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Mythos revisited: American Historians and German
Fighting Power in WWII
by Thomas E. Nutter
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Chapter Six
Max Hastings, OVERLORD
Max Hastings is another English historian who has been accused of swallowing
whole a theory that the German army was in every respect superior to its
Western opponents, and that it was defeated only by the grinding of sheer
numbers. Like the rest of the charges examined in the present work, this one is
without foundation. For example, discussing the lack of aggression displayed by
most German commanders on the morning of 6 June 1944, Hastings observes that
while the "balance of probability remains that the Allies could have gained
their beachhead against any German reaction on D-Day", nevertheless "the early
release of the armor would have made matters incomparably more dangerous for
them." He therefore concludes that "[I]t was fortunate that the senior staff
officers of all the major German formations behaved with a lassitude that
verged upon utter incompetence." One exception to this rule was Generalleutnant
Wilhelm Richter of 716.Infanterie-Division , who ordered one of his
battalions forward to recapture the Orne and Caen Canal bridges from British
paratroopers early in the morning. When this unit encountered stiff resistance
from the enemy, however, it desisted from its attack and accepted a stalemate.
Hastings observes that "716th Division's operations were conducted with nothing
like the determination that could have been expected from a top-class
formation."(63)
Hastings' praise for the martial qualities of the American soldier is
continuous. In his discussion of the near fiasco on Omaha beach, he pays
special tribute to the Ranger battalions that carried the day for the
Americans. "It was a tribute to the quality of the Rangers that despite losses
on a scale that stopped many infantry units in their tracks on Omaha that
morning, the survivors of C Company pressed on to climb the cliffs west of the
beach with bayonets and toggle ropes, clearing German positions one by one in a
succession of fierce close-quarter actions with tommy guns and phosphorus
grenades." It was these men, and their brothers in arms from the US 1st and
29th Infantry Divisions, "a handful of courageous leaders and small groups of
men" who "forced a path for the American army off Omaha beach." It is in this
context that Hastings makes reference to "Chester Wilmot and others" who
"seized upon the example of Omaha to demonstrate the supposed shortcomings of
the American soldier." Hastings rejects such an evaluation, noting that on
D-Day, there were "sufficient outstanding individual American soldiers and
enough elite units such as the Rangers and Airborne to gain the day."(64)
Hastings is effusive in his praise for American leadership. For example, he
extols in detail the virtues of General Lawton Collins, commander of the US VII
Corps. As a result of Collins' leadership, his force showed "speed and energy"
in reaching the port of Cherbourg . Hastings refers to Collins as "one of the
outstanding personalities of the campaign", a professional soldier who endured
long years of stagnation between the wars in preparation for the role he was to
play in this critical campaign. A man of "catholic" tastes, Collins was "a
ruthless driver of men" who unhesitatingly removed from command officers of all
ranks who failed to meet his standards. Far from being critical of his subject,
the author praises Collins for having "a superb eye for an opportunity on the
battlefield: American ---and British---forces in Normandy sorely needed more
commanders out of his mould."(65)
As noted above, Hastings is clearly not in the camp of those who maintain that
the German army was the epitome of professionalism. He refers, for example, to
the "crushing tactical surprise" the western Allies inflicted upon the Germans
on 6 June 1944, a boggle exceeded only by the fact that the Allies' Operation
FORTITUDE, a massive strategic deception which convinced the Germans
that General Patton was poised to invade northern France with still another
American army, "imprisoned almost the entire Fifteenth Army in the Pas de
Calais until late July." He points out that the most senior German commanders
failed to reach a consensus about how best to respond to the invasion during
its critical first days and hours. Generaloberst Alfred Jodl, the
oft-belittled toady of the Fuhrer, quickly perceived that there would be no
second invasion, while Generalfeldmarshall Erwin Rommel, the cagey
veteran of innumerable battles with these same opponents, was persuaded that 15.Armee
should remain intact and in place, thereby depriving himself and his men of
reinforcements that might have had an incalculable effect upon the battle and
perhaps the war itself. Equally deleterious to the German effort in Normandy,
according to Hastings, was the morbid state of their intelligence. "Almost
totally devoid of air reconnaissance, with every agent in Britain under British
control, lacking any breakthrough in Allied codes and aided only by the fruits
of low-grade wireless interception and prisoner interrogation on the
battlefield, Rommel, von Rundstedt and von Kluge knew pathetically little of
their enemies' potential strength or plans." It should be noted that these
characteristics, namely poor leadership and faulty intelligence, are also cited
by Hastings' critics as explanations for German defeat in the West.(66)
Footnotes
(63) Hastings, pp. 77-78.
(64) Ibid., pp. 94-102.
(65) Ibid., p. 162.
(66) Ibid., pp. 172-3, 178.
Copyright © 2004 by Thomas E. Nutter.
Please send comments to Thomas E. Nutter at: tenutter@gmail.com.
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