Mythos revisited: American Historians and German
Fighting Power in WWII
by Thomas E. Nutter
|
Chapter Ten - Part II
MICHAEL DOUBLER'S CLOSING WITH THE ENEMY
The two armored formations under the control of XII.SS Armeekorps were in poor
condition for the Ardennes offensive. 9.Panzer-Division was rated a kampfwert
II as of 1 November 1944. Although its authorized personnel strength was 13495,
its actual strength amounted to 12364 men; likewise, while its authorized
strength of Mk IV tanks was 78, it had none of these vehicles in its inventory,
and it had only 45 Panthers out of an authorized strength of 73. On that date,
it also possessed 17 Panzerjaeger IV tank destroyers. Its Panzer-Regiment 33
was at 97% of authorized personnel strength; comparable figures for its
Panzer-Grenadier-Regiment 10 and Panzerjaeger-Abteilung 50 were 74% and 86%
respectively. On 14 December 1944 the first battalion of Panzer-Regiment 33 had
three companies of Mk IV tanks (total 28 vehicles) and one company of Stug IIIs
(14), while its second battalion fielded four companies of Panthers (57
vehicles). On 1 November 1944, 15.Panzer-Grenadier-Division was also rated a
kampfwert II, with 12956 men out of an authorized strength of 14818. While the
division's Panzer-Abteilung 115 was not actually authorized to have any Mk IV
tanks, on that date it possessed 29 of these vehicles; conversely, the
battalion was authorized to have 42 Stug IIIs, but had only 5. This situation
was somewhat compensated for by the fact that the battalion had 36 Panzerjaeger
IVs, 5 more than its authorized strength. On 9 December 1944 the battalion
possessed 14 Mk IV tanks, as a result of combat losses, and 30 Stug IIIs. The
division's manpower, as a percentage of authorized strength, stood at 98% for
Panzer-Abteilung 115, 77% and 70% respectively for Panzer-Grenadier-Regiment
104 and 115, and 92% for Panzer-Artillerie-Regiment 33. Both divisions,
therefore, were understrength in terms of manpower, and while
15.Panzer-Grenadier-Division had its full complement of armored vehicles,
9.Panzer-Division was well below its nominal authorized strength in tanks and
assault guns.(189)
LXXXI.Armeekorps of 5.Panzerarmee included 340.Volks-Grenadier-Division,
12.Volks-Grenadier-Division, 47.Volks-Grenadier-Division and
3.Panzer-Grenadier- Division. 340.Volks-Grenadier-Division was constituted on
15 September 1944 from 572.Volks-Grenadier-Division, a unit raised in the 32nd
Wave. It comprised Grenadier-Regiment 694, 695 and 696, each of two battalions,
along with four battalions in Artillerie-Regiment 340.
12.Volks-Grenadier-Division was created on 9 October 1944 by the redesignation
of the former 12.Infanterie-Division. The division included Fusilier- Regiment
12, Grenadier-Regiment 48 and Grenadier-Regiment 89, totaling six battalions of
infantry, and Artillerie-Regiment 12 of four battalions. On 19 October it
absorbed Erganzung und Ausbildungs Bataillon 473; two weeks later, on 3
November, it absorbed VIII.Landwehr-Festungs-Bataillon. It was virtually at
full strength, with approximately 14800 men, and fully equipped.
47.Volks-Grenadier-Division, on the other hand, had been created on 17
September 1944 by redesignation of 577.Grenadier-Division, a division of raw
recruits from the 32nd Wave. This unit was composed of Grenadier-Regiment 103,
104 and 115, each with two battalions, and the four battalions of
Artillerie-Regiment 147. The Armeekorp's remaining formation,
3.Panzer-Grenadier-Division, was rated at a kampfwert III on 1 November 1944.
It possessed 12185 men out of an authorized strength of 13938. On this date, it
had in its inventory 27 Stug IIIs out of an authorized strength of 42, as well
as 12 Panzerjaeger IVs out of an authorized strength of 31. The division's
Panzer-Abteilung 103 stood at 89% of its authorized personnel strength. Its
infantry components, Grenadier-Regiment 8 and 29, were at 82% and 89%
respectively of their authorized strength, and its Artillerie-Regiment 3 was at
85% authorized strength. On 10 December 1944, the eve of the Ardennes
offensive, Panzer- Abteilung 103 was nearly at full authorized strength, with
41 Stug IIIs in three companies.(190)
5.Panzerarmee also controlled three additional units on 26 November 1944, as
final preparations for the Ardennes offensive began. These were
246.Volks-Grenadier- Division, 10.SS Panzer-Division "Frundsburg", and Division
Nummer 526. The first of these, 246.Volks-Grenadier-Division, had formed on 15
September 1944 by redesignation of 565.Volks-Grenadier-Division, a formation of
the 32nd Wave. Its composition at that time was Grenadier-Regiment 352, 404 and
689 (six battalions); Artillerie-Regiment 246 (four battalions) and
Fusilier-Bataillon 246. On 3 November the division absorbed additional infantry
in the form of Festungs-MG-Bataillon 54 and Schnelle-Bataillon 503, 504 and 506
(these three units now comprising Grenadier-Regiment 404), as well as
Reserve-Grenadier-Bataillon 453 and Trier-Volkssturm-Bataillon. These
replacements, and others, were necessitated by substantial losses sustained by
the division while in action during the battles around Aachen.(191)
Division Nummer 526, also denominated as 526.Aachen-Division, was an Amalgam of
replacement units totaling some 12,711 men. Its principal units were Grenadier
Ersatz und Ausbildungs Regiment 211 (3 battalions of 12 companies), Grenadier
Ersatz und Ausbildungs Regiment 536 (4 battalions of 16 companies, a pioneer
company, a panzerjaeger company and a Flak company), Grenadier Ersatz und
Ausbildungs Regiment 253 (4 battalions of 16 companies), Artillerie Ersatz und
Ausbildungs Regiment 16 (1 battalion of 4 companies of infantry and 1
detachment of 4 batteries of artillery) and Pionier Ersatz und Ausbildungs
Battalion 253 (3 companies). By far the most formidable unit of the three was
10.SS Panzer-Division "Frundsberg". On 1 November 1944 this formation was rated
as kampfwert III, possessing 15329 men out of an authorized strength of 17425.
