The Wheatfield and Stony Hill at Gettysburg
by Stephen H. Light

On the afternoon of July 2nd 1863 one of the most important and most confusing fights of the Civil War broke the silence of the small town of Gettysburg Pennsylvania. The day would be one of controversy, one of close calls, and one of bloodshed. Some of the heaviest and most important fighting on this day would take place on a small rocky slope on the southern half of the battlefield, and in a wheatfield, which forever would be known as 'The Wheatfield' to future generations.

March Northward; Meeting engagement

In May of 1863 Major General Joseph Hooker's Army of the Potomac had forced Robert E. Lee into battle at Chancellorsville. The result was a stunning yet costly Confederate victory, and the death of Stonewall Jackson. Meanwhile, out west along the Mississippi River U.S. Grant was beginning his spring campaign to take Vicksburg, one of the last links along the Mississippi that the Confederates held. To counter this move and to follow up on his success at Chancellorsville, Lee decided to carry the war into the North. Accordingly on June 3rd the Army of Northern Virginia began to withdraw from its Fredericksburg camps and make its way into and down the Shenandoah Valley, eventually crossing the Potomac. 
 
On the evening of June 28th, after a slow march northward, one of General James Longstreet's scouts came into the Confederate camp and reported Union troops closing fast from the south and east. To counter this potentially dangerous situation, General Lee ordered his army to concentrate in the vicinity of Cashtown or Gettysburg. On July 1st General Harry Heth's division of A.P. Hill's third corps moved forward to Gettysburg on a reconnaissance mission. Finding John Buford's federal cavalry in his way, Heth attempted to drive him from the town. This effort failed when John F. Reynolds' 1st corps of the Army of the Potomac arrived. From this point the battle escalated until the Confederates eventually pushed the 1st and 11th corps back through the town in late afternoon. The battle was a costly one for both sides, including the death of Reynolds himself.

General Meade; Arrival and Dispositions of the Army of the Potomac

General Meade in the meantime had been back at Taneytown, trying to get a hold on the situation at hand. Meade had been forced into the position of Army command after Lincoln accepted the resignation of Hooker on June 28th. After hearing of the death of Reynolds, Meade sent Major General Winfield Scott Hancock to the field to represent the commanding general. Hancock sent word back that the ground around Gettysburg would be a strong defensive position, and accordingly Meade broke his headquarters at about 10 p.m. and started towards Gettysburg. 

In their new positions the 11th and 1st corps occupied Cemetery hill and a portion of Culp's hill. By nightfall of July 1st portions of Sickles 3rd corps and all of Slocum's 12th corps had arrived. Sickles's corps was placed to the left of Cemetery hill, the main eminence of the Union line, and protected the Army of the Potomac's left flank. Slocum's corps, except for Geary's division, which was temporarily placed on Little Round Top, took up the Union right resting on Culp's hill. The rest of the 3rd, along with the 2nd and 5th corps had reached the battlefield at or before 7 a.m. of July 2nd. The 2nd corps took up a line on Cemetery ridge in between the 3rd corps and the 11th. The 5th corps was to act as a reserve until the arrival of the 6th. 

Worthy of mention at this time is the position that the 3rd corps took up on July 2nd and the controversy that surrounds it. General Meade had informed the brash commander of that corps, Daniel Sickles, to take up a position in which his right connected with the left of the 2nd corps and his left rested at or on Little Round Top. But, as will be shown, Sickles did not do this….

Meade, Sickles, and the 3rd Corps

Dan Sickles had been commander of the 3rd corps since before the battle of Chancellorsville. At that battle he was ordered to withdraw from the commanding high ground around Hazel Grove, and the 3rd paid the price. Sickles was known to be a womanizer. He was not a professional soldier, and not fully adapted to the large job of corps command.

When Sickles received his orders on the morning of July 2nd, he became concerned. In his opinion the ground that he was ordered to occupy was dominated by a ridge in his front along the Emmitsburg road, which ran southwesterly from the town itself. 

In order to help the reader understand more clearly, an attempt to describe the ground on Sickles's front will be made. Extending south from Cemetery hill was a ridge known by the combatants as Cemetery ridge. At the end of the ridge were two large hills known as Little Round Top and Round Top. The 2nd corps manned the northern half of the ridge, and Sickles was ordered to man the southern half extending to Little Round Top. Just to the west of the Round Tops was Plum Run Valley, named for the small stream that flowed in between the Round Tops and Houck's Ridge (Devil's Den), which made up the western barrier of the valley. The ground in and around this area was extremely rocky. 

To the north of Devil's Den was the Wheatfield. In between these two areas lay Rose Woods. This wood lot started just to the northwest of Devil's Den and made the southern and western borders of the Wheatfield. To the south of Devil's Den Plum Run split into two branches. The eastern branch made its way through Plum Run Valley and ended in front of Cemetery ridge. The western branch flowed northward through Rose woods and then turned westward near the southwest corner of the Wheatfield. 

Just to the west of the Wheatfield was a small elevation, named by Brigadier General J.B. Kershaw, and referred to hereafter in this article, as the stony hill. The stony hill, as Kershaw described it, was "covered with heavy timber and thick undergrowth." Directly to the northwest of the stony hill, was the famous Peach Orchard. The Peach Orchard was bordered on the west side by the Emmitsburg road and on the northern side by the Wheatfield road (as it is called today). This road ran in an east-west direction, starting east of Little Round Top and passing along the north slope of that hill, and running all the way to the Emmitsburg road and beyond. The ground in and around the Peach Orchard was the highest point on the line that Sickles claimed would dominate Cemetery ridge and was an excellent position for batteries. 

According to HISTORICUS, an anonymous writer (Probably Sickles himself) claiming to tell the accurate history of the battle, Sickles was extremely anxious on the morning of the 2nd. He had foreseen the importance of occupying the ground near the Peach Orchard, but had not received any orders as to the placement of his corps. Finally, after waiting a while for orders, Sickles himself went to Army headquarters and asked Meade to go over the ground on his front with him. As HISTORICUS has it, Meade replied, "O, generals are all apt to look for the attack to be made where they are." Even with this apathetic response, Sickles was so persistent that Meade consented to have General Henry Hunt, chief of artillery, go over the ground with Sickles. 

Sickles then went on to show Hunt the position. He would place troops and mass batteries in the Peach Orchard. His line would then extend southeast from there, in a broken fashion, covering the stony hill and Houck's ridge. This line would have been far to long for Sickles's corps alone, and it would leave its flanks unprotected. According to HISTORICUS, however, Hunt approved of the position, but could not order the move himself. Hunt himself claimed to have seen both the advantages and the disadvantages of the position. At some point during the inspection artillery fire erupted on Cemetery hill and Hunt turned to go. Sickles asked if he should advance his corps, to which Hunt replied: "Not on my authority." 

General Meade tells a different story than that of HISTORICUS. According to Meade's testimony in front of the Committee on the Conduct of War, early in the morning Meade had informed Sickles as to the placement of his corps. As Meade has it this position was between the 2nd corps and the Round Tops. Sometime during the morning Meade sent his son (a staff officer) to ask Sickles if his corps was in position. To this Sickles replied that there was no position there. Meade sent his son back to clarify the position for Sickles. Shortly after this Sickles arrived at Army headquarters himself, still questioning the whereabouts of his position. Again, Meade repeated his instructions, this time explaining further that Sickles was to take up the position that Geary's 12th corps division had held the previous night. Meade, now probably somewhat frustrated, was told by Sickles that, as far as he knew, Geary's division didn't have a position at all. Sickles did mention, however, that there was a good artillery position on his front, and then asked General Meade if he could deploy his corps as he saw fit. To this, Meade replied, "Certainly, within the general limits of the instructions I have given to you." Meade then ordered General Hunt to the left to help Sickles with the artillery placement. Clearly, however, Meade did not expect Sickles to advance his line so far. 

However the situation came about, Sickles fears increased as the day went on. At about noon he sent the 3rd Maine and a regiment of Berdan's Sharpshooters into the woods in the 3rd corps front on Seminary ridge. What he found was that those woods were full of Confederates and that time was running out. So it was that early in the afternoon, after Berdan's reconnaissance, Sickles decided to advance his line to cover the high ground in front. On the left, Colonel J. H. Hobart Ward's brigade covered the area of Houck's Ridge. To the northwest of Ward's line Colonel Regis de Trobriand deployed in a broken fashion on the stony hill. In the rear of de Trobriand's line in the Wheatfield Captain George B. Winslow's battery of Napoleons unlimbered. 

De Trobriand had five regiments in his brigade: The 3rd and 5th Michigan, the 110th Pennsylvania, the 40th New York, and the 17th Maine. It was a small brigade of only about 1400, and there was no way that it would be able to connect with Ward's brigade on its left or Graham's on its right in the Peach Orchard. The 3rd occupied a skirmish line in front of the stony hill and Rose Woods. Its left connected with the 2nd U.S. Sharpshooter regiment near the J. Slyder farm lane. The 3rd's right connected with the skirmishers protecting the Peach Orchard, which were deployed facing towards the south. Behind the 3rd Michigan the 110th Pennsylvania and the 5th Michigan deployed on the stony hill. The 110th was on the right, the 5th on the left, and they both faced southwest. In support of the 5th and the 110th were the 17th Maine and the 40th New York. The 17th was on the right and both regiments faced towards the Peach Orchard. 

To the right of de Trobriand's line General Charles K. Graham's brigade occupied the Peach Orchard. In Graham's rear, directly north of de Trobriand's line, Colonel George C. Burling's brigade of Humphreys's division was placed in reserve to support Birney's long line. 

Humphreys's division was placed farther to the right along the Emmitsburg road. It was a long line, and not the one General Meade had wanted. As General Winfield Hancock had stated when he saw Humphreys's division march out towards the Emmitsburg road: "Wait a moment, you will soon see them tumbling back." One might wonder what Meade's words must have been when he rode out to post the 5th corps and found Sickles in the advanced position. But it was too late to change Sickles's position now; the Confederate attack was about to begin….

Longstreet, Lee, and Confederate Plans and Preparations

The first night of July 1863 had been one of frustration for Robert E. Lee. The Army of Northern Virginia had won a victory and he, as always, was anxious to follow it up quickly. As the Confederates rolled up the Union line that afternoon, General Longstreet came up to talk strategy with Lee. Lee soon became somewhat disappointed when Longstreet argued against an attack, and instead wanted to march around the Army of the Potomac's left flank to threaten its communications with Washington. As the discussion became heated, Lee replied to Longstreet's suggestion, "If the enemy is there tomorrow, we must attack him." 

Following this less than pleasant meeting, Lee rode to Ewell's headquarters, where the commanders there expressed their opinion that, while offensive opportunities in their sector were not good, defensive possibilities were excellent. Needless to say, this was not the type of thing that Lee had hoped to hear from the command of Stonewall Jackson's old corps. 

