plant by an intelligence service that gets published in a sympathetic paper or media, and gets proliferated. And again, now with the Internet, it can be very difficult to track and detect when this kind of disinformation goes on.”[16]

National Security efforts should also seek to disseminate misleading information so that it overwhelms the adversary’s systems; analyze how the enemy utilizes the information and what key aspects they hone in on; production includes steps to mediate their intentions and plans, denying them capabilities to carry out their plans, processing and exploitation includes getting this information to the correct officials in the defense community to properly interpret enemy motives, actions, and key vulnerabilities. Collection is the stage in which our officials compile the key facts necessary to plan and direct a counter operation.

Denial is the attempt to deny one’s adversary key information either about military forces, leadership, the status of your country, the effect of the adversary's campaign on your country, on its infrastructure, information systems, or classified information; it is meant to confuse the enemy and to distort their knowledge of your intentions. There are numerous ways that that can be done, from the simplest, such as hiding in caves, to erecting false buildings, to concealing or hiding information from intelligence.[17] The US should be capable of this; denial of information or service; through imposing heavy costs on the adversary by taking down enemy information networks while also using political, diplomatic, economic, and military means to increase the costs or risks of a cyber-attack by a cyber- attacker.

Deception techniques target an adversary’s decision-making process. Ultimately, the intent is to control or manipulate the adversary’s behavior through the false display of information giving them a distorted understanding of the battle-space.[18] It is designed to make an adversary believe a reality that is at odds with the truth; typically accomplished by presenting the adversary with false information. Planning for deception operations depend on intelligence and security for success. Douhet stressed how this can be achieved by an air force in war and how they would be able to achieve maximum results employed by a strong military power; including denial operations and the attempt to block information used by an opponent to learn the truth.

The primary aim that Douhet stressed; command of the air, by its nature would create an environment of denial and deception. Douhet argued that a nation that has command of the air will have the capability to both, protect its own territory (including information), as well as cut off enemy auxiliary actions in support of land and sea operations, destroy enemy naval and land forces, and cut off communication between them and the civilian population.[19] With the command of the air, a force will have the complete ability to strike at will, while the enemy has no means of knowing how or where they will be hit. Douhet argued that, “By bombing railroad junctions, depots, and other vital objectives, Air Force A could handicap the mobilization of Army B. By bombing naval bases, arsenals, oil storages, and battleships at anchor, Air Force A could also immobilize B’s navy. By bombing the most vital civilian centers, Air Force A would quickly spread terror and panic through the nation leading to a breakdown of B’s physical and moral resistance.”[20]

Destroying the enemy’s military forces ability to acquire accurate and uniform information would be maximized by randomly destroying a machine gun arsenal, command and control nodes, a railroad station, moving trains, or any other highly populated civilian center. Attacks such as these would not only target the moral resistance of the population but attacks targeting different regions will confuse the enemy and disrupt reliable communication lines.[21] These attacks, focused on the civilian population centers, would be so devastating that the end result would be saving lives. The civilian population, “driven by an instinct for self-preservation”, would force her government to sue for peace, thus ending a war quickly.

Douhet understood how damaging the sight of a single plane could be over a city with a prior knowledge of a neighbor having been attacked; and what the sight of such an attack aircraft could do towards the use of deception operations. Once the word was out that a neighbor city was attacked through the use of incendiary and gas bombing raids, Douhet, foresaw its effects on nearby areas. He predicted that even without the use of telephones or the radio, word would spread of the paralyzing effects of one raid conducted against a single city; such a raid; one which had suspended all functionality in that city. Those who would hear of the raid would know that what happened in one city could be multiplied by ten, twenty, fifty cities; a fear which would lead to a complete breakdown of social structure.[22]

The effect of fear, whether rational or irrational, has been proven to be a more powerful weapon than even the weapon employed by the enemy. If morale is already in a weakened or fragile state, the ability to compromise it even further becomes an advantages tool for those employing either air or cyber weapons.

