In the Support of Amorality: The Rise of the Staff in the Western Way of War
by Nathan D. Wells
Controversy abounds on the topic of whether or not a so-called 'Western Way of
War" exists. There is much to be said for both sides of the debate, but it does
appear that the West has given more than it has got in military operations over
the last few centuries. Everything from an innate cultural propensity to
violence to technological superiority has been used as an explanation for its
existence. Western armies have certainly been used with devastating effect
since the seventeenth century, or the beginning of the military revolution of
gunpowder weapons and the reforms of Maurice of Nassau. Armies became larger,
more professional entities, yet also grew more mobile, flexible and effective.
A primary reason for this was the creation and rise of importance of the modern
staff system. While a staff in its most basic form is merely a group tasked to
assist an operational commander, the adoption of staffs in Western armies not
only made them more effective, but also modified their world view. Staffs
brought a cold, objective view to the battlefield. Victory through glory was
not their aim; victory through crunching numbers was. The rise of the Staff in
Western Armies; especially those of France and Prussia illustrate this process.
By the end of the evolutionary period of staff systems; the mid-nineteenth
century, the road to the cold, calculated operational slaughter of the First
World War had been surveyed, and the business-orientated view of warfare since
the end of the Second World War had its precedent.
The Staff Officers' Field Manual of the United States Army defines the
staff as follows: 'The staff of a unit consists of the officers who assist the
commander in his exercise of command." [1] Conversely, a Capital or Greater
Staff was roughly, 'all military personnel not belonging in its active capacity
to a particular regiment, but attached rather to the general headquarters of
the field army." [2] Indeed, the term 'staff" most likely stems from the
observation that these were the officers who the commander would lean on to
successfully exercise is duties; indeed they are the vital cogs in the
commanding machine." [3] It may seem ironic to begin with the American
definition of what the staff is, considering that the United States was the
last major Western nation to adopt a higher staff; doing so only in 1902 when
the Spanish-American War of 1898 illustrated how wholly inadequate prepared the
United States Army was for that conflict. Indeed, the United States will only
be discussed in terms of its General Staff in the field; as it had not Great
General Staff until after the covered timeline of this study. While General
Staffs had their ancestors dating back to pre-Classical times, and were usually
associated with professional, paid soldiers; it is to the Swedish King
Gustavo's Adolph's (1594-1632) that most credit for the modern higher or
Greater General Staff should be directed. It was he who also reintroduced an
appreciation of sound logistics unheard of since Roman times. It is only
through sound logistics that 'expansive and continued" warfare is possible. [4]
Gustavus Adolphus' reforms went much further, however. Special duties such as
Courts Martial, and control of intelligence were allocated to the Staff. In a
sense then, the General Staff became the embodiment of the Enlightened Age in
the realm of warfare. This was by no means an overall positive development; or
even a truly realistic one. The Age of Enlightenment was an era marked by an
intense desire to solve, categorize, calculate and control. The idea of a staff
was directly in line with these principles. The great military theorist Maurice
of Nassau had stressed the adoption of Roman Linear tactics as being compatible
with the current Gunpowder Revolution. These were an enlightened theorist's
dream come true. Linear tactics, as their name implies stresses orderly lines
of troops arrayed against similar armies. The only major (theoretical)
difference from Classical times was that weight of men was replace by weight of
metal, as all soldiers became a missile troops. Uniforms and weapons were
standardized on a scale not seen since Classical times, as well. While the
mass-production of the Industrial Revolution was still almost two centuries in
the future, the mentality of warfare through pure numbers had been born.
Maurice's defeat of the Spanish at Nieuport in 1600 proved the merit of his
tactics; but it was with Gustavus Adolphus that his reforms and the utility of
a General Staff would be most marked. Nothing develops interest in a military
axiom more than success; and Gustavus Adolphus was quite successful. If the
Hundred Years War had seen the first great revolution in military affairs; then
the reign of Gustavus Adolphus was the second. Delegating tasks such as
intelligence, reconnaissance, operations and billeting to certain specialized
officers illustrated a desire to maximize their effectiveness and promote based
on merit. While his attention to field artillery and the military science of
engineering and field fortification are the most studied; it should not be
forgotten that 'a staff organization had emerged that was to serve as a pattern
for the next 300 years." [5] Here again was the ideal Staff to be able to
solve, categorize, calculate and control any issues that might exist on the
battlefield. The Swedish King's willingness to employ foreign troops in his
armies meant that even after his death in the Battle of Lutzen in 1632, the
principles set forth would be disseminated around Europe. It is no surprise
that the French would be at the forefront of Staff development, (not to mention
nearly every other facet of military affairs) for in 1639 the remains of
Gustavus's army were absorbed into that of France. The rise of the Staff in
Gustavus Adolphus's army had paralled that of the Age of Enlightenment; for
military theorists were enlightened theorists like their peers. Order and
intellectual achievement were the ideals of the day; and have been since. With
the growing attempts to reduce warfare to a rational set of events, it should
be no surprise that the modern staff had its genesis here.
