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Six Frigates: The Epic History of the Founding of the U.S. Navy


Six Frigates: The Epic History of the Founding of the U.S. Navy
by Ian W. Toll

List Price: $27.95 
Hardcover: 560 pages
ISBN: 0393058476
Publisher: W. W. Norton
Publish Date: October 2, 2006



A review by Caleb John Klingler

In the wake of the American Revolution, an infant nation seeks to make a name for itself upon the world stage. But the United States lacks a navy sufficient to defend itself, let alone venture beyond its own waters. Politicians must decide whether to protect America itself by building a strong but costly navy or relying on permanent and less costly fixed fortifications that will leave America secure on land but vulnerable on the high seas. Ian Toll’s[1] epic narrative, Six Frigates, shows how America solved the navy dilemma.

In his introduction, Toll argues that if America wished to emerge as a naval power, it would face major obstacles: Toll tells the story of how one nation challenged English supremacy of the seas, while others stayed in their ports out of fear of the Union Jack. The book begins with the waning days of the George Washington administration as the political debate raged over whether a navy was necessary for defense of the nation; how big would it need to be, whether its purpose would be principally coastal defense or the projection of active force around the world, and how much treasure will the government be willing to spend on a such navy. Thomas Jefferson and the Republicans opposed the formation of a navy or at least wished to see at most a small one, restricted to defending the coastal areas. The Republicans feared having a navy might compromise American neutrality by involving the nation in a European conflict. The Republicans feared: “The proposed navy, was merely a pretext to raise taxes and hire, “a host of revenue officers” (33).[2] On the other hand, the Federalist Party favored a large navy that could contend with the European powers and force them to respect America’s right to exist: “If America was serious about asserting its maritime rights and protecting its hard-won independence, “we must endeavor, as soon as possible, to have a navy” (33) The Federalist pushed for ratification of the constitution that included for the creation of a navy.[3]

Toll stressed that, after American independence, the security of oversees commercial activity became an issue. As American merchant fleets sailed their goods around the world, the lack of a navy made them easy prey for nations that resented competition where they had once held monopolies, such as the East India Company which previously had no rival in the Chinese trade-market (21). The Federalists maintained that a powerful navy was needed to deter such threats. Through an eventual compromise, both Federalists and Republicans agreed that a navy showed be limited to six heavy frigates, and hence the title of the book under review.[4]

The uniqueness of the six frigates lay in their very construction. The American Navy department named Joshua Humphreys to design and build the ships. He crafted a single standard model for the ships designs, this allowed the ships the same look and feel: “In proposing very heavy frigates—frigates with keels, frames, and scantlings akin to those of a 74-gun ship—Humphreys was essentially proposing to build a hybrid between the frigates and battleships of the Royal Navy” (50).[5] Surprisingly, no other nation, including England, had a standardized design for their navies. The location of each frigate was in a different location, in order to promote diversity of governmental spending and avoid the awarding monopolies of government contracts.

Toll maintains that, while the American Navy was young and untested, Humphreys’ design in fact made the frigates more than a match for ships of the same caliber.

Throughout, Toll illustrates the significant roles the frigates played in each crisis that America faced. He divides the book into three main sections, each leading up to an important climax. The first section, “To Provide and Maintain,” traces the story of the six frigates up to the Quasi War with France (1798–1800), an undeclared conflict over attacks by French privateers on American merchant vessels.[6] The conflict reached its climatic conclusion when shots exchanged in January 1800, when the American frigate Constellation engaged the French frigate L’Insurgente (119). After a short engagement, the French ship L’Insurgente struck the colors and the battle ended in a clear victory for the Constellation against a formidable and apparently similarly armed opponent. The Constellation carried forty-four 24-lb. cannons and the L’Insurgente carried thirty-six 12-pounders; at the time of the battle neither side knew the types of cannons present (115).

In the second part of the book, “To the Shores of Tripoli,” Toll recounts America’s first direct recourse to using armed conflict to solve an international crisis. The Tripoli War broke out in 1804 over the capture of the USS Philadelphia by the Barbary Pirates of Tripoli.[7] The pirates demanded ransom in return for the captured crewmen. President Jefferson initially refused to pay and authorized open hostilities against the Barbary Pirates, mounting a naval blockade and funding a partially successful coup d’état (232). But, the war finally came to an end with a ransom being paid. No other nation had ever challenged the Barbary Pirates in open war, since it was cheaper to pay the pirates tribute than to finance a naval expedition to secure commerce in the Mediterranean.

The Americans’ successes during the Quasi War and the Tripoli War underscored the value of the six frigates. But despite these successes, the political debate over the maintenance of the navy continued to rage at home. The Republicans claimed the cost of maintaining the frigates was too high and sought ways to shrink the Navy budget by building up costal defenses and relying on small gunboats.

