At least two things are evident from the foregoing passage. First, Creveld does not refer to U.S. combat divisions, as Bonn claims, but to "units", a fact which is evident from not only the paragraph in question, but from the surrounding context as well. Such "units" could include something as small as an armored company or platoon, or a fighter or bomber squadron, or even an individual aircraft. Second, at least one of the animals referred to by Creveld---"birds"---was in fact used as a divisional symbol by at least two

U.S. combat formations---the 45th Infantry Division and the 101st Airborne Division---and at least as far as is known, the soldiers in those formations were not "embarrassed" by those symbols. Moreover, one need only consult any one of a number of works on the Eighth Air Force to determine that many of its units bore symbols such as belligerent dogs, bees and hornets, ruptured ducks, bulls and the like.

Bonn's flawed methodology in approaching his topic is apparent very early in the book. For example, he asserts that the personnel strength of German units (which he claims are not available from German sources) may be gleaned from American sources. This can be done, according to Bonn, by "meticulously screening available U.S. intelligence reports" and comparing these to the estimates provided by German veterans of the Vosges campaign in the manuscripts they wrote for the U.S. Army in the immediate postwar era. The numbers thus yielded are then cross-referenced with German tables of organization and equipment to give "accurate hard quantities or numbers". There are at least two serious drawbacks to this method. First, as Niklas Zetterling has shown, while numbers of personnel and weapons may not be available from the records of a large German formation (such as Heeresgruppe G), those numbers are often available, either directly or by "patching together" from subordinate formations such as divisions or army corps.(108) Second, no one with anything more than a passing familiarity with the German army would suggest that cross-checking against a German table of organization and equipment in 1944 would be a meaningful exercise. The fact of the matter is that such tables were fanciful characterizations of what the OKW and OKH would have liked for their formations to look like. For example, on 1 August 1944 Panzer Divisions underwent a complete reorganization, into the so-called "Type 44 Panzer Division". A Panzer Division included one Panzer regiment of two battalions; the first battalion included four companies of 17-22 Panther tanks each, while the second battalion possessed four companies of 17-22 Mk IV tanks each.(109) 21.Panzer-Division engaged the Allies during the Normandy fighting. On 8 August 1944 its Panzer-Regiment 22 fielded a total of 20 combat ready Mk IV tanks, over sixty fewer than its maximum authorized strength. More interesting still is the makeup of 21.Panzer-Division on the eve of the Normandy campaign, at which time it was organized as a "Type 43 Panzer Division". According to this organizational structure, it should have had two Panzer battalions, the first consisting of four companies of 22 Mk IVs each, and the second comprising four companies of 22 Panthers each. In fact, on 1 June 1944 the first battalion of Panzer-Regiment 22 had four companies of 17 Mk IVs each, while the Regiment's second battalion broke down as follows: 5 Kompanie, 5 Mk IV (long barrel), 9 French Somua; 6 Kompanie, 5 Mk IV (long barrel), 13 French Somua, 2 British Hotchkiss; 7 Kompanie, 5 Mk IV (long barrel), 13 French Somua; 8 Kompanie, 6 Mk IV (short barrel).(112) These discrepancies between the nominal strength of the 21.Panzer-Division and its actual makeup are typical of the distinctions between ideal and reality which characterized all formations in the German army at this stage of the war.

It is indeed on this fundamental issue of German combat organization that Bonn runs aground very early. In his section entitled "German army Organization", Bonn discusses the makeup of German infantry, panzer, mountain and panzergrenadier divisions, suggesting that the organization of these various formations did not change from 1939 onward.(113) Of the reorganization of panzer divisions in 1943 and 1944 he gives no inkling whatever. Likewise, he indicates that German infantry divisions included three infantry regiments of three battalions each. In fact, since at least the middle of 1943 many German infantry divisions, including those taking part in the critical battle of Kursk on the Eastern Front, fielded only six infantry battalions.(114) This structure was formalized in 1944 by the organization of the "Type 44 Division".(115) For example, on 18 October 1944 198.Infanterie-Division, which took part in the Vosges campaign, included Grenadier-Regiment 305, 308 and 326, each having two battalions.(116) Formations such as 198.Infanterie-Division therefore had much the same character as the Volks-Grenadier divisions created by the German army in late 1944, the character of which Bonn adequately describes.(117)