Relative manpower strengths of the division's principal units stood at 83% of
authorized strength for its SS Panzer-Regiment 10, 75% for SS
Panzer-Grenadier-Regiment 21, 71% for SS Panzer-Grenadier-Regiment 22, 44% for
SS Panzer-Aufklarungs-Abteilung 10 and 60% for SS Panzer-Jaeger-Abteilung 10.
The division was woefully understrength in terms of armored fighting vehicles;
out of an authorized strength of 101 Mk IV tanks, it possessed only 4; it also
possessed only 14 Panthers out of an authorized strength of 79. By 10 December
this position had deteriorated further; there were 10 Panthers and 2 Mk IVs in
the division's inventory, with 25 Panthers and 34 Mk IVs in transit.(192)
The second primary striking force for the Ardennes offensive was 6.Panzerarmee,
which on 26 November 1944 was designated Panzer Armeeoberkommando 6, and
controlled only four formations, namely 1.SS Panzer-Division "Liebstandarte
Adolf Hitler", 2.SS Panzer-Division "Das Reich", 9.SS Panzer-Division
"Hohenstauffen" and 12.SS Panzer-Division "Hitlerjugend". The senior Waffen SS
formation was 2.SS Panzer-Division "Das Reich", a unit with a formidable
reputation for combat prowess and ferocity. By the autumn of 1944, however, it
was in rather diminished circumstances; on 1 November it rated a kampfwert III,
even though its then total manpower strength of 18499 was higher than its
authorized strength of 17797. In weaponry, however, it was in woeful condition.
It was without tank destroyers of any kind, and possessed only 2 tanks out of
an authorized complement of 180. Both SS Panzer-Grenadier-Regiment 3 and 4
stood at 50% of authorized strength; the figures for SS
Panzer-Aufklarungs-Abteilung 2 and SS Panzer-Artillerie-Regiment 2 were 65% and
88% respectively. By 10 December the division's weapons situation had improved
somewhat; it then had 58 Panthers (authorized strength 79) and 28 Mk IVs. Of
these latter vehicles the division was authorized to have 101; the shortfall
was partially compensated for by the presence of an additional 28 Stug
IIIs.(193)
1.SS Panzer-Division "Liebstandarte Adolf Hitler" was in rather better
condition than its sister formation, although it too rated only a kampfwert III
on 4 November. Its manpower situation was favorable; overall, with 20500 men it
was nearly 2000 men over its authorized strength, so that each of its
subordinate combat units stood at nearly full strength. While it remained
deficient in armored fighting vehicles, it still possessed 32 Panthers, 25 Mk
IVs and 21 Panzerjaeger IVs. By 3 December the number of tanks available to the
division's organic units had not increased to authorized strength levels (it
now had 42 Panthers and 37 Mk IVs out of a total authorized strength of 180
tanks). However, the division now had attached to it SS
Schwerer-Panzer-Abteilung 501 with 45 Tiger tanks. While this division was
therefore still well below its authorized levels of armored fighting vehicles,
it still possessed a formidable armored component.(194)
On 1 November 1944, 9.SS Panzer-Division "Hohenstauffen" was rated at kampfwert
IV; with 14861 men it was well below its authorized strength of 17817. Although
its armored element, SS Panzer-Regiment 9, was at 100% of authorized personnel
strength, other combat units were debilitated. SS Panzer-Grenadier-Regiment 20,
for example, stood at only 65% of authorized strength, and while SS
Panzer-Aufklarungs-Abteilung 9 had 88% of its authorized manpower, it was
without any vehicles. Of its full complement of 180 tanks, the division
possessed only 5; it also had only one tank destroyer. By 8 December the
division was still not at full strength in terms of armored fighting vehicles;
although authorized to have 79 Panthers, it still had only 33 (with 25 in
transit), and of its authorized 101 Mk IVs it possessed only 32, the deficiency
being only partially corrected by the presence of 28 Stug IIIs in the
division's inventory.(195)
One flank of the German attack formation for the Ardennes offensive was to be
held by 15.Armee, composed of XXX.Armeekorps z.b.V. and LXXXVIII.Armeekorps, as
well as certain other units. On 26 November 1944, XXX.Armeekorps z.b.V.