In the book’s next section, “England Again,” Toll describes the never ending cycle of American naval draw-down and build-up, as the focus turns back towards problems with Great Britain. America handled its first major crisis with relative ease, “Letters from the Mediterranean [Preble’s fleet] left no doubt that Preble’s [actions against the Barbary pirates] vigorous prosecution of the war had made its mark (257). With the Mediterranean Sea secured through a treaty, America now faced an all too familiar threat; it would have to contend with Britain if its navy was going to win respect among the great powers. The war with Tripoli, which many Jeffersonians had opposed to begin with, had been very expensive and the government was seeking to trim the military budget. The gunboat, which had proved itself in the fight against Tripoli,[8] would both save money and appeal to small-navy preference of Jeffersonian Republicans.

Before the War of 1812 was an issue between America and Britain, the raison d’être of American navy had changed drastically. America was turning away from staking a claim to a significant political position in the world toward the protectionist stance of defending North American own ports; the gunboat fleet seemed suited to this goal both budgetary and operationally. In June 1807, the U.S.S. Chesapeake (original frigate) came under fire from the 52-gun, HMS Leopard, over the issue of English seamen jumping ship[9] to enter service aboard American merchant vessels (295). The HMS Leopard demanded to search the Chesapeake for run away British sailors. The Chesapeake refused the Leopard’s demand and as a show of force the Leopard fired. The ensuing engagement caught the captain of the Chesapeake by surprise and, after a short battle, the Chesapeake surrendered (295). After the engagement the Leopard found three British deserters (298).

The outbreak of the War of 1812, left both-sides at a crossroads were negotiating a peaceful settlement was beyond reach. America, for the first time as an established nation, was going to confront the world’s strongest naval power. Despite the sizable difference between the respective navies the Britain’s navy contained the clear advantage with dozens of warships, where as the American frigates were able to go head-to-head with the British in single combat; proving Toll’s thesis. On 22 June 1812, the 36-gun U.S.S. President engaged the 42-gun HMS Belvidera (335). After a battle that lasted into the waning darkness, no clear winner could be declared. The Belvidera escaped into the night. The President suffered heavy damage, but was not forced back into port for repairs (337).

On 19 August 1812, the U.S.S. Constitution engaged the British 44-gun frigate Guerrière (347). The Constitution used the “Weather Gauge”[10] to maneuver into attack Guerriére and deliver a devastating broadside that knocked out its mizzenmast; a few more broadsides forced the Guerrière to surrender with heavy casualties (349–354). Toll describes many other examples of the American frigates battling British vessels with similar success. As the American ships won numerous victory’s they still were unable to overcome the vast numbers of British vessels; this forced the America fleet to seek safe in their harbors for the remainder of the war.

Toll’s use of the American frigate engagements with the enemy helps him to achieve his thesis; the American naval tradition was small and under-strengthen for its time, but proved affective in single combat. The American naval tradition is not what we perceive of it today, a world-class power that can sail to parts around the world on a whim. However, the American frigate experiment was a stab at the unknown that faced many daunting challenges; from Congress’s oversight that demanded a smaller naval budget in accordance to the Constitution, or tackling Pirates in the Mediterranean.

Toll shows exactly how a small, newly independent nation was able to scrape together a fleet of standard-designed ships, were the equal of vessels from of any other nation of comparable size. In Six Frigates, he writes not only for academics; his brisk narrative style will appeal to a wider audience of students and non-specialists. This engaging book offers an innovative analysis of the American naval experience.

Footnotes

[1]. According to the book jacket Ian Toll’s experiences include working as a Wall Street analyst, a Federal Reserve financial analyst, and a political aide and speechwriter. Six Frigates is his first published book.

[2]. William Maclay, a concerned Republican.

[3]. Alexander Hamilton’s Federalist Papers number 24.

[4]. The 44-gun USS Constitution, USS United States, and the USS President; the 36-gun USS Congress, USS Chesapeake, and USS Constellation.

[5]. His standardization model achieved the six ships based on either 44- or 36-gun configurations, as well allowed for the ships to utilize a heavier haul for more protect as compared to other frigate of the era.

[6]. Privateers differ from pirates in that a single nation grants them permission, in letters of marque and reprisal, legally to seize enemy ships. The U.S. Constitution provided Congress the ability to grant letters of marque (Article 1, Section 8).

[7]. So named from the Barbary Coast of North Africa (present-day Tunisia, Libya, and Algeria).

[8]. The gunboats made many raids on Tripoli because of the shallow depth of the harbor made it naturally difficult to navigate. The American Frigate, the U.S.S. Philadelphia ran aground in Tripoli’s bay and precipitated the conflict.

[9]. In the British navy, seamen were forced into service called impressment, while in the American navy service was voluntary and became preferred over service in the British navy.

[10]. A naval tactic in which a ship maneuvered into a position using the advantage of the wind.



Copyright ©2008 Caleb John Klingler.

Published online: 04/26/2008.

* Views expressed by contributors are their own and do not necessarily represent those of MHO.

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