In the introductory portion of his work, Bonn acknowledges several facts concerning the condition of the Wehrmacht in 1944, which facts evidently elude him later in the book. Describing the coastal defense divisions (Kustenverteidigungsdivision) guarding the French coast, he observes that they were composed of "older troops, convalescing wounded, or somehow otherwise physically disabled soldiers of little value in a field environment." He notes further that they had no transport capability. Referring to the Volks-Grenadier divisions, he points out that they possessed diminished reconnaissance capability and severely reduced artillery assets, and that normally they trained for only ten weeks before being deployed in combat. He comments also upon the fact that the reduced strength of German divisions, particularly their reduction from three to two battalions per regiment, meant that such units could not be relied upon to accomplish the sort of tasks called for by German doctrine, namely counterattacks. These changes, and others, resulted in "a loss of operational flexibility and increased friction in battle."(118)

In a brief passage, Bonn also recognizes shortcomings in the German training regime brought about by the exigencies of war, and in particular by the losses sustained since the beginning of the Russian campaign in 1941. He notes, for example, that the traditional reliance upon the regimental Erzatzbataillon to train recruits had been undermined by the pressure to replace losses as quickly as possible from any sources available, so that the "feeling of belonging to a specific unit from the outset of a soldier's military service was diminished if not altogether lost." The same stresses led, as the war continued, to wholesale conversion of Luftwaffe personnel into field combat troops, in many cases comprising what came to be known as Luftwaffen-Feld-Divisionen. Likewise, extraneous naval personnel became replacements for army formations. In both situations, Bonn recognizes, there could be no expectation that training in infantry combat techniques would be sufficient. Bonn also acknowledges the increasing German reliance on Volksdeutsche, the growing tendency to commit training units to combat, and the resort to draconian techniques of discipline, all of which contrived to reduce the combat effectiveness of the Wehrmacht .(119)

It is noteworthy that in his brief remarks on the deficiencies of the German army in the autumn of 1944, Bonn focuses upon symptoms instead of causes. This, it will become plain, is a characteristic of the genre. A reader lacking sufficient historical background, upon being confronted with Bonn's evidence, might well conclude that the German army and its leadership had simply lost contact with reality, and wantonly reconstituted their field formations in ways that would render them incapable of fulfilling the tasks called upon them by German doctrine. The root cause of the disconnect between the war the Germans were fighting and their ability to fight it, namely the fundamental destruction of the German army by the war in the East, is only alluded to. There are, of course, scattered references to the fact that the German army had been at war continuously since the autumn of 1939, and indeed even that it had been engaged against the Red Army for three years before Allied troops ever set foot on Western Europe. In fact, however, there is no recognition that the Red Army had simply gutted the Wehrmacht in those three years of bitter fighting. Indeed, the reverse is true---Bonn and his cohorts purposefully lead the reader to the inference that the United States and German armies were somehow fighting on equal terms from June 1944 to the end of the war. Conveniently left out of the story is the fact, for example, that since the beginning of 1942 the German army had never been capable of replenishing the personnel losses sustained in the East, that its mobility, which had never been great in the first place, had been severely reduced by attrition over five years of warfare, that its combat units were persistently short of manpower, weapons and munitions, and that it had been forced to rely upon foreign conscripts whose loyalty and combat effectiveness were both highly suspect.

Bonn begins his narrative with a description of the so-called Battle for the High Vosges. While the premise of Bonn's work is that the Vosges campaign was fought on equal terms, a detailed reading of his own description of it shows that it was not. For example, he admits that the defensive positions constructed in the area of the German LXIV.Armeekorps, built by, among others, Russian prisoners, members of the Hitler Jugend and RAD, and the Organization Todt, were ill suited to German doctrine. In particular, they were not constructed in a manner which would facilitate mutual fire support. Likewise, the condition of the German units comprising 19.Armee was not good. The premier unit, 21.Panzer-Division, "was in the best shape it had been in since the Normandy campaign."(120) As has been noted previously about this formation, such a statement does not say much. Compared to the other German units involved, however, it may in fact have been of noteworthy quality. While Bonn is at some pains to describe these other German units, and does so with some frankness as to their shortcomings, he hardly does them justice. He describes the tactical organization of 16.Volks-Grenadier-Division as "chaotic", pointing out that it had been created out of troops from destroyed and disbanded units. In fact, the division's Grenadier-Regiment 221, 223 and 225 each disposed of only one battalion of troops. As Bonn notes, the division included security, fortress and jaeger troops; it also, however, included a motley array of Kriegsmarine, Luftwaffe and army training formations. All in all, 16.Volks-Grenadier-Division did not hold promise for high combat effectiveness.(121)