Regardless of the opinions of his subordinates, Lee had devised an outline for an attack the next day. As the sun rose in the east and General Meade was inspecting his lines, Lee met with Longstreet, Hill, and two division commanders of Longstreet's corps, John Bell Hood and Lafayette McLaws. Lee explained to the generals his plan of attack. Longstreet was to assault the Army of the Potomac's left flank and Hill was to support him and continue the attack. Lee was still uncertain about the role of Ewell's corps, so at 9 a.m. he rode out to Ewell's headquarters to figure out what role the 2nd corps would play. While Lee was gone Longstreet got to work, sending E. P. Alexander to the left with three battalions of artillery. 

After Lee returned with the knowledge that Ewell's corps would demonstrate and attack if the opportunity arose, the plan was set and Longstreet set out at 12 p.m. after waiting 30 minutes for Hood's final brigade, under command of E. M. Law, to arrive. The planning of the day was done, and now all that remained was for Longstreet, Hill, and Ewell to get into position. This seemed easier than it actually was.

At some point during the march McLaws and Captain Johnston from Lee's staff, who led the march, came to the top of a rise and saw in the distance Little Round Top, with signal corps flags waving. This certainly would not due. The plan was for Longstreet's corps to march unnoticed, but if the corps marched across this rise the signal station on Little Round Top would easily spot them. As a result, McLaws and Longstreet decided to turn the corps around and march back to a more concealed route that McLaws had noted earlier in the day. The march became further delayed when Hood's division marched into and past the rear of McLaws' division. By the time it was all sorted out and McLaws' division began to form opposite the Peach Orchard it was late afternoon. 

What the Confederate commanders in McLaws' division saw next was a surprise. Based on an early morning reconnaissance, the federal flank should not have extended as far south as the point where McLaws' division was deploying for battle. To the surprise of Kershaw, one of McLaws' brigadiers, and to McLaws himself, the federal left not only extended to their front, but well past it. As McLaws tried to adapt to this change, he began to receive orders to move immediately forward from Longstreet and Lee, who had yet to find out the true state of affairs. According to McLaws, Longstreet sent him an order stating that only a "regiment of infantry and a battery of artillery" were in his front. Finally, at the last moment, McLaws was ordered to halt and wait for the beginning of Hood's attack before he was to go in. 

By 4 p.m. the attack was about ready to begin, and the first brigades of Hood's division stepped off…. 

The Attack Gets Under Way: the Opening Shots in the Wheatfield

Hood's division soon moved forward and struck the federal line in Devil's Den and also began to move towards the unoccupied Little Round Top. His attack became disorganized when he fell wounded and was taken from the field. Even so, the attack still had enough power to cause de Trobriand to send the 40th NY to help support Ward. De Trobriand also made another movement to help Ward by sending the 17th Maine to the stone wall on the southern side of the Wheatfield. There, the men from Maine poured flanking fire into Robertson's brigade, which was attacking Devil's Den. 

De Trobriand's brigade had been reduced to minimum numbers for the defense of the Wheatfield, but at this point they received some help. The 8th New Jersey and 115th Pennsylvania of Burling's brigade would be sent in to cover the gap between the 5th Michigan and 17th Maine. The 8th would take a position on the right of 115th Pennsylvania, which itself would be on the right of the boys from Maine. 

The right of de Trobriand's brigade was also about to receive support. Barnes's division of the 5th corps (minus Vincent's brigade, which had gone to Little Round Top) was marching towards the Stony Hill. Barnes would not be in position for the first assault on the Wheatfield, but would be there to be involved in one of the major controversies of the day. 
The arrival of the 8th New Jersey and 115th Pennsylvania couldn't have come too soon. Anderson's brigade of Hood's division was now coming forward and began moving through Rose Woods toward the Wheatfield. The opening shots in this horrific struggle were about to be fired.

From left to right Anderson's brigade was aligned as follows: 9th Georgia, 8th Georgia, 11th Georgia, and the 59th Georgia. As they moved forward the 59th would come to the aid of the 3rd Arkansas from Robertson's brigade, who was then assaulting Ward's men. Next in line, the 11th Georgia would assault primarily the 17th Maine, which had the protection of the stone wall. The 8th Georgia hit the regiments recently sent by Burling, while the 9th had some problems of its own. It was receiving flanking fire from the other regiments of de Trobriand's brigade on the Stony Hill. To combat this the commander of the 9th, Captain George Hillyer, refused his left three companies and continued the assault on the 8th New Jersey. 

The situation for the 8th New Jersey was not a good one. At this point in time it was receiving heavy attacks on both its front and flank from the 8th and 9th regiments of Anderson's brigade. The 8th did not occupy a very good position to begin with, but now with Anderson's tremendous pressure, it gave way. Soon to follow would be the 115th Pennsylvania, whose flank was uncovered by the retreat of the 8th. The 8th would go all the way back to its original position near Trostle's woods, but the 115th would halt in the Wheatfield and give support to Winslow's guns, which were now firing rapidly towards the unseen Georgians in Rose Woods. 

The 17th Maine was in a predicament of its own right now. Using the protection of the stone wall, the boys from Maine were barely managing to repulse the attack of the Georgians in their front. But on their flank the supports from Burling's brigade had given way. To combat this, Lieutenant Colonel Charles B. Merrill gave orders for his right flank to refuse its line and bend back into the Wheatfield. The men on that flank would no longer have the protection of a wall in their front, but they would still resist the Confederates bravely. 

