Mythos revisited: American Historians and German
Fighting Power in WWII
by Thomas E. Nutter
|
Chapter Nine - Part II
KEITH BONN AND THE LEVEL PLAYING FIELD
The Kriegsgliederung for 26 November 1944 reflects a different picture
of the German forces involved than does Bonn's narrative. 19.Armee possessed
three corps, LXIV.Armeekorps (708.Volks-Grenadier-Division and
716.Infanterie-Division [bodenstadig]), LXXXX.Armeekorps
(16.Volks-Grenadier-Division and 269.Infanterie- Division) and LXIII.Armeekorps
(159., 189., 338. and 198.Infanterie-Division; Panzer-Brigade 106 and
30.Waffen-Grenadier-Division der SS (Russische #2). 1.Armee's subordinate units
were LXXXII.Armeekorps (416.Infanterie-Division, 19.Volks-Grenadier-Division
and 21.Panzer-Division), XIII.SS Armeekorps (48.Infanterie-Division and
347.Infanterie-Division [bodenstadig]; 559. and 36.Volks-Grenadier-Division;
17.SS Panzer-Grenadier-Division "Gotz von Berlichingen" and 11.Panzer-
Division) and LXXXIX. Armeekorps (245. Infanterie-Division [bodenstadig]; 553.
and 256.Volks-Grenadier-Division). 1.Armee also had attached to it Hohere
Kommando Voges, commanding 361.Volks-Grenadier-Division, Panzer-Lehr-Division
(which together constituted Gruppe Bayerlein) and a Kampfgruppe of 25.
Panzer-Grenadier-Division.(134)
In November 1944, therefore, a number of different formations appeared in the
German order of battle, particularly in 1.Armee. 48.Infanterie-Division had
been formed as a static infantry division in February 1944. It was destroyed in
the retreat across France. Its ranks included a battalion of Armenians, a
regiment of former Luftwaffe trainees and troops from replacement and fortress
units. It had six battalions of infantry, three of artillery and a panzerjaeger
battalion.(135)
36.Volks-Grenadier-Division came into being on 9 October 1944, created from 36.
Grenadier-Division, a unit which in turn had not become operational until 15
September and traced its lineage to an infantry division bearing the same
number that had been destroyed by the Red Army in Operation Bagration.
36.Volks-Grenadier-Division had six infantry battalions in Grenadier-Regiment
87, 118 and 165, and four battalions in Artillerie-Regiment 268.(136)
Another unit that formed as a bodenstadig division was 245.Infanterie-Division.
It was unusual in that it contained nine battalions of infantry
(Grenadier-Regiment 935, 936 and 937), as well as three battalions of artillery
(Artillerie-Regiment 245). It lacked, however, organic transport facilities, as
well as organic pioneer, signals and other support units. A similarly immobile
unit was 256.Volks-Grenadier-Division, which had been formed on 17 September
1944 by the redesignation of 568.Volks-Grenadier-Division. Like
245.Infanterie-Division, 256.Volks-Grenadier-Division had no pioneer, signals
or other support units common to most German infantry divisions. It did,
however, have six battalions of infantry (Grenadier-Regiment 456, 476 and 481)
and four of artillery (Artillerie-Regiment 256).(137)
361.Volks-Grenadier-Division was formed on 21 September 1944 from
569.Volks-Grenadier-Division. It was another unit of six infantry battalions
(Grenadier-Regiment 951, 952 and 953) and four artillery battalions
(Artillerie-Regiment 361). Like others of its kind, it lacked any organic
pioneer, signals or panzerjaeger units. Its core formation,
361.Infanterie-Division, had been one of those destroyed in June 1944 while
forming part of Heeresgruppe Centre in Russia. It had fought in the Arnhem
battles before being posted to the Vosges region. A similar unit was
708.Volks-Grenadier-Division (Grenadier-Regiment 728, 748 and 760;
Artillerie-Regiment 658), formed on 4 September 1944 by merging
573.Volks-Grenadier-Division with the remnants of 708.Infanterie-Division,
which had been destroyed at Falaise by the French 2nd Armored Division. The
parent formation had been formed for coastal defense, and had included, at the
time of the Allied invasion, (Kossacken) Grenadier-Regiment 360.(138)
We have already spoken at length about the condition of 21.Panzer-Division on
the eve of the Vosges campaign. It is worth mentioning, however, that during
the Normandy campaign 21.Panzer-Division took about 8000 casualties, or about
50% of its authorized strength. By the end of August, it had a total of ten
combat ready tanks. The division was destroyed in the Falaise encirclement and