The modern French army can be dated to the reign of Charles VII (1403-1461)
when the conglomeration of feudal forces was replaced with a more permanent
standing army; complete with specialist units; with artillery being the most
famous. It was not until Cardinal Richelieu's (1585-1642; prime minister of
Louis XII) absorption of the remains of Gustavus Adolphus's army in 1639 that
the French began their foray into staff warfare. These troops were concentrated
into an elite corps under the command of Bernard of Saxe-Weimar, later a tutor
to the great Marshal Turenne. In this age of 'gentlemanly warfare" lessons
learned in the classroom and battlefield were equally important; especially as
allies in one war might be enemies in the next, as professionals served as much
for pay as patriotism. The methods that had worked so well for the Swedish King
were now put to use by the French. The French went beyond simply adopting
Swedish Linear tactics, however; instead reforming their entire staff system.
The first part of this was the creation of the 'intendance" system, by which
all administration of the army became the officer designated as the intendant.
[6] However, it would be the influence of Louis XIV's minister of war, the
Marquis de Louvois (1641-1691) that would begin the meteoric rise of the staff
in the French army. Louvois was a true believer in the organizational method,
and thus the importance of an efficient staff system appealed to him. It was to
Louvois that the first French General Staff can be linked. This was prescient,
for the army rapidly expanded during his term in office. When Louvois assumed
his post, the field army stood at 20,000. At the time of his death, that number
had increased to 100,000. [7] Without an efficient and effective Capital Staff,
the armies of the 'Sun King" Louis XIV would never have been as powerful as
they became. His successor Pierre de Bourcet, (1700-1780) a career staff
officer, would be well-placed to continue staff reforms. The War of the
Austrian Succession (1740-48) would serve as the first showcase of his
abilities. It was a succeeding conflict, the Seven Years War (1756-63) that
would prove most important to the rise of the Staff. It was during this
conflict that Bourcet and Frederick the Great could indeed be described as the
forge of both the French and Prussian Capital Staffs, for it was during the war
that Bourcet and Frederick the Great made their reforms on the French and
Prussian Staff systems, respectively. Due to the increasing size of the armies
involved, as well as the global stage that the conflict was fought; the lack of
enough trained staff officers was keenly felt. Marshal de Broglie blamed many
mistakes made by French forces on 'the complete ignorance of the officers, from
sub-lieutenant to lieutenant generals, of the duties of their position and all
the details of which they ought to be masters." [8] Following the cessation of
hostilities, Bourcet was appointed director of the Grenoble Staff College and
wrote Principles de la Guerre de Montagues. This work contains quite a
few axioms that are traditionally equated with Napoleon, such as appreciation
of the value for good reconnaissance, operational planning and adequate supply
as the basis for any major military undertaking. With effective staffs often
comes great expense; and in 1771, the Bourcet 'special quartermaster staff" was
abolished; though it was briefly reconstituted in 1783 under the Marquis
d'Aguesseau. The French Revolution ended both the ancient regime, and the staff
system which had served it so well. The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars would
serve to create a new style of French Staff under Pierre Alexandre Berthier
that would serve Napoleon well.
Berthier had served on the Staff under d'Aguesseau. He would prove to be one of
the main reasons for Napoleon's early rise; especially in his ability to
translate orders from Bonaparte to his Lieutenants, often in distant locales.
He did have a great shortcoming, however, in that his mind was often too
literal; often only serving to assist Napoleon in the intricacies of the French
Language; and acting as a glorified chief clerk. He went even so far to comment
that 'I am nothing in the army…I receive the marshals' reports in the name of
the Emperor, and I sign his orders for him." [9] In terms of utilizing his
Staff, Napoleon would on more than one occasion fall into the trap of many a
great captain: micro-managing. As David Chandler comments:
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There was no call for originality of thought or effort; Napoleon decided
all, planned all, controlled all. The staff was merely the vehicle for the
transmission of command and the provision of data---nothing more. [10]
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A commander's staff is only as effective as his use of it. Napoleon in many
ways was the last passionate great captain. While he did possess a keen
objective military mind; he was also a product of the Revolutionary Age. A
'whiff of grapeshot" could define events, just as a 'King on horseback" might
have prevented them in the first place. The fact that many of his Capital Staff
officers had had to survive the anti-intellectualism of Robespierre did not
help matters. Napoleon was one of the great Captains of his age, or any other
for that matter. Yet, he strove to do too much on his own; and relegated those
areas of his empire not visited by himself to their own devices. The experience
of Andre Massena in Portugal is enlightening. Declared by Napoleon himself as
'the greatest name in my military empire," General Massena was tasked to invade
Portugal, and defeat the English-backed insurgency there. [11] Beyond this
basic order, however Massena was given little guidance to bring about this
result. Making matters worse was the fact that contact between Massena and
Berthier was by no means regular; and the latter was often ill-informed about
the current state of affairs in Iberia. Indeed, after crossing into Portugal
itself, communications completely broke down; forcing Massena to send a Captain
Mascarenhas, a Portuguese officer to Paris in disguise. Unfortunately, he was
captured and hanged as a traitor. [12] Napoleon was better informed on the
progress of his general, due to English newspapers accurate accounts of
Massena's Portuguese travails. From the point of view of a staff officer, the
entire Iberian campaign was a disaster. The lack of communications, logistical
ability, or reinforcements indicated an almost cavalier attitude among the
French high command; especially of Napoleon. It would also prove to be an
example of foreshadowing. While Napoleon's earlier dramatic victories, like
those of Gustavus Adolphus, were over those Western Armies that were not
modernized; his later Pyrrhic victories and defeats were at the hands of those
armies that had learned from his example.
The post-Napoleonic era would not be kind to the French Capital Staff. While
Marshal Gouvin Saint-Cyr strove for a level of competence among Staff officers.
He did so by closing the corps to outsiders, and setting up a special school in
Paris, the Ecole d'application d'etat-major. However, as Dallas Irvine
comments, this was to prevent" crying abuse rather than the providing of a
system of sifting out and exploiting to the utmost the best brains of the
army." [13] Yet, the negative situation that had existed under Napoleon was
recognized, and reforms instituted in 1826. The most important of these was
that Staff officers must have actual line service. Unfortunately, a Capital
Staff can only do so much service to a mediocre government. In 1831 the July
Monarchy combined the Capital Staff with the Topographical Section. Thus,
instead of being concerned with potential military issues, the Staff was tasked
to be more concerned with the updating of a detailed map of France. [14] To
make matters worse, the July Monarchy became embroiled in Algeria; (not the
first or last time that this North African nation would prove to be an 'African
Ulcer.") As the campaigns in Iberian had shown, a long drawn out campaign of
guerilla warfare often proves the greatest Achilles heel to interest in the
Capital Staff. Algeria was to be no As a final blow to the reborn Staff Corps
was the Law of 1833, which dictated that appointments would be based on
seniority, not merit; and ended the line service requirements for Staff
officers. This law was still enforced at the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian
War in 1870. Only after the deadly efficiency of the Prussians had been shown
by both the defeat of the Danes and Austrians, were reforms dictated by the
Minister of War, Marshal Niel. By then, it would be too late.
If the Prussian General Staff proved to be the superior by the mid nineteenth
century, how was its lineage different from that of France? Walter Goerlitz
comments that 'two sharply opposed influences have thus assisted in forming the
character of the German General Staff, the stratified feudal society of old
Prussia, and the new nationalism of the French Revolution." [15] The Prussian
General Staff preceded this, however; as this refers to its glory years of the
nineteenth century, where it helped defeat Napoleon; then later his nephew,
Napoleon III in the Franco-Prussian War. When one thinks of Capital Staffs,
Prussia/Germany almost invariably is the first military to come to mind. J. D.
Hittle says quite succinctly that it was Prussian theorists who 'demonstrated
conclusively that a strong staff was an indispensable component of any great
nation's military machine." [16] Going a bit further, he comments that:
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Of all the modern great powers of Europe, none has so consistently
manifested such a progressive national aptitude toward the improvement of the
military method as Germany. The intellectual approach has been the keynote of
their military technique for centuries---an intellectual emphasis that proved
not to be a straight-jacket on progressive thought, but rather a firm basis on
which pioneering by military thinkers could be best directed into the channels
of practical application. [17]
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In a sense, the Prussian General Staff was a greater student of the ways and
means of the 'Western Way of War." The General Staff was based upon the old
'Quartermaster-Generals" Staff of the preceding two centuries; to about 1635.
This Staff (like other Western Staffs) was a direct copy of the Swedish
pattern; and was a direct result of the chaos caused by the Thirty Years War
(1618-48) which devastated Germany. The Quartermaster-General's Staff was
mainly concerned with the supply and billeting of the army; an unglamorous, yet
highly vital set of duties. As the quartering of troops in the field dictated
the need for access to water, food, and roads, supplementary duties such as
intelligence and reconnaissance became more pronounced. As vital as these
functions were, the Quartermaster-General's Staff had all but been phased-out
until the arrival of Frederick the Great; who provided the spark to resuscitate
the Staff. This may have something to do with Frederick's introduction to
military life. Frederick grew up demonstrating no ardor for the military or
war; (possibly as a result of being awakened at dawn by the sound of a cannon
firing.) Indeed, he even attempted to flee to England in the company of two
friends, Lieutenants Katte and Keith. The plotters were discovered, and
Frederick was stripped of his rank and forced to watch Katte's execution by
beheading. While still on restriction, he was put to work in the auditing
office of the war department checking invoices, payrolls and the like. [18] He
was no royal prince whose first exposure to the military was the pomp and
grandeur of the parade ground, or court guards in fancy uniforms. To Frederick,
the Prussian Army was a community of paperwork, and individual costs. Combat in
its most basic form may be killing; but warfare in its basic form was that of
numbers. To have successful continued operations, the state must be able to
cover the costs of warfare. These costs may be in terms of money, material, or
manpower; but they are costs, nonetheless. Frederick, more that any other
Captain of his day realized this. Barely had his reign begun than he invaded
the Austrian province of Silesia, thereby beginning the First Silesian War
(1740-42) part of the War of Austrian Succession. This was designed to provide
capital and raw materials to Prussia, which was lacking in both. In the wars
that filled much of his reign, it was often Frederick's amoral view of military
operations that ensured the survival of the Prussian state. Experience in the
War of the Austrian Succession (1740-48) and the Seven Years War (1756-63) had
illustrated the need for trained Staff officers. While Frederick, like Napoleon
might have been enough of a military genius to not require much of a staff; he
had a much higher regard for their services than the Corsican. In his personal
history of the Seven Years War, Frederick wrote that 'the army stood the test
of many campaigns, but the want of a good Quartermaster-General's Staff was
often felt at Headquarters." [19] Shortly after the cessation of hostilities,
the king selected twelve officers who he felt had a special aptitude for Staff
duties.
Frederick was definitely a child of his time. As one of the so-called
'Enlightened Monarchs" of Europe, he was fluent in several languages, showed an
aptitude for music and was a lover of books. It should not be surprising that
the Staff, or 'Brain of the Army" as British author Spenser Wilkinson described
it a century and a half later, would appeal to Frederick. His own literacy has
entailed that his own thought are still available to modern readers, while the
establishment of the Kriegsacademie a year after Bourcet's Principles
de la Guerre de Montagues was published illustrated that he realized
that future commanders not to his level of genius would require Staff
assistance. Not only was it useful in the completion of successful military
operations, but the Staff utilized the same basic axioms that Frederick himself
associated with the military. There was to be no chase for glory, merely the
seeking out of victory. This more often than not was the result, and it was
without a whit of sarcasm that Napoleon, visiting Frederick's grave after
defeating the Fourth Coalition in 1807, remarked to his own staff: 'Gentleman,
if this man were still alive I would not be here." Napoleon had understood the
genius of Frederick, but not the genius of the Staff. Sadly, for the Prussians,
he was not the only person of this mentality. For twenty years after the death
of Frederick, the Prussian General Staff was allowed to erode in quality,
leading to the disastrous defeat at the hands of Napoleon at Jena in 1806. Yet,
even before this defeat, a few theorist saw the need to keep pace with the
Revolutionary Armies that had turned back the Prussians at the Battle of Valmy
in 1792. General von Lecoq and Colonel Christian von Massenbach were early
proponents from about 1800. Indeed, so agonized was Massenbach at the state of
affairs, that in January 1802 he addressed a memorandum to the king covering
such topics as drawing plans for military operations, division of the country
into three theaters of war and proposals concerning a topographical survey of
the country. [20] After Jena, Massenbach's proposal was used as the core
directive for the new War Ministry, and that his services 'must be regarded as
marking a distinct stride in the gradual growth of the present general staff."
[21] It is thanks to Gerhard Scharnhorst, however that the concept of the
'general staff with troops" was fully embraced. Ironically, it is perhaps
Napoleon that the reborn Prussian General Staff should be most thankful to. His
devastating victory at Jena removed the obstacles to reform. The wave of
Revolutionary thought that his victories unleashed also served as a motivating
force. Indeed, without Napoleon, there might have been no Scharnhorst,
Gneisenau or Stein. Scharnhorst was actually present at Jena in the capacity of
a general staff officer. First-hand knowledge of combat operations was a vital
characteristic to a successful staff officer. Shortly before Jena, Sharnhorst
penned the observation that 'What ought to be done, I know only too well; what
is going to be done, only the gods know." [22] It is small wonder that he was
all too wiling to organize the reforms of the Prussian army, especially that of
its staff. Angered at his relative powerlessness as a chief-of-staff, in 1808
he issues guidelines so that general staff officers and generals of the army
would realize what was expected of them, and generals 'should be cognizant of
the duties of a general staff officer, so that misunderstandings, overlapping,
wrong expectations, or accusations might be avoided." [23] As an additional
step to improve command and control, beginning in 1809 officers of the general
staff were assigned to the various army headquarters; this being extended to
corps and brigades in the campaigns of 1813-14. These staff officers were not
attached to the commander of these units; but rather to the headquarters as a
whole.
The next great reform of the Prussian General Staff came following the fall of
Napoleon. Beginning in 1821, both the General Staff and 'general staff with
troops" was placed under a single chief, General von Muffling as Chief of the
General Staff of the Army; with control being gradually shifted away from the
War Minister. This was partially an attempt to guarantee the survival of the
General Staff; especially in light of the belief that democracies were not able
to develop and possess military power. Considering the lack of respect for the
U.S. military at the time; as well as the metamorphosis of French Republican
Armies into Imperial units, this is not surprising. Indeed, it would not be
until the American Civil War that General Staffs on any level would be
utilized. It can also be supposed that after Germany having been a battlefield
for the better part of two centuries, the General Staff reformers were in no
mood to jeopardize the security of Prussia for non-military ideals. Muffling is
perhaps best known for the fact that it was during his term that Carl von
Clausewitz wrote Vom Krieg. In 1828, the last of the pre-Moltke
reforms was enacted. These reforms dealt with the manner in which field staffs
at the corps level were to be organized, as well as the method in which the
business of the commands would be handled through subsections of the staff.
These subsections were general staff, routine staff, legal and departmental, or
intendance sections. [24] This arrangement would continue to the end of the
Second World War.
It was the period following the Napoleonic Wars that the Industrial Revolution
took hold of the West. Mass production, booming population, and (perhaps most
apt for this subject) the rise of the railroads were its hallmarks. In 1857,
Helmut von Moltke became Chief of the General Staff. Moltke presents a study in
contrasts to historians. A member of the rather large penniless lower nobility,
he had written fiction, as well as translated all twelve volumes of Edward
Gibbons Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire into German to supplement
his meager earnings as a junior officer. [25] An intellectual who prized other
intellectuals, he sought to turn military affairs on its head. Before covering
Moltke's influence, it might be wise to discuss Jomini and his effects on the
American Civil War. It was at this time that Napoleon III was attempting to
create a French military Renaissance. On the surface, he succeeded. French
military treatises were widely read, and the half century from the end of the
Napoleonic Wars until the end of the United States Civil War could best be
described as the Age of Jomini. Antoine-Henri Jomini was a minor Swiss noble
who served in various capacities in both the French and Russian Armies during
the Napoleonic Wars. Whatever his skills as a staff officer, Jomini was
definitely a prolific writer. The maxim of 'if Napoleon were the god of war,
Jomini was his one true prophet." [26] Jomini is almost synonymous with the
American Civil War, with the old joke that Officers on both sides went to war
with a saber in one hand, and a copy of Jomini in the other. One of the
earliest military textbooks used at the United States Military Academy at West
Point proclaimed 'General Jomini has transcended all writers on war…and has
reduced the hitherto mysterious science of war to a few self-evident principles
and axioms." [27] Such lofty praise proclaiming the simplification of war
explains a great deal about the slaughter that would occur between 1861 and
1865; not to mention how disillusioned Americans became of Jomini. Indeed, the
conflict virtually assured that his best contemporary Clausewitz would rise
from obscurity and greatly surpass him in renown. The U.S. Civil War began
showing numerous influences from the French. Units on both sides, known as
'Zouaves" utilized gaudy French uniforms that were extraordinarily conspicuous
on the battlefield; often featuring the pantaloon rouge or red trousers favored
by the French. Even the basic forage cap was a near direct copy of that used by
the army of Napoleon III. Of course, there was also Jomini. Both the Union and
Confederacy were inspired by the French Staff system, for there was almost
nothing else to go on. The United States Army Staff regulations dated to the
Revolutionary War. Braxton Bragg called for a series of reforms that would have
created an embryonic staff; but his calls went unheeded. [28] When war broke
out, most commanders on both sides simply appointed friends and cronies to
their staff. Members of Thomas 'Stonewall" Jackson included his brother-in-law,
prewar friends and former students from the Virginia Military Institute. [29]
What regulations existed was unknown to the mostly recent civilians on both
sides. As Napoleon was still the Great Captain of the nineteenth century, it
was to his historians that the combatants turned. Jomini proved the most
prolific, primarily for the fact that he outlived the majority of his
contemporaries. Indeed, had Clausewitz or Berthier lived longer, Jomini might
never have had the influence he eventually wielded. His staff service was
flawed for three major reasons. The first was that his ego convinced him that
everyone else was wrong and criticism directed his way was by inferior minds
(such as Berthier and Clausewitz) trying to sabotage his good name. The second,
and more damning for our purposes flaw is his lack of tactical experience.
Unlike most French Napoleonic officers; (but very much like those Staff
officers under Napoleon III) Jomini had not commanded so much as a company of
the line; actually believing that tactical experience was unnecessary. Finally,
Jomini was a throwback to an earlier age; not a prophet for where the century
was going. He preferred 'loyal and chivalrous warfare." [30] While not a very
courteous fellow, he possessed an all too moral view of war. He was fascinated
by the concept of interior lines, which in the pre-industrial society lacking
railroads was not an all-together bad idea. Yet, Jomini lived until 1869, so he
should have realized that railroads would change everything, as the American
Civil War had shown. One man who realized the importance of railroads was
Helmut von Moltke.
If Napoleon (and by extension Jomini) favored movement along interior lines;
then Moltke stressed deployment on external lines. The key to this, and to
victory was on rapid deployment via the railroads. The finest rail systems on
the Continent were in Germany, and this would prove a distinct advantage. This
also added a new element of complexity to war, and only an efficient General
Staff would be able to deal with said complexity. While railroads have enabled
troops to be deployed during the U.S. Civil War at a rate far surpassing
previous conflicts, the lack of an effective staff system really only meant
that the slaughter would begin that much sooner. The Seven Weeks War in 1866
changed the perception of the railroads during wartime dramatically. The
Austro-Hungarian Empire had proved an obstacle to a unified Germany, both out
of its own willingness to face another strong Central European power; as well
as the fact that a majority of German-speaking Catholic states (in the south)
backed the Hapsburg monarchy. If the Franco-Prussian War was Otto von
Bismarck's; then the Seven Weeks War was Helmut von Moltke's While it is
usually rarely a good thing for an army to be commanded by royal personage; let
alone two out of three, this was not a hindrance; thanks to both the overall
planning; and staff communication. The fact that the Austrians sent their
ablest commander, the Archduke Albert to a backwater command; (replacing him
with the Commanding General of the Ordnance Department, von Benedek to avoid
royal humiliation,) only played into Moltke's hands. [31] The Austrians were
not thinking amorally; only for glory, (or rather the avoidance of
humiliation.) Even without the involuntary Austrian assistance, and occasional
Prussian blunders, Moltke's plan worked to near perfection. The three Prussian
armies merged on schedule near the village of Sadowa; winning a decisive
victory over the Austrians. Moltke, Bismarck and King William I waited for
reports of the battle. Bismarck offered Moltke his cigar case, upon which the
Staff officer picked the finest cigar, and while lighting it remarked to the
king, 'Your majesty is not merely winning the battle today. You are winning the
campaign." [32] Moltke was right. Vienna lay open to the Prussian Armies, and
the conflict was for all intents and purposes over. With the peace that
followed; Prussia now became a major power in its own right, something that was
not looked kindly upon by France. The road to the Franco-Prussian War was now
open.
