The Battle Tannenberg, 1914
by Birrion Sondahl
The Battle of Tannenberg was the first major battle in World War I on the
eastern front. It pitted the forces of Russia against those of Germany. The
major battle was preceded by a much more minor affair at Gumbinnen which had a
great influence upon the course of the campaign. The Gumbinnen encounter led
into the actual Battle of Tannenberg where the German Eighth Army encircled the
Russian Second Army. The result of the battle was near total annihilation of
the Russian forces. There were many factors which played a part in the German
victory. These included logistics, intelligence, terrain, and communication
among others. Overall the Battle of Tannenberg was one of the only battles of
maneuver conducted in a war which is remembered for its static positions. The
German victory at Tannenberg allowed for the war to continue when an early
Russian victory could perhaps have knocked Germany out of the war.
The start of World War I on the eastern front found Germany in a precarious
position. The majority of her troops had been sent to the western front and
committed to the offensive there as outlined by the Schlieffen plan. This left
the eastern front ill prepared to defend against a Russian assault. The reason
why Germany took such a risk was because the German high command had not
expected the Russians to be capable of mobilizing in less than six weeks. The
Russians gained an advantage in surprise by sending the first of their troops
into East Prussia a mere eight days after the start of the war. The speed of
this mobilization was primarily achieved due to the Russian's neglect of
logistical preparations. [1] The result of this speedy mobilization was that
Germany was threatened with a two front war with only a token force stationed
on the eastern front.
The Russian forces which were being deployed upon the eastern front were under
the command of Generals Samsonov and Rennenkampf. These two men have often been
portrayed as bitter rivals [2] but this has been shown to be pure myth. [3]
Each of these two Russian armies consisted of around 400,000 men. General
Rennenkampf was in control of the Russian First Army and had been ordered to
advance to the west and engage any German forces encountered. The Second Army
under the control of General Samsonov was to “swing around south of the
Masurian Lakes region into the rear of the engaged German force.” [4] The goal
of these maneuvers was a double envelopment of the German forces on a strategic
scale. The German army was to be caught between the Vistula, Masurian Lakes,
and the Russian forces. The Russians hoped for a decisive victory which would
clear the way to Berlin and an early end to the war.
Facing this Russian force, the Germans had a force numbering about 210,000 men.
[5] These men formed the German Eighth Army and were under the command of
General Prittwitz. This force had been deployed with the Vistula at its back.
Upon learning of the early Russian mobilization, Prittwitz favored a retreat
behind the Vistula but this plan of action was vetoed by the German High
Command. As a retreat was out of the question, Prittwitz chose to follow a plan
offered to him by his chief of staff, Colonel Max Hoffman. This plan called for
the Eighth Army to concentrate a surprise attack against the Russian First Army
in the vicinity of Gumbinnen. The expectation was that the Russians could be
lured into an ambush upon the River Angerapp.
While it is true that the Russians had a significant numerical advantage, the
Germans were much more experienced and well supplied. Colonel Lawrence G. Karch
describes this material advantage in the following statement, “Each active
German division contained 12 batteries of light artillery (twice as many as a
Russian division), backed by 6 batteries of howitzers. Each active German corps
had an attached battalion of heavy howitzers. Further, such impressive
firepower was supported by an efficient logistics system fed by Germany's
highly developed rail network.” [6] The Germans had also received much better
prewar training than the Russians received. Karch describes the state of the
Russian army in stark contrast to the Germans, “The entire [Russian] army was
short a million modern rifles and a billion cartridges. There were not enough
uniforms or boots. While Russia had 60 batteries of heavy artillery, Germany
had 381.” [7] Due to their hasty mobilization, the Russians also lacked medical
supplies and field bakeries. [8] This meant that the smaller German force was
better prepared for a battle than the Russians.
In addition to these significant shortages, the Russian forces were also
lacking in aerial reconnaissance forces. Although Russia had a large air arm,
this force had been employed primarily on the Austrian front. In contrast to
this, the Germans were able to deploy a significant force of reconnaissance
airplanes on the eastern front. Armstrong describes the German airforce on the
eastern front as consisting of the following, “Forty aircraft belonging to
Feldflieger Abteilungen (field flying sections) 14, 15 and 17 and
Festungs-Fleiger Abteilungen (fortress flying sections) 4, 5, 6 and 7 were at
the Eighth Army's disposal.” [9] These aerial forces were to play a great part
in discerning the intents of the Russian armies. They had already been used to
determine that the Russians were approaching Gumbinnen.
The Battles of Stalluponen and Gumbinnen
In spite of the German's superior intelligence and logistics, the Gumbinnen
operation did not go at all as had been originally planned by Colonel Hoffman.
This was greatly due to the actions of the corps commander Major General
Hermann von Francois. Acting without orders, Francois decided to take his corps
into Stalluponen where one of the Russian divisions was resting. Stalluponen
was a small town twenty five miles to the east of Gumbinnen. Although the
attack upon it was successful in capturing 3,000 prisoners, it tipped off the
Russians as to the German's plan to attack Gumbinnen. The bulk of the Russian
losses were suffered by the 105th Regiment. After the attack, the remnants of
the Russian force fell back from Stalluponen in disarray to the east. With the
new knowledge that the Germans were in the Gumbinnen area in force, General
Rennenkampf now chose to halt his forces and reconsider his advance.
Upon learning of Francois' attack, General Prittwitz immediately ordered him to
withdraw to Gumbinnen. Francois replied insubordinately, “Report to General
Prittwitz that General Francois will break off the engagement when he has
defeated the Russians.” [10] The Stalluponen skirmish continued throughout the
evening. Francois only broke off the engagement when his left became exposed to
Russian fire. It was only then that he followed his orders to return to the
Gumbinnen region.