In the same light, cyber terrorism is manipulated as a forum of attack for those who wish to create social or political change. Cyber terrorism in general, can be defined as an act of terrorism committed through the use of cyberspace or computer resources. As such, a simple propaganda in the Internet, that there will be bomb attacks during the holidays can be considered cyber terrorism. Typically, the mode of operation is cyber terror through computer based destruction or violence.[23] These attacks, just as the use of air operations against civilian targets, are aimed to break morale, and induce fear and panic. : “I compare these cyber- attacks to having your home burgled and person possessions stolen. There is an irrational and emotional sense of personal violation even though the crime itself is non-violent and material possessions can always be replaced.”[24] The person’s sense of security has been taken away from their current situation and the two-fold effect is that these persons know they are still vulnerable. The attack has succeeded in many ways because it has lowered the morale of the target base. The same process was written upon by Douhet. What is worse for those who have been attacked is the knowledge that the attacker is still out there. Vulnerabilities like this are so effective because the attacker targets symbolic targets.

Both terrorists and criminals or those who use cyberspace as a forum for their offensive capabilities, whether acting alone or as part of a government, attack government, military, civilian, and financial targets to manipulate cyberspace as a forum to execute their intentions and goals. “Modern multinational businesses employ information networks to integrate central headquarters distribution systems, and production lines that are often scattered across multiple countries and continents. The huge flow of finance is largely dependent on the internet while disruption of these systems could severely damage the operations of the world economy. In turn, this would contribute to financial panics, recessions, and even depressions. Attacks on these targets, (the source of a nation’s strength, not the manifestation of it, could bring the military might to a halt).

In the information age, some of the structures that constitute the "supporting framework" of society are likely to be the high technology networks that allow individuals to communicate, access their money, and be employed. If a symbolic target is attacked or destroyed it further isolates individuals from the society in which they formerly felt secure and protected. Thus, they are ideal targets for symbolic violence.[25] From a related view, Douhet argued that, “By bombing railroad junctions, depots, and other vital objectives, Air Force A could handicap the mobilization of Army B. By bombing naval bases, arsenals, oil storages, and battleships at anchor, Air Force A could also immobilize B’s navy. By bombing the most vital civilian centers, Air Force A would quickly spread terror and panic through the nation leading to a breakdown of B’s physical and moral resistance.’

Douhet believed in the offensive nature of airpower, urging his peers to understand that, “Air attacks aimed at the source (civilian morale, economic centers, and industrial bases) as opposed to the manifestation of an enemy’s strength (the military), would restore the deciveness to warfare as opposed to the stalemate of World War I and would produce a much swifter and humane end to the war.”[26]

Air operations directed against an enemy’s specific material and moral resources could potentially bring the enemy’s war making capability to an expedient halt. Those in the air war community called these points ‘bottle-neck ‘ targets because with relatively little force, an enemy’s resistance and future war-making capability could be broken if these specific economic and industrial ‘choke points’ were destroyed. Douhet based his substantiation of air war doctrine off of these enumerated factors: modern war allows for no distinction between combatants and noncombatants, successful offensives by surface forces are no longer possible, the advantage of speed and elevation in the three dimensional arena of aerial warfare makes it impossible to take defensive measures against an offensive aerial strategy.

Therefore, at the outset of war, a nation must launch massive bombing attacks against the enemy centers of population, government, and industry all aimed to shatter civilian morale. In terms of military results, it is much more important to destroy a railroad station, a bakery, a war plant, or to machine-gun a supply column, moving trains, or any other behind-the-lines objective, than to strafe or bomb a trench. The results are immeasurably greater in breaking morale ... in spreading terror and panic than in dashing it against more solid resistance.

Douhet envisioned both the psychological and psychical consequences of what would happen if an enemy announced it would attack a target city. Such an attack, should only occur once because of the risk involved, this also meant that the objective should be thoroughly destroyed during the mission. “It is possible that one simple cyber-attack could succeed against a number of organizations and enterprises. Many companies do not take the time or spend the money to fix well publicized vulnerabilities.”[27] As well there are also hacking activities directed towards individuals, families, organized by groups within networks, tending to cause fear among people, demonstrate power, collecting information relevant for ruining peoples' lives, robberies, blackmailing etc.

Douhet advocated that aerial offensives must establish aerial superiority, once having suppressed enemy aerial defenses, offensive forces should carry such out attacks with such destructive magnitude that they would psychologically crush the enemy, and that they should specifically target peacetime commercial and industrial establishments which would offer the least physical and the least moral resistance; buildings of major importance, private and public transportation centers, and specifically designated civilian centers. Consequently, the only other viable recourse would be to sue for peace on the enemy’s terms or to maintain diplomatic negotiations even if it was not considered productive to the latter belligerent.