As has been previously observed, an essential part of Bonn's methodology is to rely not upon German records, but upon contemporary U.S. Army intelligence reports, for evidence about the constitution of German units in the Vosges campaign. This is well demonstrated by his treatment of the so-called 716.Volks-Grenadier-Division, also purportedly subordinate to LXIV.Armeekorps. Noting that it included remnants of a variety of units, including men from the Kriegsmarine and the Luftwaffe, Bonn observes that its major subordinate units were Volks-Grenadier-Regiment 726 and 736. In fact, there is no evidence that 716.Volks-Grenadier-Division ever existed. There was, instead, a 716.Infanterie-Division in the German order of battle during the Vosges campaign, whose principal maneuver elements were Grenadier-Regiment 726 and 736. 716.Infanterie-Division had been formed as an occupation division in 1941, and was virtually annihilated in the Normandy fighting. It was reorganized in August 1944. At that time, the companies of Grenadier-Regiment 726 possessed a total of 14 machine guns and no infantry support or anti-tank guns. At the same time, the companies of Grenadier-Regiment 736 managed 12 machine guns, no infantry support guns, and a single 75mm PAK 40 anti-tank weapon. Likewise, the division's Artillerie-Regiment 1716 had no guns. At the beginning of November 1944, 716.Infanterie-Division absorbed troops from no less than 17 different battalions and 9 different regiments and companies. It is no wonder that American intelligence officers, upon whose reports Bonn relies for his information, produced incorrect information about 716.Infanterie-Division, since most of the captured Germans interviewed by them probably had no real idea of the identity of the division to which they belonged. Even Bonn admits that this disparate collection of Luftwaffe, Kriegsmarine and over-aged troops "received only rudimentary infantry combat training", an evaluation that is probably generous in the extreme.(122)

Bonn describes 198.Infanterie-Division, also part of LXIV.Armeekorps, as being in "a difficult personnel predicament", even though it supposedly fielded some 3800 infantrymen at the start of the campaign. He avers that the division had two infantry regiments (Grenadier-Regiment 305 and 308) composed mainly of Reichsdeutsche, but that many of the soldiers "had been previously adjudged unfit for combat duty". 198.Infanterie-Division had been destroyed in Russia and rebuilt in southern France at the beginning of June 1944. It actually fielded three infantry regiments (Grenadier-Regiment 305, 308 and 326), each containing two battalions, as well as Artillerie- Regiment 235, Fusilier-Bataillon 235 and Feldersatz-Bataillon 198. In a fashion similar to 716.Infanterie-Division, on the eve of the Vosges campaign 198.Infanterie-Division absorbed troops from six different battalions and five regiments and companies, including men from two Kriegsmarine units, 8.Schiffs-Stamm-Abteilung and leichte Marine-Artillerie-Abteilung 687 . A less worthy opponent for the U.S. Army can scarcely be imagined.(123)

Bonn includes several situation maps for specific dates during the Vosges campaign. Each of these situation maps is associated with an order of battle for the same period, in which the American and German units involved are set out. The first of these situation maps covers the period 15 October-21 October 1944. The German portion of the order of battle includes, under Heeresgruppe G, 19.Armee (IV.Luftwaffen-Feldkorps, LXIV. Armeekorps) and 1.Armee (LXXXIX.Armeekorps, LVIII.Panzerkorps). The further breakdown depicts IV.Luftwaffen-Feldkorps controlling 338.Volks-Grenadier-Division; LXIV.Armeekorps directing 198.Infanterie-Division (reinforced with (Kosaken-) Festungs-Grenadier-Regiment 360) and 716.Volks-Grenadier-Division; LXXXIX. Armeekorps including 21.Panzer-Division and 16.Volks-Grenadier-Division; and LVIII. Panzerkorps commanding 11.Panzer-Division (committed primarily against U.S. XII Corps), 15.Panzer-Grenadier-Division (withdrawn 16 October) and 553.Volks- Grenadier-Division. This work has previously outlined the structure of 198.Infanterie- Division on 16 October 1944. We have also discussed the composition of 16.Volks- Grenadier-Division, as well as that of the nonexistent 716.Volks-Grenadier-Division (in fact 716.Infanterie-Division ).(124)