The next day, August 19, the fighting was renewed. This time it was in the
Gumbinnen area and marked the start of what is now known as the Battle of
Gumbinnen. This battle began when a group of Russian cavalry came into contact
with a regiment of German landswehr a short distance outside the town. Shortly
after contact, the Russian cavalry dismounted and brought forward their
artillery. With the addition of this extra firepower, they were able to drive
the German force back. However in this effort, the Russians suffered around 400
casualties and expended the greater part of their ammunition supplies. [11]
Overnight, Francois' corps began a long march in order to contact the enemy.
His force of the I Corps had now been supplemented by the 1st Calvary Division.
Armstrong describes the march in the following manner, "The German 2nd Infantry
Division moved through the Zulkiner Forest, while the cavalry rode toward
Pillkallen. In so doing, they swung clear of the Russian flank and entered the
gap left by the retiring Russian cavalry." [12] In the early hours of the
morning, they came into contact with a Russian force made up of the 28th
Division. As Karch describes, "Russian artillery initially put up a spirited
defense, but when their ammunition ran low (an early Russian logistics
casualty), the Germans prevailed." [13] The battle lasted well into the
daylight hours. The Russian situation was only saved through a repositioning of
the 29th Division which filled the gap left by the battered 28th Division. The
German left flank now became a stale mate with neither side having an
advantage.
The situation in the center was markedly different. Here the Germans had been
forced to march all the way from the Angerapp and therefore they arrived much
later in the day than Francois' corps had done. In the center, General von
Mackensen's XVII Corps advanced against General Rennenkampf's III Corps.
General von Mackensen was supported by two other corps. The Russians had been
forewarned by Francois' earlier attack and were much better prepared for
Rennenkampf and those forces supporting him. At first the German attack went
well, but the Russian enclosed the flanks and two German corps were broken
under heavy artillery fire. The Germans suffered additional casualties when
"the German batteries of the 2nd Division mistakenly but effectively fired on
their own infantry." [14] These forces retreated back to the west towards
Konigsberg.
Rennenkampf chose not to pursue the defeated German forces. He did not even
send reconnaissance forces to keep track of the rapid German retreat. The
Russian cavalry could have kept up with the retreating Germans, but they were
not deployed in this capacity. The main reason for this was because Rennenkampf
still considered the German I Corps under Francois to be a threat. It had been
checked but not defeated. The center and Russian left had been cleared, but
Rennenkampf was always cautious as long as Francois remained in place on his
right, he did not believe his position secure enough to risk a pursuit.
The situation was different at German headquarters. As Karch writes, "The
uncharacteristic sight of defeated German soldiers streaming mob-like to the
rear really unnerved Prittwitz." [15] Prittwitz now believed that the entire
eastern front was lost and the only hope was a retreat to hold the line at the
Vistula. This is what he had originally planned and the defeat at Gumbinnen
only reinforced his belief that this was the only feasible plan. Prittwitz
proceeded to phone Moltke and inform him of this. Moltke was horrified by this
information and it did not take him long to decide that Prittwitz was not fit
to command the Eighth Army. On August 22, Moltke appointed Major General Erich
Ludendorff as chief of staff of the Eighth Army and General Paul von
Beneckendorff und von Hindenburg as commander of the Eighth Army. It was in
response to Moltke's telegraph asking him to come out of retirement that
Hindenburg sent the famous reply, "Am Ready." [16] These two men were now moved
to the eastern front as quickly as possible to assume their new
responsibilities.
Meanwhile, the German intelligence forces had been doing their work. After the
Battle of Gumbinnen concluded on August 20, a note had been found upon a dead
Russian officer. This note contained the greater part of the Russian plans for
the campaign. As Hindenburg recalled, "It told us that Rennenkampf's Army was
to pass the Masurian Lakes on the north and advance against the
Insterburg-Angerburg line. It was to attack the German forces presumed to be
behind the Angerapp while the Narew Army was to cross the Lotzen-Ortelsburg
line to take the Germans in flank." [17] In addition to the discovery of this
note, the German intelligence forces had also been monitoring Russian radio
communications. One of the first radio messages which was intercepted and
decrypted was Rennenkampf's order to not pursue the defeated German forces.
This was one of the last Russian radio transmissions which was sent in code. As
Armstrong describes, "Less than a month's campaigning had indicated to the
Russians that coded orders were often useless." [18] The reason for this was
due to a lack of trained telegraph operators. The Russians now began
transmitting their messages without encoding and the Germans benefitted from
intercepting these messages.
Battle Preparations
On August 21, the day after the Battle of Gumbinnen, the Russian forces
remained in their positions. In spite of repulsing the Germans the previous
day, Rennenkampf believed that they would renew their assault upon the Russian
positions. It is clear that at this point he did not truly understand that he
had gained a victory over the German forces. The Russian cavalry spent the day
searching for signs of the Germans. Finally that night, Rennenkampf decided
that the Germans had indeed fallen back and he once again prepared to resume
his cautious advance.
Prittwitz was now preparing for a full scale retreat to the Vistula while his
replacement was still on the way. However, his mind was changed through the
persuasive efforts of his chief of operations, Colonel Hoffman. Karch describes
Colonel Hoffman as "arguably the best strategist during the entire war." [19]
His actions in August on the eastern front would do much towards gaining this
reputation. In order to convince Prittwitz to halt the retreat, Hoffman
reminded his commander that any retreat to the Vistula would be threatened by
the Russian Second Army under Samsonov. Any such retreat would leave the Eighth
Army in an even more precarious position than the defeat at Gumbinnen had
already left it. Hoffman believed that a more sound strategy would be to
concentrate upon Samsonov who would not suspect an attack. As Karch describes,
"Prittwitz accepted Hoffmann's advice, but then incredibly failed to inform
Moltke of these changes of plans!" [20] Acting upon intelligence from the air
reconnaissance forces and intercepted Russian radio messages, Prittwitz now
began to move the Eighth Army to attack the Russian Second Army.