The men of the 11th Georgia in Merrill's front continued its ferocious assault, and surged towards the stone wall. Both sides experienced tremendous casualties, but in the end the 17th would hold on to their position bravely. As Barnes division formed facing to the west on the Stony Hill, the 32nd Massachusetts of Sweitzer's brigade would be forced to change front and check the Rebels trying to exploit the gap left by Burling's departure. Anderson now could see that without support, he couldn't get any further in his assault, so he took his brigade and withdrew a little ways to wait the support of McLaws's division. 
While in the process of pulling back, Anderson would be wounded severely enough to be taken from the field. The command of the brigade would pass to Lieutenant Colonel William Luffman, who would continue the withdrawal. 

The men on both sides in this opening action suffered severely, but for both the day was still far from over. It was now about 5:30, and Longstreet's assault had begun just a little over an hour before. A temporary lull fell over the Wheatfield. This lull may have been a little misleading to the combatants at the time. The lull did not mean that the combat was over, it simply was the calm before the storm. 

Barnes's Division Forms on the Stony Hill

During the opening stages of Anderson's fight, the men of Barnes's fifth corps division were filing into line to the right of the third corps units on the Stony Hill. Tilton's brigade would form just to the north east of de Trobriand's two regiments, and would also face southwest, as de Trobriand did. From left to right Tilton's brigade was as follows: 22nd Massachusetts, 1st Michigan, and the 118th Pennsylvania. In reserve behind the main line was the 18th Massachusetts. Forming in the rear of Tilton, in a second line facing west, was Sweitzer's brigade. Sweitzer from right to left was: the 32nd Massachusetts, 62nd Pennsylvania, and the 4th Michigan. 

As the 8th New Jersey withdrew, the 32nd Massachusetts, as told before, was ordered to shift over to repel Anderson. Barnes was now in position on the Stony Hill, and for the moment things were beginning to calm down. Even the Confederate batteries opposite the Stony Hill and the Peach Orchard seemed to at once become silent. Then, suddenly a salvo of three Confederate guns broke the stillness of the relatively quiet battlefield. This was the signal, Lee's old war horse had give McLaws the order to advance, and for the first time of the day the possession of the Wheatfield would be seriously challenged. 

Kershaw Attacks

Joseph Kershaw and his brigade of South Carolinian troops had been enduring the fire of artillery and waiting to advance for about two hours by the time the orders came. During this time Kershaw had been studying the features of the ground and trying to decide on his attack plan. Kershaw's orders were to wheel to the left and strike the federal line somewhere near the Peach Orchard, but Kershaw knew that there was a federal force on what he proclaimed the Stony Hill. Kershaw, at some point either before the advance or in the beginning stages of the advance, decided that he was going to strike the troops on the Stony Hill first before turning his attention to the Federals on his left. 

Kershaw had expected to find Barksdale's Mississippi brigade to advance in tandem with his men and for the two forces to attack as one, but as Kershaw advanced he noticed that Barksdale was not advancing for some reason. Kershaw then decided that he would divide his attacks to cover the absence of Barksdale. The 8th regiment, 3rd Battalion, and 2nd regiment wheeled toward the Peach Orchard to strike the sparsely defended batteries there, while the 7th and 3rd South Carolina would move east to strike the regiments on the Stony Hill. 

Kershaw's regiments crossed the Emmitsburg Road and, upon reaching the Rose farmyard, split into two groups, Kershaw himself going with the right wing. The left wing went forward and attacked the batteries near the Peach Orchard. At this time, while the right wing was not engaged, Kershaw directed the 7th South Carolina to shift to the right to correct an overlap between that regiment and the 3rd. Unfortunately, this order was carried to the left wing somehow, which was at that point moments away from driving the enemy from the Orchard. The left wing then followed the order and swung to the east, where the batteries along the Wheatfield road soon fired right into their flank with devastating affect. 
Meanwhile Kershaw's right wing moved forward to the attack, and Anderson's brigade in Rose woods again resumed its offensive. As Kershaw moved in from the west, they were able to strike the 118th Pennsylvania, on Tilton's right, squarely in the flank. To meet this threat Colonel Tilton refused the 118th's line. The next thing that happened has been one of the biggest controversies since that day. Colonel Tilton found General Barnes and explained the situation. His men, having just been engaged, were now being flanked. He asked permission for his men to withdraw to Trostle's woods to protect his flank. Barnes immediately granted this and then sent orders for Sweitzer to do the same. 

In years to come Barnes and Tilton would have to defend this decision. They were in a tough position, but the fact of the matter was that they had barely been engaged. De Trobriand in later years would never have a kind word to say about his 5th corps supports that retired early that day. As Kershaw's men went forward they barely met any resistance at all. 

As Tilton and Barnes decided to retire, Sweitzer and de Trobriand was preparing to fight. When Anderson's brigade advanced to the attack again, Sweitzer ordered the 62nd Pennsylvania and 4th Michigan to change front and offer support to the 32nd Massachusetts. But just as the battle was beginning, things went all wrong for the federal forces. Tilton's withdrawal had created a vacuum. It uncovered the flanks of every federal troop on the Stony Hill and forced the withdrawal of 110th Pennsylvania and 5th Michigan. Although many in Sweitzer's brigade were upset at being ordered to withdraw, they also began to fall back. Even the 17th Maine, who had so stubbornly resisted the efforts of Anderson's brigade up to this point, faced too much pressure and began to fall back. Because of Tilton and Barnes's decision, the whole federal line, although retreating in good order, was on the verge of collapse. 

As the men of de Trobriand, Sweitzer, and Tilton's brigades came across the Wheatfield towards the protection of Trostle's woods, Winslow and his guns were busy firing away. Anderson's skirmishers were beginning to venture into the field itself, but the main body of Anderson's brigade stayed in the woods for protection from Winslow's rapid firing gunners and their case and solid shot. As Kershaw's regiment worked their way down the east slope of the Stony Hill, however, they were now able to put some well-placed fire on Winslow's guns. To avoid having his guns captured, Winslow limbered them up, using some stray horses he found from Smith's battery (positioned on top of Devil's Den and in the Plum Run Valley) to replace those horses of his that had been killed. 

As the men of the 17th Maine crossed the field and got to the Wheatfield road, they were met by General Birney, who was on the scene trying to correct things. Birney, according to Lt. Col. Merrill, rode in front of the regiment and ordered a charge upon the enemy as a delaying action. "With cheers for our gallant commander" the regiment charged into the Wheatfield and checked the advance of Anderson. The 115th Pennsylvania, which had been standing by Winslow's guns all this time, now withdrew as the men from Maine relieved them. 

Birney then went back to Trostle's woods and came upon the 5th Michigan. Once again, as he had done with the 17th, Birney ordered them to advance again into the Wheatfield. There the two regiments stood, trying desperately to hold on until reinforcements could arrive. The roar of battle was as loud as ever before. The action was hand to hand in some cases. Lt. Col. Merrill would report that seven out of ten men in his color guard were either wounded or killed. For the day the 17th Maine would suffer 35 percent casualties, the men in the 5th Michigan 40 percent. 

De Trobriand's men had held to the last, but now they were running desperately short on ammunition. In their rear however, things were beginning to stir. The 17th Maine and 5th Michigan had held on long enough, for reinforcements had arrived. 

A few minutes before crisis hit the Wheatfield, General Winfield Scott Hancock had his men stirring on southern Cemetery Ridge. Coming forward to see one of his best Brigadiers, Colonel Edward Cross, Hancock greeted him by saying, "Colonel, this day will bring you a star." To this, the brave and courageous Colonel replied "No general, this is my last battle". Within minutes, Cross would set off at the head of his brigade to meet his fate in the Wheatfield. 

Caldwell's Division Enters the Fight

The men of John Caldwell's Division of the 2nd corps probably watched on with the same anxiety that Hancock had shown earlier that afternoon when they watched the 3rd corps take up its forward position. Sickles move had uncovered Hancock's left flank, which happened to be Caldwell's position. Shortly after 4 p.m., General Hancock ordered Caldwell to step off to support Sickles's overextended men. As the division marched down Cemetery Ridge, they came across the 5th corps reinforcements heading to the Wheatfield. Seeing the 5th corps, the order was countermanded and Caldwell and his men returned to their positions. 

Caldwell's division was composed of four brigades. Cross's brigade, General Samuel Zook's brigade, Colonel John Brooke's brigade, and of course, Colonel Patrick Kelly's famed but depleted Irish Brigade. Soon after returning to Cemetery Ridge, Caldwell once again received instructions to support the federal left. This time, however, his instructions directed him to support the 5th corps, which had only just arrived! 

It was at this point when Colonel Cross had told General Hancock his bleak premonition and then rode off to battle. In the Irish Brigade, as the good Irish men marched off for what could be their last battle, Father William Corby stood upon a rock and gave absolution to the whole brigade. To be sure, the men of Caldwell's division knew that the battle ahead was not going to be easy. 

Now, as the 17th Maine and 5th Michigan began to give way in the front, Caldwell was forming up in battle formation. He had such little time that some brigades were forced to form backwards, and each brigade went off on its own when it was ready.

Cross's brigade was the first to go in. Nearest the eastern edge of the Wheatfield, it swiftly stepped into the field and marched across towards Rose Woods and Anderson's Georgians who lay in wait. As his men advanced, the 5th New Hampshire, on his left flank, and part of the 148th Pennsylvania were able to gain cover from Rose Woods as it extended farther to the north at that point. The 61st New York, on the right flank, and also the 81st Pennsylvania, had no such luck and had to advance straight across the field under a galling fire. 

Cross was able to halt Anderson and push his brigade back a bit, but soon his advance stalled. While trying to get it moving again, the gallant Colonel's premonition came true, as he was shot down. His last known words were, "I did hope I should see peace restored to our distressed country. I do think the boys will miss me. Say goodbye to all." Cross's brigade would be taken over by H. Boyd Mckeen. 

Over on the other end of Caldwell's line, General Zook had been roped in by a desperate Dan Sickles. Earlier, when Caldwell's division had started marching towards the Wheatfield, an aide from Sickles found General Zook and asked for support. Spurring to see Sickles, Zook galloped away from his brigade, and then soon returned and ordered the brigade off in a more western direction than that of the rest of the division. 

Now, as Cross went in, Zook was preparing to advance from the Wheatfield road southwestward towards the Stony Hill. His advance was made difficult by the masses of Barnes's troops reforming in Trostle's woods. From left to right, Zook went in as follows: 66th New York, 52nd New York, 140th Pennsylvania, and in reserve the 57th New York. 
Before the advance, Colonel Richard P. Roberts, commander of the 140th Pennsylvania, attempted to instill his men with courage. "Men of the 140th," he shouted, "recollect that you are now defending your own soil, and are fighting to drive the invader from your own homes and firesides. I shall expect you to conduct yourselves as if in the presence of your wives, you sisters, and your sweethearts, and not disgrace the flag you bear or the name of Pennsylvania!" 

With those inspiring words Zook' brigade set off and soon got entangled with Kershaw's men on the Stony Hill. They quickly scrambled up the wooded heights. Here, as Zook was in the lead of his brigade, he was shot off his horse, mortally wounded. As he turned to his aide, Lieutenant Josiah Favill, he commented, "It's all up with me, Favill." Caldwell had lost his second brigadier with in a matter of minutes. The following day, upon hearing of the repulse of Pickett's charge, General Zook would state, "Then I am satisfied, and am ready to die." 