reformed in September by incorporating Panzer-Brigade 112. Another formation to
make its first appearance in the field was 30.Waffen-Grenadier-Division der SS
(Russische #2). This formation had its roots in occupied Belorussia, and
included a large portion of Russian, Ukrainian and White Ruthenian
Schutzmannschaften, locals recruited by the Germans for so-called "police"
duty, in which capacity they were employed against Russian partisans in the
German rear. The division was activated in the summer of 1944, but was
considered (for good reason) unreliable as a fighting force. Its order of
battle comprised Waffen-Grenadier-Regiment der SS 75, 76 and 77,
Waffen-Artillerie-Regiment der SS 30, an anti-tank battalion, pioneer battalion
and an anti-aircraft battalion. In August it absorbed 2300 mutineers. In
September its Artillery regiment comprised only a staff and a staff battery,
two batteries of 122mm Russian guns, and a nebelwerfer battery. On November 2
Waffen-Grenadier-Regiment der SS 77 was disbanded.(139)
11.Panzer-Division was a veteran unit that had spent a considerable portion of
its active life fighting on the Eastern Front. Its order of battle included
Panzer-Regiment 15, Panzer-Grenadier-Regiment 110 and 111,
Panzer-Aufklarungs-Abteilung 11 and Panzer-Artillerie-Regiment 119. In February
1944, after having been decimated in the Cherkassy pocket, it was reorganized
and rebuilt by troops from 273.Reserve-Panzer-Division. It was severely
battered during the Normandy fighting. In August it had possessed 79 Panthers;
by the first of September its armored component consisted of 30 Panthers, 16
MkIVs and 4 MkIIIs. In September it was rebuilt again, this time by absorbing
Panzer-Brigade 113. This may have added a maximum of 10 Panthers and 3 MkIVs to
the tank inventory of Panzer-Regiment 15, thus providing the regiment with a
total of 40 Panthers, 19 MkIVs and 4 MkIIIs. Even with these additional
vehicles the division's tank park was far below its authorized strength of 91
MkIVs, 79 Panthers and 21 StugIIIs. In November 1944 1.Armee's Hohere Kommando
Voges had under its command a Kampfgruppe of 25.Panzer-Grenadier-Division,
which also had been destroyed on the Eastern Front. Indeed, so decimated had
25.Panzer-Grenadier-Division been that it was reduced to the status of a
Kampfgruppe.(140)
At the time of the Allied invasion of Normandy, Panzer-Lehr-Division was
perhaps the strongest formation in the German army. Its principal units
comprised Panzer-Lehr-Regiment 130, Panzer-Grenadier-Lehr-Regiment 901 and 902
and Panzer-Artillerie-Regiment 130. It possessed 237 tanks and assault guns,
among them 99 long-barreled Panzer Mk IVs, 89 Panthers and 10 StugIIIs, as well
as more exotic weapons such as 31 Jagdpanzer IVs and 8 Tigers (including 5
Tiger IIs). Moreover, unlike any other panzer division in the German army, all
four of its panzergrenadier battalions were mounted on half-tracks, as was its
pioneer battalion. At the beginning of June, it mustered 14,699 soldiers. By
August, however, over 50% of these men had become casualties, and its
complement of combat ready armored vehicles had been reduced to a dozen Mk IVs
and 5 Panthers. It was withdrawn from the invasion front and reformed in
October. Whereas previously the division had included two panzer battalions,
now it was reduced to only one, with a nominal establishment of 28 Panthers and
28 Mk IVs. In November, on the eve of its commitment against the US 7th Army,
the division's tank inventory included 34 Mk IVs and 38 Panthers.(141)
19.Armee's 269.Infanterie-Division had been formed in 1939 and had
Infanterie-Regiment 469, 489 and 490, each of three battalions, as well as
Artillerie-Regiment 269 of four battalions. It participated in the invasion of
France in 1940, and was on occupation duty in Denmark until the advent of the
campaign in Russia. It fought with XL.Panzerkorps through the autumn of 1941,
and in the Battle of the Vokhov in early 1942. The division was decimated by
these battles on the Northern Front, and in December 1942 what was left of the
division was reformed from various units and went to Norway, where it remained
until November 1944. On November 6, 1944 the Division included
Infanterie-Regiment 469 and 489 (six battalions) and Artillerie-Regiment 269
(three battalions), as well as divisional service units, including a company of
Russian "volunteers". It had been planned to reform Infanterie-Regiment 490,
but this was never done.(142)