When Hindenburg and Ludendorff arrived on August 23, the Eight Army was still
preparing for this attack. Colonel Hoffman had effectively taken over command
from Prittwitz and was assigning tasks for the attack. Both Hindenburg and
Ludendorff approved of Hoffman's plans and allowed the redeployment to go along
as scheduled. This redeployment was a major process as Francois' I Corps, which
had not suffered as greatly as the other forces at Gumbinnen, would be moved
from the German left all the way to form a new right flank. This was done by
rail and took a total of two days. Karch describes the rest of the
dispositions, "The rightmost German corps at Gumbinnen redeployed by another
set of trades to become the new German center at Tannenberg. Finally, the two
German corps that broke and ran at Gumbinnen forced marched and reorganized en
route to become the new Eighth Army left flank. Only a single German cavalry
division was left to screen Rennenkampfs quiescent First Army." [21] The German
center, the X Corps, was the weakest numerically. Hindenburg describes it as
"thin, not weak." [22] The two wings were quite strong as the goal in the
upcoming assault was to recreate Cannae on a strategic scale. The center was
meant to bend but not break while the two wings would encircle Samsonov's army
completely.
General Samsonov's army had been making slow progress since the start of the
war. Armstrong describes their march as a "struggle" which only covered fifteen
miles a day. [23] This slow rate of progress was quite unsatisfactory to
General Zhilinsky, who continually encouraged Samsonov to pick up the pace. He
finally detached the I Corps from the First Army and sent it to the south to
join with the Second Army. His goal was to take pressure off the First Army by
strengthening the Second. The German reconnaissance took note of this movement.
After the Battle of Gumbinnen, General Rennenkampf now became the slower of the
two Russian armies as he advanced towards Konigsberg. Between August 23 and 25,
the First Army only advanced a total of twenty miles. [24]
August 25, 1914, was an important day for the German intelligence service. It
was on this day that two radio messages were intercepted which helped to
reinforce the German plans. Armstrong describes these two messages, "The first
message indicated that Rennenkampf was not an immediate threat. Samsonov's
message was somewhat garbled, but the Germans deduced from both messages that
neither Russian army was aware of impending danger and that Samsonov and
Rennenkampf were tending to diverge rather than converge their forces." [25]
The first message had been the operational orders for the IV Corps while the
second was orders for the XIII Corps. Having a nearly complete knowledge of
where the enemy was would be of great help to the German forces. Once it became
clear that Rennenkampf was marching very slowly upon Konigsberg and not
converging with Samsonov, the Germans understood that they now had an
opportunity to isolate and destroy Samsonov's army. As Hindenburg recalled, "In
any case we must now have not the slightest hesitation in leaving but a thin
screen against Rennenkampf's mighty force." [26] The attack would involve as
many troops as the Germans could muster. This new intelligence made it clear
that Rennenkampf would take at the very least four days to reach Samsonov.
Both Hindenburg and Ludendorff understood that it was of vital importance to
begin the attack immediately. The entire Eighth Army was now ordered to attack
the following day, August 26. This attack was completely unexpected by General
Samsonov who believed "he was facing a single corps instead of a five-corps
army poised to strike a mortal blow." [27] With this in mind, Samsonov was also
preparing an attack of his own. His attack was directed in the vicinity of
Soldau and to the north and northwest where he believed the German flank to be.
The Battle of Tannenberg
As August 26 dawned, the German Eight Army and the Russian Second Army were
both advancing to attack each other. The difference between the two advances
was that the Germans knew the location of the enemy while the Russians, relying
upon their cavalry for reconnaissance, had only the vaguest of ideas as to the
position of the Germans. The Eighth Army was now poised for a double
envelopmentt. It only remained to be seen if they would be able to carry it out
according to the plan.
The main German attack was to be carried out by the I Corps under Francois. And
as had happened earlier in the campaign, Francois once again showed his ability
for independent action and his defiance of his superiors. He had been ordered
to attack and envelop Samsonov's left flank with assistance from the XX Corps.
Their main opposition would be the Russian XIII and XV Corps. Francois' force
was concentrated against Soldau and he was ordered by Ludendorff to begin his
attack at dawn. Due to the slow march of his artillery support, Francois did
not cooperate with orders and only attacked halfheartedly. As Armstrong
describes, "after 3 p.m. he refused to send his troops farther ahead until all
his guns had arrived." [28] The attack had only just started and it had already
deviated from plan due to Francois' refusal to continue until his artillery
arrived. Valuable time was being lost.
The German flanking maneuver upon the Russian left went much better than
Francois' attack. Here General Mackensen's X Corps and General Below's I
Reserve Corps were able to concentrate upon a single Russian corps with great
success. General Mackensen concentrated his corps against the Russian 4th
Division, which could not handle the weight of the German attack. The fighting
lasted throughout the day, but the Germans had the advantage in each stage. The
Russian artillery had faltered early leaving their infantry open to assault.
Armstrong describes Mackensen's attacks as occuring in a "series of quick
rushes." [29] From these attacks, it is clear that Mackensen understood the
importance of speed in maneuver warfare. By the end of the day, his tactics had
greatly contributed it to the rout of the Russian VI Corps. This force retired
from the field to the south in the direction of Ortelsburg.
In the center, the Russians were on the offensive. It was here that the Germans
were weakest, but the plan only required that they hold against the Russian
assault. This was a difficult task as a significant number of Samsonov's forces
had been concentrated for the assault. The Germans were slowly pushed back
throughout the day, but they did not break. Thus at the end of the day the
situation in the center was little changed. This was also true of Russian left
flank where Francois had not pressed his attack. The Russian right was fast
beginning to deteriorate. The retreat of the Russian VI Corps left the XV and
XIII Corps both without protection upon their left flanks.