comprised only one unit, a kampfgruppe of 346.Infanterie-Division. This was
another of the static infantry divisions employed by the Germans in the west,
and included Grenadier- Regiment 857 and 858, Artillerie-Regiment 346,
Fusilier-Bataillon 346, Panzer-Jaeger-Bataillon 346, Pionier-Bataillon 346 and
Nachrichten-Bataillon 346. Although it had been formed in the fall of 1942, the
division had first seen action near Caen during the Normandy fighting, where
its ranks had been considerably thinned. It was involved in the battle of the
Falaise Pocket, and retreated across France and Belgium into Holland, where it
was engaged, with a few howitzers and twenty-five hundred men, in the Battle of
the Scheldt. It was for this reason that it was characterized as a kampfgruppe
only at the end of November. Indeed, in December 1944, the division was
reformed, so decrepit had it become. It now included Grenadier-Regiment 857 and
858, as well as Grenadier- Regiment 1018, Fusilier-Bataillon 346 and
Artillerie-Regiment 346. With the exception of Grenadier-Regiment 858, which
came from the old 346.Infanterie-Division, all of these units were created from
portions of other units.(196)
LXXXVIII.Armeekorps controlled 6.Fallschirm-Jaeger-Division, along with two
additional static formations, 711.Infanterie-Division and
712.Infanterie-Division. 6. Fallschirm-Jaeger-Division had been formed in June
1944. Its table of organization was robust; Fallschirm-Jaeger-Regiment 16, 17
and 18, each of three battalions; Fallschirm-Panzerjaeger-Bataillon 6 (3
companies); Fallschirm-Granatwerfer-Bataillon 6 (3 companies);
Fallschirm-Artillerie-Regiment 6 with three battalions; Fallschirm-Flak-
Bataillon 6, with 5 batteries; Fallschirm-Pionier-Bataillon 6 of 4 companies,
Fallschirm-Nachrichten-Bataillon 6, and divisional support units. All of this,
however, was grossly misleading. Fallschirm-Jaeger-Regiment 16 did not in fact
join the division, but was instead sent to the eastern front. In addition,
formation of Fallschirm-Jaeger-Regiment 17 and 18 was never completed, because
both units immediately went into action in the Normandy battles. These
regiments, and the remainder of the division in kampfgruppe form, were nearly
destroyed in the invasion front. The remnants of the division, along with
elements from XXIX., XXXI., XXXVIII. and XL. Luftwaffen-Festungs-Bataillon,
were reformed on 15 October 1944 in Meppel, Holland. Reference to this unit's
"divisional" status in the German order of battle, therefore, is a matter of
convention only. In fact, it had never been anything more than a kampfgruppe,
and by the eve of the Ardennes offensive it was a very battered one
indeed.(197)
The other two units in LXXXVIII.Armeekorps were 711.Infanterie-Division and
712.Infanterie-Division. Both were static formations which came into being in
1941. 711.Infanterie-Division, including among its soldiers "volunteer" Turks
and Caucasians, had been decimated in the Normandy battles and subsequently
removed to Holland for reconstitution. Its Grenadier-Regiment 731, 744 and 763
were of two battalions each, and were supplemented by Fusilier-Bataillon 1711.
The division's Artillerie-Regiment 1177 had three battalions. The division also
had panzerjaeger, pioneer and signals battalions. 712.Infanterie-Division was
even more thinly populated than its sister unit. It possessed two infantry
regiments, (Grenadier-Regiment 732 and 745) with a total of six battalions,
Artillerie-Regiment 652 (one battalion only) a signals battalion, a pioneer
battalion and a single panzerjaeger company. The division had been badly mauled
in Walcheren prior to the Ardennes battle.(198)
The other shoulder of the offensive was to be supported by 7.Armee. On 26
November 1944 this formation nominally had seven army corps under its command;
however, two of these, LIII.Armeekorps and LXXXV.Armeekorps z.b.V., were staff
organizations only. Two of the corps commands were at least apparently
formidable, having under their command five divisions each. One of these was
LXXIV.Armeekorps, which controlled 275.Infanterie-Division,
344.Infanterie-Division and 89.Infanterie-Division as well as
272.Volks-Grenadier-Division and 277.Volks-Grenadier-Division.
272.Volks-Grenadier-Division was of recent vintage, having been created on 17
September 1944 by redesignation of 575.Grenadier-Division. The division had
three regiments (Grenadier-Regiment 980, 981 and 982) of two battalions each,
and four battalions of artillery under the command of Artillerie-Regiment 272.
277.Volks-Grenadier-Division was a mirror image of its cohort
272.Volks-Grenadier-Division. It had come into being on 4 September 1944 in
Hungary, having been formed from 574.Volks-Grenadier-Division, a unit of the
32nd Wave. There were a total of six infantry battalions in its
Grenadier-Regiment 989, 990 and 991, and four of artillery in
Artillerie-Regiment 277.(199)
Although the Kriegsgliedierung for 26 November 1944 lists both 275.Infanterie-
Division and 344.Infanterie-Division as under the command of LXXIV.Armeekorps,
neither of these units actually took part in the Battle of the Bulge. Indeed,
275.Infanterie- Division had been so battered in the Huertgen Forest battles
that its remnants were simply absorbed into 344.Infanterie-Division. The latter
formation was sent to the Eastern Front before the commencement of the Battle
of the Bulge.(200) 89.Infanterie-Division, however, did stay on to fight in the
battle. This division had been formed in January, 1944, was heavily engaged in
the Normandy battles, and destroyed in the Falaise pocket. It was rebuilt
thereafter, and nominally included Grenadier-Regiment 1055 and 1056 of three
battalions each, and Grenadier-Regiment 1063 of two battalions. During
September and October it absorbed a variety of Landwehr, Luftwaffe, fortress
and replacement battalions. It was with this conglomeration of troops that the
division prepared to confront its opponents in the Ardennes.(201)
Also under the command of 7.Armee on the eve of the Ardennes offensive was
LXXX.Armeekorps, comprising 353.Infanterie-Division and
212.Volks-Grenadier-Division. The latter formation had been created in
September, 1944 and consisted of Grenadier-Regiment 316, 320 and 423 totaling
six battalions, four battalions of artillery in Artillerie-Regiment 212, and a
Fusilier company. 353.Infanterie-Division had been destroyed in the West,
having fought continuously in Normandy, the Falaise pocket and along the
Siegfried Line. It was reformed in November 1944 with a hodgepodge of troops.
