Mythos revisited: American Historians and German
Fighting Power in WWII
by Thomas E. Nutter
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Chapter Ten - Part I
MICHAEL DOUBLER'S CLOSING WITH THE ENEMY
At the time Michael Doubler published Closing with the Enemy: How GIs Fought
the War in Europe, 1944-1945, in 1994, he was a serving Lieutenant
Colonel in the United States Army. Doubler characterized his book as having a
purpose similar to that of Infantry in Battle , a volume published by
the U.S. Army Infantry School at Fort Benning, Georgia in 1934 for the purpose
of reintroducing the experience of battle to an officer corps then suffering
from a steady decline in active duty veterans of the First World War. Referring
to the "drawdown" of the American armed forces in the aftermath of the Cold
War, the author draws the reader's attention to the evidently incompatible
facts that while soldiers with combat experience would be disappearing from the
armed services as a result of the "drawdown", threats from regional powers to
the national security of the United States would remain. Doubler's stated
purpose, then, is to use military history to stimulate "disciplined thinking"
about the challenges of the future battlefield, while promoting "the viewpoint
of the veteran" among officers trained in peacetime.(168)
While at some level Doubler may have had in mind the didactic purpose discussed
above when he wrote Closing with the Enemy , it is clear that he had
another and perhaps more significant motive. This can be seen literally from
the very beginning of the book, in the third page of the Introduction, in which
Doubler comments as follows:
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"The notion that the American army achieved victory in World War II only
because of its employment of overwhelming numbers of lavishly supplied troops
against an exhausted Wehrmacht is untrue. American combat power had definite
limits imposed by constraints on resources and time. The decision to limit the
size of the army to ninety divisions, the soldier replacement system, and the
organization of some combat formations reduced the army's effectiveness.
Inexperience blunted the fighting ability of many units, and some commands had
much more difficulty than others in making the transition from novice to
veteran. Senior American commanders were adept at operational maneuver and
concentrating firepower, but inadequate numbers of combat formations and
occasional manpower and logistical shortages hampered operations."
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It is no exaggeration, in fact, to say that these themes, much more than
"lessons learned", lie at the core of Doubler's work.(169)
Doubler turns immediately to the theme of the apparently unique difficulties
besetting the U.S. Army in the ETO. Among these were "combat exhaustion", a
condition that bedeviled the Americans in Europe because of a lack of
experience in evaluating and treating this malady, as well as more fundamental
difficulties stemming from inadequate schooling in mine clearance, the
maintenance and use of weapons, and intelligence gathering. More grievous still
were shortcomings in the quality and supply of personnel replacements, both
officers and enlisted men. By the autumn of 1943, American divisional
commanders were complaining that the officer replacements they were receiving
were "lacking in aggressive leadership, self-reliance, and the ability to meet
emergencies." Doubler observes that one most aggravating aspect of this problem
was that personnel policies prevented the reclassification of officers who
failed in combat, with the result that men who were relieved of duty in one
command often were reassigned to identical leadership positions in another
combat formation. An even greater difficulty was the poor quality of
replacements among enlisted soldiers. An apparently universal complaint was
that these men required remedial training at the front, because they "did not
hate the enemy enough, lacked the killer instinct, and tended to fraternize
with enemy prisoners of war…". Doubler identifies several reasons for this
lamentable situation. The first was that because of policies embraced early in
the war, "ground combat units failed to receive their proportionate share of
high quality volunteers and draftees" because the Navy, Marine Corps and Army
Air Force were receiving a far greater number of such personnel. The second
reason cited by Doubler was the "excessive transit time within the replacement
system". This meant that the average replacement spent five months traveling to
his new unit, losing morale, discipline, training and physical conditioning
along the way. This situation was exacerbated by the fact that it often could
not be cured; many replacements found their way into units heavily engaged with
the enemy and consequently unable to invest the time and resources necessary to
recover the soldier's fighting edge. The frequent result was that the
replacement became a nearly instant casualty. By the spring of 1944, Doubler
contends, it was unclear whether the American replacement system would be
adequate to the challenge that would surely confront it when the Allies invaded
continental Europe.(170)
Doubler's work is a tribute to the qualities of the American soldier
demonstrated by his ability to overcome these difficulties. The first occasion
on which this might be observed was in the bocage country of Normandy. Here the
U.S. First Army encountered the German 7.Armee, which Doubler characterizes as
consisting of "three fresh infantry divisions, the remnants of four more
infantry divisions that had suffered heavy casualties during the early fighting
in Normandy, a parachute regiment, and three regimental-sized combat teams
known in the German army as kampfgruppen." This force, says Doubler, included
35,000 troops supported by "a wide assortment of heavy weapons and
approximately eighty tanks." It was ordered and prepared to take advantage of
the benefits offered by the hedgerows, and to make the Americans "die for every
inch of ground".(171)
Doubler's thesis is perhaps best expressed in his final chapter, entitled The
Schoolhouse of War. The essence of it is set forth in the following passage:
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"The many tactical and technical adaptations that occurred in the ETO
invalidates the popular notion that the army won battles because of
overwhelming material superiority. If the army had been able to crush the
Germans with an abundance of resources alone, there would have been no need for
changes in battle techniques. Clearly, the materiel advantages the army