During the fighting on the 26th, the Germans had intercepted another important
Russian radio message. This message was sent to Rennenkampf and informed the
Germans that the Russian II Corps was being repositioned to the south to aid
Samsonov. The Germans quickly sent orders to the 1st Cavalry Division to
intercept the Russians and at all costs prevent them from coming to the rescue
of Samsonov's army. In spite of the success of the day, Ludendorff was still
quite concerned. This was due to the knowledge that the Rennenkampf was sending
reinforcements. He believed that this force could turn the German flank and
rather than the Russian Second Army being caught in a massive double
envelopment it would be the German Eighth Army. The delay of Francois had been
key for this left a great portion of Samsonov's force still intact. Dubeski
states that "Ludendorff started to panic and lose his nerve, thinking of the
size of the gamble." [30] This may have been stated too broadly, but it is
clear that at this point Ludendorff had grave doubts about the possibility of
success in the battle. Hindenburg mirrored these doubts, and would later
describe his thoughts at the time, "How would the situation develop if these
mighty movements and the enemy's superiority in numbers delayed the decision
for days? Is it surprising that misgivings filled many a heart, that firm
resolution began to yield to vacillation, and that doubts crept in where a
clear vision had hitherto prevailed? Would it not be wiser to strengthen our
line facing Rennenkampf again and be content with half-measures against
Samsonof? Was it not better to abandon the idea of destroying the Narew Army in
order to ensure ourselves against destruction?" [31] The commanders of the
Eighth Army were in doubt as to what would be the next best step in their
campaign.
It was now that Colonel Hoffman once more stepped to the forefront of events.
Dubeski describes Hoffman's actions, "He said that he knew a secret that would
turn the battle in their favor. He told them an anecdote from his experiences
as an observer in the Russian-Japanese War of 1904-1905. Hoffmann said he knew
that the Germans could concentrate their forces against one Russian army and
then the other because the Russian generals hated each other and would not come
to each other's aid." [32] This was a completely false anecdote, yet it served
to encourage Hindenburg and Ludendorff. It was indeed enough that, as
Hindenburg recalls, "We overcame the inward crisis, adhered to our original
intention, and turned in full strength to effect its realization by attack. So
the order was issued for our right wing to advance straight on Neidenburg, and
the left enveloping wing 'to take up its position at 4. a.m. and intervene with
the greatest energy.'" [33] The crisis of the battle had been overcome greatly
through the efforts of Colonel Hoffman and the battle would continue the
following day according to plan.
The fighting renewed at daylight on August 27. Francois' artillery had now
arrived was in position to support a renewed advance. As Armstrong describes,
"At dawn, 28 field and eight heavy batteries crushed the opposition near Usdau,
and then the I Corps infantry overran the Russian positions." [34] In many ways
these tactics were similar to those carried out by Mackensen the previous day.
The greater part of the Russian right had now been defeated and fell back
towards Soldau. However, one brigade did launch a successful counter attack at
Heinrichsdorf which did much to check Francois' pursuit. Despite this check,
Francois continued with a pursuit to the south and southeast. His original plan
had been to proceed to Neidenburg but this changed due to an intercepted
Russian radio message. This message referred to the possibility of Russian
reinforcement by the 3rd Guards Division from Warsaw. [35] Francois did not
wish to engage fresh Russian troops and therefore limited his pursuit.
Meanwhile, the Russians were attempting their own envelopment maneuver against
the German XX Corps and 3rd Reserve Corps. The main part of this attack was
carried out by the Russian XV Corps. This assault was launched at daylight on
August 27th. As the XX Corps was fresh, it was able to handle itself throughout
the day without breaking. Once again, the Germans benefited from being warned
in advance of the Russian movements by radio intercepts. With knowledge of the
intent of the Russians, the Germans were able to counter their moves and make
sure that the line held strong. However, in spite of this knowledge, the German
center was still very hard pressed by the Russian assault . General Samsonov
was dedicated to achieving a breakthrough and had concentrated as many troops
as he could against the German center. As Dubeski writes, "The German centre
suffered considerable disarray in the severe fighting." [36] Several battalions
broke and fled, but as a whole the center once more simply gave ground rather
than breaking. This continual push forward placed Samsonov's troops deeper into
the trap in accordance with the German plan.
Throughout the day, much more reassuring news had reached Hindenburg and
Ludendorff. The night before they had been reinforced by Hoffman's tale, but
now they had concrete intelligence material. As Hindenburg recalls, "Moreover,
we learned that it was only in the imagination of an airman that Rennenkampf
was marching in our rear. The cold truth was that he was slowly pressing on to
Konigsberg. Did he, or would he, not see that Samsonof's right flank was
already threatened with utter ruin and that the danger to his left wing also
was increasing from hour to hour?" [37] Once again the Germans could act in
confidence without expecting the entire of Rennenkampf's force to fall upon
their flank and rear. The situation had become much clearer throughout the
fighting on August 27th and the two German commanders now agreed that the
encirclement of the entire Russian Second Army was within reach. That evening
they dictated the orders which would complete this encirclement.
The fighting continued on August 28. General Samsonov had now moved to the
front and taken personal charge of the XV Corps. Once again, his orders were
intercepted by the Germans. Armstrong describes the contents of these
intercepted messages in the following statement, "more intercepted radiograms
from the Russian XIII Corps disclosed that it was marching from Allenstein
southward to Hohenstein and that its vanguard would arrive in Grislienen, five
kilometers north of Hohenstein, at noon." [38] As a result of this knowledge,
the German I Reserve Corps was directed upon Stabigotten-Grislienen. This would
place them in the rear of the Russian XIII Corps. This would prevent the
Russian XV Corps from receiving any reinforcements. The German I Reserve Corps
engaged the Russian XIII Corps at Grislienen where a battle raged throughout
the day with neither side breaking. General Samsonov remained with the Russian
XV Corps, which was now heavily pressured in the vicinity of Waplitz. The fate
of the Russians was now becoming clear to Samsonov, who seemed to place his
only hope in fighting his way out with the Russian XV Corps. As Armstrong
relates, "when Samsonov arrived [at Waplitz], [he] embraced the XV Corps
commander and told him, in a melancholy tone of voice that inspired little
confidence, 'You alone will save us.'" [39] Both Russian flanks were now in
full scale retreat and were being rolled up by the German forces. Only the
center could truly be considered to remain intact as night fell.
