A Hill Called White Horse
October 6, 1952 - October 15, 1952
By Anthony J. Sobieski
"The Chinese are all over the f***ing place start shooting at my bunker!"
No other battle during 1952 in the Korean War could match the Battle for White
Horse Mountain, otherwise known as Hill 395, either in voracity or intensity.
This action goes largely unaccounted for in the annals of American military
history from the Korean War. Why? Mainly because it was a battle between the
Republic of Korea (ROK) Army and the CCF (Chinese Communist Forces). The extent
of involvement by United Nations units was regulated to armor units, artillery
battalions, and other support units. The defense of White Horse Mountain was in
the hands of the commander of IX Corps, Lt. Gen. Reuben E. Jenkins. IX Corps
was tipped off about an impending attack in the White Horse area when a Chinese
Officer had surrendered to the ROKs in the area of Observation Post 'Roger',
which was located on Hill 284, a small hill mass on the right of White Horse,
and which overlooked a portion of the Chorwon Valley. The American artillery
Forward Observer, 2nd Lt. Paul Braner of the 213th Field Artillery Battalion
brought the prisoner to the attention of IX Corps after he discovered that the
ROKs were torturing the prisoner not far from his bunker;
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"On Hill 284 we were shelled and mortared regularly, but no one was injured.
There were Chinese assaults on the position, but they did not succeed against
the ROK infantry guarding the hill. I liked the ROKs and ate regularly with
them. The ROK commander liked that and me. One day after an assault the
previous night, I was invited by the ROK CO to pay him a visit to his HQ for
some 'entertainment'. A Chinese officer after the night's action had been
captured. Actually he surrendered because there was supposedly to be a big
assault on White Horse that next night, and he did not want to become a
casualty. I was appalled that they were 'sporting' with him, the bearer of such
valuable information. I immediately went to my OP and encoded a message for the
IX Corps Fire Direction Center. Within the hour a reinforcement team from IX
Corps came to pick him up."
-- Lt Paul Braner
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The players…
UN Forces : By this time during the fighting in Korea,
the war had started to become known as the 'Artillery War' because of the heavy
use of artillery by UN forces to defend the Main Line of Resistance (MLR).
General Jenkins brought in what support he could to be prepared for the
supposed upcoming assault. The 213th Field Artillery Battalion, which was in
position behind White Horse at the time supporting the ROK infantry, became by
default a central player in the defense of the mountain. Realizing that the UN
must hold White Horse at all costs, IX Corps and ROK I Corps artillery units
began to immediately reposition to fire on and support White Horse. The 213th
along with the 955th Field Artillery Battalion fired the 155mm split-trail
'towed' howitzer, which was the most prominent artillery weapon of the war. The
937th Field Artillery Battalion was brought in, they fired the 155mm 'Gun',
commonly known as the 'Long-Tom'. These weapons fired the same shell as the
155mm towed howitzer, but had additional range. The 424th Field Artillery
Battalion was then added, and they provided the 'heavies', the 8-inch howitzer,
perfect for bunker busting, they had range and 'punch'. Additional units from
IX Corps were the 2nd Chemical Mortar Battalion, the 2nd Rocket Field Artillery
Battery, and the 140th Anti-Aircraft Artillery Battalion. The 140th fired a
'quad-.50' weapon, which in essence was four .50 caliber machine-guns linked
together on the back of a truck. These weapons were used to 'sweep' hillsides
with machine-gun fire, a very effective weapon. Three ROK artillery battalions,
the 30th, 51st and 52nd Field Artillery's, were also moved into position. The
ROK battalions fired the 105mm towed howitzer, which was the close-support
weapon of choice in Korea. All of this firepower was there for one reason; to
help the ROK infantry stop the Chinese assault.
Even though this was an artillery war, the brunt of defense was still up to the
infantry to slug it out, trench by trench. By 1952, the ROK Army had started to
show it's transformation from a rag-tag group of inexperienced men who would
'bug-out' when faced with a fight, to a professional force of seasoned
soldiers. The defense of the mountain was a test they could not fail. The 9th
ROK Division's 30th, 29th, and 28th Regiments, roughly 12,000 men, which were
in possession of the strategic hill, where in place and were ready. The 30th
ROK Regiment was positioned directly across the crest of the hill. The 29th and
the attached 51st ROK Regiments were in direct support on the MLR, located on
the backside of the hill, and the 28th ROK Regiment was held in reserve.