Meanwhile, Kelly's famed men were about ready. The Irish Brigade never did have the luck of the Irish in this war. At Antietam, they were the ones who had to pleasure of storming the Sunken Road. And now, not only were they about to be involved in one of the bloodiest fights at Gettysburg, but unlike the rest of Caldwell's division they would have no cover whatsoever and would be forced to march straight across the rows of wheat.

Kelly's men stepped into the Wheatfield equipped with their .69 caliber smoothbore muskets and buck-and ball ammunition, which, although poor for long-range usage, would come in handy in the fight this day. Going into the fight, the Irish brigade aligned the 116th Pennsylvania on the right, followed by the 28th Massachusetts, 63rd New York, 69th New York, and the 88th New York on the left flank. 

According to Major St. Clair A. Mulholland, commander of the 116th Pennsylvania, after an initial firefight the men of the 116th soon dashed upon the enemy (probably the 7th South Carolina). The two regiments became confused and intermingled, when Major Mulholland, who's stories are often difficult to believe, claims to have jumped on a rock and ordered the enemy to surrender, and he claims many did. 

Kershaw's two regiments were now in a bit of a tight spot. Kelly hit them on the right and Zook's brigade hit on the left. As Kershaw later explained, "I have never been in a hotter place." Soon a regiment of Semmes brigade came up on Kershaw's right to help out against the Irish, and Kershaw also bent the line of the of the 7th South Carolina back, but the pressure was too much. Slowly but surely Kershaw was being pushed back. 

All this while Caldwell had held John R. Brooke's brigade in position along the Wheatfield road. He wished to use it as a reserve and throw it in wherever it was needed. Now the time had come. Cross's advance had stalled and his men had run out of ammunition. Semmes and Anderson had begun to work their way onto Kelly's flank as well. And so it was now Brooke's turn to join the fray. 

Brooke's brigade stepped off to relieve Cross's worn out men. With parts of Cross's brigade advancing in support, Brooke quickly reached Rose Wood's and hit Anderson's line, driving him back across the western branch of Plum Run and out of the woods. From left to right Brooke was aligned as follows: 145th Pennsylvania, 27th Connecticut, 53rd Pennsylvania, 64th New York, and the 2nd Delaware. Soon with Anderson's line retreating Brooke hit Semmes brigade, which without its commander had fallen in on the right of Kershaw. Soon this brigade retreated also, as Brooke's men swiftly climbed the Stony Hill. To his right, Kershaw finally was forced to fall back, as both flanks were being turned. Caldwell's division had triumphed, and had driven the Rebels back. 

After Brooke had swung westward to deal with Semmes, however, Anderson's brigade began to cause trouble on his flank, which was now open. To protect this flank, Caldwell went to see Sweitzer, whose brigade was still located in Trostle's woods. Asking for support, Sweitzer referred Caldwell to Barnes. When the two went to Barnes, he granted Sweitzer permission to advance into the field to support Brooke's left flank. 

As Brooke and Sweitzer went into the Wheatfield, once more the federal troops were receiving reinforcements. Earlier in the day Romeyn B. Ayres division of the 5th Corps had arrived on the north slope of Little Round Top. One Brigade, Stephen Weed's, was moved onto Little Round Top itself. The other two, Sidney Burbank's and Hannibal Day's, for the moment had halted on the north slope. Soon they began to advance across the valley towards the heavy fighting now going on in the Wheatfield. They halted at the stone wall on the eastern edge, unable to enter the fight because at the moment Brooke's brigade, and then subsequently Sweitzer's, was moving perpendicularly across their front. 

The men in Caldwell's division at this point must have felt on top of the world. All except a few men in Zook's brigade, who must have been able to see events transpiring to the west in the Peach Orchard. Similarly, one might think that Kershaw would not have been very happy at this point in the fight. But as a matter of fact, his spirits were probably never better, as he remarked in recalling the sight presented to him when he emerged from Rose Woods: "I saw Wofford coming in splendid style." 

Soon, as Sweitzer's men advanced, Sweitzer himself would ominously note that the men on the Stony Hill were retiring, which he of course attributed to the 2nd corps brigades being relieved by fresh troops. A little later, however, Private Edward Martin, the brigade's pennant bearer, would blurt out, "Colonel, I'll be ______ if I don't think we are faced the wrong way!" 

An Advance in Splendid Style

After being delayed somewhat by the batteries in front of his jump off point, William Barksdale's Mississippi brigade had finally gotten off. They swiftly moved towards the Peach Orchard and crashed through driving everything in front of them, and then, turning to the northeast, began to sweep away Graham's brigade and Humphreys's division along the Emmitsburg Road. Following Barksdale up in support, was W.T. Wofford's brigade of Georgians. As they moved forward behind Barksdale, none other than General Longstreet himself accompanied them.

For some reason still unexplained, Longstreet made the swift decision to shift Wofford's brigade to support the troops near the Stony Hill, instead of having him follow Barksdale. Wofford's Georgians however, were ready for any test, and the 16th, 18th, and 24th regiments, along with Philip's and Cobb's legions advanced swiftly through the now cleared Peach Orchard straight for Zook's open flank. 

When Wofford hit Zook's flank, the federal troops had been engaged for a long time and were not at all prepared for another test. The deciding moment in the Wheatfield fight had come. Offering little or no resistance, the northern troops scrambled back in disorder. In the Irish brigade the confusion and fear of being surrounded was so great that some units were ordered to break ranks and every individual to save themselves. 

As Wofford advanced, the whole Confederate line in the area once again took up their advance. Kershaw's left wing, the 8th, 3rd battalion, and 2nd South Carolina joined in, as well as much of Semmes and Anderson's brigades. The whole Confederate effort was now concentrated directly on the forces in the Wheatfield. 

To make matters much worse, Colonel Tilton, stationed in Trostle's woods facing west, would once again leave the field early, without having even put up the show of a fight this time. His brigade faded back in the face of Wofford, and failed to even attempt to check the advance. 

As Kelly, Zook, and Tilton scrambled for safety, Brooke too would be forced to fall back, as Anderson pressured his flank, and Semmes pressured his front and flank. He could not hope to hold on to his hard fought ground and of course was swept up in the route. 
Jacob Sweitzer had by now realized the real situation of things, and swiftly began to correct them. Unlike Tilton, Sweitzer was full of fighting spirit this day. He changed the fronts of the 4th Michigan and the 62nd Pennsylvania to face the coming storm of Wofford, Kershaw, and Semmes, leaving the 32nd Massachusetts to fend off Anderson's men. 

Back near Burbank and Day's men at the eastern stone wall, Caldwell and Ayres had been conferring. As Kelly and Zook's men began to stream out of the woods across the field, one of Ayres's aides remarked to Caldwell, "General, you had better watch out, the line in front is giving way." Caldwell replied however that the troops were only being relieved. After a short pause the aide, still quite worried, finally spoke up again to General Ayres, saying "I don't care what any one says, those troops in the front are running away." This caught the two generals' attention, and finally Caldwell moved off to attend to his men. 

Meanwhile, in the Wheatfield those left were still struggling to hang on. Colonel Harrison Jeffords of the 4th Michigan was one of the many to exhibit tremendous acts of bravery. Before battle the regiment had received a new flag, and Jeffords swore to all that he would protect the flag with his life. Today, in the Wheatfield, the color bearer for some reason dropped the flag. Jeffords, his brother, and another officer charged back for the flag and a hand to hand encounter ensued. In the end, his brother and the officer were shot down, and Jeffords was run through with the bayonet. The first two would survive, but Jeffords would die, his last words being "Mother, mother, mother." 

With most of Sweitzer's brigade now shifted to meet Semmes, Wofford and Kershaw head on, Ayres now directed Burbank to move his regulars into the Wheatfield and wheel to the left to hit Anderson's men. Burbank complied with these orders and began to step off, in order from left to right: 17th US, 11th US, 10th US, 7th US, and the 2nd US. They swiftly moved towards Anderson's men, and could have done some damage if it were not for the fact that by this time Sweitzer's men had given way finally under the pressure. 

With no support now on his right flank, Burbank now also was forced to fly from the Wheatfield. All that stood in the Confederate's way now was Colonel Hannibal Day's brigade of regulars. This time, instead of advancing into the teeth of the Confederate advance like Burbank, Day fell back fighting across the Plum Run Valley. For the first time of the day, the Confederates had swept through the Wheatfield. The Confederates in the Wheatfield must have felt as Colonel E.P. Alexander felt viewing the situation as a whole as he moved his battalion up to the Peach Orchard. "When I saw their line broken & in retreat, I thought the battle was ours…I rode along my guns, urging the men to limber to the front as rapidly as possible, telling them we would 'finish the whole war this afternoon.'" 

Epilogue

As the victorious rebels stormed across the valley General Longstreet was not as happy as most. Looking ahead at the north slope of Little Round Top he could see that the last division of the 5th corps had arrived, and thousands of troops from the 6th corps were arriving every minute. His tired men moved on, but every second the enemy was preparing to counterattack. Finally, General Longstreet made a well thought out decision. The order was passed down the line to retire back into the Wheatfield. 

Some, such as Wofford, were angered by this decision. They saw that victory was in hand, and wanted to continue. But as the order was passed down, the situation was getting much better for the Army of the Potomac. As Longstreet's men retired, Colonel William McCandless's brigade of Pennsylvania reserves were beginning an advance that would check Anderson, Semmes, and Kershaw. North of this advance, General Frank Wheaton was also about to begin his advance to check Wofford. Behind these two brigades, more and more reinforcements were coming up. General Meade had been brilliant all day, and this was one of the culminating moments at Gettysburg. Reinforcements were pouring over the northern slope of Little Round Top and Longstreet had been repulsed. 

The fight in the Wheatfield was finally over. Though the Confederates had seized this area, the Northern troops would hang on to the critical points. The battle on this day was far from over, but for the troops of General Longstreet's command that survived, they could finally take some much-needed rest after a day in hell.

Appendix: Casualties in the Wheatfield 
(Killed, Wounded, and Missing)
Confederates:
Anderson: -------
Kershaw: 630 
Semmes: 430
Wofford: 334 

Union:
Cross: 330
Kelly: 196
Zook: 358
Brooke: 389
De Trobriand: 490
8th NJ (Burling): 47
115th PA (Burling): 24
Tilton: 125
Sweitzer: 427
Day: 382
Burbank: 447