The morning of August 29th found the Germans in an excellent position. As
Hindenburg recalls, "The ring round thousands and thousands of Russians began
to close. Even in this desperate situation there was plenty of Russian heroism
in the cause of the Tsar, heroism which saved the honour of arms but could no
longer save the battle." [40] Karch also gives a description of this day's
events, "Francois opened up with another great artillery barrage that shattered
the remainder of the Russian left flank. This permitted his corps to block the
route of retreat of the entire second Army. In the center, two Russian corps
continued to fight well, but their situation deteriorated rapidly caught in the
crushing jaws of an enormous double envelopment."[41] The Russian forces under
Samsonov were all but completely encircled by the Eighth Army. Those which had
not yet been defeated openly in battle were concentrated in the
Neidenburg-Willenberg-Passenheim area. Throughout the day, defeated Russians
had been surrendering in large numbers. Hindenburg himself had received the
surrender of two Russian corps commanders at Osterode. [42] By the end of the
day, the prisoners numbered in the thousands. The Prussian center had bent but
not broken and now time was running out for Samsonov. If he did not manage to
fight his way out with the XV Corps soon, he too would be forced to surrender.
Meanwhile, to the north, Rennenkampf remained oblivious to his comrade's
predicament. His orders of the night of the 29th and the morning of the 30th
have been described by Armstrong as follows, "one such message indicated that
during the Russian II Corps' countermarch, which had been ordered for the
second time, the soldiers were to demolish all railroads and telegraph wires
west of the Konigsberg-Rastenburg line, including those at Korschen and
Tastenburg." [43] Others of his orders mentioned that he was planning a great
encirclement of Konigsberg, where he believed the primary German force to be
located. Once again, Russian reconnaissance and intelligence forces had proved
inadequate. When the Germans intercepted these messages, it was quite clear
that Rennenkampf would not be arriving on their flank. Hindenburg and
Ludendorff were once again reassured that their flanks remained secure and
returned to concentrating upon the task at hand – the annihilation of
Samsonov's army.
There was one more hope for the remnants of Samsonov's force. This came from
the reinforcements which were marching from Myszaniec. As Hindenburg described,
"On August 30th the enemy concentrated fresh troops in the south and east and
attempted to break our encircling ring from without." [44] As the Germans were
now formed roughly in a ring around the Russian center, these reinforcements
arrived in the German rear. Hindenburg and Ludendorff did not have many forces
which were not already engaged in the destruction of the remaining Russian
forces within their encirclement. Therefore they were only able to send the
weak reserves of Francois and Mackensen's corps to counter the Russian
reinforcements. However, these Russian forces had become strung out across
twenty-three miles in their advance and therefore "the attempt to mitigate the
catastrophe to Samsonof came to naught." [45] When this relief attempt was
repulsed, there was no hope left to Samsonov's forces.
Scattered Russian forces continued to resist throughout August 31st. It was
only, as Armstrong describes, on the evening of August 31st that, "Zhilinsky
finally judged the battle to be lost." [46] He now ordered those Russian troops
which were not surrounded to retreat to the east. This included Rennenkampf,
who during the entire period of the battle had achieved absolutely nothing. His
cavalry had made a tentative approach to the German positions, but naught had
come of this. The battle was now over. Armstrong describes the outcome, "the
Russian Second Army had lost an estimated 30,000 troops killed, and the Germans
claimed to have taken a total of 92,000 prisoners and 300 guns." [47] Keegan
and Strachan gives the same number of prisoners, but place the casualties
higher at 50,000 killed and wounded. [48] German casualty estimates vary, Blair
gives them as 10-15,000 men. [49] Michael Duffy gives the total as "fewer than
20,000 casualties" and claims that "in addition to prisoners captured over 500
guns." [50] He also notes that it required sixty transport trains to bring the
bounty of the victory back to Germany. The German victory over Samsonov's army
was complete. Two entire corps had been destroyed and the rest had been
severely beaten. Of the total of 150,000 men who were encircled, perhaps only
10,000 reached safety.
This great victory gained its name from Ludendorff. As Armstrong writes,
"Ludendorff chose to name after the nearby town of Tannenberg, 'in memory of
that other battle long ago [in 1410] in which the Teutonic Knights succumbed to
the united Lithuanian and Polish hosts.'" [51] The battle now went into history
as the Battle of Tannenberg. The events of the battle were quite straight
forward. The reason for the victory is more difficult to determine.
Reasons for Victory
There are a number of factors which contributed to the German victory at
Tannenberg. One of these primary factors was the lack of Russian logistical
support. As Karch writes, "Soon after hostilities started, many Russian
artillery batteries were limited to firing no more than four rounds per day
due, in part, to a lack of transport for munitions." [52] This lack of
ammunition resulted in a lack of sustained firepower capability. In this age
before tanks, artillery was very important to successful operations. As Colonel
S.L.A. Marshall noted about the second world war, "And yet, until the day of
final surrender, the far purpose of all movement in war is the upbuilding of
one's own fire power [italics added] and position at the expense of the enemy's
power and position." [53] He continues, "The familiar words of Napoleon: 'It is
on supply that war is made,' simply underscores the fact that primarily war is
made with fire, and that logistics have a decisive effect upon the arena only
when they enable military forces to bring a superior fire to bear." [54] The
first of these statements shows how important fire power is to victory in
battle. The second shows how important logistics is to upholding fire power.
