Mythos revisited:
American Historians and German Fighting Power in the Second World War
by Thomas E. Nutter
Footnotes
[1]. Weinberg, Gerhard, Germany, Hitler & World War II (Cambridge,
1995); Bartov, Omer, Hitler's Army (New York, 1991); Goldhagen,
Daniel, Hitler's Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust
(Random House, 1997).
[2]. Bonn, Keith, When the Odds Were Even (Presidio Press, 1994).
[3]. Brown, John Sloan, Draftee Division: The 88th Infantry Division in World
War II (The University Press of Kentucky, 1986).
[4]. Doubler, Michael D., Closing with the Enemy: How GIs Fought the War in
Europe, 1944-1945 (University Press of Kansas, 1994).
[5]. Mansoor, Peter R., The GI Offensive in Europe: The Triumph of American
Infantry Divisions, 1941-1945 (University Press of Kansas, 1999).
[6]. Marshall, S.L.A., Men Against Fire (Peter Smith, 1978).
[7]. Mansoor, p.6.
[8]. Ibid.
[9]. Doubler, p.7.
[10]. Brown, pp.168-169.
[11]. Marshall, pp. 8-9.
[12]. Ibid., pp. 23, 39.
[13]. Ibid., p. 42.
[14]. Ibid., p.68-69.
[15]. Ibid., p.69-70.
[16]. Ibid., p.70.
[17]. Ibid. pp.72-73.
[18]. Ibid., pp. 73-74.
[19]. Ibid., pp.116-117.
[20]. Ibid., pp.120-121.
[21]. Ibid., pp.139-140.
[22]. Mansoor, p. 259; Harold P. Leinbaugh and John D. Campbell, The Men of
Company K (New York: Quill, (1985).
[23]. Mansoor, pp. 259-260.
[24]. Doubler, pp. 289-291.
[25]. Marshall, p.108.
[27]. Mansoor, p.7.
[28]. Doubler, p.6.
[29]. Chester, The Struggle for Europe (New York: Harper, 1952).
[30]. Weigley, pp.89-91.
[31]. Ibid., pp. 99, 404.
[32]. Ibid., p.105.
[33]. Ibid., p.127.
[34]. Ibid., p.149.
[35]. Ibid., p.273.
[36]. See, Mansoor, p. 172; Doubler, pp. 90-96.
[37]. Weigley, pp. 285-6.
[38]. Ibid., pp.339, 343.
[39]. Ibid., pp.386-7, 393.
[40]. Ibid., p.403.
[41]. Ibid., pp.421-2.
[42]. Ibid., pp. 483-4.
[43]. Ibid., pp. 508-9.
[44]. Ibid., pp. 511, 513-14, 537.
[45]. Ibid., pp. 567, 574.
[46]. Ibid., p. 639.
[47]. Van Creveld, Martin, Command in War (Harvard University Press, 1985);
Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton (London, 1978); Technology
and War from 2000 B.C. to the Present (New York, 1989).
[48]. Van Creveld, Martin, Fighting Power: German and U.S. army Performance,
1939-1945 (London: Arms and Armour Press, 1983).
[49]. Doubler, p.7.
[50]. Mansoror, p. 7.
[51]. Bonn, p. 8.
[52]. Creveld, p.166.
[53]. Ibid., pp.168-9.
[54]. Ibid., p. 171.
[55]. See, for example, Omer Bartov, Hitler's Army; Gerhard Weinberg, Germany,
Hitler & World War II; and Fritz, Stephen G., Frontsoldaten: The German
Soldier in World War II (The University Press of Kentucky, 1995), among others.
[56]. Creveld, pp. 163-165
[57]. Ibid., pp. 166-169. It is noteworthy that Creveld is sharply critical of
the failures of the American replacement system, an approach shared even by his
harshest critics. The inadequacies of that replacement system are addressed in
Robert Sterling Rush's recent book, Hell in Huertgen Forest: The Ordeal &
Triumph of an American Infantry Regiment (University Press of Kansas, 2001),
which deals with the experiences of the U.S. army in the battle of the Huertgen
Forest in 1944-45. Rush's analysis shows that the American replacement system
did NOT fail, even in such a notorious meat grinder as the Huertgen.
[58]. Ibid., pp. 171-173.
[59]. Mansoor, p.8. See, Keegan, John, The Second World War ( Penguin
Books, 1989 ); Hastings, Max, Overlord: D-Day and the Battle for Normandy
( London, 1984 ); Ellis, John, Brute Force: Allied Strategy and Tactics in the
Second World War ( London, 1990 ).
[60]. Keegan, p. 382.
[61]. Ibid., pp. 383-387.
[62]. Ibid., p. 416.
[63]. Hastings, pp. 77-78.
[64]. Ibid., pp. 94-102.
[65]. Ibid., p. 162.
[66]. Ibid., pp. 172-3, 178.
[67]. Mansoor, pp. 6-8. Brown's Draftee Division is discussed more fully below
[68]. Bonn, pp. 7-8.
[69]. John Sloan Brown, Draftee Division (Presidio Press, 1998), pp. 168-169.
[70]. Ibid., p. 169; Dupuy, pp. ix-xvii.
[71]. Dupuy, pp. 3-9.
[72]. Ibid., pp. 9-18.
[73]. Ibid., pp. 19-30.
[74]. Ibid., pp. 32-39.
[75]. Ibid., pp. 40-42. It is worth observing that the "team" which worked on
HERO's Italian project on behalf of the British Ministry of Defence, and whose
efforts laid the groundwork for the QJMA, was not comprised of persons whose
knowledge of the subject matter was abstract. In addition to Col. Dupuy, the
"team" included Brig. Gen. Edwin S. Chickering, USAF, Ret.; Col. Ashton Crosby,
USA, Ret.; Col. Angus M. Fraser, USMC, Ret.; Col. Harold Quackenbush, USA,
Ret.; and Col. John A.C. Andrews, USAF, Ret.
[76]. Ibid., pp. 55-56.
[77]. Ibid., pp. 57-58.
[78]. Ibid., p. 61.
[79]. Ibid., pp. 61-62. Dupuy observes that "[W]e didn't like one of the two
conclusions which this adjustment forced upon us---that 100 Germans were
roughly the combat equivalent of 120 Americans or British---but we could not
ignore the fact that our numbers demonstrated that this was so."
[80]. Ibid., pp. 62-63. It is in this context that Dupuy makes the comment that
"[T]he remainder (of the finding of German superiority) could possibly be the
result of such factors as more experience, greater mobility, better doctrine,
more effective battle drill, superior leadership, or inherent national
characteristics", a remark that has been singled out by at least one of his
critics as clear evidence of his pro-German bias. This critique ignores Dupuy's
very next sentence, in which he states that "[A] serious analysis of the
reasons for this greater German effectiveness is an important research
requirement", thereby confirming the author's view that the question at issue
is an unsettled one. Dupuy's comparison on the subject of combat personnel is
generally confirmed by both Martin van Creveld and Robert Sterling Rush.
[81]. Ibid., pp. 63-64. Other engagements in which the effect of surprise
proved critical include the Anzio breakout of 23-25 May 1944 (American
success), Velletri, 26 May 1944 (German success), Ardennes-Sauer River
engagement, 16-17 December 1944 (German success) and the Suez Canal Crossing of
6 October 1973 (Egyptian success).
[82]. Ibid., p. 69. Ibid., pp. 71-72.
[83]. Ibid., pp. 71-72.
[84]. Ibid., pp. 76-78. The eight effects of airpower are: (1) the force
strengths of both sides are increased directly by the OLI value of direct air
support aircraft; (2) relative mobility is enhanced for the side with air
superiority; (3) vulnerability is reduced for the side with air superiority;
(4) the effectiveness of artillery is enhanced for the side with air
superiority; (5) vulnerability is increased for the side without air
superiority; (6) artillery effectiveness is reduced for the side without air
superiority; (7) direct air support is degraded for the side without air
superiority; and (8) supply capability is degraded by air interdiction.
[85]. Ibid., pp. 95-97.
[86]. Ibid., pp. 98-110. Noteworthy is the fact that HERO studied the Battle of
Kursk in 1979. In doing so, they checked the data given by Soviet secondary
sources with those shown in the captured German records at the National
Archives in Washington, D.C., a notion apparently never considered by
contemporaries of the HERO analysts, and most assuredly not by their critics.
Dupuy observes that "[I]n only one respect was there any significant difference
between the Soviet and German figures; the Soviets assessed the German
casualties as almost three times greater than the data recorded in the German
files, and showed German tank losses about five times greater than the German
figures. Since there was no reason for the Germans to falsify their records,
and since we have found their casualty and loss figures always quite reliable
in other theaters, we have taken their figures for these losses rather than the
Soviet assessments." No one in the historical community, least of all any of
Dupuy's critics, bothered to examine these selfsame records for over twenty
years, until the publication by Anders Frankson and Niklas Zetterling of Kursk
1943 (Frank Cass, 2000). Frankson and Zetterling confirmed both the
evidence used and the conclusions reached by Dupuy and his group concerning the
Battle of Kursk in every detail. It should also be observed that while Dupuy's
critics energetically dispute his findings with regard to German combat
effectiveness superiority, they do not do so with respect to his findings
concerning the combat effectiveness superiority of the Israelis in their wars
with the Arab states.
[87]. Ibid., pp. 140-146.
[88]. Ellis, pp. xvii-xviii.
[89]. Ibid., p. xix.
[90]. Ibid., pp. 37-42. The more recent scholarship is found in Millett, Alan
and Murray, Williamson, There's A War to be Won, (Oxford University
Press, 2001) and Megargee, Geoff, Inside Hitler's High Command (University
of Kansas Press, 2000).
[91]. llis, pp. 45-49.
[92]. Ibid., pp. 76-77.
[93]. Ibid., pp. 128-130. Ellis' principal source for the figures in the text
is B. Mueller-Hillebrand, Das Heer 1933-1945 (E.S. Mittler und Sohn,
Darmstadt/Frankfurt, 1954-1959), vol. 3, pp. 284-315.
[94]. Ellis, pp. 21-26. Ellis' figures are based on C. Bekker, The Luftwaffe
War Diaries, (Macdonald, 1966), p. 164 and C. Webster & N.
Frankland, The Strategic Air Offensive Against Germany (History of the
Second World War: United Kingdom Military Series), (4 vols, HMSO, 1961), vol.
4, p. 494.
[95]. Ellis, pp. 133-161. It is noteworthy that Ellis does not rely, as
perhaps he could not do, upon the findings of more recent scholarship on the
subjects of (1) the deficiencies in German torpedoes during the first two years
of the war, and (2) the effect of Ultra upon the ability of the Allies
to defend against the U-Bootwaffe.
[96]. Ellis, pp. 184-192.
[97]. Ibid., pp. 193-221.
[98]. Ibid., 533-535.
[99]. D'Este, Carlo, Decision in Normandy (Harper Perennial, 1991), passim;
Kennedy, Paul, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (Vintage Books, 1989), pp.
347-357.
[100]. Bonn, Keith E., When the Odds Were Even : The Vosges Campaign, October
1944-January 1945 (Presidio Press, 1994) (hereinafter "Bonn").
[101]. Ibid., pp. ix-xi.
[102]. Ibid., pp. 1-2.
[103]. Ibid., p. 2.
[104]. Ibid., p. 3.
[105]. Ibid., pp. 5-6. Exactly how the author knows that "most German units"
possessed their full complement of these important infantry weapons is unclear,
since he cites no German documents to substantiate the claim.
[106]. Ibid., p. 8.
[107]. Creveld, p. 46.
[108]. Zetterling, Niklas, Normandy 1944 (Manitoba, 2000).
[109]. Nafziger, George, The German Order of Battle: Panzers and Artillery in
World War II (Greenhill, 1999), p. 27; Davies, W.J.K., German army
Handbook 1939-1945 (New York, 1974), pp. 32-40; Jentz, Thomas L., Panzertruppen
v.2 (Schiffer, 1996), p. 159.
[110]. Zetterling, p. 376.
[111]. Jentz, v. 2, p. 53.
[112]. Zetterling, p. 370.
[113]. Bonn, pp. 41-45.
[114]. Dunn, Walter S., Kursk Hitler's Gamble, 1943 (Praeger, 1997)
ch. 4; Zetterling, pp. 17-18.
[115]. Nafziger, George F., The German Order of Battle: Infantry in World War
II (Greenwood, 2000) pp. 32-33.
[116]. Nafziger, Infantry in World War II, pp. 192-194; Tessin, Georg,
Verbande und Truppen der deutschen Wehrmacht und Waffen-SS 1939-1945 (Osnabruek,
1976), v. 7, pp. 284-286.
[117]. Bonn, pp. 46-48.
[118]. Ibid.
[119]. Ibid., pp. 48-51.
[120]. Ibid., p. 79. Bonn's assertions about the reinforcement of 21.Panzer-Division
do not appear to be correct. He claims that in October, 1944 it absorbed
Panzer-Brigade 113 and one half of Panzer-Brigade 112. It would
appear, however, that Panzer-Brigade 112 was disbanded on 23 September
1944 and incorporated into 21.Panzer-Division. On 1 October 1944,
however, Panzer-Brigade 113 was split apart to reinforce both 15.Panzer-Grenadier-Division
and 11.Panzer-Division. It does not appear that any portion of Panzer-Brigade
113 went to 21.Panzer-Division. Bonn remarks (p.80) that Panzer-Regiment
22 disposed of about half its normal complement of Mk IV and Panther
tanks. If true, this indicates that at the time Panzer-Regiment 112 was
absorbed, there were no tanks in either of Panzer-Regiment 22's
battalions, since on 12 September 1944 Panzer-Brigade 112 possessed 45
Mk IVs, 45 Panthers and 10 StuG IIIs. Thus while
Bonn wants the reader to draw the inference that 21.Panzer-Division was
a formidable formation, comprising up to five tank battalions, in fact it
likely possessed no more than one hundred armored fighting vehicles. See,
Nafziger, Panzers and Artillery in World War II, pp. 207-208. Indeed,
the likelihood is that Panzer-Regiment 22 had substantially fewer than
100 armored fighting vehicles when it first went into action in the Vosge, for
on 3 November 1944 it had 29 MkIVs and 8 Panthers . Jentz, v.
2, p. 165.
[121]. Nafziger, Infantry in World War II , p. 56, Tessin, v. 4, p.
33; Mitcham, Samuel W., Hitler's Legions (Stein and Day, 1985), pp. 53-54.
[122]. Nafziger, Infantry in World War II , pp. 374-377; Bonn, pp.
82-83, Tessin, v. 12, pp. 182-183; Mitcham, p. 314.
[123]. Bonn, p. 83; Nafziger, Infantry in World War II, pp. 192-194;
Tessin, v. 7, pp. 284-286. With regard to the motley assemblage of troops
comprising 198.Infanterie-Division, Bonn quotes (p. 83) an anonymous
GI as stating: "I don't care if the guy behind that gun is a syphilitic prick
who's a hundred years old---he's still sitting behind eight feet of concrete
and he's still got enough fingers to press triggers and shoot bullets!". It is
unlikely that even the Wehrmacht placed in the field any troops who
were one hundred years old, although it is a matter of record that German
"soldiers" in their seventies were captured by the U.S. 4th Infantry Division
during the battles in the Huertgen Forest. See, Rush, p. 177. Of one
thing we can be certain: there may have been "syphilitic pricks" among the U.S.
forces engaged in the Vosges campaign, but not many of them were even in their
forties, and certainly none in their seventies
[124]. Bonn, p. 90.
[125]. Kriegsgliederung, 13 October 1944 , in The Organization of the
German army 1939-1945, David Westwood, CD 1999; Mehner, Kurt, Die Geheimen
Tagesberichte der deutschen Wehrmachtfuehrung im Zweiten Weltkrieg 1939-1945
(Osnabruek, 1985), v. 11, pp. 345-347.
[126]. Westwood, Kriegsgliederung 13 October 1944; Die Geheimen
Tagesberichte der deutschen Wehrmachtfuehrung im Zweiten Weltkrieg 1939-1945 v.
11 , pp. 345-347.
[127]. Nafziger, Infantry in World War II , pp. 61-62; Tessin v.
4, p. 115; v. 6, pp. 279-280; Mitcham, pp. 56-57; Schmitz, Peter, Thies,
Klaus-Juergen, Wegmann, Guenter, Zweng, Christian, Die deutschen Divisionen
1939-1945, (Osnabrueck, 2000) v. 4, pp. 90-92.
[128]. Nafziger, Infantry in World War II , pp. 336-337; 340-341;
Tessin, v. 10, pp. 127-129; 226; Mitcham, p. 269; pp. 277-278.
[129]. Nafziger, Infantry in World War II, pp. 96-97; 349-351; Tessin,
v. 4, p. 77; v. 5, p. 149; v. 7, p. 67; v. 11, pp. 147; 166; Mitcham, pp.
76-77; 288-289; 291; 458-459; Die deutschen Divisionen 1939-1945, v. 4,
pp. 29-32; Nafziger, George F., The German Order of Battle: Waffen SS and Other
Units in Word War II (Combined Publishing, 2001), pp. 115-117.
[130]. Tessin, v. 6, pp. 206-207; v. 7, pp. 113-115; 246-247; v. 9, 210-211;
Mitcham, pp. 135-136; 232; Nafziger, Infantry in World War II, pp.
169-170; 189; 305; Nafziger, Panzers and Artillery in World War II,
pp. 205-206; Jentz, v. 2, p. 194; Dugdale, J., Panzer Divisions,
Panzergrenadier Divisions, Panzer Brigades of the Army and the Waffen SS in the
West Autumn 1944-February 1945, Ardennes and Nordwind, Their Detailed and
Precise Strengths and Organizations, Volume I [Part 1] September 1944
Refitting and Re-equipment (Military Press, Sterling, VA 2000
), pp. 137-141. Dugdale is in three parts, and will be referred to herein as
Dugdale I/1, I/2 and I/3.
[131]. Bonn, pp. 88-104. Bonn indicates that 16.Volks-Grenadier-Division
(which, as has been seen, apparently took no part in this battle) was
reinforced on 28 October by the 201st and 202nd Jager Battalions and the 291st
and 292nd Infantry Battalions z.b.V. The Kriegsgliederung contains no reference
to these units. The four units to which Bonn refers were evidently Heeres-Geburgsjaeger-Bataillon
201 and 202, and Grenadier-Bataillon z.b.V. 291 and 292.
All of these units were under the direct command of 19.Armee, but there is no
evidence they were subordinate to 16.Volks-Grenadier-Division. See,
Tessin, v. 8, pp. 1, 6; v. 9, pp. 32, 36. Finally, Bonn refers in his narrative
of this battle to 198.Infanterie-Division as "the best German infantry
division in the Vosges" (p. 100), when previously he had characterized it as
being in "a difficult personnel predicament" due to the fact that it was
composed largely of Reichsdeutsche who "had been previously adjudged
unfit for combat duty."
[132]. Bonn, p. 98; Westwood, Kriegsgliederung, 5 November 1944. Die
Geheimen Tagesberichte der deutschen Wehrmachtfuehrung im Zweiten Weltkrieg
1939-1945 v. 11 , pp. 348-350.
[133]. Bonn, pp. 102; 128.
[134]. Westwood, Kriegsgliederung 26 November 1944; Die Geheimen
Tagesberichte der deutschen Wehrmachtfuehrung im Zweiten Weltkrieg 1939-1945 v.
11, pp. 350-353.
[135]. Nafziger, Infantry in World War II, pp.96-97; Tessin, v. 5, p.
149; Mitcham, pp. 76-77.
[136]. Nafziger, Infantry in World War II, p. 85; Tessin, v. 5, pp.
54-55; Mitcham, pp. 405-406.
[137]. Nafziger, Infantry in World War II, pp. 229, 246; Tessin, v. 8,
p. 193; 240-241; Mitcham, pp. 180-181; 187-188.
[138]. Nafziger, Infantry in World War II, pp. 316; 367; Tessin, v. 9,
pp. 292-293; v. 12, pp. 159-160; Mitcham, pp. 244-245; 309-310.
[139]. Nafziger, The German Order of Battle: Waffen SS and Other Units in World
War II, pp. 130-131;
Tessin, v. 4, pp. 160-161; 291; Mitcham, pp. 376-377; 467; Nafziger, Panzers
and Artillery in World War II, pp. 130-141; Dugdale, I/1, pp. 55-58;
157-160.
[140]. Nafziger, Panzers and Artillery in World War II, pp. 82-87;
279-282; Tessin, v. 3 pp. 202-203; v. 4, pp. 223-225; Mitcham, pp. 362-364;
161-166; 403; Dugdale, I/1, pp. 49-54; 119-122; I/2, pp. 115-119; I/3, pp.
111-115; Jentz, v. 2, p. 191; Die deutschen Divisionen 1939-1945, v. 4, pp.
269-279. Though Nafziger and Tessin both show that Panzer-Brigade 113's
Panzer-Grenadier-Regiment 2113 and Panzer-Abteilung 2113 went
to 11.Panzer-Divison, Dugdale suggests that Panzer-Abteilung 2113
turned over its remaining equipment to Panzer-Abteilung 115 of 15.Panzer-Grenadier-Division.
Given the impoverished state of Panzer-Abteilung 2113's armored
element, whether or not Panzer-Regiment 15 received these vehicles may
have meant little.
[141]. Nafziger, Panzers and Artillery in World War II, pp.165-167;
Tessin,, v. 14, pp. 273-274; Zetterling, pp. 384-392; Mitcham, pp. 385-386;
Jentz, v. 2, p. 195.
[142]. Nafziger, Infantry in World War II, pp. 261-263; Tessin, v.8,
pp. 294-295; Mitchell, pp. 195-196.
[143]. Nafziger, Infantry in World War II, p. 528; Tessin, v. 9, pp.
244-245; Mitchell, p. 238.
[144]. Bonn, pp. 104-107; 115-117. Bonn's statement (p. 106) that the infantry
companies of 708.Volks-Grenadier-Division had about 125 men each must
be viewed skeptically, since no German source was consulted for this figure.
See his footnote for Chapter 3, no. 88. Hence, his later claim (p. 120) that
708.
Volks-Grenadier-Division met the U.S. 100th Infantry Division on equal
terms with regard to infantry strength must be viewed skeptically as well.
[145]. Bonn, pp. 108-109.
[146]. Ibid., pp. 110; 118-122.
[147]. Ibid., pp. 131-132; 137.
[148]. Ibid., p. 133.
[149]. Ibid., p. 119.
[150]. Westwood, Kriegsgliederung, 26 November 1944; Tessin, v.8, pp.
245-246; Nafziger, Infantry in World
[151]. War II, p. 247; Mitcham, pp. 188-189; Die Geheimen
Tagesberichte der deutschen Wehrmachtfuehrung im Zweiten Weltkrieg 1939-1945
v. 11, pp. 350-353.
[152]. Ibid., pp. 147-168.
[153]. Ibid., pp. 168-169. Goralski, Robert, World War II Almanac, 1931-1945
(Bonanza Books, 1984), pp. 122-123.
[154]. Bonn, pp. 169-170.
[155]. Ibid., pp. 169-172.
[156]. Ibid., p. 170.
[157]. Ibid., p. 184.
[158]. Bonn, p. 187; Nafziger, Waffen SS and Other Units in World War II,
p. 117; Jentz, 2 Panzertruppen, pp. 198-201.
[159]. Bonn, pp. 188-191.
[160]. Ibid., pp. 192-193.
[161]. Ibid., p. 194.
[162]. Ibid., pp. 194-208.
[163]. Ibid., pp. 211-213.
[164]. Ibid., pp. 211-213; Stein, George H., The Waffen SS Hitler's Elite Guard
at War 1939-1945 (Cornell, 1966) pp. 130-131.
[165]. Bonn, pp. 215-221.
[166]. Ibid.
[167]. Ibid., Notes pp. 235-268. In this connection it is worth observing that
at p. 240, n. 50, Bonn cites Morris Janowitz and Edward Shils, "Cohesion and
Disintegration in the Wehrmacht," Public Opinion Quarterly 12
(1948): 280-315 for the proposition ("the authors prove") that "the cultural
ties achieved through such policies (i.e., the maintenance by each German
regiment of its own training battalion, and the drawing of each regiment from
the same geographical area) was a major factor in the degree of cohesiveness
attained by German units. Also, Janowitz and Shils found that the time spent in
training together greatly enhanced officer/NCO and soldier confidence, and thus
also contributed in this way to the resilience and cohesion of a given German
unit. Those units lacking these recruitment and training-induced bonds were
found to suffer higher casualties and to break more easily in combat." This is
precisely the same argument advanced by Martin van Creveld in Fighting Power,
a work which, as we have noted above, Bonn reviles as "actually most useful
mainly for instruction in how not to write comparative history." (emphasis in
original).
[168]. Doubler, p. 9.
[169]. Ibid., p. 3.
[170]. Ibid., pp. 26-28.
[171]. Ibid., pp. 31-33. Doubler's description of 7.Armee is far from complete.
The Kriegsgliederung for June 15, July 15 and August 15, 1944 show that
7.Armee's subordinate corps commands controlled, at one time or another over
this sixty-day period, three fallschirm-jaeger-divisionen, ten
panzer-divisionen, and eighteen infanterie-divisionen. Many of these units,
however, were "divisions" in name only; the Kriegsgliederung describes them
variously as "kampfgruppe", "remainder", "party of" and "section".
3.Fallschirm-Jaeger-Division suffered 4,064 casualties between 6 June and 12
July. On 10 July, 77.Infanterie-Division was reported to have 1,840 men in
action. Between 6 June and 24 June, 91.Luftlande-Division lost 85% of its
infantry, 21% of its artillery manpower, 76% of its pioneers and 48% of its
panzerjaeger personnel. 243.Infanterie-Division lost 8,189 officers and men
between 6 June and 11 July. It had 700 men in action on 10 July; on 23 July it
was rated at kampfwert V, the lowest possible combat rating. Between 6 June and
11 July, 352.Infanterie-Division suffered almost 8,000 casualties; by the end
of July it was regarded as no longer capable of combat. It was against such
units that the bocage was "busted". See, Zetterling, Normandy 1944, pp. 218,
231, 240, 243 and 278.
[172]. Ibid., p. 272.
[173]. Ibid., pp.286-287.
[174]. Ibid., pp. 287-288.
[175]. Erickson, John, The Road to Stalingrad; Stalin's War with Germany
(Yale University Press, 1999): The Road to Berlin; Stalin's War with Germany
(Yale University Press, 1999); Glantz, David M., When Titans Clashed; How the
Red Army Stopped Hitler (University Press of Kansas, 1995).
[176]. Zetterling, Normandy 1944, pp. 27-35.
[177]. Ibid., pp. 220-222; 229-231; 239-241.
[178]. See, Robert Sterling Rush, Hell in Huertgen Forest (University
Press of Kansas, 2001)
[179]. Doubler, p. 90.
[180]. Zetterling, pp. 214-215; 270-272. As noted, Doubler also alludes to the
American assault on Aachen. 246. Volks-Grenadier-Division defended that city;
it had come into being on 15 September 1944, and was comprised of
Grenadier-Regiment 352, 404 and 689, of two battalions each and
Artillerie-Regiment 246 of four battalions. Tessin, v.8, p. 198; Nafziger,
Infantry in World War II, p.231.
[181]. Doubler, pp. 125-140; Tessin, v.10, pp. 225-226; Nafziger, Infantry in
World War II, pp. 584-585; Mitcham, pp. 277-278.
[182]. Dugdale, I/1, pp. 103-111; Doubler, pp. 145-154.
[183]. Doubler, pp. 175-181.
[184]. Mitcham, pp. 105-106; 200-201; Nafziger, Infantry in World War II,
pp. 139, 269-279; Tessin, v. 6, pp. 105-106; v. 8, pp. 318-319; Dugdale, I/2,
pp. 58-64. In view of the condition of the German units facing the U.S. 28th
Infantry Division, Doubler's claim that "the Germans had roughly three
divisions with which to throw back the American regimental-sized attack on
Schmidt" (Doubler, p. 181) seems somewhat exaggerated.
[185]. Doubler, pp. 181-186.
[186]. Ibid., pp. 187-196.
[187]. Ibid., pp. 201-202.
[188]. Nafziger, Infantry in World War II, pp. 106; 184; 188; Tessin,
v. 5, p. 226; v. 7, pp. 186-187; 219-220; Mitchell, pp. 83-84; 147-148;
181-182.
[189]. Nafziger, Panzers and Artillery in World War II, pp. 78, 272;
Jentz, v. 2, pp. 198-199; Dugdale,, I/3, pp. 23, 107.
[190]. Nafziger, Infantry in World War II, pp. 51, 96; 306; Tessin, v.
3, pp. 235-236; v. 5, p. 142; v. 9, p. 219; Mitchell, pp. 49-51; 75-76;
233-234; Nafziger, Panzers and Artillery in World War II, p. 264;
Mitchell, pp. 395-396; Dugdale, I/3, p. 101.
[191]. Nafziger, Infantry in World War II, p. 231; Tessin, v. 8, pp.
198-199; Mitchell, pp. 181-182.
[192]. Nafziger, Infantry in World War II, p. 342; Tessin, v. 11, pp.
75-76; Nafziger, Waffen SS and Other Units in World War II, p. 97; Jentz, v. 2,
p. 200; Dugdale, I/3, p. 83.
[193]. Nafziger, Waffen SS and Other Units in World War II, p. 48;
Jentz, v. 2, p. 200; Dugdale, I/3, p. 67.
[194]. Nafziger, Waffen SS and Other Units in World War II, p. 36;
Jentz, v. 2, p. 200; Dugdale, I/3, p. 59.
[195]. Nafziger, Waffen SS and OtherUnits in World War II, p. 94;
Jentz, v. 2, p. 200; Dugdale I/3, p. 73.
[196]. Nafziger, Infantry in World War II, pp. 526-528; Tessin, v. 9,
pp. 240-241; Mitchell, p. 237.
[197]. Zetterling, pp. 223-224; Mitchell, pp. 240-241; Nafziger, Waffen SS and
Other Units in World War II, pp. 189-190; Tessin, v. 3, pp. 37-38.
[198]. Nafziger, Infantry in World War II, pp. 370-373; Tessin, v. 12,
pp. 169-170; 172-173; Mitchell, pp. 311-312.
[199]. Nafziger, Infantry in World War II, pp. 267; 273; Tessin, v. 8,
pp. 308; 327; Mitchell, pp. 198-199; 202-203.
[200]. Tessin, v. 8, pp. 318-319; v. 9, pp. 233-234; Nafziger, Infantry in
World War II, pp. 269-270; 525-526; Mitchell, pp. 200-201; 236-237.
[201]. Nafziger, Infantry in World War II, p. 139; Mitchell, pp.
105-106; Tessin, v. 6, pp. 105-106.
[202]. Tessin, v. 8, pp. 53; v. 9, pp. 265-266; Mitchell, pp. 165-166; 241-242;
Nafziger, Infantry in World War II, pp. 206-207; 312.
[203]. Tessin, v. 4, pp. 90-92; Nafziger, Infantry in World War II,
pp. 58-59; Mitcham, pp. 55-56; Tessin, v. 4, pp. 237-238; Nafziger, Infantry in
World War II, p. 73; Mitcham, pp. 62-63.
[204]. Tessin, v. 8, pp. 321-322; Nafziger, Infantry in World War II,
p. 271; Tessin, v. 9, pp. 159-160; Nafziger, Infantry in World War II,
pp. 296-297; Tessin, v. 9, pp. 260-261; Nafziger, Infantry in World War II,
p. 310.
[205]. Nafziger, Panzers and Artillery in World War II, pp. 38-46;
Dugdale, I/3, p. 17; Jentz, v. 2, p. 198.
[206]. Nafziger, Panzers and Artillery in World War II, p. 154; Jentz,
v. 2, p. 198; Dugdale, I/3, p. 47.
[207]. Nafziger, Infantry in World War II, pp. 134, 317; Tessin, v. 6,
pp. 80-81; Tessin, v. 9, pp. 300-301; Mitcham, p. 102; Nafziger, Waffen SS and
Other Units in World War II, pp. 182-185; Tessin, v. 2, pp. 202-203;
Mitcham, p. 418-419.
[208]. Nafziger, Infantry in World War II, p. 111; Tessin, v. 5, pp.
247-248; Nafziger, Infantry in World War II, p. 352; Tessin, v. 11, p.
169.
[209]. Jentz, v. 2, p. 199; Dugdale, I/3, p. 7; Nafziger, Panzers and Artillery
in World War II, pp. 165-167; Dugdale, I/3, pp. 147-161.
[210]. Jentz, v. 2, pp. 198-199; Dugdale, I/3, pp. 29; 143-146.
[211]. Nafziger, Infantry in World War II, pp. 46-47; 128; Waffen SS
and Other Units in World War II, pp. 186-188; Tessin, v. 3, pp.
132-133; v. 6, pp. 47-48; v. 2, pp. 314-315.
[212]. Nafziger, Panzers and Artillery in World War II, p. 103; Jentz,
v. 2, p. 200; Dugdale, I/3 p. 89.
[213]. General discussions of the German Welle system may be found in a number
of secondary sources, including Nigel Thomas, The German army in World War II
(Osprey, 2002), pp. 214-215; and Nafziger, Infantry in World War II,
pp. 25-35.
[214]. Doubler, p. 225.
[215]. Against what, exactly, one might reasonably ask, the Luftwaffe having
long since been driven from the skies.
[216]. Doubler, pp. 21-22.
[217]. Ibid., pp. 222-223.
[218]. At page 206 of the edition of Doubler's work reviewed herein, there is a
photograph of a column of American infantrymen marching along a Belgian road
during the Battle of the Bulge. They are clad in the makeshift snowsuits
described by Doubler. Similarly clad German soldiers are shown at page 126 of
Nigel Thomas' The German army in World War II. Similar photographs of such
German soldiers can be found in other works too numerous to mention.
[219]. In addition to developing the purpose-made insulated snowsuit which was
later made available to German troops in combat zones during the winter months,
the Wehrmacht also several items of footwear designed to prevent frostbite;
among these were an insulated wicker affair that allowed landsers to spend long
periods in the snow and cold.
[220]. Doubler, p. 284.
[221]. Ibid., pp. 286-287.
[224]. Mansoor, pp. 8-9.
[225]. Ibid., p. 11. One assumes that when Mansoor decries the lack of
"systematic unit rotation" of American combat units in the ETO, he is
suggesting that such formations would have benefited from being withdrawn from
the front lines for an extended period to rest, refit and retrain. It would be
difficult in the extreme to identify a single Wehrmacht formation that
experienced the salutary effects of "systematic unit rotation" during
1944-1945.
[226]. Ibid., p. 12.
[227]. Ibid., pp. 13-14.
[228]. Goralski, World War II Almanac 1941-1945, p. 428. Norman Polmar
and Thomas B. Allen, World War II: America at War 1941-1945 (Random
House, 1991), p. 193 provides comparable figures: 16,112,566 service personnel;
294,597 battle deaths; 670,846 "nonmortal" wounds.
[229]. Kroener, Bernhard R.; Muller, Rolf-Dieter; Umbreit, Hans, Germany and
the Second World War; v.V Organization and Mobilization of the German Sphere of
Power; Part I Wartime Administration, Economy, and Manpower Resources 1939-1941,
(Clarendon Press, 2000), Diagram III.v.3.Casualties (Sick, Missing, Wounded and
Dead) and Replacement Supply of the Army in the East, 22 June 1941-31 March
1942 (excluding Army Command Norway), p. 1020.
[230]. Germany had approximately 10,000,000 men under arms over the course of
the war. Goralski, World War II Almanac 1941-1945, p. 427. During the
six month period July-December, 1941, German troops representing 0.078% of this
force became casualties. Over the course of the entire war, 0.059% of the total
American force under arms became casualties. It should be noted that the Wehrmacht
was contemporarily carrying on the campaign against the Allies in North Africa.
[231]. Kroener, Bernhard R.; Muller, Rolf-Dieter; Umbreit, Hans, Germany and
the Second World War; v.V Organization and Mobilization of the German Sphere of
Power; Part I Wartime Administration, Economy, and Manpower Resources 1939-1941,
Diagram III.v.11, Army Officers (excluding Waffen-SS) Killed, Missing, and
Taken Prisoner September 1939—April 1942, p. 1041.
[232]. Kroener, Bernhard R.; Muller, Rolf-Dieter; Umbreit, Hans, Germany and
the Second World War; v.V Organization and Mobilization of the German Sphere of
Power; Part II Wartime Administration, Economy, and Manpower Resources
1942-1944/5, (Clarendon Press, 2003) Diagram III.1.21.Total losses in
the army officer corps, 1 October 1942-31 August 1943, p. 922.
[233]. Davis, Brian L., German army Uniforms and Insignia 1933-1945 (New
York 1972), p. 212.
[234]. Kroener, Bernhard R.; Muller, Rolf-Dieter; Umbreit, Hans, Germany and
the Second World War; v.V Organization and Mobilization of the German Sphere of
Power; Part II Wartime Administration, Economy, and Manpower Resources
1942-1944/5, p. 923, n. 292.
[235]. Kroener, Bernhard R.; Muller, Rolf-Dieter; Umbreit, Hans, Germany and
the Second World War; v.V Organization and Mobilization of the German Sphere of
Power; Part I Wartime Administration, Economy, and Manpower Resources 1939-1941,
Diagram III.v.3 Casualties (Sick, Missing, Wounded and Dead) and Replacement
Supply of the Army in the East, 22 June 1941-31 March 1942 (excluding
Army Command Norway), p.1020.
[236]. Boog, Horst, Rahn, Werner, Stumpf, Reinhard and Wegner, Bernd, Germany
and the Second World War; v. VI The Global War: Widening of the Conflict into a
World War and the Shift of the Initiative 1941-1943 (Clarendon Press,
2001)., Diagram VI.i.3. Gains and Losses of Personnel by the Eastern Army,
December 1941-April 1943, p.865.
[237]. Ibid., Table VI.i.2. Assessment of Battle-worthiness of the Divisions of
the Eastern Army, as of 30 March 1942, p. 877.
[238]. Kroener, Bernhard R.; Muller, Rolf-Dieter; Umbreit, Hans, Germany and
the Second World War; v.V Organization and Mobilization of the German Sphere of
Power; Part II Wartime Administration, Economy, and Manpower Resources
1942-1944/5, Diagram III.ii.8. Losses and replacements on the eastern
front, July-November 1943, p. 1014.
[239]. Ibid., Diagram III.ii.10.Changes in actual strength of the army in the
east, 15 June 1941-1 July 1944, p. 1020.
[240]. Ellis, Brute Force, Tables 51, 53, pp. 556-557. While it is true that
the American Sherman tank was no match for either the Panther
or Tiger tanks, the vast majority of these German vehicles were, like
the mass of the German army, engaged in the East, where they encountered the
formidable T-34, the vehicle that had revolutionized armored warfare
and now possessed an 85mm main gun.
[241]. Mansoor, pp. 14-15.
[242]. It bears repeating, in light of the criticisms made herein, that the
present author, like John Ellis and others vilified by Mansoor, Bonn, Brown and
Doubler, has nothing but respect for the American soldiers, and their brothers
in arms, who suffered so much in order to bring down fascism. That such men did
suffer and die for that end, however, does not constitute grounds for Mansoor
and his ilk to distort the historical record for their own purposes.
[243]. The reader will observe that no reference is made herein to another
incalculable advantage possessed by the Allies, namely the so-called "Ultra"
intercepts. "Ultra" was a code name used to identify a weapon every bit as
essential to Allied victory in the Second World War as the Manhattan Project,
namely the ability of Allied cryptographers to decipher German radio
transmissions sent via the "Engima" cipher machine. Unaccountably, Mansoor,
Bonn, Brown and Doubler also fail to mention "Ultra", a weapon that, among
other achievements, so compromised the Afrika Korps' logistics situation that
the Allies purposely allowed a trickle of Axis supply vessels to negotiate the
Mediterranean Sea in order that the Germans might not detect the breach in
their signals system.
[244]. In connection with Operation Husky, the reader may consult the present
author's Aspects of the Allied Invasion of Sicily, 1943, which may be
found at www.militaryhistoryonline.com.
[245]. Deist, Wilhelm, Messerschmidt, Manfred, Volkmann, Hans-Erich and Wette,
Wolfram, Germany and the Second World War, v.I The Build-up of German
Aggression, (Clarendon Press, 1990), p. 409.
[246]. Ibid., pp. 413-414.
[247]. Ibid., p. 414.
[248]. Ibid., pp. 414-416.
[249]. Ibid., pp. 417-418.
[250]. Ibid., pp. 419-420.
[251]. Ibid., p. 420.
[252]. Ibid., pp. 422-425.
[253]. Ibid., p. 426.
[254]. Ibid., p. 439.
[255]. Ibid.
[256]. Ibid., pp. 439-449.
[257]. Ibid., pp. 450-456.
[258]. The Officer's Guide: A Ready Reference on Customs and Correct Procedures
Which Pertain to Commissioned Officers of the Army of the United States
(Harrisburg, Pa. 1943), p. 410. The use of fear as the essential element in the
maintenance of military discipline extends as far back in time as one may
desire to investigate. The armies of both republican and Imperial Rome employed
harsh corporal discipline as a matter of course, the death penalty being meted
out to both entire units and individuals for desertion, mutiny and
insubordination. See, Parker, H.M.D., The Roman Legions (New York,
1993), pp. 232-235; le Bohec, Yann, The Imperial Roman Army (New York,
1994), p. 60. The death penalty might also be inflicted on the Roman soldier
who slept while on sentry duty, committed theft in camp, gave false testimony,
was egregiously immoral, or committed the same minor offense four times.
Webster, Graham, The Roman Imperial Army of the First and Second Centuries A.D.
(New York, 1979). Harsh corporal discipline was practiced in the British army
for centuries, the cat o' nine tails being only one of many implements used to
keep British troops in line. The British were also not averse to the ultimate
form of corporal discipline, namely execution. Mutineers were routinely blown
to pieces by being tied to the mouth of cannon.
[259]. Mansoor, p. 24.
[260]. Ibid., p. 25.
[261]. Ibid., p. 26.
[262]. Ibid., p. 31.
[263]. Ibid., p. 38.
[264]. It should be mentioned here that at the same time that Mansoor bewails
the evisceration of American infantry divisions caused by the "90-division
gamble", he informs his readers that the U.S. army never had to rely upon
makeshift kampfgruppen in the manner of the German army, thereby
confirming the superiority of the American system over that of the Germans.
This is yet another example of the "doublethink" employed by Mansoor and his
ilk. One can be excused for wondering, it would seem, how a system as
fundamentally flawed as that of the United States could at once be relied upon
as the reason for the poor performance of American divisions and superior to
the system employed by the Germans.
[265]. Mansoor, p. 255.
[266]. Ibid., p. 253. One wonders to whom such an argument would have been
"attractive".
[267]. Ibid., p. 255.
[268]. This is a universal failing in the historiography of the U.S. army in
World War II; no one seems
capable of taking into account the fundamental fact that the condition of the
United States in 1944-1945 was nothing like the condition of Germany in those
same years.
[269]. Mansoor, pp. 255-256.
[270]. Boog, Horst, Rahn, Werner, Stumpf, