Cromwell's Wars at Sea
by John Barratt

List Price: $39.23  Hardback: 224 Pages
Publisher: Pen and Sword
Publish Date: January 2007 






Book Review
by Brian Grafton

For most casual students of history, the period between the execution of Charles I in 1649 and the restoration of Charles II in 1660 is seen simply as the "Interregnum", an aberration in the normal control and exercise of English life. England had always been a monarchy, and would continue to be a monarchy. The Commonwealth, Cromwell, and the rest were simply an error which was quickly corrected.

John Barratt's Cromwell's Wars at Sea, a tightly written and delightfully concise volume, puts paid to such casual views. It does so without being ponderous, partisan or tendentious, and leaves the reader with a very different sense of the reality and impact of England's only commonwealth. By looking at the structure, manning and activities of England's navy in Cromwell's time – the State's Navy, as it was known – Mr Barratt provides a lucid and amazingly comprehensive view of the challenges the Commonwealth faced, the concerns it had to deal with, and the means by which – even though the Commonwealth itself would fail in 11 short years – England's status was both recognized and increased during nine hard years of battle at sea.

Within England, the Commonwealth was not representative of a single governing entity. A host of factions – presbyterians, independents, levellers, moderates, and semi-royalists – had drawn together in an uneasy truce to establish England's Commonwealth. This was not a united movement: it was a disjointed group of movements whose only links were centred on the removal of kingly authority and the establishment of a parliament which represented the diversity and sovereignty of the English citizen. Between the execution of Charles I and the restoration of Charles II, England was ruled in succession by a parliamentary "Rump", an Army Protectorate under Cromwell, a brief hereditary protectorate under Cromwell's son Richard, the return of the Rump parliament, a further time under Army control, and – finally – through a decision to introduce a "Free" parliament, a restoration of the crown in the name of Charles II. Politically, England between 1649 and 1660 was anything but a stable commonwealth.

Abroad, the new Commonwealth was not on good terms with its neighbours. The Scots were enraged that the English, in executing Charles II, had executed the Scottish monarch with the same sweep of the axe. The Irish were, in theory, still pro-Royalist. Either country could provide a platform from which forces wishing to destroy the Commonwealth could launch military campaigns. This the Commonwealth knew well.

In Europe, traditional monarchies such as Spain, France and Sweden were deeply mistrustful of any nation which would commit regicide. The Dutch United Provinces were warmer towards the Commonwealth, largely through shared religious leanings, but nevertheless provided the young Charles Stuart a safe harbour, and would soon recognize him as Charles II. Mr Barratt sums up the European attitude succinctly: "exhausted by the recently concluded Thirty Years' War, no European power was anxious to embroil itself in conflict with [the] Commonwealth, but they also saw it in their interests for England to remain weak and divided." For the Commonwealth, this was not promising.

All this information Mr Barratt delineates in ten short pages: they are the background against which the story of the State's Navy unfolds. He adds a twenty-page synopsis of changes made by the Commonwealth to the structure and administration of the navy. A significant number of naval ships had remained loyal to the Royalist cause, and had absented themselves from English shores as parliamentary forces gained the ascendancy. New structures of command and control were introduced to better secure the loyalty of the remaining ships to the Commonwealth cause.

These are the foundations upon which Mr Barratt unfolds his tale. And he presents the information so clearly that his narrative carries the reader through a series of naval actions ranging from intense battles off England's coast to confrontations as far-flung as the Mediterranean, the Canary Islands, the Caribbean and the coast of North America.

In effect, Mr Barratt's story line is simple. The Commonwealth required three things from its navy in order to support and protect itself:

1. Control over and/or destruction of Royalist forces in the environs of England and adjacent waters, including those ships sailing under letters of marque as privateers. Royalists still held the Scillies, the Isle of Man and the Channel Islands. While these bases existed they constituted a threat to Commonwealth trade wishing to use Western Approaches to unload in the Channel ports or in London.

2. Support from, or at least acceptance of the new English status quo by, the small, struggling English colonies in the New World, which remained under Royalist control. While the colonies were in no way a military threat, they could become vulnerable, particularly from Spain. England could not afford to lose its foothold in the New World.

3. Economic stability through trade and commerce, a requirement which would place Commonwealth England on a collision course with the Dutch United Provinces. Though it is often forgotten, at the time Dutch commercial activity outstripped that of England, and Dutch ships and sailors were fine indeed.

An additional concern – the position the Commonwealth should take against England's traditional enemies, France and Spain – was also at issue. Mr Barratt's volume looks at each of these issues in turn, providing a clear narrative of how the State's Navy acted in each area of concern.