Throughout the battle of Tannenberg the Russians were lacking in both
logistical support and fire power capability. They had the artillery available,
as can seen in the number of guns captured by the Germans, but they did not
have the munitions to be able to put this artillery to good use. It should also
be noted that the Russians were lacking in ammunition for their rifles as well.
Turning once again to Karch, "The entire army was short a million modern rifles
and a billion cartridges." [55] He refers to the entire Russian army, not
simply those involved in Tannenberg, but nevertheless it is clear that there
were many supply shortcomings in the Russian armys at Tannenberg. The Germans
did not suffer from similar shortfalls. Their only lack of firepower came due
to the slowness of transporting their artillery. This was almost critical on
August 26th, when Francois refused to press the attack until his artillery had
arrived. As Armstrong describes, "The main strike would be launched in the area
of Soldau by I Corps, but its commander, Francois, balked at Ludendorff's
orders to attack at dawn on the 26th. One-quarter of his field guns, his heavy
guns and his artillery supply columns had not yet arrived, and his losses at
Gumbinnen had taught him the folly of attacking with inadequate artillery
support." [56] At Gumbinnen, the Germans had indeed been defeated due to lack
of artillery. At Tannenberg, it was the Russians who lacked substantial
artillery support. Once Francois' artillery did arrive, his corps was able to
tear apart the Russians facing him. As Blair notes, "modern historians such as
John Macdonald recognize the great importance that logistics played in the
Russian battlefield disaster, noting that 'Russia certainly had an abundance of
manpower, but was woefully lacking in administrative ability; nor was there
competent machinery to keep thousands of soldiers supplied in the field.'" [57]
It is clear that supply troubles had contributed greatly to the Russian defeat.
The Russians were also severely lacking in reconnaissance forces. This was due
to their sole reliance upon cavalry for reconnaissance. This cavalry was
composed mostly of Cossacks. Armstrong describes their actions on August 21st,
"The large Cossack cavalry units on which the Russian armies relied for
intelligence were so uncontrollable and inefficient that it was not until that
evening that cautiously advancing Russian infantry discovered that the Germans
had retired and were miles away." [58] If the Russians had a more reliable
reconnaissance force, they could easily have discovered the retreat of the
Germans from Gumbinnen in time to carry out a much more efficient pursuit.
Instead they wasted the day awaiting another German attack and allowed the
German forces to escape unmolested. It has been noted that the Russian army was
too disorganized at this point to continue a pursuit, but nevertheless the day
could have been spent much more productively than simply awaiting a phantom
attack. In contrast to the Russian cavalry, the Germans had a much more
efficient reconnaissance force in their airplanes. As Karch describes, "In what
must have been the first large-scale use of tactical airborne reconnaissance,
the Eighth Army employed observation aircraft to locate Russian forces. On the
other side, the Russians sent all their aircraft to the Austrian Front for some
unexplained reason. Had the Russians just one aircraft to spy on the Eighth
Army, Tannenberg may never have happened. Of course, if Rennenkampf had used
his many cavalry divisions to keep an eye on Eighth Army movements, Tannenberg
may still have been avoided." [59] It is true that the aerial reconnaissance of
the Germans could make mistakes such as when an airman reported that
Rennenkampf was beginning to march south towards the German left flank and
rear. [60] But overall, the air arm proved exceptional in its ability at
determining the location of the Russian forces.
In addition to reconnaissance, intelligence played a huge part in the German
victory at Tannenberg. One of the great questions of the battle is why the
Russians were so naive as to transmit their complete orders in the open. There
are a number of excuses for this lack of regard for radio intelligence. One was
their lack of training. Their operators were not sufficiently trained in
encoding and decoding methods to make encrypted messages efficient enough for
use. Even when they did use encoded messages, these were easily broken by the
German forces. Another reason was a lack of telegraph wire. As Armstrong
describes, "Corps headquarters had only enough wire to connect with the
divisional commanders, not enough to connect with army headquarters which
continually lagged too far behind-or with neighboring corps. Consequently,
radio became the preferred means of communication for the Russian armies." [61]
This once again points to a lack of sufficient logistical support. The hasty
mobilization had resulted in a lack of many support services and materials
which were of vital importance to the war effort. Armstrong pays especial
detail to matters of intelligence in his account of the battle. As he
describes, "In actuality, Ludendorff came to depend on several dozen intercepts
that his staff regularly collected during the day, then decoded or translated
and sent to him every night at 11 p.m. If they were late, he would become
worried and appear personally in the signal corps room to find out what was the
matter. Colonel Hoffmann was more forthright in acknowledging the value of the
intercepts. 'We had an ally,' he wrote, 'the enemy. We knew all the enemy's
plans.'" [62] Karch supports this conclusion, "Along with tactical airborne
reconnaissance, the Germans also made outstanding use of intercepted Russian
radio messages, which were conveniently broadcast in the clear or in easily
broken codes. Ludendorff personally received these intercepts and issued orders
accordingly with little delay." [63] These radio intercepts did much to
reassure Hindenburg and Ludendorff during the critical moments of the battle.
It was due to radio intercepts as well as their airborne reconnaissance that
they were able to determine that Rennenkampf was not marching on their rear.
Their reconnaissance had at first been mistaken on this but they were able to
clarify it through the intercepts and further reconnaissance. These two arms
worked together well and did much to contribute to the German victory at
Tannenberg.
Another contributing factor to the Germany victory was the terrain. The Germans
were fighting in their own territory and had knowledge of the lay of the land.