In World War II (1939-1945), civilian endurance and industrial strength, under constant aerial bombardment proved much more difficult to cripple than Douhet had anticipated. In 1942, another prominent air war theorist of the time who extrapolated many of his ideas from Douhet, was Alexander De Seversky. He remarked, “It has been generally assumed that aerial bombardment would quickly shatter popular morale, causing deep civilian reaction, even nervous derangements. On the contrary, it seems that despite large casualties and impressive physical destruction, they can take it, provided they have the will to fight and the necessary patriotism.”[28][Footnote] Alexander De Seversky fully believed that if airpower could not produce swift decisions through indiscriminate bombings, than it would produce complete ones through precision bombings.

Alexander De Seversky noted, if civilian morale and vital centers would not collapse under indiscriminate bombing, with control of the airspace over an enemy’s territory, precision bombing with carefully selected targets must replace it. The rationale behind this deduced, “ The will to resist can be broken in a people only by effectively destroying the essentials of their lives- food, water, shelter, light, sanitation, and the rest.”[30]

Douhet’s threefold theory of airpower 1. Command of the Air, 2. Suppression of enemy defenses 3. Offensives conducted by Bombers against undefended civilian populations and civilian morale were utilized in World War II in the Pacific Theater in 1945 by General Curtis Lemay.

In November 1944, before General Lemay took command, bombers, which took off from newly acquired bases at Guam, Tinian, and Saipan in the Marianas, were being used in daytime, high-altitude, precision attacks against Japan's larger cities. Yet, the B-29’s encountered Japanese fighter opposition. In January 1945, Brigadier General Curtis Lemay took command of bombing operations in the Pacific.

Shortly after taking command, General Lemay began experimenting with night low-level raids and incendiary bomb loads. Lemay’s tactics proved to be very effective. Japan was more vulnerable at night because of its lack of night fighters and manually operated anti-aircraft artillery. The switch from high explosives to incendiaries enabled the B-29s to destroy the war industries that had been largely dispersed into private homes and small shops scattered across the major urban areas.

Giulio Douhet believed that “by bombing the most vital civilian centers, it could spread terror through a nation and quickly break down their material and moral resistance.”[31] [Footnote] Prior to the attacks made by General Lemay, in December 1944, ten percent of the people believed Japan could not achieve victory. By June 1945, the percent had escalated to forty-six percent, and just prior to surrender, as a result of the night-time incendiary raids, sixty-eight percent of the population believed Japan would be defeated. Japanese civilians who believed that Japan would be defeated attributed their feelings to the constant air attacks.[31]

An integral component of the air war against Japan was its blow to Japanese morale. By using incendiary bombs at night on Japan's key urban areas, Lemay successfully applied Douhet’s airpower principles: the control of airspace; suppressing Japanese air defenses; and attacking the enemy's center of gravity.[32] “We underestimated the ability of our air attack on Japan's home islands…By July 1945, the weight of our air attack had as yet reached only a fraction of its planned proportion, Japan's industrial potential had been fatally reduced, her civilian population had lost its confidence in victory and was approaching the limit of its endurance, and her leaders, convinced of the inevitability of defeat, were preparing to accept surrender. The only remaining problem was the timing and terms of that surrender.”[33]

Douhet believed that the vastness of the sky made defense against airpower nearly impossible, which is substantially the same dilemma that proponents of a strong cyber defense are facing. The air war theorists argued that the best defense was a good offense. In the same capacity, cyber defenses are taking on more offensive, preventive roles.[34] In the same capacity, for those who utilize cyber-war, either to attack cyber systems specifically or who use cyberspace as a conduit to attack other systems (banking, weapons, etc.) their offensive capabilities are proving to be much more menacing than any current defensive systems.

Douhet proposed attacks on civilian (soft) targets would bring about a more abrupt and decisive end to war than attacks on military targets. It behooves nations that are aligned together commercially to prevent these attacks. The only means of preventing the enemy from developing these capabilities except to destroy or deter his ability to develop these weapons. This will give those in the cyber field “command of the cyber field” just as Douhet argued that one requires command of the air. Douhet also argued that airpower would be the weapon of choice in future wars. In the same regard, belligerents are able to carry out their attacks in the same way that those who first conceived of air war’s superiority would be able to. It is a strong likelihood that in the coming decades, the most prevalent form of warfare will be carried out through cyberspace via cyber-terrorism, cyber-crime, or a host of acts that are linked together. It is currently a strong probability, that nations such as the United States have not yet developed a cogent and sound defense against this type of threat because of the various complexities and nature of the beast itself.