By 1870, the stage was set for two very different militaries; and their
respective staffs to come to blows. France was considered the ideal in military
circles; primarily since most conflicts she had been involved in were against
armies with even worse staff systems than her own; such as Algeria, Mexico, and
Russia. Much like a pugilist whose career has been against carefully chosen
weaker fighters, France on the eve of the Franco-Prussian War suffered from a
glass jaw; most prominently in her staff and mobilization method. The former
manifested itself in the lack of a true French plan; the latter in the rather
pell-mell style of reaching the frontier. Whereas the Prussians brought their
regiments up to strength in the permanent corps districts and then transported
them to the front, the French rushed whatever they had to each of their 120
regimental and battalion depots to the front, and only later completed the
units with reservists and men returning from leave. [33] While problematic,
this imperfect system did give the French numerical advantage for the first few
days of the war. In fact, the major concern for the Prussians was that of a
French advance across the Rhine. This would have been a real issue; but
Napoleon III was far different than his celebrated namesake. It was here that
the lack of a plan was most apparent. In 1867 Marshal Niel had suggested a plan
near the Luxembourg border that would utilize the best concentration of French
rail lines; but Napoleon III decided on a far different plan. Thinking that the
Austrians would join any anti-Prussian war, he split the French army in two;
with one half based at Metz; the other at Strasbourg. His logic was flawed due
to the fact that the Hapsburg monarchy was doing all in its power to maintain
good relations with the Prussians. A competent and forceful Capital Staff would
have told him as much. The Prussians went to war with a plan of total victory.
Their General Staff had rationally thought almost all aspects of the coming
war. The French served merely as the pawns in their military experiment. It was
a lesson that they would not completely heed.
When the Franco-Prussian war began in 1870; the combatants both had
distinguished history of staff experience; and were indeed the most acquainted
with staff nuances. Yet, upon the outbreak of hostilities, the Prussian General
Staff was far superior to that of France. France had moved away from the key
characteristics of Staff warfare. Domestic prosperity and involvement in
'little wars" had blunted the effectiveness of the French General Staff. The
same malaise that had afflicted the Prussian General Staff in the twenty years
following the death of Frederick the Great struck the French in the half
century following Napoleon's exile. The Prussians had learned the lessons from
the American Civil War. Indeed, disillusionment with Jomini had led U.S.
commanders to Clausewitz, and eventually the vaunted Prussian staff system.
Ralph Traxler comments that 'Two institutions are generally credited with
preceding industry in the use of administrative practices as we know and
understand their application today…the Roman Catholic Church and certain
military organizations, especially that of the Prussian army." [34] Certain
commanders, such as Confederate General James Longstreet, concerned more with
intelligence and experience on his staff than prewar cronies, actually operated
in a manner more related to Clausewitz than Jomini; while Union cavalry General
Phil Sheridan was an observer with the Prussians in 1870. Clausewitz's maxim
that 'War is a continuation of policy by other means" is key here. While the
road to war can be composed of anger and hatred; the war itself should be
fought with cold determination. The Franco-Prussian War featured many gallant
charges by French, Prussian and Bavarian troops that accomplished little beyond
pure slaughter. The road to the First World War was open. France would fight
that war with fury, Germany with stoicism. The Battle of Verdun would
illustrate these opposing views. The Staff systems created during the Age of
Enlightenment received their final test in the First World War. The 'Days of
August" saw plans more complex that Moltke had been faced with; and it was only
the Staffs of the combatants that managed to wrest some order from the
battlefield. Perhaps the final word here should be one of the great quips
uttered by a staff officer. The German victory at Tannenberg in 1914 over a
Russian invasion force has been largely used as a platform to elevate Generals
Paul Von Hindenburg and Erich Ludendorff to near mythic levels. In reality, the
overall plan for the counterattack was in place even before they boarded the
train to take them to East Prussia. The Chief Staff officer on the scene was
Colonel Max Hoffman. Pictures of him show a dour, monocled officer; not
surprising in the least for a career staff officer. Escorting friends around
Hindenburg's command post after the war, he commented that 'Here is where
General Hindenburg slept before the battle, after the battle; and just between
us…DURING the battle." The General could afford to sleep soundly; for he had a
qualified staff officer in his service to dictate the battle.
