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The Vietnam War
1961 - 1973
Member Article: The "Green Beret Affair": A Brief Introduction
by Bob Seals
By the year 1969 United States involvement in South Vietnam was in its fourth
year with no end in sight. Major U.S. ground combat forces, to include elite
paratroops and marines, had been first committed in country during the spring
of 1965. The fighting had increased in scale and intensity until by 1969 U.S.
military strength stood at 536,000 on the ground. The Navy's 7th Fleet in the
Tonkin Gulf, and Air Force strategic bombers flying from bases on Guam and
Thailand providing major sea and air support for US forces on the ground. The
South East Asia Treaty Organization nations of Australia, New Zealand, South
Korea, Thailand and the Philippines would provide yet another 62,000 allied
troops fighting against the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Communist forces.[1]
Member Article: Paradoxical Trinity: WWII and Vietnam
by Walter S. Zapotoczny
According to Carl von Clausewitz, the nineteenth century military philosopher,
war is always comprised of what he called a paradoxical trinity. In his book On
War, Clausewitz described this trinity as an interactive set of three
basic dominant tendencies that drive the events of war. He said the trinity is
composed of: "primordial violence, hatred, and hostility; its element of
subordination as an instrument of policy; and the play of chance and
probability within which the creative spirit is free to roam." Each of these
tendencies generally, but not exclusively, corresponds to one of three groups
in society. The first of these three tendencies correspond mainly to the
people; the second to the government; the third to the commander and his army. another.
Member Article: The Cambodian
Incursion: A Hard Line for Change
by Major Jeremiah S. Boenisch
On 1 May 1970, United States and South Vietnamese units launched a ground and
air offensive into neutral Cambodia to eliminate North Vietnamese sanctuaries
used for frequent raids into South Vietnam. Dubbed the Cambodian Incursion by
President Nixon, the U.S. ground operation took place over a 60-day period from
1 May to 29 June and was overlapped by Allied air strikes and a 75 day South
Vietnamese incursion.[1] By combining the efforts of the South Vietnamese,
devastating air power, and army ground forces, the Allied Forces overwhelmed
enemy positions and supply points resulting in thousands of enemy killed and an
unprecedented recovery of enemy materiel. Although the incursion is sometimes
portrayed as a strategic failure, it was not. This paper will illustrate that
the campaign, though unpopular, was actually the key event necessary for
severing the enemy's lines of communications and logistics in Cambodia, aiding
the successful withdrawal program, saving U.S. credibility, and showing the
success of Vietnamization.
Member Article: Dien Bien Phu: A
Battle Assessment
by David Pennington
Jules Roy described Dien Bien Phu as the "setting in which the West had
suffered one of the greatest disasters in its history."[1] An assessment of the
Battle of Dien Bien Phu reveals that the French had no clear objective, ignored
conventional theories of warfare, over relied on air power, and underestimated
the abilities of their adversary. An objective investigation of the events at
Dien Bien Phu from November 1953 to May 1954 reveals that for as much as the
French did wrong, the Vietminh did right. When French Premier Rene Mayer
selected General Henri Navarre to become the commander in chief of French
forces in Indochina, he instructed him to create a military scenario in
Indochina that would bring about a satisfactory political conclusion to
hostilities there.[2] Navarre surveyed the situation in Indochina and concluded
the greatest threat to achieving his given objective was in Tonkin; the Navarre
Plan was the result. Navarre wanted to bring the "life and vigor" back to the
French Expeditionary Corps while at the same time assuming an offensive posture
to disrupt Vietminh forces and prevent their consolidation for a collective
offensive.[3]
Member Article: "A Time of
Testing": The Battle for Hue
by Larry Parker
During the battle of Stalingrad the legions of the Nationalist Socialist German
Workers Party (NSDAP) engaged the military might of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics (USSR) in a brutal struggle to the death. The encounter
began as a military versus military conflict along conventional lines. Due to
the extreme nature of the ideologies involved and since neither collateral
damage, public accountability, a free press nor world opinion were an issue to
either Hitler or Stalin, the battle rapidly degenerated into a vicious war of
attrition – a test of political will and national resources. Stalingrad became
an enormous slaughterhouse, devouring men and machines on a scale not seen
since Verdun. In the end the resilience of the Russian soldier and the vast
resources of the Soviet State prevailed against the professionalism of the
German soldaten and the tactical superiority of the Wehrmacht.