Its Grenadier-Regiment 941 had been formed of men from a security regiment
whose average age was 38. The division's Grenadier-Regiment 942 was made up of
troops from replacement battalions and other units in the Trier vicinity; the
men were equipped with a variety of Dutch, French, Belgian and Czech
rifles.(202)
Two more infantry formations, 18.Volks-Grenadier-Division and
26.Volks-Grenadier-Division, made up the body of LXVI.Armeekorps, another
detachment under command of 7.Armee. 18.Volks-Grenadier-Division was a new
unit, formed in Denmark on 2 September 1944 from a 32nd Wave formation,
571.Volks-Grenadier-Division. It had six battalions of infantry in
Grenadier-Regiment 293, 294 and 295, four battalions of artillery in
Artillerie-Regiment 1818, and divisional support troops. 26.Volks-Grenadier-
Division formed in Posen on 17 September 1944, also from a 32nd Wave formation,
582.Volks-Grenadier-Division, along with a cadre from the former
26.Infanterie-Division, recently destroyed in Russia. It had three regiments of
two battalions each in Fusilier-Regiment 39, Grenadier-Regiment 77 and
Grenadier-Regiment 78, Artillerie-Regiment 26 (four battalions), an additional
Fusilier company, and Panzer-Jaeger-Abteilung 26, which included
Sturmgeschutz-Abteilung 1026. In addition to the raw recruits that each of them
absorbed from the 32nd Wave formations from which they sprang, both
18.Volks-Grenadier-Division and 26.Volks-Grenadier-Division seem to have had
substantial numbers of naval and Luftwaffe personnel in their ranks. Indeed,
18.Volks-Grenadier-Division had been created to replace
18.Luftwaffen-Feld-Division, a unit destroyed in the Mons pocket. The remnants
of 18.Luftwaffen-Feld-Division had been folded into
18.Volks-Grenadier-Division.(203)
The last formation under the umbrella of 7.Armee was LVIII.Panzerkorps,
comprising two armored units (2.Panzer-Division and 116.Panzer-Division) and
three infantry divisions (352.Volks-Grenadier-Division,
276.Volks-Grenadier-Division and 326.Volks-Grenadier-Division).
276.Volks-Grenadier-Division had come into being on 4 September 1944 from the
remnants of 276.Infanterie-Division, a unit destroyed in the Normandy fighting
in August. It had six battalions of infantry (Grenadier-Regiment 986, 987 and
988) and four of artillery (Artillerie-Regiment 276). 326.Volks-Grenadier-
Division, like several other formations in 7.Armee, had been created on 4
September 1944 from a 32nd Wave unit, 579.Volks-Grenadier-Division. It was an
unusual formation, with three battalions of artillery (Artillerie-Regiment 326)
and nine of infantry (Grenadier-Regiment 751, 752 and 753). It was equipped,
however, almost entirely from captured French, Russian and Polish weapons of an
incredible variety of calibres. Yet another of these units was
352.Volks-Grenadier-Division, which came into being on 21 September 1944 from
581.Volks-Grenadier-Division of the 32nd Wave. It too was unusual, having six
battalions of infantry (Grenadier-Regiment 914, 915 and 916), four battalions
of artillery (Artillerie-Regiment 1352), a Fusilier company, Pionier-Abteilung
352 and a motorized anti-tank battalion.(204)
2. Panzer-Division was in quite a weakened condition as it prepared for the
Ardennes offensive. On 1 November 1944 it rated a kampfwert III; out of an
authorized strength of 14,716 men, it had 9,884. It was authorized to have 78
MkIV tanks and had 10; of its authorized strength of 73 Panthers it had 9. Only
its Panzerjaeger-Abteilung 38 had its full complement of troops.
Panzer-Regiment 3, Panzer-Grenadier-Regiment 2 and Panzer-Grenadier-Regiment
304 were at 67%, 60% and 42% of authorized personnel strength respectively. By
14 December the position of Panzer-Regiment 3 had improved; its first battalion
had 64 Panthers in its inventory, but its second battalion had only 28 MkIVs,
with the remaining balance of the regiment's authorized tank strength less than
compensated for by 24 Stug IIIs.(205)
The condition of 116.Panzer-Division was not much better than that of
2.Panzer-Division. It rated a kampfwert II on 8 November 1944. It was
understrength by 2500 men; it possessed 12 MkIVs (authorized 78) and a single
Panther (authorized 73), although the division had attached to it an additional
Panzer battalion with 43 Panthers in its inventory. Conditions were not greatly
improved for the division's Panzer-Regiment 16 by 16 December, when the great
offensive began. On that date, the regiment had a total of 41 Panthers (with 23
en route) and 21 MkIVs (with 5 en route, along with 14 Stug IIIs). An
additional 30 armored fighting vehicles were to be found in the division's
Panzerjaeger-Abteilung 228. Manpower strengths ranged from 93% of authorized in
Panzer-Regiment 16 to 72% in Panzer-Grenadier-Regiment 156.(206)
During the course of the Battle of the Bulge, twelve more German formations
joined their order of battle. These are reflected in the Kriegsgliederung for
31 December 1944. In the 15.Armee, the ranks of LXXIV.Armeekorps were expanded
by the addition of 85.Infanterie-Division. This unit was a 25th Wave formation
created in early February 1944. As originally constituted, it had three
battalions of artillery (Artillerie-Regiment 185) and six of infantry
(Grenadier-Regiment 1053, 1054 and 1064). By December 1944, however, it was a
shell, having been in combat since the invasion almost continuously, and
virtually destroyed in the battle around Aachen. The second unit added to
15.Armee was 3.Falschirm-Jaeger-Division, which joined LXVII.Armeekorps. It
also was present only in kampfgruppe form, having been heavily engaged in
Normandy, partially destroyed in the Falaise pocket, and withdrawn for
rebuilding in September. At that time, its ranks were filled out from seven
different Landwehr fortress battalions, as well as with men from Luftwaffe
formations. The last formation to join 15.Armee was
363.Volks-Grenadier-Division, in LXXXI.Armeekorps. This was another 32nd Wave
unit, formed September 17, 1944 from 566.Volks-Grenadier-Division. It included
six battalions of infantry (Grenadier-Regiment 957, 958 and 959), four of
artillery (Artillerie- Regiment 363.) and Fusilier-Kompanie 363.(207)
Two infantry units joined 6.Panzerarmee. 62.Volks-Grenadier-Division, which