Show Footnotes and
Bibliography
[1]. J.D. Hittle, The Military Staff: Its History and Development. Harrisburg,
PA, The Military Service Publishing Company, 1944) p. 2.
[2]. Dallas D. Irvine "The Origin of Capital Staffs." The Journal of Modern
History, Vol. 10, No. 2 (Jun., 1938) pp. 161.
[3]. John D. Stanley. 'The General Staff: An Analysis of Its Effectiveness." The
Journal of the Academy of Management. Vol. 2, No. 1 (Apr., 1959) pp.
57.
[4]. Hittle, The Military Staff. P. 33.
[5]. Ibid., p. 37.
[6]. Ibid., p. 77.
[7]. Ibid., p. 78.
[8]. Ibid., p. 79.
[9]. David Chandler, The Campaigns of Napoleon. (New York:Macmillan,
1966) p. 134.
[10]. Ibid., p. 372.
[11]. Donald D. Howard, 'Massena and Napoleon: Abandonment in Portugal," Military
Affairs, Vol 37, No 3(Oct., 1973) pp. 84.
[12]. Ibid., p. 85.
[13]. Dallas D. Irvine. . 'The French and Prussian Staff Systems Before 1870." The
Journal of the American Military History Foundation, Vol.2 No. 4
(Winter, 1938) pp. 199.
[14]. Ibid., p. 200.
[15]. Walter Goerlitz, History of the German General Staff: 1637-1945.
(New York: Barnes and Noble Books, 1995) p. 14.
[16]. Hittle, The Military Staff, p 43.
[17]. Ibid., p. 45.
[18]. Thomas R. Phillips, Frederick the Great: Instructions for His Generals.
(Mineola, NY: Dover) p. 5.
[19]. Hittle, The Military Staff, p. 50.
[20]. Ibid., p. 54.
[21]. Ibid., p. 56.
[22]. Ibid., p. 57.
[23]. Ibid., p. 58.
[24]. Ibid., p. 61.
[25]. Goerlitz, History of the German General Staff, pp. 70-71.
[26]. John R. Elting, 'Jomini: Disciple of Napoleon?" Military Affairs,
Vol 28, No. 1 (Spring 1964), pp. 17.
[27]. Ibid.
[28]. Richard L. DiNardo, 'Southern by the Grace of God but Prussian by Common
Sense: James Longstreet and the Exercise of Command in the U.S. Civil War" The
Journal of Military History, Vol 66, No. 4(Oct., 2002) pp. 1019.
[29]. Ibid., pp. 1020-1021.
[30]. Elting, 'Jomini" p. 25.
[31]. Goerlitz, History of the German General Staff, p. 87.
[32]. Ibid., p. 88.
[33]. Geoffrey Wawro, The Franco-Prussian War. (Cambridge University
Press, 2003.)
[34]. Ralph N. Traxler, 'A Model of Modern Administrative Organization: The
German General Staff." The Journal of the Academy of Management, Vol.
4 No. 2 (Aug, 1961) pp. 108.
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Copyright © 2008 Nathan D. Wells
Written by Nathan Wells. If you have questions or comments on this article,
please contact Nathan Wells at:
charongemini76@hotmail.com.
About the author:
Nathan Wells received both a BA in History, and a Masters in Military
History from Norwich University in Vermont. Following service as a Surface
Warfare Officer in the U.S. Navy, he currently teaches in the Boston area.
Published online: 06/08/2008.
* Views expressed by contributors are their own and do not necessarily represent
those of MHO. |