possessed did not mean much during close combat in the Normandy hedgerows, in
the Huertgen Forest, or during urban battles. The army was adequately equipped,
but in many cases a variety of shortages hampered operations. In early 1945
General Patton complained that he was being forced to fight with ‘inadequate
means' and told the War Department that shortages in replacements, ammunition,
and the number of combat divisions were hindering the war effort. Huge
expenditures of firepower and munitions during certain large, key operations
are usually held up as examples of American logistical superiority and the
heavy reliance on firepower. But to create stockpiles for firepower
extravaganzas in support of critical battles, air and artillery units had to
husband their ammunition. Most of the time, artillery units fired under very
strict ammunition rationing plans, and manpower and gasoline shortages hampered
several operations….Innovations in tactics and the use of weapons were the main
reasons American forces were able to turn their limited advantages in materiel
into good effect against the Germans."(172)
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In addition to the foregoing, Doubler enumerates several other impediments
overcome by the U.S. Army in defeating the Wehrmacht. For example, he dismisses
the notion that the Americans possessed an advantage in mobility. "Historians
and military analysts," Doubler maintains, "have put too much emphasis on the
army's mobility, believing that the use of tracked and wheeled vehicles gave
the army a degree of mobility that was inappropriate for the heavy fighting in
Europe. Trucks did give the army operational mobility, but motorized movement
had no influence on the battlefield." In this vein, Doubler argues that in the
ETO, American trucks were used to move supplies and replacements from Normandy
to the front, and to move units laterally between corps and army sectors, but
not to enhance the tactical mobility of the infantry in battle. For these
reasons, Doubler concludes, "[I]n reality, the army's means of logistical and
operational mobility had no direct influence on combat." Likewise, the author
endorses Eisenhower's broad front strategy as "the best way to defeat Germany
while reducing unnecessary risks to Allied troops", thereby solving the dilemma
plaguing American commanders, namely the need to stay on the offensive, while
at the same time minimizing casualties.(173)
In addition to these political constraints on the aggressiveness of the
American military leadership, there were logistical and terrain impediments
upon them. While Doubler concedes that the army was "adequately supplied and
sustained", he also argues that the American campaign in western Europe was
beset by personnel, ammunition and fuel shortages from beginning to end. In
addition to these problems, the ability of American forces to conduct maneuver
warfare was hindered by such factors as "rain, mud, swollen rivers, thick
forests, broken and compartmentalized ground, and urbanized terrain…". The most
serious difficulty for the Americans, however, was the shortage in replacement
personnel for combat units, a problem so critical that it motivates Doubler to
conclude that "Creveld's critical views on the army's soldier replacement
system [as expressed in Fighting Power] are more than justified."(174)
There are a number of problems with the logic employed by Doubler. There can be
no doubt whatever that the U.S. Army successfully modified its training and
doctrine in coming to grips with its German adversary in Western Europe. That
this is so, however, is not necessarily indicative either of the superiority of
Yankee ingenuity or of the invalidity of the argument that the Wehrmacht was
overcome in the West by the overwhelming materiel and personnel superiority of
its Allied adversaries, particularly the U.S. Army. It is a truism, it would
seem, that military establishments which shun innovation in training and
doctrine often do not survive life and death struggles with adversaries of a
less conservative bent. For example, for reasons of political orthodoxy,
western historians long cherished the notion that the Red Army of the Great
Patriotic War prevailed over the Wehrmacht solely because of its apparently
inexhaustible human and materiel resources, coupled with a callous indifference
to the fate of either. It is safe to say that the more recent scholarship of
John Erickson and David Glantz has laid to rest prejudiced view of the Soviet
war machine. Again, innovation marked the efforts of both the British and
German armies during the closing stages of the Great War, as each side sought,
with varying degrees of success, to institute tactical changes that would
enable them to break the deadlock on the western front. In the case of the
German army, at least, these changes eventually led to the combined arms mode
of combat that so enhanced its combat power in the Second World War. Indeed,
significant incidents of innovation in the history of war and military science
are too numerous to mention.(175)
In addition to the fact that the American army, like any other successful
force, must perforce have engaged in a purposeful course of self-examination
and change in order to deal with the realities of combat, it is beyond doubt
that it and its British and other western allies enjoyed substantial advantages
over the Wehrmacht in terms of human and materiel resources. Contrary to the
inference that Doubler and others would have us draw, these advantages made a
difference. They did so because they were both numerical and, at least with
regard to personnel, qualitative as well. By late July 1944, after nearly two
months of fighting in the Normandy lodgment area, there were nearly 1.5 million
US and British combat troops in France. At that time, German effectives in the
area totaled not more than 380,000, thus providing the western allies with a
numerical advantage of almost 4:1. There can be no doubt of the numerical
superiority enjoyed by the western allies in terms of equipment. On D-Day
alone, for example, the U.S. army landed six tank battalions and a battalion of
tank destroyers; on the same day, the British placed on French soil 900 tanks
and other armored vehicles. Within striking distance of the beachhead on that
day were only four battalions of German tanks capable of successfully engaging
the Allied mobile forces.(176)
Nor were the advantages enjoyed by the western allies numerical only. Taking
the Normandy campaign as an example (and the German situation can only be
characterized as deteriorating thereafter), the details about the German
divisions confronting the invaders illustrate this point.