increased the ranks of LXVI.Armeekorps, had been created on 22 September 1944
to replace the former 62.Infanterie-Division, which had been destroyed in
Bessarabia and disbanded. It had ten battalions of troops; four in
Artillerie-Regiment 162, and six in the division's infantry regiments
(Grenadier-Regiment 164, 183 and 190). 560.Volks-Grenadier-Division was added
to II.SS Panzerkorps. It was created in August 1944 from miscellaneous army and
Luftwaffe units in Norway and Denmark. In addition to a pioneer battalion and a
motorized anti-tank battalion, the division had three regiments of infantry
with six battalions total (Grenadier-Regiment 1128, 1129 and 1130) and four
battalions of artillery (Artillerie-Regiment 1560).(208)
Two armored units joined 5.Panzerarmee's XXXXVII.Panzerkorps. Panzer-Lehr-
Division had only the second battalion of its Panzer-Lehr-Regiment 130
available, with 40 Panthers and 37 MkIVs. This regiment was at full strength
(indeed, it had an excess of armored vehicles); the division's two infantry
regiments, however. (Panzer-Grenadier-Lehr-Regiment 901 and 902) were only at
about 80% of authorized personnel strength. The Fuhrer-Begleit-Brigade entered
the battle at full strength in manpower, and with 67 MkIVs in its second
battalion, Panzer-Regiment-Grossdeutschland. While both of these formations had
formidable numbers of armored vehicles, they suffered from the same manpower
issues that beset the rest of the German army at this stage of the war.(209)
Two additional armored units joined 7.Armee. Under the army's direct command
was 11.Panzer-Division, one of the stronger formations in the battle. It rated
a kampfwert II on 1 November 1944, and was nearly at full strength. On the very
eve of the battle it had in its inventory 31 MkIVs (30 en route) and 47
Panthers (37 en route). Although still technically understrength (it was 36
vehicles short of its authorized strength) it was in much better condition than
many of its cohorts. Another strong formation, joining LIIIl.Armeekorps, was
Fuhrer-Grenadier-Brigade. It was somewhat in excess of its manpower
authorization, and had 67 armored vehicles (11 Stug III, 19 MkIVs and 37
Panthers).(210)
Three infantry divisions also joined 7.Armee. 5.Fallschirm-Jaeger-Division and
9.Volks-Grenadier-Division joined LIII.Armeekorps. The condition of
5.Fallschirm-Jaeger-Division was unenviable. It had been severely mauled in the
Normandy battles, where it was reduced to mere remnants. In October it was
reformed in Holland from Flieger-Regiment 22, 51 and 53.
9.Volks-Grenadier-Division was created on October 13, 1944 in Denmark from the
so-called Schatten-Division-Dennewitz, a 32nd Wave unit. The last unit to join
the order of battle was 79.Volks-Grenadier-Division, which had come into being
on 27 October 1944 from the Katzbach (586.) Volks-Grenadier-Division. It was
typical of the type of division formed by the Germans at this stage of the
war----six battalions of infantry (Grenadier-Regiment 208, 212 and 226) and
four of artillery (Artillerie-Regiment 179.). It is reputed to have been at
about half-strength for the battle, with little in the way of artillery, but
nevertheless seems to have given a good account of itself.(211)
One of the more renowned units to take part in the Ardennes offensive was 12.SS
Panzer-Division "Hitlerjugend". This formation, which had experienced its
baptism of fire in Normandy, and then been virtually annihilated in the Falaise
pocket, had been reformed. As of November 1, 1944 it rated a kampfwert IV, with
a total manpower of almost 3,000 in excess of its prescribed maximum of 18,548.
In respect of armored fighting vehicles, however, it was well below
establishment, having 31 MkIVs out of the standard 103, and only 23 Panthers,
well below the 79 that it was supposed to have. On the eve of the offensive,
December 8, 1944, its condition had improved only slightly; it had gained 10
MkIVs and 14 Panthers. It was also able to field 22 Panzerjaeger IVs.(212)
At this juncture, it is useful to consider the system by which the Wehrmacht
filled the ranks of its field armies. Over the course of the war, Wehrmacht
infantry formations, or rather the individual soldiers that made them up, were
called up in thirty-five "waves" (Welle). In general, it can be said that the
higher the wave number, the more reduced in size was the division, and the
lower the quality of the equipment, troops and weapons. There were four basic
incarnations of the German infantry division. Waves 1 through 20 were "M1939"
divisions; these were built along the model of the 1918 German infantry
division, with three infantry regiments totaling nine battalions, and an
artillery regiment, with support troops. The main differences between the 1918
version of the German infantry division and its 1939 counterpart were brought
about by technological advances. Over time, the number of men in a division
steadily dwindled from nearly 18,000 to about 11,000. Beginning in the autumn
of 1943, German infantry divisions began to be formed as "Type 44" or "neuer
Art" divisions. Waves 21 through 28 were formed along this pattern, which was
constructed around three infantry regiments totaling six battalions and an
artillery regiment of four battalions. The nominal strength of a Type 44
division was 12,772 men. After the failed attempt on Hitler's life in July
1944, a third iteration of the German infantry division came into being, in the
form of the Volks-Grenadier-Division. These formations (waves 29-32) had a
nominal strength of 10,072 men in three regiments of two battalions each, and
an artillery regiment of four battalions. An effort was made to compensate for
the shortfall in manpower by a greater use of automatic weapons and personal
anti-tank weapons, namely the panzerschreck and the panzerfaust. The artillery
battalions, however, were of greatly reduced strength, with three of the twelve
batteries consisting of outmoded 75mm light field guns in place of three
batteries equipped with 105mm howitzers. In December 1944 the "Type 45"
division was instituted. Waves 33-35 were to be organized as Type 45 divisions,
which were very like the makeup of the Volks-Grenadier-Divisionen. Very few
such formations took the field before the end of hostilities.