Finally, three tank battalions were assigned to cover the underlying valleys on
each side of the mountain. The U.S. 73rd and 140th Tank Battalions, and the ROK
53rd. The American tank battalions were armed with the M46 tank and 90mm gun,
and the 53rd ROK, had the M24 tank and 75mm gun. These tank battalions were
used not only to support the infantry, but also to regularly run up each
valley, raise havoc, and pull back to keep the Chinese on their toes.
The reason why the 213th Field Artillery became the 'lynch pin' for the whole
support unit participation in the battle was due to its position behind White
Horse and the position of its Observation Posts, or 'OPs'. Each artillery
battalion utilized OPs and Forward Observers, they were the eyes and ears of
the battalion, and were the defenders of the infantry. Each Forward Observer,
or 'FO' team, consisted of an officer who was the FO, a reconnaissance
sergeant, and a radio operator. These three man teams served on the front
lines, operated independently, and had direct contact with their respective
battalions behind the MLR. The 213th had two established Observation Posts at
the time of the battle, one nicknamed 'Love' for 'OP Left', which was situated
literally on the forward most point of White Horse Mountain, and had a
commanding view of the entire valley. The second OP was on Hill 284, OP Roger
(for right) to the right of White Horse, and additionally had a third OP with
the French Battalion on Hill 278, which was on the left of the mountain. The
other artillery units also had OPs within the battle area, but none had as
commanding a view of the battle than did the 213th's. Throughout the raging
battle, the 213th's two FO teams on OP's Love and Roger manned the only two
effective OP's in the entire forward zone of action.
Chinese Forces (CCF): The task of taking White Horse
was assigned to the 38th CCF Army. A Chinese Army was roughly equivalent to a
US Corps in Korea. The 38th CCF was a battle hardened army comprised of
divisions who had been fighting for some time in Korea. The Chorwon Valley was
always considered to be a direct route to Seoul, the South Korean capital. The
Chinese plan was simple; to hit hard and drive a wedge into the UN lines, then
punch those lines with even more troops to push on to Seoul and eventually take
the capital. White Horse was the key to the whole plan. Capturing White Horse
meant capturing Seoul in the eyes of the Chinese. This was to be considered an
extremely important move, if the Chinese could capture Seoul, it would send a
message to the UN and South Korea that they (the Chinese) and North Korea were
a force to be reckoned with at the Truce table. The slightest bit of ground
given by either side was used as form of maneuver during the Truce talks, and
the taking of Seoul would be considered a 'feather in the hat' for the
communists. It is important to note that no North Korean forces participated in
this battle , yet it is considered one of the largest single
battles of the entire war. This was a solely Chinese creation and undertaking,
which in hind sight shows the dominance of the Chinese government in supporting
it's bordering North Korean 'neighbors'.
The 38th CCF Army was comprised of the 114th and 113th Divisions with the 112th
Division in reserve. The 114th supplied the brunt of the attacking force with
the 340th and 342nd Regiments, and had the 341st Regiment in reserve. The 113th
Division, comprised of the 337th and 338th Regiments, and the 339th in reserve,
were also part of the attacking force. The entire 112th Division, which was
comprised of the 334th, 335th, and 336th Regiments was held in Army reserve for
the battle, but soon they too were committed in the desperate attempt made by
the CCF. Miscellaneous units rounded out the formation, everything from
infantry to armor to artillery. The Chinese were years behind the US and UN
when it came to using artillery, most of which was outdated Russian weapons
like the 76mm gun. The support weapon of choice by the Chinese was the mortar,
of which they used the 122mm, 81mm, and 61mm versions. Roughly 23,000 infantry
troops, plus 8,000 armor/artillery troops, plus another 10,000 men who served
as ammo and liter bearers, were all gathered for one purpose; to take White
Horse.
White Horse Mountain, Korea
Looking east across the Chorwon Valley towards Whitehorse Mountain in Korea
during the winter of 1952 (Photo by Martin Markley)
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The Stage is Set…
On the evening of October 6th, while the infantry were in place and ready, most
of the support artillery units had finished pre-registering their weapons
(firing and adjusting on coordinates to ensure they were sighted in properly)
and were settling in for evening chow. The first rounds of the Chinese began to
come in, not just on the infantry defending White Horse, but also on the
support units behind the MLR. This continued shelling went on for the entire
length of the fight. The Chinese knew that they needed to knock out the UN
artillery if they wanted any chance of winning the fight. An artillery
battalion officer told a war correspondent the morning after a particularly
heavy shelling the previous night, 'It seemed as if the Chinese had a radio
right in the middle of our firing batteries !' A report of the night
before showed that one of the perimeter guards had spotted what he thought was
a flicker of light on the secondary defensive line a quarter mile behind the
Battalion's area. This area was supposed to be unoccupied, so they sent a
patrol to investigate and found pieces of rice cakes and other Chinese rations.
The crest of White Horse exchanged hands no less than ten times in ten days of
fighting between the ROKs and the Chinese. The valiant efforts of the ROK
infantry and the tremendous fire delivered by the artillery battalions were the
deciding factor in stopping the determined attack on the mountain. At one point
during the first day of the battle, the Chinese overran the 213th Field
Artillery Battalion's OP 'Love', but the FO team held their post, and called in
artillery fire upon their own position.
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"When I called Fire Direction Center, I think I called some stupid fire
mission. I said something like 'The fucking Chinese are all over the place
start shooting at my bunker!' or something like that. It wasn't what you would
call a regulation fire mission. I went back inside the main bunker and by then
the Chinese were all over the place. They came up and threw grenades in and
shot in there, but they couldn't see because it was dark back in there. It was
moonlight out, and we could see them. They rushed us probably four or five
times, and each time they rushed in there they could only get one in through
the doorway at a time, and we were back in there and I was shooting around the
corner with my carbine left handed. You know, you could pull off a lot of
bullets one at a time, and I don't know how many of those Chinese we got
because there was none left alive in the bunker. They would throw a grenade in
and they would rush it, rush in right behind the grenade and we'd shoot back at
them, and they'd get their ass out of there. This was while we were waiting for
the artillery to come in, to get there."
-- Lt Joseph Adams
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The battle begins…
Day 1, October 6th 1952
The outright ferociousness of the fighting started on the first day, and
continued thought out the battle. During one nine hour period on the first day,
Baker Battery of the 213th alone fired over 1500 rounds, averaging 1 round
every 2 minutes per howitzer. The battery consisted of 6 howitzers. The US 36th
Searchlight Company was assigned the task of battlefield illumination. This
would be augmented by planes dropping flares and the artillery battalions
firing 'illumination' missions, which were artillery shells that were larges
flares that were fired and ignited high over the battle area and drifted down
to earth via a parachute. And last but not least, pilots from the 5th Air Force
were assigned to fly suppression missions in the rear marshalling areas of the
Chinese. The US/UN was as serious about keeping White Horse as the Chinese were
at taking it. On the evening of the 6th, as darkness started to settle in, the
two lead attacking battalions of the 342nd CCF, covered by the prepatory
artillery and mortar barrage on the forward slope and crest of White Horse,
moved into position. When they were in position, they began their attack.
Charging up the slopes of White Horse, these battalions were cut to pieces by
small arms fire, napalm, which was rolled down the slopes by the ROK
infantrymen, and the concentrated fire coming from eight artillery battalions.
The Chinese troops fell back under the pressure, regrouping what was left of
the assaulting battalions, which now made up company size units, and again
attempted to take the crest. They were able to make a small dent in the ROK
lines, and even pushed some of the ROK infantry off of the crest. Both sides
suffered greatly on the first day. As quoted in William Russell's book 'Ten
Days at White Horse'; "At the close of the first day's action, some 500 dead
Chinese soldiers littered the forward slopes of White Horse. The ROKs listed
300 killed and wounded. It was a bloody beginning."
Diversionary attacks took place across the IX Corps lines in an attempt to hide
the real prize, White Horse. With heavy prepatory artillery fires, company and
battalion size attacks hit on both sides of the mountain. In the annals of US
Army military history, this is where the Battle of White Horse falls in, as a
footnote to US Army actions surrounding Hill 281 (Arrowhead Ridge) and the
Alligator Jaws, which were to the left of White Horse, and to Hill 391 (Jackson
Heights), which was to the right. It is interesting to note that the 9th ROK
Division sector recorded over 12,000 rounds of artillery hitting their lines on
just this first day of battle, more than for the entire previous month.
Day 2, October 7th 1952
By noon of the second day, the CCF was ready to try again. The remaining troops
of the initial assault force, reinforced with fresh troops, again moved up the
forward slope of the hill. This time they were able to take the forward most
ROK outpost on the hill, held by one company of the 30th ROK Regiment. The
outpost was surrounded and cut off, and the ROKs battled throughout the day to
rescue them. By evening, they were lost. Late in the evening, two ROK
battalions that were in reserve stormed up the hill and drove the Chinese out
of their trenches and back down the slopes of White Horse. Enemy and ROK
casualties were mounting, with some CCF units being reported at only 20% of
their initial strength.
Day 3, October 8th 1952
The diversionary actions on the flanks of White Horse had lost steam by now,
with both sides openly acknowledging that White Horse Mountain was the main
target of the Chinese attack. Early in the morning, the CCF lined up three
battalions, one to replenish those in positions on or near the hill, and two to
assault the hill, this for the 4th time in three days. At one point late in the
day on day three, a ROK lieutenant radioed angrily to the rear after hearing
radio rumors that the ROK infantry had been thrown off the mountain "Who
reports that the enemy has the top of White Horse? We are still here! Send us
grenades and machine gun ammunition. We will remain! " Artillery on
both sides continued to pound each other's positions, with thousands of rounds
being exchanged, not just on the crest and slopes, but also on the supporting
artillery and armor units. The ever popular term 'counter-battery fire' was
given and received by these artillery battalions many times over. Bravery of
another sort was also evident in these units. While the ROK infantry was
battling it out, sometimes in hand-to hand fighting on the hill, the gun crews
would be at their posts, firing their howitzers as enemy artillery shells
rained down on their positions. No one, to a man, left his post for the safety
of a bunker.
Day 4, October 9th 1952
The Chinese made another push for the summit of White Horse early in the
morning of day 4, and were successful in pushing the ROK infantry back down the
rear slopes of the hill. Massive concentrated artillery fire was used to halt
the advance. The ROK infantry regrouped, and bloody hand-to-hand combat ensued.
By mid-day, the 29th ROK Regiment, led by its regimental executive officer,
took the hill and killed all remaining Chinese on the crest. There was
unexpectedly light resistance, but massive CCF artillery fire pushed them back.
The see-saw battle was taking its toll on both sides, but the CCF troops were
taking the worst of it. UN artillery was proving its devastating power in this
fight, and was earning its namesake 'The King of Battle'. As the CCF prepared
to assault the hill yet again, U.S. artillery Forward Observers saw troops
marshalling in an assembly area north of the hill, and a decision was made to
fire a massive 'Time on Target', or 'ToT'. The 2nd Infantry Division Artillery,
or DIVARTY, was contacted and after coordination of eight artillery battalions,
the order was given to "Time on Target, three rounds 155mm, eight rounds 105mm
" with the coordinates of the unsuspecting Chinese. The devastation was massive
and complete, two whole CCF infantry battalions literally ceased to exist. By
the end of the 4th day of fighting, the ROK infantry still controlled the crest
of White Horse.
Day 5, October 10th 1952
By now, the tactics of the CCF were quite evident. The incredulous use of the
Chinese infantry by their commanders in 'human wave' attacks can not be
explained, other than they obviously thought that the onrush of thousands of
screaming infantry sometimes rushing through their own artillery barrages was a
mental and physical sight that would scare the ROKs into retreating. It did
not. It was also by this time suspected that the CCF were supplying their
troops with drugs 'dope' to make them crazed and carefree enough to throw their
lives away in bloody onrushes. Sometimes the overwhelming sea of men did push
the ROKs off of the crest, but they always came back. The see-saw battle went
on.
Continued attempts to flank White Horse were met with murderous tank and
artillery fire, and were stopped. Early on the 10th, the CCF 334th and 342nd
Regiments began yet another assault, which pushed the ROK infantry off the
crest of the hill, only to be themselves pushed off the crest a few hours later
by two battalions of the 29th ROK Regiment. Back and forth the deadly game
continued, troops on both sides sometimes occupying and abandoning the same
positions three and four times, all in the span of one day. UN and CCF
artillery pounded the crest and positions all over White Horse, turning the
mountain into a surreal barren landscape. By now, the battle was described as "a
free for all…with artillery shaking the hill like a volcano ".
Day 6, October 11th 1952
IX Corps decided to attempt to ease the pressure off of the main attack area of
the battle. In the early morning hours of the 11th, companies of the 140th Tank
Battalion and 51st ROK Infantry Regiment moved through friendly lines onto the
plain on the right side of the hill. When they reached about 500 yards into
no-man's-land they opened fire on CCF positions on the forward slopes of White
Horse and other positions northeast of the MLR. As they were doing this,
another company of the 73rd Tank Battalion and a company of the 30th ROK
Infantry Regiment moved forward on the left side of the mountain, past the
French Battalion on Hill 278, and began additional harassing fire on CCF
positions. The Chinese were relentless though, committing another battalion,
made up of remnants of the 335th and 336th CCF Regiments, to the fight on the
crest. Captain James Holton, a U.S. Army PIO reporter (Public Information
Office) who was covering the battle, filed this report on late in the evening
on October 11th "Only moans of wounded and screams of men being knifed and
blasts of occasional grenade(s) can be heard. Friend often grasps nearby figure
to determine if friend. Sometimes ROKs using trick: Yank off headgear of
opponent to feel head and determine if hair shaved. " The casualties
on both sides were steadily mounting.
Day 7, October 12th 1952
On the 7th day of battle, Baker Battery of the 213th Field Artillery Battalion
recorded firing over 300 rounds, which was roughly 50 rounds per artillery
'tube', in one hour during one particular fire mission. Such was the
ferociousness of White Horse. Even after seven days, the CCF leadership refused
to give up the fight, and became more committed than ever to taking White
Horse. Three battalions of the 336th CCF were sent into the fray. To counter
this, the ROKs committed two battalions of the 30th ROK Regiment. By mid
morning, a fierce small arms and machine gun battle was raging, and by the
afternoon the ROKs eventually pushed the CCF approximately 50 yards down the
forward slope of the hill. Both sides dug in, stubbornly holding onto what
positions they had. Artillery from both sides continued to pound the hill and
supporting units behind the MLR.
Day 8, October 13th 1952
Now into the second week of fighting, the sense that the tide was turning was
there. Over the course of the previous night into the early morning, the ROKs
repelled three separate attacks, and then went on the offensive. The 28th ROK
Regiment 'leapfrogged' over the 30th ROK Regiment, who were in control of the
crest and partially of the forward slope, and began to hit the Chinese hard on
the western end of the hill. Because of the repeated repulsing of CCF units on
and around White Horse, they attempted to probe UN lines further to the right,
bordering the 9th ROK and 7th U.S. Infantry Division sectors. In U.S. Army
history, these probing attacks are recorded as separate incidents, but in
reality were part of the bigger battle for White Horse. This also could be
looked at as too little too late by the CCF leadership, having expended most of
their fighting force on the actual Hill 395, having been thwarted repeatedly,
now making a minor effort at an 'end run' flanking movement.
General Jenkins again played a successful deception on the Chinese forces on
the 13th. Using the 64th Tank Battalion and elements of the U.S. 3rd Infantry
Division, he had these units cross into enemy territory on the far right sector
of the 9th ROK Division, bordering the Kumwha Valley area. In broad daylight,
with the same intent as used previously, these units shot up the enemy
positions around them and caused the CCF to hold reinforcements and artillery
off of White Horse in case the UN pushed a further advance. The deception
worked, the CCF was fooled completely.
By the end of the 8th day of battle, there were over 8,400 enemy dead counted
on the slopes of White Horse Mountain and surrounding area.
Day 9, October 14th 1952
The ROKs continued their push, this time on the right side of the hill, and
into the morning of the 14th elements of the 29th ROK Regiment overran two
platoons of Chinese troops that were on the northern slopes. The Chinese,
desperately not wanting to give up any ground, committed reinforcements of the
335th and 336th CCF Regiments. By the afternoon, the 3rd Battalion of the 29th
ROK Regiment was added to the mix, and that combined with heavy direct fire
from tanks on the east side of the hill stemmed the rush. The Chinese still
held some ground on White Horse, and were in a decisive moment, to either
continue to commit their men to a slaughter, or to give up the hopeless fight
and prepare for another day. The CCF units were still full of fight, but with
some companies with as little as 15-20 available men, these groups almost were
ceasing to exist as fighting units. The ROKs, themselves also hard pressed with
battle weary men, decided to dig in at 'Objective A' which was a line north of
the crest of the mountain.
Day 10, October 15th 1952
This day held the last, final act of this horrible play. At dawn, units of the
112th CCF Division, which had replaced the 114th CCF Division, got into a
bitter hand to hand struggle with the ROKs holding Objective A. By mid-morning,
it was over and the ROKs had completely held onto their positions. Sensing
victory, the 29th ROK Regiment was ordered to sweep the entire hill, and forced
all remaining Chinese to withdraw down the forward slopes of White Horse and
back across the MLR. The battle had ended…
Epilogue
Today, in Seoul Korea, in the National War Museum, there is a bronze statue
called 'The Ten Human Bombs'. This bronze monument is of ten ROK infantrymen
who are considered the heroes of White Horse. Their company at one point was
being forced off of the top of White Horse, and these ten men rallied the men
around them and literally dove into the face of the enemy to save the crest and
their unit. The importance that South Korea places on and gives the Battle of
White Horse Mountain cannot be overlooked. It is considered one of the greatest
achievements by the ROK Army during the whole war, and in truth, it was, not
only for them, but for the UN. The 9th ROK Division was renamed after the
battle, and forever after was, and is, known as the White Horse Division.
The Chinese paid dearly for the attempt on White Horse. Total CCF dead and
wounded was estimated at 9,500 men, roughly 1/3 of the entire attacking force.
Many of these casualties were troops that did not even make it to the slopes of
White Horse, they were killed by overwhelming artillery fire and tank fire
before they could begin their assaults. ROK losses were considerably lighter,
which can partially be attributed to battle hardening of troops, training, and
experience. The ROKs reported over 3,300 casualties, of which 500 were listed
as killed in action. U.S. and ROK artillery and tank fire played an extremely
important part in the defense of the hill. Firepower was certainly on the side
of the UN, while troop strength was the key to CCF success. When the UN
firepower and experience went head to head with brunt Chinese force, the UN
came out on top. There were eight artillery battalions firing for the UN. Each
averaged 15,000 to 20,000 rounds fired in ten days. One battalion, the 213th
fired over 26,000 rounds. All of this amounted to over 150,000 rounds of
artillery being fired by the UN. The Chinese launched 28 separate attacks and
counter-attacks to take Hill 395, all of which eventually met with failure. The
Chinese would need to look for another route to Seoul.
Reference
FIRE MISSION! The Story of the 213th Field Artillery Battalion in
Korea
By Anthony J. Sobieski
TEN DAYS AT WHITE HORSE
By William Russell
Special After Action Report, Hill 395 (White Horse Mountain) 6-15 October 1952.
APO 264: HQ, IX Corps, 1952. ca 80 p. + maps. #04-9.1952.
Copyright © 2005 Anthony J. Sobieski
Written by Anthony J. Sobieski. If you have questions or comments on this article,
please contact Anthony J. Sobieski at:
raven299@verizon.net.
About the author:
Anthony Sobieski is a Department of Defense employee and US Air Forcereservist. He is a recognized
Korean War historian and author, havingpublished three books on the subject; FIRE MISSION! (2003),
FIRE FOREFFECT! (2005), and A Hill Called White Horse (2009). A 1998 graduate ofthe Phoenix Raven
certification course, Anthony is the 299th certifiedRaven in the U.S. Air Force.
Published online: 07/04/2005.
* Views expressed by contributors are their own and do not necessarily represent
those of MHO. |