There is certainly a discrepancy between the order of battle set forth by Bonn for the German forces on the date in question and that shown in the Kriegsgliederung dated October 13, 1944. The latter shows LVIII.Panzerkorps (subordinate to 5.Panzerarmee, not 1.Armee) including 11.Panzer-Division and 15.Panzer-Grenadier-Division (and not 553.Volks-Grenadier-Division); LXIV.Armeekorps having 198.Infanterie-Division and 716.Infanterie-Division; and IV.Luftwaffen-Feldkorps including 338.Infanterie-Division. The Kriegsgliederung does show 21.Panzer-Division and 16.Volks-Grenadier-Division to be part of Heeresgruppe G's order of battle, but as part of 5.Panzerarmee's XXXXVII. Panzerkorps. On the date in question, LXXXIX.Armeekorps belonged to Heeresgruppe B's 15.Armee .(125)

What German forces, then, did the troops of the U.S. 7th Army's VIth and XVth Corps actually encounter between 15 and 21 October 1944? According to the Kriegsgliederung for 13 October 1944, the German 1.Armee consisted of LXXXII. Armeekorps (416.Infanterie-Division, 462.Infanterie-Division and 19.Volks-Grenadier- Division) and XIII.SS-Armeekorps (17.SS Panzer-Grenadier-Division "Gotz von Berlichingen", 559.Volks-Grenadier-Division and 48.Infanterie-Division, along with the remnant of 553.Volks-Grenadier-Division). On the same date, the Kriegsgliederung shows 19.Armee as having had LXIV.Armeekorps (716.Infanterie-Division [bodenstadig] and 198.Infanterie-Division), IV.Luftwaffen-Feldkorps (338.Infanterie- Division) and LXXXV.Armeekorps z.b.V. (159.Infanterie-Division, 189.Infanterie-Division and Panzer-Brigade 106). A detailed consideration of these German units is warranted, in order to properly evaluate Bonn's thesis that the Vosges campaign represented one in which the opposing forces were equally matched.(126)

LXXXII.Armeekorp's 19.Volks-Grenadier-Division was two weeks old when the Vosges campaign began, having been constituted on 1 October 1944 from 19.Grenadier-Division (formed 8 August 1944) along with Ersatz und Ausbildungs Bataillon 463. It included the remnants of 19.Luftwaffe-Sturm-Division, which had been destroyed in Italy. Its three regiments (Volks-Grenadier-Regiment 59, Volks-Grenadier-Regiment 73 and Volks-Grenadier-Regiment 74) each fielded two battalions of four companies each. The division also included Panzer-Jaeger-Bataillon 119 and Artillerie-Regiment 719, as well as Pionier-Bataillon 119, signals and support units. Panzer-Jaeger-Bataillon 119 was noteworthy for having not only 12 towed 75mm antitank guns, but also the services of Sturmgeschutz-Abteilung 1119.(127)

LXXXII.Armeekorp's 416.Infanterie-Division had been on garrison duty in Denmark before the Allied invasion. It included Grenadier-Regiment 712, 713 and 774 with a total of six battalions, Artillerie-Regiment 416, Panzer-Jaeger-Abteilung 416 and pioneer, signals and support units. 416.Infanterie-Division was composed of men whose average age was thirty-eight. It had been nicknamed the "whipped cream division" as a reflection upon the special diets that many of its soldiers required. When it encountered the U.S. 7th Army in the Vosges at the beginning of October, it possessed roughly 8500 troops and little in the way of artillery. 462.Infanterie-Division was composed of Grenadier-Regiment 1215, 1216 and 1217 and Artillerie-Regiment 1462. It had no organic panzerjaeger unit. While this division (redesignated in November 1944 as 462. Volks-Grenadier-Division) was listed on the order of battle of LXXII.Armeekorp, in fact it was engaged in the defense of Metz, where it was destroyed.(128)