The steady erosion in the size and strength of the German infantry division,
first as a result of necessity, and then as a matter of official policy, had
its roots in the Nazi regime's ill-conceived war against the Soviet Union.
Great as were the Wehrmacht early successes against the Red Army, the true
result of the war in the East was the evisceration of the German army, both in
manpower and equipment. Indeed, it is not too much to say that the Heer never
recovered from the strain placed upon it in 1941-42; the next three years of
war against the Stalinist regime merely caused the German army's condition to
go from bad to worse. The result of this could be seen in the German infantry
divisions that squared up to face the Allies in the Ardennes offensive.
Twenty-three German infantry divisions took part in the Ardennes offensive.
Thirteen (56%) of these formations (9., 18., 26., 47., 79., 212., 246., 272.,
277., 326., 340., 352. and 363.Volks-Grenadier-Divisionen) were from the 32nd
wave. 560.Volks-Grenadier-Division was from the 30th wave, and
183.Volks-Grenadier-Division was from the 31st wave. 59.Infanterie-Division was
a 27th wave static division. The remaining formations (85., 89., and
176.Infanterie-Divisionen and 12., 62., 276., and
353.Volks-Grenadier-Divisionen) had been without exception created from the
remnants of divisions that had been destroyed recently in either the West or
the East, their ranks filled or supplemented with Luftwaffe, foreign and
Landwehr personnel, ill-trained and armed with motley collections of assorted
obsolescent and exotic weapons. Some idea of the level of training of these
units may be gained from considering that the 30th and 31st waves had been
called up in August 1944, while units in the 32nd wave were called up the
following month. The thirteen divisions in the 32nd wave, therefore, went into
battle with at most four months training; the two formations from the 30th and
31st waves had the luxury of an additional month's instruction. Of the rest,
85.and 89.Infanterie-Divisionen had been reformed in October 1944 after being
mauled in Aachen and Falaise, respectively; 176.Infanterie-Division had been
constituted in November 1944; 62. and 276.Volks-Grenadier-Divisionen were
created in September 1944, and 12.Volks-Grenadier-Division the following month;
and 353.Volks-Grenadier-Division in November 1944. The last-named formation is
worth describing in detail, as an extreme (although not particularly unusual)
example of depths to which the Heer had fallen in its final six months of
existence. 353.Infanterie-Division, from which 353.Volks-Grenadier-Division
sprang, had been destroyed at Falaise. The core of the new division came from
local defense units and remnants of formations escaping from France. The
"cadre" of Grenadier-Regiment 941 consisted of old men from Sicherungs-Regiment
1, a security unit that had garrisoned Paris for two years prior to the Allied
invasion. This regiment had virtually no heavy weapons, and the average age of
its personnel was between 40 and 48; this brought the average age of
Grenadier-Regiment 941 to around 38. Grenadier-Regiment 942 was based on the
former Feld-Ersatz-Bataillon 353, which consisted of alarm and replacement
units from Trier, and was armed with a mixture of Dutch, French, Belgian and
Czech rifles.(213)
It is against this background that we must evaluate Michael Doubler's comments
on the Battle of the Bulge. Doubler is silent as to the quality of the German
formations that opposed the Americans in the Bulge; he says literally nothing
on the subject. His analysis of the battle is also bereft of any mention that
the Americans enjoyed the benefit of being on the defensive, a topic to which
he, Keith Bonn and Peter Mansoor warm easily when explaining the apparently
otherwise inexplicable ability of the German army to defend such places as the
Normandy beachhead and the Huertgen Forest. On the other hand, he is frank to
admit that the Americans enjoyed two supremely important advantages over their
German foes, namely artillery and air supremacy. Of the former, he states:
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The artillery's ability to concentrate and shift vast quantities of firepower
was extraordinary: by 21 December artillery commanders had assembled
twenty-three battalions behind the Elsenborn Ridge. The four infantry divisions
defending the northern shoulder of the Bulge received continuous support from
the 348 guns massed around Eisenborn. This unanticipated gathering of howitzers
and cannons was probably the greatest concentration of artillery firepower in
the ETO, if not in all of U.S. military history.(214)
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Of the profound effect of American air power on the Germans, Doubler has the
following comments:
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Air operations around Bastogne were only a small part of the total air effort
during the Battle of the Bulge. When the weather cleared on 23 December,
fighter-bombers flew 696 sorties to establish air superiority(215), to
interdict German L[ines]O[f]C[ommunication]s, and to assist ground units…On
Christmas Eve, Ninth Air Force P-47s flew 1,100 sorties. By 26 December
American air power was taking a toll on the enemy, as aircraft cratered and cut
highways and railroads, destroyed bridges, rubbled villages that choked German
supply lines, and demolished vast quantities of enemy vehicles and rolling
stock…During 23-31 December Ninth Air Force fighter-bombers and medium bombers
flew 10,305 sorties and dropped 6,969 tons of bombs while losing 158 aircraft.