Similar conclusions are currently being made within regards to the military potential of cyberspace. Many members of the Military community propose that cyber-attacks war will dominate the conflict therein obviating any need for the use of the army and the navy.

A potential way to prevent cyber-attacks in the future is by using the Intelligence Cycle in reverse. Taking what has been assessed of the arguments made by Douhet in conjunction with its relation to cyber security, a primary means to prevent cyber intrusions, and maintain “command of cyber security” is to effectuate the deterioration in morale of enemy state or non-state actors. This starts with dissemination; the manipulation of information distributed out, and the control of what information is emphasized or de-emphasized based upon an initial assessment of the culture that the threat emanates from. Within this point, US Intelligence prevention will also be able to integrate denial and deception operations of our own. This will not in itself fully prevent breaches in security, but it will slow down cases of espionage. Since Foreign Intelligence Services will also need to validate the legitimacy of information gathered, it behooves the US Intelligence Community to make this type of validation either impossible or so time-consuming that it gives US Officials time to react.

Based upon the model of the “reverse” Intelligence Cycle, once information based on the threat from cyber-attacks has been disseminated to both internal officials and disinformation has been disseminated to outside (potential threats), the next step is to analyze the various aspects of the information including the intelligence production styles of it by said threats. This will indicate their strengths and their weaknesses; and what their greatest targets will be. Once they reveal their biases or objectives, it will allow US Intelligence officials to process and exploit previous knowledge of these groups as well as current trends, agendas, or motives of the threat revealed by the analysis of information. To further solidify how, where, or why the group or individuals operate in cyberspace, the next natural step is to collect information through human intelligence after studying the plausible movements of these groups. Once the movements, beliefs, and behaviors are determined, one can move on to the last stage; planning and direction. Here they will decide how or in what fashion the adversary will be defeated.

Taking what has been assessed of the arguments made by Douhet in conjunction with its relation to cyber security, a primary means to prevent cyber intrusions, and maintain “command of cyber security” is to effectuate the deterioration in morale of enemy state or non-state actors. This starts with dissemination; the manipulation of information distributed out, and the control of what information is emphasized or de-emphasized based upon an initial assessment of the culture from which the threat emanates. Within this point, US Intelligence prevention will also be able to integrate denial and deception operations of its own. These denial and deception themes should also integrate aspects of “Strategic Deflection” or the means of bouncing an action or responsibility away from oneself and toward another person, time, or place. The value in this is that when an attack cannot be prevented, its effects or the damages it inflicted can be minimized since the value of striking symbolic targets in the first place is because of the reaction of the attack. Strategic Deflection will take the attention away from the attack and place it elsewhere. The reduction of vulnerabilities, as well as stronger communication ties (dissemination of information) within the Intelligence Community, in tandem with the dissemination of false information to known or suspected hot beds for these threats, will support Douhet’s maxim of ‘depriving the enemy of all means of operation.’ Douhet argued that the only means to defend against enemy offensive capabilities was to go on the offensive as well, as is required in the cyber-realm by adopting and integrating methods found in the Intelligence Cycle.
 
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Footnotes


[1]. Requirements, planning and direction, collection, processing and exploitation, analysis and production, and dissemination.

[2]. Peter Paret, Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. 1986) 633

[3]. Giulio Douhet, The Command of the Air (Tuscaloosa, AL: Coward- McCaann, Inc. 1942. New imprint in 1998 by Air Force History and Museum Program.) 22

[4]. Giulio Douhet, The Command of the Air (Tuscaloosa, AL: Coward- McCaann, Inc. 1942. New imprint in 1998 by Air Force History and Museum Program.). 219

[5]. Giulio Douhet, The Command of the Air (Tuscaloosa, AL: Coward- McCaann, Inc. 1942. New imprint in 1998 by Air Force History and Museum Program.) 252-253

[6]. Army Vision: 2010: http://www.army.mil/2010/DEFAULT.HTM

[7]. Giulio Douhet, The Command of the Air (Tuscaloosa, AL: Coward- McCaann, Inc. 1942. New imprint in 1998 by Air Force History and Museum Program.) The University of Alabama Press: 30

[8]. Fas.org.