As Hew Strachan explains, "East Prussia was where the German general staff had
learnt its craft in staff rides and manoeuvres. It knew the ground, and
Schlieffen had taught that in a defensive battle the Masurian lakes provided
the opportunity for operations on interior lines." [64] The Germans took
advantage of this knowledge and their experience with maneuvers in the area.
The Russians did not have a similar knowledge of the terrain. This had an
especially negative affect upon General Samsonov. First of all, the terrain
influenced the communications of the Russian forces greatly. The lack of
telegraph wire has already been noted and radio contact was not entirely
reliable due to the lay of the land. In fact, throughout much of the battle
Samsonov had little or no contact at all with his flanks. As Gurko writes, "The
absence of news was due to the difficulty of maintaining connection in such
open fighting and also to the fact that both the flanking corps were moving,
and had the utmost difficulty in maintaining any kind of communication with the
other commanders." [65] The terrain in which the greater part of the battle
occurred has been described as a "bewildering and fatal maze of marshes,
creeks, lakes, and quagmires." [66] The entire battlefield covered around 200
square miles. [67] In this terrain, the Russians often became lost. Once again
following Gurko's account, "Destitute of any information concerning the other
troops under his control, Samsonof lost all power of directing operations and
thus infringed one of the elementary rules of military strategy, that which
provides that the commander of an army shall choose as his headquarters some
spot where information can readily be brought to him and whence he can
communicate with all the forces under his command." [68] General Samsonov had
placed himself with the troops in the center of the Russian line. Here the
battle went well for several days, as it was opposing weak German forces. In
fact, it went so well that "General Samsonof's immediate observation was such
an encouraging picture that final victory appeared a matter of certainty." [69]
It was not until the night of August 29th that it became clear to Samsonov that
all was lost. As Armstrong describes, "Horrified by what he saw as his
disintegrating army retreated through the woods on the night of the 29th, he
spoke of ending his life. His staff tried to dissuade him, but during one of
their rest halts they noticed that he was no longer among them; then a shot was
heard." [70] Samsonov had taken his own life, but it was the terrain which had
contributed significantly to the loss of so many other Russian lives. As Blair
notes, "Attempting to escape, the Russians 'broke and took to the fields, only
to find that what appeared to be solid ground was in fact an impassible bog in
which horses, men, and guns slowly sank from sight.'" [71] Due to a better
knowledge of the area and communications abilities, the Germans did not suffer
a similar disorientation and were able to move efficiently throughout the area.
Another item of note about the German victory at Tannenberg was the totality of
the German effort. Everything had been thrown against Samsonov. The entire
Eighth Army had been concentrated in order to gain a local superiority over
Samsonov's army. Hindenburg recalls how "Everything must be thrown in which
could prove of the slightest use in manoeuvre warfare and could at all be
spared." [72] The garrisons from the fortresses of Graudenz and Thorn and the
trenches covering the Masurian Lakes were nearly emptied in the effort to gain
this superiority. The only troops not committed to the battle were those left
to cover Rennenkampf. These consisted of simply a "cavalry division and the
Konigsberg garrison with two Landswehr brigades." [73] Had Rennenkampf not been
so cautious or had better intelligence as to the German location, he could
easily have marched through this opposition and fallen upon the German left
flank en masse. But he chose to slowly advance upon Konigsberg and the Germans
were therefore capable of surrounding Samsonov with the entirety of their force
and achieving the victory of Tannenberg.
Another great question which has been raised about the battle is why
Rennenkampf did not march to relieve Samsonov. A great part of this has been
explained in the failure of his reconnaissance forces. Another explanation has
been given by Karch, "Samsonov and Rennenkampf were old and bitter rivals going
back to the Russo-Japanese War." [74] This explanation however comes from
Hoffman's anecdote which has become a part of what Dubeski calls the "victory
myth" of Tannenberg. He explains, "It looked like Hoffmann's anecdote 'saved
the day' for the Germans, yet it contained no literal truth. Russian historians
documented that on no occasion did General Rennenkampf and General Samsonov
ever get into a violent dispute or even have the opportunity to do so." [75]
Therefore it must be concluded that Hoffman's anecdote was simply made up on
the spot in order to boost the morale of his commanders who at that time were
beginning to weaken in their resolve to carry out their ambitious plan of
double envelopment. So the question remains as to why Rennenkampf did not move
south with his whole army. The only plausible explanation must be that he, like
Samsonov, did not realize the gravity of the situation until it was much too
late. This must be explained by the paucity of the Russian communications. As
it is known that Samsonov lacked communication with even his own flanks, it is
quite reasonable to believe that any true communication between the two armies
was next to impossible. Coordination between the two armies was being attempted
through the efforts of General Zhilinsky. As Armstrong describes, "Zhilinsky,
whose orders to his army commanders had become increasingly reactive and
belated, unjustly accused Rennenkampf of failing to control his army. He was
genuinely surprised when Grand Duke Nicholas reported to the czar, 'I am
inclined to think that General Zhilinsky has lost his head and in general is
not capable of controlling operations.' Zhilinsky, not Rennenkampf, ended up
being relieved of his command." [76] It seems that the major reason why
Rennenkampf never relieved Samsonov must be attributed to the communications
breakdown in the Second Army and between headquarters and the armies. Zhilinsky
was too far back to adequately grasp the situation while Samsonov was too far
separated from his forces to do the same. Therefore by the time the situation
became clear to either of these men, it was far too late for Rennenkampf to
come to the rescue.