5.Fallschirm-Jaeger-Division, supposedly an elite formation, was pitifully
weak. Less than 10% of its soldiers had received parachute training by the time
of the invasion; no more than 20% of its officers had received infantry
training or had combat experience. It had an authorized strength of 17,455, but
possessed only 12,253 effectives; overall it lacked 50% of such basic weapons
as machine guns and antitank guns. Its Pionier battalion had 38 rifles, 700
less than it was authorized; the antitank battalion had 3 75mm. antitank
weapons when it was supposed to have 36. One of its regiments lacked 1800 of
its authorized rifles. The division had virtually no motor vehicles.
77.Infanterie-Division, which moved to the invasion front beginning on June 8,
1944, possessed on that date 9,095 officers and men and 1,410 Russian
"volunteers". It had two infantry regiments of three battalions each. All of
the infantry battalions fielded 40 machine guns and 7-8 81mm. mortars. There
was one heavy weapons company in each regiment; together, they possessed a
total of 8 Russian infantry guns. The division's artillery regiment had 16
105mm. howitzers and 12 88mm. antitank guns. By the end of June it had suffered
about 2000 casualties; much of the remainder of the division went into
captivity at St. Malo in August. The division was disbanded on 15 September. A
unit that was immediately engaged on D-Day, counterattacking American
paratroopers on the Cotentin Peninsula, was 91.Luftlande-Division. It possessed
no more than about 8,000 men; its three artillery battalions were equipped with
a mountain howitzer, the 105mm. Gebergs-Haubitze 40, whose ammunition was not
interchangeable with that of the standard 105mm. field howitzer. Between 6-24
June, the division lost 85% of its infantry, 21% of its artillery personnel,
76% of its engineers and 48% of its antitank personnel. It was then reduced to
five Kampfgruppen; of these, one was composed of Russians and another of Turks.
By August, the division had suffered 5000 casualties.(177)
The German forces described above were typical of those which met the Allied
invasion. By no stretch of the imagination can they be considered comparable to
the British, American and other Allied forces that engaged them. Likewise,
Doubler's attempt to discount the other advantages enjoyed by the U.S. army are
unavailing. For example, his assertion that "motorized movement had no
influence on the battlefield" is patently absurd, as is his corollary statement
that "the [US] army's means of logistical and operational mobility had no
direct influence on combat". The U.S. army employed a superabundance of wheeled
vehicles to supply its combat forces at the front, and to move those combat
forces from one point to another, as Doubler freely admits. At the same time,
the German army was virtually without mobility, and thus was without the
capacity either to adequately supply its combat forces, or to move them about
the battlefield for tactical purposes. Would Doubler exchange the mobility
possessed by the U.S. army, as evidenced by its employment of copious numbers
of trucks and the like, for the virtually static character of the Wehrmacht,
dependent as it was upon horse transport and a polyglot collection of wheeled
vehicles of dubious origin and quality?
Unavailing too are the other reasons Doubler offers for the performance of the
U.S. army. He asserts that the ability of the U.S. army to bring into play its
overwhelming capacity to engage in maneuver warfare was constrained by terrain
and weather conditions, such as rain, mud, thick forests, swollen rivers and
other natural impediments. Apart from the fact that the German forces faced
exactly the same obstacles to their employment, since when have military forces
of any origin not been trained and equipped to deal with such conditions? Yet
further, Doubler complains that the U.S. army was bedeviled throughout its
campaign in Western Europe by chronic personnel shortages, particularly among
its infantry forces. More recent scholarship has shown, however, that the U.S.
army was fully capable of taking remedial action to successfully address such
shortages, even in such a notorious contest as that in the Huertgen Forest in
1944-1945. As this work has made clear, however, German efforts to rectify
personnel shortages at the same time involved them in resorting to the use of
convalescents, foreigners, the ill-trained and the ill-equipped.(178)
To give examples of the prowess of the U.S. army, and particularly its ability
to successfully adapt to various combat conditions, Doubler turns his focus on
individual incidents. To illustrate the army's ability to deal with the
difficulties of urban combat, for example, the author refers to the battles of
Brest and Aachen. These are worth examining in some detail. The port of Brest,
at the tip of the Brittany peninsula, was of strategic importance to the
Allies, because of its excellent deep-water port. The Allied scheme called for
the capture of the city as quickly as possible, and the army assigned the task
of doing so to the US VII Corps under Maj. Gen. Troy H. Middleton. VII Corps
consisted of the 2d, 8th and 29th Infantry Divisions, whose total strength for
the operation, including supporting troops, Doubler puts at 50,000 soldiers.