I have no wish to retell Mr Barratt's story. I want merely to set the stage for his fine explanation of the State's Navy's wars, which began in May, 1649 – a mere five months after the execution of Charles I – with Blake's blockade of Kinsale in southern Ireland, and went on relatively uninterruptedly until April, 1657, with Blake's defeat of a Spanish squadron in the battle of Santa Cruz.

What makes Mr Barratt's volume so compelling? It isn't merely the skill with which he provides a narrative, though that is impressive in itself. It also has to do with the insights he provides, while telling his story, into naval warfare during the 1650s.

For instance, he offers remarks on the changing nature of ships of war during this period. As the first Dutch War approached, the Dutch – widely expected to triumph over England in any naval engagement – used fast, lightly gunned ships; their tactics were to close the enemy rapidly and subdue him using boarding parties. English ships were somewhat larger and carried a much greater number of guns firing a much heavier weight of iron. The Dutch, were unimpressed by the additional guns carried by the English ships. In their eyes, the extra cannons had not proven themselves effective during the battle with the Armada some sixty years ago. The English drew exactly the opposite conclusions. They felt their ships had performed well against the much larger Armada, and were prepared to build on the result of that assessment. After the first few confrontations with the Commonwealth, the Dutch explored the need to build new ships of war (modelled on English ships), but for a variety of reasons the exploration went nowhere.

Mr Barratt also discusses the question of crewing, from ship's boy to Admiral. The first point he makes – and this surprised me – is that neither the Dutch nor the English navy had what we might recognize as a professional “officer class”. The Dutch approach to boarding led to a relatively large number of soldiers sailing on each ship: if rapid boarding is the aim, then soldiers make sense as the “assault element” once the ships are locked together. The Dutch, therefore, drew their naval leaders from a pool of respected and capable captains of their commercial fleet, who had often had to repel attacks from corsairs, privateers, and ships of hostile nations. For the Commonwealth, the loyalty of many of their naval officers was suspect. The answer was to transplant many of their army generals to naval duty, with the argument that artillery on land is not all that different than artillery at sea. To a large extent, that proved to be true.

There was also the difficulty in providing seamen for the ships at sea. Both nations suffered from this to some extent, though the higher pay scales of the Dutch fleet made the need for “pressing” men negligible, which was not the case in the Commonwealth navy. For both navies, however, finding bodies to man the ships was an ongoing challenge. In England, this led to new Articles of War and – more important – greater attention to such questions as schedules of payment, the rating of sailors by their skills, and an attempt to meet other long-standing grievances.

In addition, Mr Barratt also raises issues about maritime naval structure, and provides a window into the 18th century in doing so. In attempting to benefit from their clear weight in guns, the Commonwealth navy began exploring new means of bringing their guns to bear with greater effect. This led, inevitably, to new administrative structures within a fleet, and to new requirements and conduct during an engagement. The Dutch, with less firepower in their ships and with a continuing belief in rapid boarding, were doomed to the defensive at best, and to losing any naval battle at worst. The Dutch maintained a much larger percentage of Army troops aboard their vessels than did the English. They learned, to their regret, that much of a battle at sea is a naval battle. And although the Commonwealth too assigned soldiers to ships of the State's Navy, they appeared to learn very quickly that naval engagements were, by-and-large, no place for land-soldiers. For whatever reason – and the chance of booty, usually in the form of “prize money”, played large with sailors – the Commonwealth found that naval actions were better left to sailors, rather than any army supernumeries who might be aboard.

Many of these issues are, of course, background information which any military historian must provide for any topic in hand. Mr Barratt has, in other words, simply done his job. It is the skill with which has done so which is impressive. His subject is, after all, the sea wars of the Commonwealth, and he maintains his focus on the battles themselves, giving details of decisive fleet actions of various kinds: fleet-to-fleet; blockade; amphibious; diplomatic. All the background information is provided without breaking the reader's focus on the battles themselves.

I also appreciate Mr Barratt's ability to capture the intellect, honour and weaknesses of the great admirals he presents on either side of the many conflicts he discusses. The names are, I believe, at best only faintly familiar: Blake, Vane, With, Tromp, Rupert, Ruyter, Lawson, Montague, Monck and many others are paraded before the reader as tactics develop, political factions gain or lose ascendance, or questions of loyalty or capabilities are asked. Each of these leaders, to various degrees, is depicted for his capabilities and failings as a leader and strategist. They are, Mr. Barratt suggests, no different from battle leaders of today, concerned for their men, their equipment and the honour of their cause, while also trying to gauge the abilities and intentions of their superiors and – of course – the components under their control.