There is no doubt that the Battle of Tannenberg was a significant victory for
the Germans. If the Eighth Army had been lost, the way to Berlin would have
been wide open to the Russian armies. Instead the Russians were driven out of
German territory and as Duffy writes, "no Russian army penetrated German
territory again until the close of the Second World War, in 1945." [77]
Hindenburg and Ludendorff have been given credit for the victory as the
commanders, but Colonel Hoffman deserves much of the credit. He had created the
plan and convinced Prittwitz to put it into action prior to the arrival of the
new commanders. And then when Hindenburg and Ludendorff began to vacilate, he
came up with the anecdote about the rivalry between Samsonov and Rennenkampf
which kept them dedicated to the plan. The German intelligence and
reconnaissance forces also deserve credit for the victory. The Russians can be
blamed for their failure to adequately support their forces with a logistical
backline as well as they inability to maintain communication and failure in
reconnaissance. As is always true in war, there were many reasons why the
Battle of Tannenberg ended as it did. A study of the battle helps to give
insight to the numerous complexities of war which have persisted across the
ages.
Show Footnotes and
Sources
Footnotes
1. Karch, Lawrence G. “Lessons on maneuver warfare and fighting smart.” Marine Corps Gazette. Dec. 1994.
2. Ibid.
3. Dubeski, Norman. “Victory myths and the battle of Tannenberg.” Journal of Political and Military Sociology. Winter 2001.
4. Karch.
5. Hindenburg, Paul von. "The Battle of Tannenberg" in Source Records of the Great War, Vol. II, ed. Charles F. Horne, National Alumni, 1923: http://www.firstworldwar.com/source/tannenberg_hindenburg.htm.
6. Karch.
7. Ibid.
8. Armstrong, Richard N. “Tactical triumph at Tannenberg.” Military History. Aug. 1997.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid.
13. Karch.
14. Keegan, John. "The First World War." New York: Random House: 1998, pg. 145.
15. Karch.
16. Armstrong.
17. Hindenburg.
18. Armstrong.
19. Karch.
20. Ibid.
21. Karch.
22. Hindenburg.
23. Armstrong.
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid.
26. Hindenburg.
27. Karch.
28. Armstrong.
29. Ibid.
30. Dubeski.
31. Hindenburg.
32. Dubeski.
33. Hindenburg.
34. Armstrong.
35. Ibid.
36. Dubeski.
37. Hindenburg.
38. Armstrong.
39. Ibid.
40. Hindenburg.
41. Karch.
42. Hindenburg.
43. Armstrong.
44. Hindenburg.
45. Ibid.
46. Armstrong.
47. Ibid.
48. Keegan, pg. 149, Strachan, Hew. "The First World War." New York: Viking Penguin: 2004, pg. 137.
49. Blair, John J. "The right force for the battle: The theater support command." Army Logistician. Fort Lee: Sep/Oct 2001.Vol.33, Iss. 5.
50. Duffy, Michael. "Battles: The Battle of Tannenberg, 1914." July 19, 2003: http://www.firstworldwar.com/battles/tannenberg.htm
51. Armstrong.
52. Karch.
53. Marshall, S.L.A. "Men Against Fire: The Problem of Battle Command." Norman, Oklahoma: 1947, pg. 66.
54. Marshall, pg. 67.
55. Karch.
56. Armstrong.
57. Blair.
58. Armstrong.
59. Karch.
60. Hindenburg.
61. Armstrong.
62. Ibid.
63. Karch.
64. Strachan, pg. 135.
65. Gurko Vasily. "The Battle of Tannenberg" in Source Records of the Great War, Vol. II, ed. Charles F. Horne, National Alumni, 1923: http://www.firstworldwar.com/source/tannenberg_gurko.htm
66. This description is found in Blair's "The right force for the battle: The theater support command" as he cites Willis John Abbott. I believe he is quoting from the following text: Abbott, Willis John. “The Nations At War. A Current History.” NY, Leslie-Judge Co., 1918 edition. However, I was unable to determine exactly as Blair did not give a list of citations.
67. Blair.
68. Gurko.
69. Ibid.
70. Armstrong
71. Blair, once again quoting from Abbott.
72. Hindenburg.
73. Ibid.
74. Karch.
75. Dubeski.
76. Armstrong.
77. Duffy.
Works Cited
Armstrong, Richard N. “Tactical triumph at Tannenberg.” Military History. Aug. 1997: 58+.
Blair, John J. "The right force for the battle: The theater support command." Army Logistician. Fort Lee: Sep/Oct 2001.Vol.33, Iss. 5: 32+.
Dubeski, Norman. “Victory myths and the battle of Tannenberg.” Journal of Political and Military Sociology. Winter 2001: 282+.
Duffy, Michael. "Battles: The Battle of Tannenberg, 1914." July 19, 2003: http://www.firstworldwar.com/battles/tannenberg.htm
Gurko, Vasily. "The Battle of Tannenberg" in Source Records of the Great War, Vol. II, ed. Charles F. Horne, National Alumni, 1923: http://www.firstworldwar.com/source/tannenberg_gurko.htm
Hindenburg, Paul von. "The Battle of Tannenberg" in Source Records of the Great War, Vol. II, ed. Charles F. Horne, National Alumni, 1923: http://www.firstworldwar.com/source/tannenberg_hindenburg.htm
Karch, Lawrence G. “Lessons on maneuver warfare and fighting smart.” Marine Corps Gazette. Dec. 1994: 74+.
Keegan, John. "The First World War." New York: Random House: 1998.
Marshall, S.L.A. "Men Against Fire: The Problem of Battle Command." Norman, Oklahoma: 1947.
Strachan, Hew. "The First World War." New York: Viking Penguin: 2004
Copyright © 2008 Birrion Sondahl.
Written by Birrion Sondahl. If you have questions or comments on this article,
please contact Birrion Sondahl at:
birrion@slewfoot.us.
About the author:
Birrion Sondahl recently completed his degree in Military History from American Military University.
In addition to studying military history, he is an avid freestyle skier. He lives at home
with his parents, three cats, and a flock of chickens in Spirit Lake, Idaho.
Published online: 06/01/2008.
* Views expressed by contributors are their own and do not necessarily represent
those of MHO.
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