Middleton's plan was to surround the city and crush its garrison. The Germans
assigned command of the Brest defense to Generalleutnant Herman B. Ramcke, an
experienced and resolute parachute officer who had fought with distinction in,
among other places, Crete and North Africa. The German forces consisted of
343.Infanterie-Division and 2.Fallshirm-Jaeger-Division. According to Doubler,
Hitler had instructed Ramcke to defend Brest to the last man.(179)
Doubler estimates the size of the German garrison force at Brest at 30,000 men.
This figure appears to be significantly inflated; at the end of July 1944,
2.Fallschirm-Jaeger-Division mustered 162 officers and 7,389 other ranks; the
strength of 343. Infanterie-Division on 1 June 1944 was 11,021. Moreover, even
these figures are deceiving, since they do not account for the troops not
attached to these units when the Americans moved to reduce the fortress on 21
August. Parts of 343.Infanterie-Division, including two infantry battalions
(III./Infanterie-Regiment 898 and III./Infanterie-Regiment 897), an engineer
company (1./Pionier-Bataillon 343), an artillery battery
(7./Artillerie-Regiment 343) and part of 14./Infanterie-Regiment 898 with two
75mm. antitank guns, had been detached for service with 352.Infanterie
Division.
Similarly, 2.Fallschirm-Jaeger-Division lacked its Fallschirm-Jaeger-Regiment
6, which was serving with 91.Infanterie-Division. It was also without II. and
III./Fallschirm-Artillerie-Regiment 6, both of which were at the artillery
school at Luneville, as well as its Flak-Abteilung, then serving with
II.Fallschirmkorps. Also missing were I./Fallschirmjager-Regiment 2 and a
mortar battalion, Fallschirm-Granatwerfer-Bataillon 2. Further details on these
formations are also illuminating. One reason for the weakened condition of 2.
Fallschirm-Jaeger-Division was that at the time of the Normandy invasion it was
recovering from a severe mauling recently received on the Eastern Front. On 1
July its engineer battalion was reported at 42% of its authorized strength. The
Division was far below its authorized strength in heavy antitank guns (4 out of
60), mortars (28 out of 108), machine guns (497 out of 739) and motor vehicles
of all kinds. As noted by Doubler, 343.Infanterie-Division was a static
formation, and consequently had only a limited number of motor vehicles and
about 1200 horses. Its ability to defend itself against tanks was extremely
limited, for it possessed only two 75mm. and six 50mm. antitank guns. Its
static artillery weapons included a variety of captured French and Russian
guns.(180)
Another important contest recounted by Doubler is the American assault on Metz
between September and December 1944. The principal American forces involved the
US XX Corps from Patton's Third Army, particularly the US 7th Armored and 5th
and 90th Infantry Divisions. The defense of the Metz "fortress" fell to
Division Nr. 462, which Doubler estimates to have been 14,000 strong and
composed of "fortress troops and students, staff, and faculty members of the
numerous military schools located in Metz. Many of these soldiers were among
the best the German army had to offer, having been selected for additional
schooling based on their exemplary performance on the battlefield." Doubler
also characterizes the division as "experienced".
While it may be accurate to describe as "experienced" some of the soldiers who
comprised Division Nr. 462, this term is clearly inappropriate when applied to
the division as a whole. The unit was formed in October 1942 as a replacement
formation. In December, 1943, it was composed of the following units:
Grenadier-Ersatz-Regiment 246; Grenadier-Ersatz-Regiment 552;
Grenadier-Ersatz-Regiment 572; MG-Ersatz-Bataillon 14;
Artillerie-Ersatz-Regiment 35; Bruckenbau-Ersatz und Ausbildungs Bataillon 3.
All of these units, as their names imply, were replacement formations only.
During September and October 1944, there was a continuous interchange of units
between Division Nr. 462 and other units; some units of the division were sent
as replacements to units in the field; at the same time, new replacement
formations from other locations were amalgamated in to the division. On October
19, 1944, in the midst of the American assault on Metz (which began September 7
and concluded with the capture of the city on November 28) the division was
renamed 462.Infanterie-Division, and still later, 462.Volks-Grenadier-Division.
At the time of its reorganization in October, it comprised Grenadier-Regiment
1215, Grenadier-Regiment 1216, Grenadier-Regiment 1217, Artillerie-Regiment
1462, Division Fusilier Kompanie 462, Pionier-Bataillon 1462,
Nachrichten-Abteilung 1462, Feldersatz Bataillon 1462 and divisional service
troops. The division was destroyed at Metz and not reformed.(181)
As the foregoing demonstrates, the attachment of the moniker "experienced" to
Division Nr. 462 and its progeny is a misnomer. The division was never in
combat before or after its ordeal at Metz. Its table of organization changed
almost continuously for the two years of its existence. The units which moved
in and through it were, from beginning to end, intended to be replacement
formations. Nevertheless, this force managed to frustrate its opponents for the
better part of two months, and to exact a heavy toll in American casualties.
Doubler admits that the American commanders misused their troops and acted
unwisely by essentially attacking frontally a heavily reinforced position,
thereby throwing away the advantages they possessed in airpower and artillery.