XIII.SS Armeekorp's 48.Infanterie-Division fielded Volks-Grenadier-Regiment 126, 127 and 128, each with two battalions of infantry. The division also had Panzer-Jaeger-Abteilung 148, which consisted of two companies. The division's Artillerie- Regiment 148 had three batteries of light and medium howitzers. 553.Volks-Grenadier-Division was created on 9 October 1944 by renaming 553.Grenadier-Division, which itself had been created on 11 July 1944. There were a total of five battalions in the division's Grenadier-Regiment 1119 and 1120, along with four battalions in its Artillerie-Regiment 1553. The reason that the Kreigsgliederung shows this formation as a "remnant" is that its core element, 553.Grenadier-Division, had been destroyed near Nancy. Whatever was left of 553.Grenadier-Division was reinforced with an amalgam of formations including Festungs-Infanterie-Bataillon 1416, Festungs-MG-Bataillon 51, Festungs-MG-Bataillon 56, Sicherheits-Bataillon 960, Grenadier Ersatz und Ausbildungs Bataillon 110 and Pionier-Bataillon 243. It is far from likely that 553.Volks-Grenadier-Division was a cohesive force when it was encountered in the Vosges Mountains. Likewise, 559.Volks-Grenadier-Division had been formed on 9 October 1944 by renaming its core formation, 559.Grenadier-Division (formed 11 July 1944). 559.Volks-Grenadier-Division had six battalions in Grenadier-Regiment 1125, 1126 and 1127 as well as four in Artillerie-Regiment 1559. 17. SS Panzer-Grenadier-Division "Gotz von Berlichingen" had been formed as an elite division in October 1943. It had been virtually destroyed in Normandy and was withdrawn and reformed, absorbing SS Panzer-Grenadier-Brigade 49 and 51 from Denmark. In October 1944 it had not completed the process of reformation.(129)

German 19.Armee included LXIIII.Armeekorps, whose constituent units (716.Infanterie-Division and 198.Infanterie-Division) have previously been described. It is worth mentioning, however, that the Kriegsgliederung denotes 716.Infanterie-Division as "bodenstadig" (static) the military implication of which is that the unit had no organic means of transportation. 19.Armee's IV.Luftwaffen-Feldkorps had only one division, 338.Infanterie-Division. It had been created in November 1942 as a coastal defense unit. There were six battalions in its Grenadier-Regiment 757, 758 and 759 and three in its Artillerie-Regiment 338. It had suffered considerably in the retreat across France, and was reformed in October from a number of battalion-sized formations from the Luftwaffe and Kriegsmarine, as well as Landeschutzen and fortress troops. LXXXV.Armeekorps' 159.Infanterie-Division had also been formed less than a week before the U.S. 7th Army encountered it in the Vosges. There were six battalions in its Grenadier-Regiment 1209, 1210 and 1211 and four in Artillerie-Regiment 1059. It also had Panzer-Jaeger-Bataillon 1059. Also less than a week old on its first contact with the Americans was 189.Infanterie-Division, comprised of Grenadier-Regiment 1212, 1213 and 1214 with a total of six battalions, Artillerie-Regiment 1089 of four battalions and Panzer-Jaeger-Bataillon 1089, as well as support troops. Grenadier-Regiment 1212 had been reformed from Sicherheits-Regiment 1000; Grenadier-Regiment 1213 was constituted of ad hoc units including the so-called Jung, Hollermeier and Muller Bataillonen; Grenadier-Regiment 1214 was as well created from an ad hoc unit, the so-called Menke Regiment. The Armeekorps' last unit, Panzer-Brigade 106, had been formed at the end of August 1944 and contained Panzer-Abteilung 2106 (four companies) and Panzer-Grenadier-Bataillon 2106 (five companies). On 12 September 1944 its armored element consisted of 11 Jagdpanzer IV and 36 Panther tanks.(130)