At the same time, particularly when discussing the English "Generals at Sea", we are reminded subtly of the theocratic basis of the Commonwealth – a strict, personal Christianity so strongly felt that the land and sea wars of the Commonwealth were deemed to be not England's wars, but God's. As an example, I was particularly struck by two parts of a dispatch from Robert Blake to the Navy Commissioners after the Battle of Dungeness, which Mr Barratt inserts using little more than a quarter of a page. The first says simply "I presume your Honours' longing for an account of what hath passed between us and the Dutch fleet and I hope you have hearts prepared to receive evil as well as good from the hands of God." [Italics mine.] The second part of the dispatch touches Blake's request for release from his post, "so that I may spend the remainder of my days in private retirement and prayers for a blessing on you and the Nation." I agree with Mr Barratt that the second quotation contains an element of calculation on Blake's part. Nevertheless, the two quotations together remind us that God was deemed to play a large and immediate role in determining the success of Cromwell's regime. The insertion of this quotation shines light on the forces which drove the Commonwealth, and serves to centre the reader once more on the fact that this is a 17th-century conflict based on 17th-century values. I would be hard-pressed to believe that this quarter-page inclusion is accidental: Mr Barratt is returning us to the 1650s.

In Cromwell's Wars at Sea Mr Barratt demonstrates considerable skill in making military history work. By providing a political, social and intellectual structure at the beginning of his book, he creates an environment in which the specifics of his study – the actions of the State's Navy – are understandable and clear.

Mr Barratt's writing skills are considerable. For the most part, his presentation is based on what appears to be simple narrative style. But there are nuances and sophistries that appear from time to time, which add an edge to his writings, though I'm not certain I should say this is always his intention. In general, the fluency and subtlety of his chronicle and his argument offer any reader an extremely lucid, sensible and intellectually acceptable interpretation of Cromwell's Navy.

Are there problems with the volume? Of course! Some may be the author's issues, though I believe most are issues with the publishers. For instance, while the publication offers a glossary of largely nautical terms – a good idea, in my estimation – there are one or two terms which were missed. If the glossary provides an explanation of a "demi-culverin", why would there be no mention of "sakers", which are specifically noted in the text? My SOED tells me a "saker" is a gun (almost obsolescent by the time Mr Barratt is covering) which is slightly smaller than a "demi-culverin", which is, thankfully, covered in the glossary. A small issue, I admit, but frustrating for a reader who is not comfortable with weapons which some may understand quite readily, but which are no longer in general use.

I'm also bothered by the lack of maps, though Mr Barratt's volume has a fair number. There are maps of the Scillies, maps of at least one Channel Island (Jersey), and maps of Santa Cruz. But there are no maps detailing English waters. I have heard of such landmarks as Portland Bill, I will admit. I have heard of the Downs, I will admit. Both play prominently in Cromwell's Wars at Sea. But I'm not able to place them precisely: England is not my island.

Mr Barratt does offer a description of the location of the Downs: "The Downs were the broad anchorage off the English coast near Deal, enclosed by the Kentish coast to the west and the treacherous Goodwin Sands to the east. At their northern end the Downs were entered from the North Sea or the Thames Estuary via the Gull Channel, and in the south from the English Channel close to the South Foreland." I will admit that this simply sends me to an atlas which I pray will note the Gull Channel or the South Foreland. If not, I am, figuratively and literally, at sea.

The mapping issue is magnified when certain battles are described by what I can only conceive of as "local" markers. Dungeness, Kentish Knock, Portland and Gibbard Shoal come to mind. There are diagrams for each of these actions, but no means of relating them to England, the continent, or – for all I know, from a visual point of view – South America.

The minor weaknesses of the glossary, the personally irritating lack of maps, and one or two proofing errors aside, I must say that I am very impressed by John Barratt's volume. He gives the State's Navy a life, strength and purpose which has, I believe, been largely lost to casual historians. Before the execution of Charles I, England's navy existed largely at the whim of the king. As of 1649, the navy became a formal arm of the Commonwealth's military, and would play a major role in establishing and maintaining English presence at sea. With the death of Cromwell in 1658, the Commonwealth began to disintegrate, with power shifting from Cromwell's son Richard to a restored Rump parliament to the overthrow of the Rump by a rigid faction of the Army under a Committee of Safety. Through most of this, the State's Navy remained uncommitted to any faction. In the end, however, John Lawson's squadron of the State's Navy blockaded the Thames in support of a return to parliamentary rule. This action, together with the threat of former General-at-Sea George Monck, now commanding the army in Scotland, broke the will of the Committee of Safety, leading to the possibility of the restoration of the monarchy.

Copyright © 2007 Brian Grafton.

Written by Brian Grafton. If you have questions or comments on this article, please contact Brian Grafton at: bg@briangrafton.com.

Published online: 03/11/2007.

* Views expressed by contributors are their own and do not necessarily represent those of MHO.