[9]. Giulio Douhet, The Command of the Air (Tuscaloosa, AL: Coward- McCaann, Inc. 1942. New imprint in 1998 by Air Force History and Museum Program.).276

[10]. Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive: Cyber-security. http://www.ncix.gov/issues/ithreat/csg-v3.pdf

[11]. Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive: Cyber-security http://www.ncix.gov/issues/cyber/index.php

[12]. http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/National_Cyberspace_Strategy.pdf

[13]. http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/National_Cyberspace_Strategy.pdf

[14]. http://www.ncix.gov/issues/cyber/index.php

[15]. Giulio Douhet, The Command of the Air (Tuscaloosa, AL: Coward- McCaann, Inc. 1942. New imprint in 1998 by Air Force History and Museum Program.) The University of Alabama Press:28

[16]. Background Briefing on Enemy Denial and Deception. http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2162

[17]. Background Briefing on Enemy Denial and Deception. http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2162

[18]. Military Deception: Hiding the Real/ Showing the Fake. http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA421609

[19]. Giulio Douhet, The Command of the Air (Tuscaloosa, AL: Coward- McCaann, Inc. 1942. New imprint in 1998 by Air Force History and Museum Program.) 25

[20]. Giulio Douhet, The Command of the Air (Tuscaloosa, AL: Coward- McCaann, Inc. 1942. New imprint in 1998 by Air Force History and Museum Program.) 57

[21]. Giulio Douhet, The Command of the Air (Tuscaloosa, AL: Coward- McCaann, Inc. 1942. New imprint in 1998 by Air Force History and Museum Program.) 126

[22]. Giulio Douhet, The Command of the Air (Tuscaloosa, AL: Coward- McCaann, Inc. 1942. New imprint in 1998 by Air Force History and Museum Program.) 58

[23]. PSYOP Regimental Blog: http://psyopregiment.blogspot.com/2011/06/psychological-impact-of-cyber-attacks.html

[24]. PSYOP Regimental Blog: http://psyopregiment.blogspot.com/2011/06/psychological-impact-of-cyber-attacks.html

[25]. Chapter Three: The Shifting Nature of Terrorism, A. Toward Cyber-terror: The Shifting Nature of Terrorism. http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/cyber/docs/npgs/ch3.htm

[26]. Peter Paret, Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. 1986) 633

[27]. Rise of Cyberwar. http://www.afa.org/mitchell/reports/1108cyberwar.pdf

[28]. Russell F. Weigley. The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy. 236

[29]. Russell F. Weigley. The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy. 236

[30]. Giulio Douhet, The Command of the Air (Tuscaloosa, AL: Coward- McCaann, Inc. 1942. New imprint in 1998 by Air Force History and Museum Program.) 57

[31]. United States Strategic Bombing Survey, PAC. http://www.anesi.com/ussbs01.htm#taaatjhi

[32]. Major Gregory C. Winn USAF, “Douhet: Still Relevant Today.” http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1991/WGC.htm

[33]. United States Strategic Bombing Survey, PAC. http://www.anesi.com/ussbs01.htm#taaatjhi

[34]. Franklin D. Kramer, Stuart H. Starr, Larry Wentz, Cyberpower and National Security (Washington D.C. National Defense University Press, Potomac books Inc. 2009) 12-15

[i]. Giulio Douhet, The Command of the Air (Tuscaloosa, AL: Coward- McCaann, Inc. 1942. New imprint in 1998 by Air Force History and Museum Program.) 19

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Copyright © 2012 Holly Senatore

Written by Holly Senatore. If you have questions or comments on this article, please contact Holly Senatore at:
hollysenatore@yahoo.com.

About the author:
Holly Senatore was born and raised in San Francisco, California in a military household. Her goal is to teach U.S. Naval History or Modern Japanese Military History at the U.S. Naval Academy in Annapolis, MD after she finishes her PhD in History. She has always had a passion for World War II in the PAC theater and in recent years, that interest has expanded to include relations between America and Japan since the mid-nineteenth century.

Published online: 04/17/2012.

* Views expressed by contributors are their own and do not necessarily represent those of MHO.
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