He credits them, however, for adapting to the situation and devising a more
practical, if not less costly, method for eventually overpowering the
defenders. Precisely how this fits with the author's thesis that the U.S. army
destroyed its German opponents by something else than overwhelming force is
unclear. As observed elsewhere, successful armies do adapt to their enemies and
the conditions in which they fight. If the American commanders had not changed
their approach to this particular situation, what would be our judgment of
them? And, in fact Doubler's account of the reduction of Fort St. Julien, the
last major stronghold in the complex of defenses at Metz, by the Americans is a
tribute to their use of the largest weapon available (a 155 mm. howitzer) to
fire thirty rounds at a range of less than 50 yards to breach the enemy
defenses once and for all. Fort St. Julien was taken by elements of the US 95th
Infantry Division on 18 November; this division was "fresh", according to
Doubler, when it became involved in the fighting at Metz little more than a
month earlier on 16 October. Its commanders had learned much from the mistakes
of the formation that it had relieved, the US 5th Infantry Division, which had
been ground up in its efforts to subjugate Fort Driant, another portion of the
Metz complex. The evidence is that the American victories at Brest and Metz
were the product of the employment of overpowering force against enemy
formations of unequal size and firepower. The Americans should have prevailed
and did, and it would be only appropriate to regard them critically if they had
not.
Doubler devotes a single chapter to a description of the methods adopted by the
American forces to cross rivers against enemy opposition. As the author
observes, "[T]o win the war, American forces had to master the skills required
to cross rivers in the face of enemy fire, often under the most trying weather
conditions." Doubler's work shows how well the Americans succeeded in mastering
those skills time after time as they fought their way to the heart of the Reich
in a series of river crossings, the most notable of which was the celebrated
Rhine crossing at Remagen. It must be observed, of course, that successful
western armies had learned this art repeatedly, from the time of Caesar onward.
The German army, for one, had crossed innumerable rivers under fire during its
years of conquest from 1940-1942; in the summer of 1944 the Red Army was in the
process of crossing the same rivers in reverse, in most cases against fierce
opposition. One of the crossings particularly described by Doubler was that of
the Moselle by the US 80th Infantry Division and 4th Armored Division in early
September 1944. Between 4-16 September, these formations attacked
3.Panzer-Grenadier-Division between the villages of Pont-a-Mousson and
Dieulouard, ultimately forcing the enemy to retreat to the east and give up the
bridgehead to the Americans. The Americans purchased the victory at
considerable cost to themselves, against one of the better armored formations
in the Wehrmacht. Though comparatively strong, however,
3.Panzer-Grenadier-Division still suffered from a number of critical
deficiencies. Its armored elements were noteworthy for their relative strength.
On 1 September the division's Panzer-Abteilung 103 possessed 37 Stug III
assault guns and three tanks; Panzerjaeger-Abteilung 3 included an additional
31 Jagdpanzer IVs, thereby giving the division a total of 71armored fighting
vehicles, of which 13 were in either short or long-term repair. The division's
Artillerie-Regiment 3 was also quite formidable, although it possessed no
self-propelled guns. It had three battalions with a total of 24 105mm.
howitzers, 8 150mm. howitzers and 3 100mm. cannon. The division's
Panzer-Aufklarungs-Abteilung 103 was also a powerful formation, liberally
equipped with armored personnel carriers. There were, nevertheless, substantial
deficiencies in the division. In the previous month, it had suffered 841
casualties. Thus, while its Grenadier-Regiment 8 was at 87% strength, its
sister regiment, Grenadier-Regiment 29, was only at 67% of its manpower
strength; its second battalion was particularly weak and in urgent need of a
refit. The division's total manpower shortage as of 9 September totaled 1390
NCOs and other ranks. The division was short 724 pistols, 2450 rifles, 829
light machine guns, 523 heavy machine guns and 814 vehicles of all types. The
panzergrenadiers were transported in a mixture of light and medium cars and
trucks. Most of these were civilian vehicles of mixed Italian, French and
German origin, and most (75%) lacked cross-country ability, so that the
division's infantry was confined largely to the roads when in action.(182)
Doubler also recounts the historic struggle mounted by the U.S. army in the
Huertgen Forest in the winter of 1944-45. His point of view is that the
American army was in no way prepared to conduct such a struggle, being
ill-fitted either by training or doctrine, while its German adversaries,
schooled in such fighting by the bitter war it had fought in the East, enjoyed
not only this advantage but also the benefits granted by favorable terrain.
Added to this, as Doubler is at pains to point out, was the disadvantage
suffered by the Americans from the inefficiencies of their replacement system.
All of these factors, along with the appalling weather conditions, combined to
produce for the Americans what Doubler refers to as "some of the most gruesome
fighting in the European campaigns."