The forces encountered by the U.S. Vlth and XVth Corps between 15 and 21 October 1944, therefore, included units typical of those found throughout the German army in this last six months of war. 716.Infanterie-Division was one of the Army's weakest formations, having been totally destroyed in the Normandy battles, and by Bonn's own admission consisted of, among others, former Luftwaffe and Kriegsmarine personnel who were overage and without adequate infantry training. Its sister formation in LXIV.Armeekorps, 198.Infanterie-Division, was a similar amalgam of inexperienced and untrained personnel, again by Bonn's own admission previously adjudged unfit for combat duty. None of the infantry formations on the German side fielded more than six battalions of infantry. Four of the German formations (553. and 559.Volks-Grenadier-Division and 159. and 189.Infanterie- Division) had been in being less than a week before the American campaign began, while another (19.Volks-Grenadier-Division) had been created two weeks before the start of the American effort in the Vosges. One German unit (416.Infanterie-Division) consisted of less than robust soldiers whose average age exceeded thirty-eight years, while at least one other (48.Infanterie-Division) was composed of a large number of foreign nationals with no personal loyalty to the Third Reich.

Not even Keith Bonn would assert that, faced with such opposition, the American soldiers carrying out the assault between 15 and 21 October were at a quantitative or qualitative disadvantage. He does assert, however, that obvious disparities between these German forces and the Allied troops involved (3rd, 36th, 45th and 79th U.S. Infantry Divisions, 106th U.S. Combat Command and 2nd French Armored Division) were leavened by two principal elements, namely the higher rate of fire of the German machine guns, and the advantages offered by the terrain to the German defenders. Nevertheless, he admits that the Americans outnumbered their opponents in both men and weapons. The outcome of this struggle, as Bonn describes it, was a draw---the Americans achieved their objectives, while the Germans traded space and troops for three weeks' time---"time to further prepare the positions that constituted the last barrier before the Vosges passes and the Alsatian Plain, time that would bring the winter snows and fog to completely stymie American air support and superior quantities of armor, and time that would bring relief as a result of the Germans' December Ardennes counteroffensive."(131)

Bonn goes on to describe the so-called "fight for the Vosges winter line" between 5 November 1944 and the end of the month. According to Bonn, on 5 November 19.Armee included IV.Luftwaffen-Feldkorps (198.Infanterie-Division) and LXIV.Armeekorps (21.Panzer-Division and Panzer-Brigade 106, 716. and 16.Volks-Grenadier-Division), while 1.Armee had LXXXIX.Armeekorps (361. and 553.Volks-Grenadier-Division). The Kriegsgliederung, however, shows that 1.Armee on this date disposed of three corps, namely LXXXII.Armeekorps (416. and 49. [bodenstadig] Infanterie-Division, 19.and 462.Volks-Grenadier-Division and 17.SS Panzer-Grenadier-Division "Gotz von Berlichingen" ), XIII.SS Armeekorps (48.Infanterie-Division and 559.Volks-Grenadier-Division), and LXXXI.Armeekorps (361. and 553.Volks-Grenadier-Division). On the same date the Kriegsgliederung shows 19.Armee as including LXIV.Armeekorps (716.Infanterie-Division [bodenstadig] and 16.Volks-Grenadier-Division, 21.Panzer-Division and Panzer-Brigade 106), IV.Luftwaffen-Feldkorps (198. and 269.Infanterie-Division) and LXXXV.Armeekorps (159., 189.and 338.Infanterie-Division).(132)

Bonn includes another order of battle for the German forces for the period between 12 and 26 November, in which the only change from that of 5 November is the exchange of 708.Volks-Grenadier-Division for 21.Panzer-Division in LXIV.Armeekorps. His narrative, however, sets forth yet another order of battle for 26 November in which 19.Armee has lost IV.Luftwaffen-Feldkorps, but retains LXIV.Armeekorps, now consisting of 708., 716.and 16.Volks-Grenadier-Division. According to this order of battle, the character of 1.Armee has changed completely. Its XIII.SS Armeekorps is shown to command 11.Panzer-Division and 17.SS Panzer-Grenadier-Division "Gotz von Berlichingen". The Armee's other corps is identified as "Hoehe Kommando der Vogesen", possessed of Panzer-Lehr-Division, 25.Panzer-Grenadier-Division, and 256. and 361.Volks-Grenadier-Division.(133)