Twenty-five years later and 5000 miles to the Southeast, a similar battle was
fought in the ancient city of Hue. Now the forces of communism were pitted
against the forces of democracy[1] in one of the major confrontations of the
Cold War. For twenty-six bloody days, American and Army of the Republic of
Vietnam (ARVN) troops waged a fierce house-to-house struggle against North
Vietnamese Army (NVA) soldiers and National Liberation Front / Viet Cong (NLF /
VC) irregular forces for control of Hue.
Member Article: "Peace" in a Very Small Place: Dien Bien Phu 50
Years Later
by Bob Seals
Stepping out of the small Vietnam Airlines aircraft on a June day in 1999,
we found ourselves on the sweltering airfield tarmac. We were in an enormous
valley, completely surrounded by towering, wooded hills hundreds of meters in
height to the north, south, east and west. The lazy Nam Yum River wound like a
snake, making turns through the low ground. Laos was eight kilometers due
west. We were, of course, in the small North Vietnamese village of Dien Bien
Phu, site of one of the most decisive battles of the 20th century, perhaps of
all time.[1] Dien Bien Phu was the greatest Airborne battle ever fought, a decisive event of
the Cold War with international communism, a disaster that inevitably led to the
demise of a colonial empire and to subsequent United States involvement in
Southeast Asia. It is a battle relatively unknown to most Americans, including
many professional Army Officers. The siege of the French Union garrison of Dien
Bien Phu during the First Indochina War was an epic 56-day blood-letting that
became one of the great turning points in history, a battle that as one French
Foreign Legionnaire remarked "was an occasion for military heroism on a grand
scale."[2] One might add that it was also an opportunity for military
miscalculation on a grand scale, a potent mixture of unquestionable heroism and
stupidity that has fascinated me for years.
Member Article: The Wild Weasels "Daredevils of the skies"
by Mike Nastasi
During the early days of the Vietnam War, the United States Air Force had
almost full autonomy over the skies of Vietnam. However, once the Soviet Union
and China began arming the North Vietnamese Army (NVA), with advanced Surface
to Air missile (SAM) systems, the U.S. domination of the skies was abrubtly
challenged. To deal with the new SAM threat, the U.S. Air Force decided to
dedicate men and machine exclusively to the SAM's. Thus a new breed of aviator
and aircraft were born, the "Wild Weasels." The purpose of the "Weasels" was to
seek out and engage NVA SAM sites, and if possible destroy them. Often times
though, the only way the Weasel pilots could locate a SAM site was by getting
the NVA to fire a SAM at them, thus revealing their position. Tantamount to a
suicide mission, the Weasel missions were amongst the most dangerous sorties of
the war. Losses in the Weasel squadrons were among the highest of the war. In
the early stages of the Weasel development, the aircraft and its avionics were
not ideally suited for this new and dangerous mission. However as the war
progressed, the U.S. Air Force developed a dedicated Weasel aircraft, the
Republic F-105G Thunderchief. The "Thud" as it is affectionately known to the
pilots who flew it, is recognized as the workhorse of the Vietnam War. The men
who flew the F-105 love the airplane and from all accounts the aircraft
performed superbly throughout the war.
Read
more...
Member
Article: The Role of Airpower in the Vietnam War
by Mike Nastasi
The use of air power in the Vietnam War would change the way wars were fought
for the Twentieth century and beyond. New technological advances and more
sophisticated weapons made the Vietnam War a testing ground for the U.S.
military. New tactics and approaches were used and to varying degrees of
success. Air power would be used as a bargaining tool and as punishment for
North Vietnamese acts of aggression. Vietnam also introduced the attack
helicopter as a vital weapon and it dawned a new age of tactics for the U.S.
military. Starting with the training and advising of the South Vietnamese Air
Force (VNAF), and culminating with the Christmas bombing of 1972, the U.S.
would be involved in the skies over Vietnam for over 15 years. Consistent with
U.S. military as well as political objectives the air war in Vietnam gradually
increased and built up throughout the campaign. Air components of all four
military services were utilized. Jet bombers and fighters were used extensively
for the first time in the history of modern warfare. There are many differences
of opinion regarding the effectiveness of the air campaign during the Vietnam
War, with many historians arguing that the air war was too costly in lives and
money. Proponents of the air campaign say that it dawned a new age in warfare
and actually helped bring the war to a close. The air campaign was not without
cost however. The North Vietnamese, with the help of the former Soviet Union,
had developed an extensive air defense network, and the United States suffered
heavy helicopter, plane and pilot losses throughout the campaign.
Read more...
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