The Ninth claimed the destruction of 2,323 enemy trucks, 207 armored vehicles,
173 gun positions, 620 railroad cars, 45 locomotives, 333 buildings, and 7
bridges.(216)
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Doubler's work is thus significant for both what it says and does not say about
the great winter battle of 1944-45. Having mentioned the powerful artillery and
air power advantage that the United States' forces possessed in the battle, he
neglects to mention that the Germans lacked adequate resources with regard to
either of these key combat elements. Instead, he returns to his theme of
American superiority---not in terms of materiel, but in terms of doctrine,
ingenuity and adaptability, to say nothing of plain old fighting resolve. On
the subject of improvisation and adaptability, for example, Doubler has the
following comments:
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Infantrymen discovered several ways to ensure their combat effectiveness. Olive
drab uniforms stood out in the snow, so riflemen rummaged through Belgian homes
and tore up white sheets to use as improvised snowsuits…The lack of overshoes
prompted troops to wrap their feet in burlap bags to prevent trench foot and
frostbite…Despite their heavy weight, armored vehicles slid and spun on icy
roads, so tankers and mechanics improvised two methods to give their steel
monsters better traction. Maintenance sections welded a short piece of angle
iron to every fifth or sixth track block that acted like a cleat, gripping snow
and chopping through ice. Other crewmen removed several rubber pads from their
tracks, so the track's steel frame clawed into the ground…Tankers mixed their
own homemade whitewash to camouflage their vehicles. A lack of antifreeze was a
problem throughout the winter, so mechanics learned to add alcohol or kerosene
to cooling systems to keep engines from freezing.(217)
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Without doubt, the ability of the American soldier to improvise, stay alive and
fight under such harsh conditions in the manner described by Doubler is a
powerful tribute to the native ingenuity and toughness of the GI. However,
reading Doubler's description of these incidents, and others like them, gives
anyone with a fair knowledge of the Wehrmacht a sense of déjà vu. In the
terrible winter of 1941-1942 in Russia, the landsers also used bed sheets as
makeshift snowsmocks to provide them with camouflage in the deep snow.(218) In
that first winter in Russia, German soldiers also lacked overshoes, and
suffered from an additional disadvantage never experienced by the GI—the
hobnailed jackboot, footwear without peer in conducting the cold. German
soldiers sought oversized boots and packed them with newsprint to act as
insulation; when this was not possible, they too resorted to wrapping their
boots in whatever material might come to hand.(219) The Germans addressed the
problems which confronted heavy armored vehicles in deep snow and ice by
copying the solution developed by the Russians, namely the wide tank tread used
on the Panther and Tiger tanks and their variants. For use with older-model
vehicles still in production---the MkIV tank and the Sturmgeschutze, both of
which were issued with a tread much narrower than that found on the Panther or
Tiger---the Germans created the so-called Ostkette, a tank tread with a
flexible extension on each link, designed to emulate the performance of wider
tank treads. The first winter in Russia also saw German troops using makeshift
camouflage, in the form of whitewash made from whatever was available, to cover
tanks and other vehicles and thereby reduce their vulnerability. The Germans
too struggled with shortages of antifreeze in 1941-1942, although in their case
the substance was virtually nonexistent rather than merely in short supply. In
Russia, however, the cold was so severe that it froze engine oil—and thus the
engines themselves—absolutely solid. German tankers adapted to this
circumstance by either leaving tank engines running constantly, or building
small fires under the engine crankcase to thaw the oil and the engine.
The present work has already discussed the concluding chapter of Doubler's
book, entitled The Schoolhouse of War. That chapter is a paean to the American
way of making war, standing for the proposition that the decisive defeat of the
Heer by the U.S. Army in western Europe during 1944-1945 may be attributed to a
number of factors, not including materiel superiority. It is also an example of
nonsense substituted for analysis, as well as a classic example of the
application of the double standard.
In his last chapter, for example, Doubler speaks to the failure of the U.S.
army to exploit its advantage in mobility, referring particularly to the
battles in Normandy and the Huertgen Forest, in which the army was unable to
deploy its vast armada of armored vehicles to good advantage. On this point he
remarks that "[R]oad networks are needed to support the logistical
infrastructure required by mechanized forces" and that "[B]ad weather restricts
cross-country maneuver, keeps vehicles roadbound, and adds to soldiers'
miseries." These conclusory statements would seem to be self-evident; for
Doubler, however, they assist in explaining the failure of the western Allies
to decisively thrash the German army before the end of 1944. Yet, the German
army had somehow managed to successfully use the selfsame roadnet in its defeat
of the French in 1940. And if adequate road networks are essential to support
mechanized forces, how do we explain the German army's victories in Russia in
1941 and 1942 (and those of the Red Army in 1943 and 1944) over road networks
that were not only inadequate, but quite nonexistent in any meaningful
sense?(220)
Doubler's final chapter also includes some quite astounding assertions. He
states, for example:
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Historians and military analysts have put too much emphasis on the army's
mobility, believing that the use of tracked and wheeled vehicles gave the army
a degree of mobility that was inappropriate for the heavy fighting in Europe.
Trucks did give the army operational mobility, but motorized movement had no
influence on the battlefield…In reality, the army's means of logistical and
operational mobility had no direct influence on combat.(221)
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One can be forgiven for goggling in disbelief at such statements. Can Doubler
really mean that "motorized movement had no influence on the battlefield" or
that "logistical and operational mobility had no direct influence on combat"?
If he is serious, and correct, then modern armies would be well advised to
embrace the model imposed on the German army by the inability of German
industry to produce sufficient wheeled and tracked transport vehicles, and rely
upon literal horsepower for "logistical and operational mobility". Even if
Doubler is correct in asserting that the mobility of the U.S. army, with its
innumerable trucks, "had no direct influence on combat", it is nevertheless
clear that the indirect influence of the army's incomparable mobility on combat
operations was staggering. It is no exaggeration to say that the ability of the
U.S. army in World War II to supply its logistical needs and move its troops
where they were most needed was without precedent in military history. That
such a capacity was vital to the ability of that army to successfully prosecute
its war cannot be gainsaid by any reasonable student of that conflict, whether
the effect of that capacity was indirect or not. For an example of what it
meant for a modern army to be unable to avail itself of the benefits of such
mobility one need look no further than the German army. In the final analysis,
such assertions, and many others like them in Closing with the Enemy ,
cannot be taken seriously.
Footnotes
(189) Nafziger, Panzers and Artillery in World War II, pp. 78, 272;
Jentz, v. 2, pp. 198-199; Dugdale,, I/3, pp. 23, 107.
(190) Nafziger, Infantry in World War II, pp. 51, 96; 306; Tessin, v.