Footnotes
(100) Bonn, Keith E., When the Odds Were Even : The Vosges Campaign, October 1944-January 1945 (Presidio Press, 1994) (hereinafter "Bonn").
(101) Ibid., pp. ix-xi.
(102) Ibid., pp. 1-2.
(103) Ibid., p. 2.
(104) Ibid., p. 3.
(105) Ibid., pp. 5-6. Exactly how the author knows that "most German units" possessed their full complement of these important infantry weapons is unclear, since he cites no German documents to substantiate the claim.
(106) Ibid., p. 8.
(107) Creveld, p. 46.
(108) Zetterling, Niklas, Normandy 1944 (Manitoba, 2000).
(109) Nafziger, George, The German Order of Battle: Panzers and Artillery in World War II (Greenhill, 1999), p. 27; Davies, W.J.K., German army Handbook 1939-1945 (New York, 1974), pp. 32-40; Jentz, Thomas L., Panzertruppen v.2 (Schiffer, 1996), p. 159.
(110) Zetterling, p. 376.
(111) Jentz, v. 2, p. 53.
(112) Zetterling, p. 370.
(113) Bonn, pp. 41-45.
(114) Dunn, Walter S., Kursk Hitler's Gamble, 1943 (Praeger, 1997) ch. 4; Zetterling, pp. 17-18.
(115) Nafziger, George F., The German Order of Battle: Infantry in World War II (Greenwood, 2000) pp. 32-33.
(116) Nafziger, Infantry in World War II, pp. 192-194; Tessin, Georg, Verbande und Truppen der deutschen Wehrmacht und Waffen-SS 1939-1945 (Osnabruek, 1976), v. 7, pp. 284-286.
(117) Bonn, pp. 46-48.
(118) Ibid.
(119) Ibid., pp. 48-51.
(120) Ibid., p. 79. Bonn's assertions about the reinforcement of 21.Panzer-Division do not appear to be correct. He claims that in October, 1944 it absorbed Panzer-Brigade 113 and one half of Panzer-Brigade 112. It would appear, however, that Panzer-Brigade 112 was disbanded on 23 September 1944 and incorporated into 21.Panzer-Division. On 1 October 1944, however, Panzer-Brigade 113 was split apart to reinforce both 15.Panzer-Grenadier-Division and 11.Panzer-Division. It does not appear that any portion of Panzer-Brigade 113 went to 21.Panzer-Division. Bonn remarks (p.80) that Panzer-Regiment 22 disposed of about half its normal complement of Mk IV and Panther tanks. If true, this indicates that at the time Panzer-Regiment 112 was absorbed, there were no tanks in either of Panzer-Regiment 22's battalions, since on 12 September 1944 Panzer-Brigade 112 possessed 45 Mk IVs, 45 Panthers and 10 StuG IIIs. Thus while Bonn wants the reader to draw the inference that 21.Panzer-Division was a formidable formation, comprising up to five tank battalions, in fact it likely possessed no more than one hundred armored fighting vehicles. See, Nafziger, Panzers and Artillery in World War II, pp. 207-208. Indeed, the likelihood is that Panzer-Regiment 22 had substantially fewer than 100 armored fighting vehicles when it first went into action in the Vosge, for on 3 November 1944 it had 29 MkIVs and 8 Panthers . Jentz, v. 2, p. 165.
(121) Nafziger, Infantry in World War II , p. 56, Tessin, v. 4, p. 33; Mitcham, Samuel W., Hitler's Legions (Stein and Day, 1985), pp. 53-54.
(122) Nafziger, Infantry in World War II , pp. 374-377; Bonn, pp. 82-83, Tessin, v. 12, pp. 182-183; Mitcham, p. 314.
(123) Bonn, p. 83; Nafziger, Infantry in World War II, pp. 192-194; Tessin, v. 7, pp. 284-286. With regard to the motley assemblage of troops comprising 198.Infanterie-Division, Bonn quotes (p. 83) an anonymous GI as stating: "I don't care if the guy behind that gun is a syphilitic prick who's a hundred years old---he's still sitting behind eight feet of concrete and he's still got enough fingers to press triggers and shoot bullets!". It is unlikely that even the Wehrmacht placed in the field any troops who were one hundred years old, although it is a matter of record that German "soldiers" in their seventies were captured by the U.S. 4th Infantry Division during the battles in the Huertgen Forest. See, Rush, p. 177. Of one thing we can be certain: there may have been "syphilitic pricks" among the U.S. forces engaged in the Vosges campaign, but not many of them were even in their forties, and certainly none in their seventies
