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Sir
Richard Grenville and the Last Fight of the Revenge, 1591
by John
Barratt
Background
Just after 5pm on August 30th 1591, off the island of Flores in
the Azores, the opening shots were fired in one of the epic “last
stands” of military history. The ferocious twelve -hour battle
between Queen Elizabeth Ist’s finest warship, Revenge, captained
by Sir Richard Grenville, and a massive Spanish fleet including
King Phillip’s latest and most powerful warships, immediately
aroused a controversy which has echoed down the centuries. Were
Sir Richard’s ship and crew victims of a gross blunder or a
suicidal and insane bid for glory by Grenville, or was the true
story of the last fight of the Revenge rather different?
England’s defeat of the Armada in the summer of 1588 did not end
the war. Nor did it permanently turn the course of the fighting in
England’s favour. The “Counter-Armada” of 1589, aimed at the
capture of Spanish-held Lisbon, proved a costly failure which
further discredited the already somewhat tarnished reputation of
Sir Francis Drake. And, by later in the same year, Spanish naval
strength had largely recovered from the losses suffered in the
Armada expedition.
Already stretched by the demands of continuing war at sea, English
resources were further drained by support sent to the French
Protestant forces under Henry of Navarre. This left little to
spare to mount further large-scale offensive operations. Instead
growing attention was focussed on a strategy put forward by the
architect of Elizabeth’s new navy, Sir John Hawkins. Sir John
proposed that the approaches to the Spanish coast be dominated by
a squadron consisting of roughly six of the Queen’s warships and a
similar number of privately-financed vessels, with support ships.
This squadron would do as much damage as possible to Spanish
merchant trade, but its main objective would be to strike at the
great treasure fleets, vital to the Spanish economy, which each
year brought home the bullion from the mines of America. The loss
of even one of these flottas would strike a devastating blow at
King Philip’s ability to continue the war, and enrich the Queen
and her financial backers.
Hawkins intended that squadrons should be relieved every four
months, so maintaining a permanent blockade, but there were never
in practice sufficient resources available to make this possible.
There were often gaps of several months between squadrons, of
which the Spaniards took full advantage.
In a refinement of the original strategy, in addition to the
squadron based off the Azores, a second force would operate nearer
to the Spanish coast, both to provide another opportunity of
intercepting any flotta which escaped the Azores detachment, and
also to give warning of any activity by the increasingly
formidable fleet based in Spanish ports. One result of this
expansion of effort was a tendency to employ more large armed
merchant ships in the English squadrons.
The operations planned for the summer of 1591 were intended to
follow this pattern. Previous squadrons, whilst doing some damage
to Spanish seaborne trade, had failed in their main objective of
intercepting a treasure flotta. Nevertheless, Spanish movements
had been severely disrupted. The 1590 flotta had taken refuge for
the winter in the Cuban port of Havana, so the summer of 1591
offered the dazzling prospect of a treasure fleet double its
normal size.
The squadron intended to operate off the coast of Spain consisted
mainly of privateers, commanded by George, Earl of Cumberland. But
the main responsibility for intercepting the flotta would rest
with the Azores Squadron. Details of its composition in 1591 vary,
but the core of the squadron consisted of six of the Queen’s
warships, backed by a fluctuating number of privateers, pinnaces
(scouting vessels), and victuallers. The squadron was financed by
Queen Elizabeth herself, and other backers included Sir Walter
Raleigh, and the naval commander-in-chief, Lord Howard of
Effingham.
Command of the squadron was given to a kinsman of Effingham, Lord
Thomas Howard, 30-year-old son of the Duke of Norfolk. Howard has
been heavily criticised for his role in ensuing events, to the
point of suggestions of cowardice. But, although he had relatively
little sea-going experience, Howard had been knighted for his
gallantry during the Armada campaign, and there is nothing to
suggest that he lacked at least adequate competence.
It had originally been planned that Raleigh should sail as
second-in-command, or “Vice-Admiral” of the squadron, but at the
last minute he was replaced by a kinsman, Sir Richard Grenville.
Copyright 2001 by
John Barratt.
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