Copyright © 2001 Stephen Light

Footnotes:
[1] The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies (Government Printing Office, Washington DC, 1889), Series I, Volume XXVII, Part 1, p. 115. Note: Hereafter Cited as OR--refers to Series I, Volume XXVII unless otherwise noted. 
[2] OR, Part 1, pp.115-116
[3] John D. Imhof, Gettysburg; Day Two: A Study in Maps (Butternut and Blue, Baltimore, 1999), pp. 3-5 
[4] Ibid., pp.3-5
[5] OR, Part II, p.367 
[6] Imhof, Gettysburg; Day Two: A Study in Maps, pp.1-5
[7] OR, Part I, pp.130-131 (HISTORICUS letter)
[8] Harry W. Pfanz, Gettysburg: The Second Day (University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill NC, 1987), pp.93-97
[9] OR, Part I, pp. 130-131 (HISTORICUS letter)
[10] Pfanz, Gettysburg: The Second Day, pp.93-97
[11] Ibid., pp.83-93
[12] Imhof, Gettysburg; Day two: A Study in Maps, pp. 10-13
[13] Ibid.
[14] Pfanz, Gettysburg: The Second Day, p.268
[15] Edwin B. Coddington, The Gettysburg Campaign: A Study in Command (Simon and Schuster, New York, 1968), p.361
[16] Ibid., pp.363-368
[17] Ibid., pp.373-375
[18] James Longstreet, From Manassas to Appomattox (De Capo Press, New York, 1895), pp.363-365
[19] Lafayette McLaws, Gettysburg, Southern Historical Society Papers, Vol. 7, pp. 64-90 (found online at www.gdg.org)
[20] Ibid., OR, Part II, pp. 367-370
[21] OR, Part I, pp.519-521
[22] Pfanz, Gettysburg: The Second Day, p. 242
[23] Imhof, Gettysburg Day Two: A Study in Maps, pp.69-70
[24] Jay Jorgensen, Anderson Attacks the Wheatfield (Gettysburg Magazine, Issue Number 14, January 1st, 1996, available online at www.gdg.org)
[25] Ibid.
[26] OR, Part I, pp. 522-523
[27] Imhof, Gettysburg Day Two: A Study in Maps, pp. 79-81
[28] Jorgensen, Anderson Attacks the Wheatfield (G.M.)
[29] Imhof, Gettysburg Day Two: A Study in Maps, pp.83-87
[30] Pfanz, Gettysburg: The Second Day, pp.252-253
[31] OR, Part II, pp. 367
[32] Kershaw to Bachelder, March 20th, 1876, Bachelder Papers (Morningside Books, Dayton Ohio, 1995), Vol. I, p.452. Note: Hereafter cited as BP
[33] Ibid.
[34] OR, Part I, pp. 607-608
[35] Pfanz, Gettysburg: The Second Day, pp. 259-262
[36] Winslow to Bachelder, May 17th, 1878, BP, Vol. I, p. 590
[37] OR, Part I, pp. 522-523
[38] Ibid.
[39] Pfanz, Gettysburg: Day Two, p. 266
[40] Ibid., p. 269
[41] Ibid., p. 268
[42] OR, Part I, p. 379
[43] Pfanz, Gettysburg: The Second Day, pp. 268-269
[44] OR, Part I, pp. 381-382
[45] Pfanz, Gettysburg: The Second Day, p. 273
[46] Ibid. pp. 269-270
[47] Imhof, Gettysburg Day Two: A Study in Maps, pp. 119-123
[48] "General Zook's Brigade t Gettysburg", BP, Volume I, p. 417
[49] Pfanz, Gettysburg: The Second Day, p. 277
[50] Ibid., p. 281
[51] Imhof, Gettysburg Day Two: A Study in Maps, pp. 115-116
[52] Notes of a Conversation with Col. Mulholland, BP, p. 420
[53] Kershaw to Bachelder, April 3rd, 1876, BP, p. 470
[54] OR, Part II, pp. 367-370
[55] OR, Part I, p. 379
[56] Imhof, Gettysburg Day Two: A Study in Maps, p. 152-159
[57] OR, Part I, pp. 610-612
[58] OR, Part I, pp. 634-635
[59] OR, Part II, p. 367-370
[60] Pfanz, Gettysburg: The Second Day, p. 291
[61] Imhof, Gettysburg Day Two: A Study in Maps, pp. 149-150
[62] Notes of a Conversation with Col. Mulholland, BP, p. 420
[63] OR, Part II, pp. 367-370
[64] Imhof, Gettysburg Day Two: A Study in Maps, pp. 172-173
[65] OR, Part I, pp. 400-401
[66] OR Part I, pp. 610-612
[67] Pfanz, Gettysburg: The Second Day, p. 298
[68] Ibid., pp. 293-294
[69] OR, Part I, pp. 644-645
[70] E.P. Alexander, Fighting for the Confederacy (Edited by Gary W. Gallagher, University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill NC, 1989), p. 240
[71] Pfanz, Gettysburg: The Second Day, pp. 399-400
[72] Ibid., pp. 396-400
[73] Confederate numbers obtained in OR, part II, pp. 363-364
Union numbers obtained in OR, part I, pp. 175-179

Bibliography:
Harry W. Pfanz, Gettysburg: The Second Day, University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill NC, 1987

John D. Imhof, Gettysburg Day Two: A Study in Maps, Butternut and Blue, Baltimore, 1999

The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume XXVII, Parts I and II, Government Printing Office, Washington DC, 1889

Edwin B. Coddington, The Gettysburg Campaign: A Study in Command, Simon and Schuster, New York NY, 1968

James Longstreet, From Manassas to Appomattox, De Capo Press, New York NY, 1895

Lafayette McLaws, Gettysburg, Southern Historical Society Papers, Volume 7, available online at www.gdg.org

Jay Jorgensen, Anderson Attacks the Wheatfield, Gettysburg Magazine, Issue No. 14, January 1st, 1996, available online at www.gdg.org

Bachelder Papers, Volume I, Morningside Books, Dayton Ohio, 1995

E.P. Alexander, Fighting For the Confederacy, Edited by Gary W. Gallagher, University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill NC, 1989

Copyright © 2001 Stephen Light