(124) Bonn, p. 90.
(125) Kriegsgliederung, 13 October 1944 , in The Organization of the German army 1939-1945, David Westwood, CD 1999; Mehner, Kurt, Die Geheimen Tagesberichte der deutschen Wehrmachtfuehrung im Zweiten Weltkrieg 1939-1945 (Osnabruek, 1985), v. 11, pp. 345-347.
(126) Westwood, Kriegsgliederung 13 October 1944; Die Geheimen Tagesberichte der deutschen Wehrmachtfuehrung im Zweiten Weltkrieg 1939-1945 v. 11 , pp. 345-347.
(127) Nafziger, Infantry in World War II , pp. 61-62; Tessin v. 4, p. 115; v. 6, pp. 279-280; Mitcham, pp. 56-57; Schmitz, Peter, Thies, Klaus-Juergen, Wegmann, Guenter, Zweng, Christian, Die deutschen Divisionen 1939-1945, (Osnabrueck, 2000) v. 4, pp. 90-92.
(128) Nafziger, Infantry in World War II , pp. 336-337; 340-341; Tessin, v. 10, pp. 127-129; 226; Mitcham, p. 269; pp. 277-278.
(129) Nafziger, Infantry in World War II, pp. 96-97; 349-351; Tessin, v. 4, p. 77; v. 5, p. 149; v. 7, p. 67; v. 11, pp. 147; 166; Mitcham, pp. 76-77; 288-289; 291; 458-459; Die deutschen Divisionen 1939-1945, v. 4, pp. 29-32; Nafziger, George F., The German Order of Battle: Waffen SS and Other Units in Word War II (Combined Publishing, 2001), pp. 115-117.
(130) Tessin, v. 6, pp. 206-207; v. 7, pp. 113-115; 246-247; v. 9, 210-211; Mitcham, pp. 135-136; 232; Nafziger, Infantry in World War II, pp. 169-170; 189; 305; Nafziger, Panzers and Artillery in World War II, pp. 205-206; Jentz, v. 2, p. 194; Dugdale, J., Panzer Divisions, Panzergrenadier Divisions, Panzer Brigades of the Army and the Waffen SS in the West Autumn 1944-February 1945, Ardennes and Nordwind, Their Detailed and Precise Strengths and Organizations, Volume I [Part 1] September 1944
Refitting and Re-equipment (Military Press, Sterling, VA 2000 ), pp. 137-141. Dugdale is in three parts, and will be referred to herein as Dugdale I/1, I/2 and I/3.
(131) Bonn, pp. 88-104. Bonn indicates that 16.Volks-Grenadier-Division (which, as has been seen, apparently took no part in this battle) was reinforced on 28 October by the 201st and 202nd Jager Battalions and the 291st and 292nd Infantry Battalions z.b.V. The Kriegsgliederung contains no reference to these units. The four units to which Bonn refers were evidently Heeres-Geburgsjaeger-Bataillon 201 and 202, and Grenadier-Bataillon z.b.V. 291 and 292. All of these units were under the direct command of 19.Armee, but there is no evidence they were subordinate to 16.Volks-Grenadier-Division. See, Tessin, v. 8, pp. 1, 6; v. 9, pp. 32, 36. Finally, Bonn refers in his narrative of this battle to 198.Infanterie-Division as "the best German infantry division in the Vosges" (p. 100), when previously he had characterized it as being in "a difficult personnel predicament" due to the fact that it was composed largely of Reichsdeutsche who "had been previously adjudged unfit for combat duty."
(132) Bonn, p. 98; Westwood, Kriegsgliederung, 5 November 1944. Die Geheimen Tagesberichte der deutschen Wehrmachtfuehrung im Zweiten Weltkrieg 1939-1945 v. 11 , pp. 348-350.
(133) Bonn, pp. 102; 128.