Doubler recounts the ordeal of the 9th Infantry Division's 39th Infantry
Regiment and 60th Infantry Regiment in the Huertgen during the first two weeks
of October 1944. During this period, the division managed to advance some 3000
yards at a cost of 4500 men. 60th Infantry Regiment suffered a 100% turnover in
combat troops in a struggle that ended in stalemate. Determined to capture the
key village of Schmidt, First Army commander General Courtney Hodges assigned
the task to his V Corps, commanded by General Gerow. The latter, in turn,
selected for the job his most rested unit, 28th Infantry Division. Hodges
assigned to this unit the objective of Vossenack; the division's 112th Infantry
Regiment attacked in the middle of the line, with its sister 109th Infantry
Regiment and 110th Infantry Regiment on the left and right flanks respectively.
These units were to cross the Kall River gorge and capture the village of
Kommerscheidt, preparatory to advancing on Schmidt. Doubler argues that General
Norman Cota, the commander of the 28th Infantry Division, was not only deprived
of initiative by the constraints placed upon him by First Army and V Corps, but
was forced to divide rather than concentrate its effort by advancing its three
regiments over three diverging axes of attack. The result was a fiasco of the
first magnitude.(183)
Doubler identifies the three German units arrayed against 28th Infantry
Division as 275.Infanterie-Division, 89.Infanterie-Division and
116.Panzer-Division. This latter formation he characterizes as "one of the
Wehrmacht's stalwart units in the west". On 1 October 1944, 116.Panzer-Division
rated a Kampfwert (combat value) of II, in a system where the values ranged
from the highest (I) to the lowest (V) in combat value. While the division
therefore was not regarded as ready for any mission, it was nevertheless
considered to be in relatively good condition. It was not, however,
particularly powerful in tanks, having on hand a total of 28 Panthers
(authorized strength 73) and 19 Mk IVs (authorized strength 78), along with 11
Stug III assault guns in its Panzerjaeger-Abteilung 228. In September the
division had suffered 1176 casualties, and now had 11,373 men out of an
authorized strength of 12,467. The division was deficient in armored vehicles
of all types. Its Panzer-Grenadier-Regiment 60 and 156 were nearly at full
personnel strength, as was its Panzer-Artillerie-Regiment 146.
89.Infanterie-Division had been formed in January 1944 and included
Grenadier-Regiment 1055 and 1056, each of three battalions, in addition to
Artillerie-Regiment 189. The division had been destroyed in the Falaise pocket
and was rebuilt with troops from Grenadier-Regiment 1063 and men from various
fortress and replacement battalions. It was once again nearly destroyed in
September, and was in very weak condition by October. 275.Infanterie-Division
had been formed in November 1943, and in the next month was constituted from
four battalions of Reserve-Division 158. At the time of its formation it
included Grenadier-Regiment 983, Grenadier-Regiment 984 and Grenadier-Regiment
985, each of two battalions, Fusilier-Bataillon 275, Artillerie-Regiment 275 of
three battalions, and divisional support units. The division had been
demolished in the Cobra offensive in July 1944 and was caught in the Falaise
pocket in August, where its remnants were practically annihilated. What was
left of it fought again at Aachen in September; by the beginning of October its
strength was listed at five thousand men, with few heavy weapons. It was this
depleted unit that saw action in the Huertgen forest.(184)
Doubler points out that in contemplation of the assault, Major General Leonard
G. Gerow reinforced 28th Infantry Division with "considerable added brawn",
including the three battalions of 1171st Engineer Combat Group, 707th Tank
Battalion, two tank destroyer battalions, as well as eight battalions of
artillery from V and VII Corps. The assault would also have support from six
fighter-bomber groups and forty-seven "weasel" cargo carriers. Doubler
describes the battle which ensued between the regiments of 28th Infantry
Division and the German defenders between 2 November and 7 November. This was a
brutal slugging match that centered around the villages of Vossenack, Schmidt
and Kommerscheidt; each of these hamlets changed hands either partially or
completely during the battle, and at its end the Americans were forced to
retreat in disarray, having suffered substantial casualties. Doubler credits a
number of factors for the American failure: a conceptually flawed plan of
attack that led to dispersal, rather than concentration, of forces; a tenuous
resupply line through the forest; terrible weather that grounded American air
support and turned the ground to little more than a swamp, resulting in an
explosion of cases of trench foot. Most importantly, however, the Americans
suffered from two significant detriments: a high number of inexperienced,
untrained replacements, and an absence of air support, which allowed the
Germans to "concentrate remarkable strength against Schmidt and Kommerscheidt."
(185)
Doubler's explanation for the disaster absorbed by the 28th Infantry Division
lacks substance. The difficult terrain and terrible weather affected both
attacker and defender equally. It is questionable, to say the least, whether
the feet of the American infantrymen suffered worse from the cold and wet than
those of their German counterparts, shod as they were in their hobnail boots so
well known for conducting the cold. The notion that the American force was
burdened by a high proportion of inexperienced and untrained replacements also
fails to resonate. As noted above, neither 89.Infanterie-Division nor
275.Infanterie-Division was composed of trained and experienced soldiers. Both
units had been virtually destroyed in the Falaise pocket, and had nonetheless
been in more or less continuous combat since then. By the time they were
committed to battle in the Huertgen, they were divisions in name only, having
been scratched together from fortress and replacement units of dubious quality.