3, pp. 235-236; v. 5, p. 142; v. 9, p. 219; Mitchell, pp. 49-51; 75-76;
233-234; Nafziger, Panzers and Artillery in World War II, p. 264;
Mitchell, pp. 395-396; Dugdale, I/3, p. 101.
(191) Nafziger, Infantry in World War II, p. 231; Tessin, v. 8, pp.
198-199; Mitchell, pp. 181-182.
(192) Nafziger, Infantry in World War II, p. 342; Tessin, v. 11, pp.
75-76; Nafziger, Waffen SS and Other Units in World War II, p. 97; Jentz, v. 2,
p. 200; Dugdale, I/3, p. 83.
(193) Nafziger, Waffen SS and Other Units in World War II, p. 48;
Jentz, v. 2, p. 200; Dugdale, I/3, p. 67.
(194) Nafziger, Waffen SS and Other Units in World War II, p. 36;
Jentz, v. 2, p. 200; Dugdale, I/3, p. 59.
(195) Nafziger, Waffen SS and OtherUnits in World War II, p. 94;
Jentz, v. 2, p. 200; Dugdale I/3, p. 73.
(196) Nafziger, Infantry in World War II, pp. 526-528; Tessin, v. 9,
pp. 240-241; Mitchell, p. 237.
(197) Zetterling, pp. 223-224; Mitchell, pp. 240-241; Nafziger, Waffen SS and
Other Units in World War II, pp. 189-190; Tessin, v. 3, pp. 37-38.
(198) Nafziger, Infantry in World War II, pp. 370-373; Tessin, v. 12,
pp. 169-170; 172-173; Mitchell, pp. 311-312.
(199) Nafziger, Infantry in World War II, pp. 267; 273; Tessin, v. 8,
pp. 308; 327; Mitchell, pp. 198-199; 202-203.
(200) Tessin, v. 8, pp. 318-319; v. 9, pp. 233-234; Nafziger, Infantry in
World War II, pp. 269-270; 525-526; Mitchell, pp. 200-201; 236-237.
(201) Nafziger, Infantry in World War II, p. 139; Mitchell, pp.
105-106; Tessin, v. 6, pp. 105-106.
(202) Tessin, v. 8, pp. 53; v. 9, pp. 265-266; Mitchell, pp. 165-166; 241-242;
Nafziger, Infantry in World War II, pp. 206-207; 312.
(203) Tessin, v. 4, pp. 90-92; Nafziger, Infantry in World War II, pp.
58-59; Mitcham, pp. 55-56; Tessin, v. 4, pp. 237-238; Nafziger, Infantry in
World War II, p. 73; Mitcham, pp. 62-63.
(204) Tessin, v. 8, pp. 321-322; Nafziger, Infantry in World War II,
p. 271; Tessin, v. 9, pp. 159-160; Nafziger, Infantry in World War II,
pp. 296-297; Tessin, v. 9, pp. 260-261; Nafziger, Infantry in World War II,
p. 310.
(205) Nafziger, Panzers and Artillery in World War II, pp. 38-46;
Dugdale, I/3, p. 17; Jentz, v. 2, p. 198.
(206) Nafziger, Panzers and Artillery in World War II, p. 154; Jentz,
v. 2, p. 198; Dugdale, I/3, p. 47.
(207) Nafziger, Infantry in World War II, pp. 134, 317; Tessin, v. 6,
pp. 80-81; Tessin, v. 9, pp. 300-301; Mitcham, p. 102; Nafziger, Waffen SS
and Other Units in World War II, pp. 182-185; Tessin, v. 2, pp. 202-203;
Mitcham, p. 418-419.
(208) Nafziger, Infantry in World War II, p. 111; Tessin, v. 5, pp.
247-248; Nafziger, Infantry in World War II, p. 352; Tessin, v. 11, p.
169.
(209) Jentz, v. 2, p. 199; Dugdale, I/3, p. 7; Nafziger, Panzers and
Artillery in World War II, pp. 165-167; Dugdale, I/3, pp. 147-161.
(210) Jentz, v. 2, pp. 198-199; Dugdale, I/3, pp. 29; 143-146.
(211) Nafziger, Infantry in World War II, pp. 46-47; 128; Waffen SS
and Other Units in World War II, pp. 186-188; Tessin, v. 3, pp. 132-133;
v. 6, pp. 47-48; v. 2, pp. 314-315.
(212) Nafziger, Panzers and Artillery in World War II, p. 103; Jentz,
v. 2, p. 200; Dugdale, I/3 p. 89.
(213) General discussions of the German Welle system may be found in a
number of secondary sources, including Nigel Thomas, The German army in World
War II (Osprey, 2002), pp. 214-215; and Nafziger, Infantry in World
War II, pp. 25-35.
(214) Doubler, p. 225.
(215) Against what, exactly, one might reasonably ask, the Luftwaffe having
long since been driven from the skies.
(216) Doubler, pp. 21-22.
(217) Ibid., pp. 222-223.
(218) At page 206 of the edition of Doubler's work reviewed herein, there is a
photograph of a column of American infantrymen marching along a Belgian road
during the Battle of the Bulge. They are clad in the makeshift snowsuits
described by Doubler. Similarly clad German soldiers are shown at page 126 of
Nigel Thomas' The German army in World War II. Similar photographs of such
German soldiers can be found in other works too numerous to mention.
(219) In addition to developing the purpose-made insulated snowsuit which was
later made available to German troops in combat zones during the winter months,
the Wehrmacht also several items of footwear designed to prevent frostbite;
among these were an insulated wicker affair that allowed landsers to spend long
periods in the snow and cold.
(220) Doubler, p. 284.
(221) Ibid., pp. 286-287.
Copyright © 2004 by Thomas E. Nutter.
Please send comments to Thomas E. Nutter at: tenutter@gmail.com.
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