347.Infanterie-Division (bodenstadig) had been formed in late 1942 for garrison
duty in Holland. In April 1944 it had received (Nordkaukasische)
Infanterie-Bataillon 803 and (Turkestanische) Infanterie-Bataillon 787, which
made up the fourth battalion of Festungs-Infanterie-Regiment 860 and 861
respectively. It was committed to the fighting in the Normandy campaign and
destroyed. On October 21, 1944 it had been reorganized to include three
regiments of two battalions each. Grenadier-Regiment 860 was formed from
Erganzung und Ausbildungs Bataillon 77 and 412; Grenadier-Regiment 861 from the
staff of Erganzung und Ausbildungs Regiment 536, Erganzung und Ausbildungs
Bataillon 454 and Landwehr-Festungs-Bataillon VII; and Grenadier-Regiment 880
from the staff of Reserve-Grenadier-Regiment 36, as well as
Reserve-Grenadier-Bataillon 80 and 107. The division's Artillerie-Regiment 347
had four battalions.(143)
Bonn's orders of battle for the German formations confronting the Americans in
the High Vosges are, therefore, wrong. This, of course, can be attributed to
his failure to rely on any original German source for his information. More
importantly, however, as this detailed review of the units involved shows, the
motley assemblage of German forces arrayed against the Americans was not equal
to the task presented it by its commanders. As was the case in the struggle for
the Low Vosges, the German formations engaged can best be described as
"ragtag". Among all of the German infantry and Volks-Grenadier divisions
assembled by 1.Armee and 19.Armee for the defense of the High Vosges, only one
(269.Infanterie-Division) had been in existence for more than two months; most
had been formed for half that period of time. Again with the exception of
269.Infanterie-Division (and possibly 245.Infanterie-Division, a static
formation), all of the German infantry formations were reformed from units that
had been destroyed in combat, and included hodgepodge collections of reserve,
replacement, fortress and Landwehr troops, as well as sizeable numbers of
foreign nationals. Most were virtually immobile, and lacked even a pretense of
the TO&E called for by the operative Wehrmacht regulations. The few panzer
units under the command of 1.Armee and 19.Armee were panzer in name only. All
had recently been destroyed either in the Normandy fighting or on the Eastern
Front. None had even a semblance of its authorized strength.
The irony of Bonn's discussion of the battle for the High Vosges is that he is
aware of most of the foregoing, yet clings to the fiction that the match he
describes is one among equals. He admits that "many of the First and Nineteenth
Army combat units in the Vosges were made up largely of soldiers who had
received only four to six weeks of infantry training prior to being committed
to battle." He makes similar, but more detailed comments, about
708.Volks-Grenadier-Division, one of the principal units in his story.
|
Much of the division had been wrecked while fighting Third Army units in
September, and the entire division had been pulled back to Czechoslovakia to
refit, receive new personnel, and train for six weeks prior to being deployed
in the Vosges. Although the cadre consisted largely of experienced Kriegsmarine
and Luftwaffe noncommissioned officers, few of them had much experience in
ground combat. The greater bulk of the ranks were filled by recruits varying in
age from eighteen to forty-five. The infantry companies of this division had
about 125 men each, so, including the divisional Fusilier company,
708.Volks-Grenadier-Division could field about 3,200 men in its combat infantry
units.
|
|
Of this division Bonn also avers that "[A]lthough well equipped and close to
authorized strength for a division of its type, the 708th's training period was
hardly adequate for the development of the cohesion so important for success in
rigorous mountain warfare." Bonn also remarks that 716.Volks-Grenadier-Division
"was so weak from the pummeling its troops had taken that it was hardly able to
do more than defend strongpoints along the Vosges line…with its thousand or so
remaining infantrymen" and that 16.Volks-Grenadier-Division "defended an even
smaller sector, in recognition of its strength of barely more than a reinforced
battalion." He also admits that even though the German troops were fighting at
the borders of their homeland, many of them now believed the war to be lost.
Further, he notes the fact that the Germans were forced to rely upon polyglot
formations of Germans, foreign nationals and German speaking foreigners
"contributed significantly to the weakening of the social bonds between unit
members in pressure situations. Similarly, lacking extensive unit training and
missing the cohesive bonds born of shared hardships and living experiences with
their comrades prior to commitment to combat…many German soldiers felt no
particular loyalty to their units or comrades." Indeed, he recounts that the
U.S. 103rd Infantry Division captured Russian and Polish nationals in German
uniform who confessed to having murdered their German officers in order to
surrender.(144)
Bonn continues to set the stage for his story by providing details concerning
two American units engaged, the 100th and 103rd Infantry Divisions. The
so-called "Century Division" had been activated in November 1942 and took part
in the Second Army maneuvers in the Cumberland Mountains of Tennessee in the
winter of 1943-1944, "during which its soldiers received superb preparation for
their eventual commitment to the Vosges winter campaign." Although it lost 3000
of its infantrymen, taken as replacements for units already in action, the
100th Infantry Division had received nearly six months' supplementary training
at Fort Bragg before embarking for Europe. The 103rd Infantry Division ("Cactus
Division") had also been activated in November 1942, and participated in Third
Army maneuvers in Louisiana in the fall of 1943. It received supplementary
training in Texas between November 1943 and September 1944, in part for the
purpose of acclimating replacements for infantrymen taken out as replacements
for units in combat. Bonn points out that these two divisions, in addition to
Combat Command A of the fresh 14th Armored Division, helped give the attacking
US VI Corps an infantry force ratio of 2.9 to 1 against the enemy, as well as
greater unit cohesion as compared to the Germans.(145)
Having laid out all of these facts about the strengths and condition of the
opposing forces, however, Bonn then descends into the realm of fantasy. In the
area of the US VI Corps, he explains, the disparities he has been at pains to
outline are rendered meaningless---"the odds in the battle for the High Vosges
and the German winter line were much closer than the force ratios
indicated"---because, inter alia, the Germans were on the defensive, on ground
well suited for it, Allied airpower was nullified by fog, and Americans were
forced to suffer in the open while the Germans enjoyed the comforts of
fortifications and buildings. The American infantrymen, says Bonn, lived a
terrible existence, exposed to the elements, subsisting on cold C rations and K
rations, never able to build a fire, always cold and wet. It is in this context
that Bonn recounts the clash between the 100th Infantry Division and
708.Volks-Grenadier-Division, which he characterizes as important because it
describes a conflict between two equally "green" formations. In that clash,
says the author, the "odds were virtually even, although the Germans held the
advantages of terrain and position." In it, as well, he argues that "[T]raining
and the tactical proficiency and cohesion borne of ‘community of experience'
would make the difference in the outcome."(146)
Bonn's comments on the outcome of the struggle are revealing. He observes, for
example, that "[A]lthough the Americans…had gained overall numerical
superiority, they did not need it; battalion on battalion, company on company,
they were outfighting the Germans and overrunning them." For the first time in
history, he notes, an army defending the Vosges had failed in its task. Despite
being free of interference from Allied aircraft, German "forces of often
comparable---and always adequate---size failed to halt their adversaries."
Finally, "[I]n the best possible weather for defense, fighting on the doorstep
of their homeland, against an enemy far from his, the commanders of the German
army organized and trained their soldiers so poorly and provided such
impoverished leadership that their units could not accomplish a mission in
which no army had ever before failed." In spite of these successes, however,
Bonn has to admit that the German LXIV.Armeekorps, or at least parts of it,
including 716.Volks-Grenadier-Division, were able to fight off their American
assailants and retreat into the Alsatian plain to fight again another day.(147)
What is truly striking about Bonn's narrative is the contrast between what he
knows, or seems to know (or perhaps ought to know), about the opposing forces,
and his conclusions about the combat in which they engaged. This is well
demonstrated by his retelling of the following incident:
|
"Outside Ville, a small incident occurred that illustrates the difference
between the opposing sides' success in integrating noninfantry replacements
into their combat formations. On or about 27 November, Pfc. Will Alpern, a
nineteen-year-old automatic rifleman in Company I, 410th Infantry, was speaking
with a just-captured German prisoner. The German complained that he was not
supposed to be fighting in infantry combat, because he had originally been a
ground crewman in the Luftwaffe. He went on to say that he was sure the
Americans would never do anything so stupid or desperate as reassign such
troops to the infantry. Private Alpern informed the prisoner that he had been
brought into the army through the ASTP and had been assigned to an Army Air
Forces unit before his assignment to the Cactus Division at Camp Howze, Texas,
for duty as an infantryman."
|
|
The fundamental problem with this comparison is that Private Alpern, like
everyone else in the U.S. army during World War II, began his career with
sixteen weeks training as an infantryman regardless of the fact that he was
assigned, after his training as an infantryman, to the Army Air Force. Had Pfc.
Alpern been a sailor (as many German "infantrymen" were at this stage of the
war), the story would, of course, have been different. But Pfc. Alpern was not
a sailor; he was a member of the U.S. army. In the Wehrmacht, the same was not
the case. Luftwaffe personnel were not trained as infantrymen. Theirs was a
service entirely separate from the German army (as the US Air Force would
someday become), and with the exception of those members of Luftwaffe
Fallschirmjaeger and panzer formations (as apparently the captured German in
this instance was not), Luftwaffe personnel did not receive basic training as
infantrymen. That was one of the reasons why Luftwaffen-Felddivisionen, those
sops to Reichmarschal Goering's ego formed of extraneous Luftwaffe personnel
when the war turned against Germany, were so often literally blown to bits when
thrown into combat with their adversaries.(148)
The story of Pfc. Alpern and the captured German is but one example of the
strain of unreality that pervades Bonn's work, as well as that of others of
this genre, in his effort to invidiously compare the US and German armies in
the time and place in question. For example, Bonn describes the encounter of
the US 100th Infantry Division with 708. Volks-Grenadier-Division as one
between equals, taking particular note of their common status as units "green"
to combat. How, one might reasonably inquire, can such a comparison be made?
100th Infantry Division, Bonn has told us, trained as a unit for almost two
years before being committed to action in the Vosges, including six months
supplemental training to enable it to acclimate new soldiers. In addition, Bonn
has observed, the division had received "superb preparation" for its combat in
the Vosges, by virtue of having participated in maneuvers in the Cumberland
Mountains. Much the same was true of the 103rd Infantry Division, another
"green" American unit in its first combat. On the other hand,
708.Volks-Grenadier-Division, the 100th Infantry Division's principal opponent
in the battle and a unit typical of German infantry divisions at this juncture
of the war, was immobile, rebuilt from a wrecked division and contained a
hodgepodge of personnel and units. 708.Volks-Grenadier-Division had trained as
a unit for four-six weeks before being committed to battle. Its NCO cadre
consisted of many former NCOs from the Luftwaffe and Kriegsmarine, whom Bonn
observes lacked experience in ground combat. Its training was inadequate to
establish unit cohesion and loyalty, and it contained a significant number of
foreign nationals. Can one really assert that combat between these two units
can be described as an equal one? A unit whose personnel, many of whom had
difficulty communicating with one another, and who had received at the most six
weeks infantry training from NCOs with no experience as infantrymen themselves,
against another that had trained together for two years, and whose personnel
were so homogeneous in nature that not even men with common backgrounds and a
common language were permitted to serve with them because of the color of their
skin?
Bonn seems to realize that his comparison is an absurd one, because he goes on
to explain away to failure of the American forces to utterly annihilate their
opponents by arguing that whatever distinctions between the forces may have
favored the Americans were rendered meaningless by other factors beyond their
control, such as the fact that the Germans were on the defensive, were in
prepared positions while their adversaries were exposed to the elements, and
were free from air attack because of the weather. These, unfortunately, are
nothing but excuses, and not very good ones at that. Lack of air cover, of
course, is a two way street---the Germans did not suffer from air attack during
the Vosges campaign, but neither did the Americans. Indeed, the Americans had
virtually never been harassed by German aircraft since first setting foot on
the continent six months earlier, because the Eighth Air Force had driven the
Luftwaffe from the skies.
The argument that the Germans were favored by being on the defensive is equally
unavailing---defensive positions, no matter how formidable, are of little
practical consequence if, as in this case, they are manned by untrained,
irresolute troops, many of whom are incapable of communicating with one
another, some of whom have no commitment to the army or the regime that put
them in harm's way, and most of whom already believe their cause to be lost.
Finally, there is not in fact much to choose between being exposed in the open
to foul weather in the dead of winter and being in prepared positions in the
same ground. It is highly doubtful, for example, that the Germans in such
positions, any more than their American adversaries, made fires to warm
themselves or cook hot meals, since to do so would have obviously drawn down
upon them the unwanted attention of American artillery. Nor would the Germans
have been much better off for simply having roofs over their heads, so long as
they had mud under their feet. No one who has ever read anything about trench
warfare, either in the First or Second World Wars, would conclude that a
soldier in a wet, cold, stinking hole in the ground, whose position is well
targeted by enemy artillery, holds an advantage great enough to make him the
assured victor in a struggle of the kind that ensued in the Vosges.
Finally, there is the suggestion, made by Bonn, that one notable failure of the
Germans in general, as compared with the Americans, is that the former chose to
rebuild divisions from the burnt out hulks of others, and did so with amalgams
of disjointed personnel whom they gave six weeks training and then committed to
combat. Anyone with the least knowledge of the position in which the Germans
found themselves in during the latter stages of World War II knows that the
measures they resorted to, as exemplified by the sort of units encountered by
the Americans in the Vosges, were forced upon them by the exigencies of a war
long lost. The German army had no recourse but to throw together whatever
formations it could, as fast as it could, and get them into the field as fast
as possible, in order to stem the tide of Allied advance. The idea that it
chose to field so-called infantry units made up from the detritus of a lost war
is so silly as to hardly warrant comment.(149)
The balance of Bonn's book is devoted to the Battle for the Low Vosges, which
extended from late November 1944 to mid-January 1945. It included a period of
movement warfare in the Low Vosges between the last week of November and 20
December; an attack by the Americans against the Maginot Line at Bitche,
contemporaneous with a battle in the Siegfried Line; and the repulse by the
Americans of the German Nordwind counteroffensive. At the beginning of this
period, according to Bonn, 1.Armee consisted of LXXXIX.Armeekorps, including
361.Volks-Grenadier-Division and 245.Infanterie-Division; and XIII.SS
Armeekorps, with 25.Panzer-Grenadier-Division and 11.Panzer-Division, later
replaced by 257.Volks-Grenadier- Division. We have previously described all of
these units, with the sole exception of 257. Volks-Grenadier-Division. This
formation was created on 13 October 1944 by the redesignation of
587.Volks-Grenadier-Division (the so-called Gross-Goerschen Schatten-
Division). It had Grenadier-Regiment 457, 466 and 477 each of two battalions,
Artillerie-Regiment 257 of four battalions, and divisional support units,
including Fusilier Kompanie 257. It was of the same ramshackle quality as
others of its ilk. It should be noted that, as related above, Bonn's reference
to 25.Panzer-Grenadier-Division as being in action at this point is incorrect;
only a truncated Kampfgruppe of 25. Panzer-Grenadier-Division existed.
Likewise, the Kriegsgliederung for 26 November 1944 describes a different order
of battle than that recited by Bonn. The Kampfgruppe of
25.Panzer-Grenadier-Division was under the command of Hohere Kommando Vogensen,
as were 361.Volks-Grenadier-Division and Panzer-Lehr-Division (which
constituted Gruppe Bayerlein). LXXXIX.Armeekorps controlled
245.Infanterie-Division (bodenstadig) as well as 553.Volks-Grenadier-Division
and 256 Volks-Grenadier-Division. XIII.SS Armeekorps was composed of
48.Infanterie-Division, 559.Volks-Grenadier-Division, 347.Infanterie-Division
(bodenstadig), 36.Volks-Grenadier-Division, 11.Panzer-Division and 17. SS
Panzer-Grenadier-Division "Gotz von Berlichingen". LXXXII.Armeekorp consisted
of 416.Infanterie-Division, 21.Panzer-Division and
19.Volks-Grenadier-Division.(150)
Bonn's description of the various stages of the Battle for the Low Vosges is
somewhat less partisan than the first part of his work. He does concede, for
example, that the German forces there were significantly outnumbered, but that
nevertheless they "gave ground grudgingly" during the first two weeks of
December. He also admits that 1.Armee "displayed similar proficiency" to that
shown by 19.Armee in defending the High Vosges, using proper doctrine,
tenaciously defending, vigorously counterattacking and showing an ability
"even…to inflict significant reverses" on the Americans. Indeed, the Germans
inflicted high casualties on their opposite numbers. Significant resistance by
the Kampfgruppe of 25.Panzer-Grenadier-Division and other German troops in
little villages like Ratzwiller in the area of the 324th Infantry Regiment and
Enchenberg in that of the 114th Infantry Regiment effectively neutralized
support for the American infantry by the 749th Tank Battalion and 776th Tank
Destroyer Battalion, so that the footsoldiers were forced to rely upon
themselves alone to wear down the enemy. More success was had in the area of
the U.S. 45th Infantry Division, reinforced by elements of the 103rd Infantry
Division, where the Americans attacked the "heavily outnumbered" German
245.Infanterie-Division. The 245.Infanterie-Division, bereft of armored
support, was "ripped open" by the attackers.(151)
Footnotes
(134) Westwood, Kriegsgliederung 26 November 1944; Die Geheimen
Tagesberichte der deutschen Wehrmachtfuehrung im Zweiten Weltkrieg 1939-1945 v.
11, pp. 350-353.
(135) Nafziger, Infantry in World War II, pp.96-97; Tessin, v. 5, p.
149; Mitcham, pp. 76-77.
(136) Nafziger, Infantry in World War II, p. 85; Tessin, v. 5, pp.
54-55; Mitcham, pp. 405-406.
(137) Nafziger, Infantry in World War II, pp. 229, 246; Tessin, v. 8,
p. 193; 240-241; Mitcham, pp. 180-181; 187-188.
(138) Nafziger, Infantry in World War II, pp. 316; 367; Tessin, v. 9,
pp. 292-293; v. 12, pp. 159-160; Mitcham, pp. 244-245; 309-310.
(139) Nafziger, The German Order of Battle: Waffen SS and Other Units in
World War II, pp. 130-131;
Tessin, v. 4, pp. 160-161; 291; Mitcham, pp. 376-377; 467; Nafziger, Panzers
and Artillery in World War II, pp. 130-141; Dugdale, I/1, pp. 55-58;
157-160.
(140) Nafziger, Panzers and Artillery in World War II, pp. 82-87;
279-282; Tessin, v. 3 pp. 202-203; v. 4, pp. 223-225; Mitcham, pp. 362-364;
161-166; 403; Dugdale, I/1, pp. 49-54; 119-122; I/2, pp. 115-119; I/3, pp.
111-115; Jentz, v. 2, p. 191; Die deutschen Divisionen 1939-1945, v. 4, pp.
269-279. Though Nafziger and Tessin both show that Panzer-Brigade 113's
Panzer-Grenadier-Regiment 2113 and Panzer-Abteilung 2113 went
to 11.Panzer-Divison, Dugdale suggests that Panzer-Abteilung 2113
turned over its remaining equipment to Panzer-Abteilung 115 of 15.Panzer-Grenadier-Division.
Given the impoverished state of Panzer-Abteilung 2113's armored
element, whether or not Panzer-Regiment 15 received these vehicles may
have meant little.
(141) Nafziger, Panzers and Artillery in World War II, pp.165-167;
Tessin,, v. 14, pp. 273-274; Zetterling, pp. 384-392; Mitcham, pp. 385-386;
Jentz, v. 2, p. 195.
(142) Nafziger, Infantry in World War II, pp. 261-263; Tessin, v.8,
pp. 294-295; Mitchell, pp. 195-196.
(143) Nafziger, Infantry in World War II, p. 528; Tessin, v. 9, pp.
244-245; Mitchell, p. 238.
(144) Bonn, pp. 104-107; 115-117. Bonn's statement (p. 106) that the infantry
companies of 708.Volks-Grenadier-Division had about 125 men each must
be viewed skeptically, since no German source was consulted for this figure.
See his footnote for Chapter 3, no. 88. Hence, his later claim (p. 120) that
708.
Volks-Grenadier-Division met the U.S. 100th Infantry Division on equal
terms with regard to infantry strength must be viewed skeptically as well.
(145) Bonn, pp. 108-109.
(146) Ibid., pp. 110; 118-122.
(147) Ibid., pp. 131-132; 137.
(148) Ibid., p. 133.
(149) Ibid., p. 119.
(150) Westwood, Kriegsgliederung, 26 November 1944; Tessin, v.8, pp.
245-246; Nafziger, Infantry in World
(151) War II, p. 247; Mitcham, pp. 188-189; Die Geheimen
Tagesberichte der deutschen Wehrmachtfuehrung im Zweiten Weltkrieg 1939-1945
v. 11, pp. 350-353.
Copyright © 2004 by Thomas E. Nutter.
Please send comments to Thomas E. Nutter at: tenutter@gmail.com.
|