Even the vaunted 116.Panzer-Division was of little value to the defenders; its
troops were being husbanded for the coming Ardennes offensive, and its depleted
armored element was committed only partially and piecemeal to the battle. Like
the Americans, the Germans lacked air support; even if the weather had been
fine, however, the Luftwaffe would not have been there to assist the defenders.
Doubler's assertion that the Germans "were free to concentrate remarkable
strength" to the battle, therefore, is on truly shaky ground.
Doubler goes on to describe the ordeal endured by other American formations,
notably the 1st Infantry Division, 4th Infantry Division and 8th Infantry
Division, in the holocaust of the Huertgen forest. They ultimately prevailed,
of course, but at an appalling cost---24,000 American battle casualties, with
another 9,000 men down with a mixture of battle fatigue, trench foot and
sickness. Doubler finds a number of reasons for this apparent failure of
American arms. The Americans had no opportunity to train adequately for
fighting in dense forests. Their combat engineer units were not up to the tasks
of clearing minefields and keeping supply lines open. Because the American
formations were committed seriatim and under dangerous and difficult
conditions, they were unable to learn from one another. The army's leadership
was wanting, both at the higher and lower levels of command. Most importantly,
the army suffered from the manifold deleterious effects of its inadequate
replacement system. Ultimately, however, Doubler's verdict is that the battle
in the Huertgen forest was one that should never have been fought. This was so
for two principal reasons. First, the Germans possessed an almost decisive
advantage in fighting on terrain of their choosing in an environment that gave
every advantage to the defender." Second, the battle showed
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"that weather and terrain alone can force an army to search for new tactics and
combat techniques. More than anything else, thick trees, difficult ground, and
atrocious weather determined the torturous course of events….Close-quarters
combat and poor observation prevented American units from bringing artillery
and CAS [close air support] to bear. The dense forest made it difficult for
units to maintain proper direction and orientation. Poor trails and a lack of
roads made resupply and medical evacuation difficult. Rain transformed the
entire forest into a slippery morass, and fog and early morning mists reduced
visibility. Mud and snow concealed mines and booby traps while adding frostbite
and trench foot to the other discomforts troops had to withstand. In addition
to losses from enemy fire, the stress of combat, bad weather, horrid living
conditions, and gloomy surroundings inflicted psychological and physical
casualties at alarming rates." (186)
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The problem with Doubler's analysis of the Huertgen Forest battle is that
nearly all of the difficulties described by him plagued both attacker and
defender alike. As has already been mentioned, the weather does not play
favorites among combatants. If the
Americans suffered physically from the effects of mud, fog and snow, and the
associated conditions of trench foot and frostbite, so too did the German
defenders; both sides were engaged in a running battle for key villages and
hamlets, in which first one side and then the other advanced and then retreated
over the same exposed ground. Both sides were equally affected by close combat
in deep forests; both struggled over the same forest paths to revictual
themselves and carry off their wounded. Each army suffered from a lack of air
support; the Americans because of the weather conditions, the Germans as a
result of the total suppression of the Luftwaffe. Lastly, as Doubler himself
admits, the fact that this battle took place at all was the result of
decision-making on the part of the Allies, not the Germans. It can hardly be
argued, then, that the fight was conducted over ground of the Germans'
choosing. In this tragedy, both parties did the best they could with the hand
dealt them.
Doubler's last substantive chapter deals with the Battle of the Bulge, a
struggle that will ever be regarded as one of the most sterling moments in the
military history of the United States. "The ultimate outcome of the titanic
struggle in the Ardennes," says Doubler, "lay in the skill and determination of
the opposing forces. The Germans managed to mass the equivalent of twenty-nine
infantry divisions and twelve panzer divisions organized into four separate
armies….Compared to the huge German forces massing for the offensive, American
units in the Ardennes were spread thin." As Doubler notes, the driving forces
behind the German offensive were 5.Panzerarmee and 6.Panzerarmee; 7.Armee and
15.Armee protected the southern and northern flanks of the attack respectively.
(187)
How were the "twenty-nine infantry divisions and twelve panzer divisions" that
comprised the "huge German forces massing" for the Ardennes offensive composed?
5. Panzerarmee had under its command XXXXVII.Panzerkorps, LXXXI.Armeekorps and
XII.SS Armeekorps. The latter formation included 59.Infanterie-Division,
176.Infanterie- Division, 183.Volks-Grenadier-Division, 9.Panzer-Division and
15.Panzer-Grenadier-Division. 59.Infanterie-Division was a static division
consisting of Grenadier-Regiment 1034, 1035 and 1036, each of two battalions,
Fusilier-Bataillon 59, Panzer-Jaeger-Bataillon 59 and Artillerie-Regiment 159
of three battalions. It had fought in the withdrawal from France, and by
September 1944 its strength amounted to less than fifty anti-tank guns and
howitzers and 1000 infantrymen. Nevertheless, it continued to fight against the
Americans and British in Operation Market-Garden until November, when it was
placed in Heeresgruppe B reserve. 176.Infanterie-Division had been formed on 31
October 1944, and included Grenadier-Regiment 1218, 1219 and 1220, totaling six
battalions, Fusilier-Bataillon 176, Panzer-Jaeger-Bataillon 176 and
Artillerie-Regiment 1178 of four battalions. In September 1944 the division had
a strength of seven thousand men, most of whom were of poor quality; one
battalion consisted of men with serious hearing maladies, two comprised
Luftwaffe personnel, while many others in the ranks were convalescents and
semiinvalids. In spite of this, the division fought in the Battle of
Maastricht, at Arnhem during Operation Market-Garden, and along the Roer River.
It was actually refitting and reequipping during the Battle of the Bulge.
183.Infanterie-Division had come into existence on 15 September 1944, having
been formed from the so-called Dollersheim-Schatten-Division of the 31st Wave,
and included Grenadier-Regiment 330, 343 and 351, each of two battalions, as
well as Artillerie-Regiment 219 of four battalions. The composition of the
division was enhanced on 19 October 1944 by the absorption of
XVI.Landwehr-Festungs-Bataillon and Festungs-MG-Bataillon 42. Much of the
division was made up of raw and ill-trained Austrians; it was engaged in the
Siegfried Line battles and at Aachen, and near the end of November
Grenadier-Regiment 330 was annihilated at Geilenkirchen.(188)
Footnotes
(168) Doubler, p. 9.
(169) Ibid., p. 3.
(170) Ibid., pp. 26-28.
(171) Ibid., pp. 31-33. Doubler's description of 7.Armee is far from complete.
The Kriegsgliederung for June 15, July 15 and August 15, 1944 show that
7.Armee's subordinate corps commands controlled, at one time or another over
this sixty-day period, three fallschirm-jaeger-divisionen, ten
panzer-divisionen, and eighteen infanterie-divisionen. Many of these units,
however, were "divisions" in name only; the Kriegsgliederung describes them
variously as "kampfgruppe", "remainder", "party of" and "section".
3.Fallschirm-Jaeger-Division suffered 4,064 casualties between 6 June and 12
July. On 10 July, 77.Infanterie-Division was reported to have 1,840 men in
action. Between 6 June and 24 June, 91.Luftlande-Division lost 85% of its
infantry, 21% of its artillery manpower, 76% of its pioneers and 48% of its
panzerjaeger personnel. 243.Infanterie-Division lost 8,189 officers and men
between 6 June and 11 July. It had 700 men in action on 10 July; on 23 July it
was rated at kampfwert V, the lowest possible combat rating. Between 6 June and
11 July, 352.Infanterie-Division suffered almost 8,000 casualties; by the end
of July it was regarded as no longer capable of combat. It was against such
units that the bocage was "busted". See, Zetterling, Normandy 1944, pp. 218,
231, 240, 243 and 278.
(172) Ibid., p. 272.
(173) Ibid., pp.286-287.
(174) Ibid., pp. 287-288.
(175) Erickson, John, The Road to Stalingrad; Stalin's War with Germany
(Yale University Press, 1999): The Road to Berlin; Stalin's War with Germany
(Yale University Press, 1999); Glantz, David M., When Titans Clashed; How the
Red Army Stopped Hitler (University Press of Kansas, 1995).
(176) Zetterling, Normandy 1944, pp. 27-35.
(177) Ibid., pp. 220-222; 229-231; 239-241.
(178) See, Robert Sterling Rush, Hell in Huertgen Forest (University
Press of Kansas, 2001)
(179) Doubler, p. 90.
(180) Zetterling, pp. 214-215; 270-272. As noted, Doubler also alludes to the
American assault on Aachen. 246. Volks-Grenadier-Division defended that city;
it had come into being on 15 September 1944, and was comprised of
Grenadier-Regiment 352, 404 and 689, of two battalions each and
Artillerie-Regiment 246 of four battalions. Tessin, v.8, p. 198; Nafziger,
Infantry in World War II, p.231.
(181) Doubler, pp. 125-140; Tessin, v.10, pp. 225-226; Nafziger, Infantry in
World War II, pp. 584-585; Mitcham, pp. 277-278.
(182) Dugdale, I/1, pp. 103-111; Doubler, pp. 145-154.
(183) Doubler, pp. 175-181.
(184) Mitcham, pp. 105-106; 200-201; Nafziger, Infantry in World War II,
pp. 139, 269-279; Tessin, v. 6, pp. 105-106; v. 8, pp. 318-319; Dugdale, I/2,
pp. 58-64. In view of the condition of the German units facing the U.S. 28th
Infantry Division, Doubler's claim that "the Germans had roughly three
divisions with which to throw back the American regimental-sized attack on
Schmidt" (Doubler, p. 181) seems somewhat exaggerated.
(185) Doubler, pp. 181-186.
(186) Ibid., pp. 187-196.
(187) Ibid., pp. 201-202.
(188) Nafziger, Infantry in World War II, pp. 106; 184; 188; Tessin,
v. 5, p. 226; v. 7, pp. 186-187; 219-220; Mitchell, pp. 83-84; 147-148;
181-182.
Copyright © 2004 by Thomas E. Nutter.
Please send comments to Thomas E. Nutter at: tenutter@gmail.com.
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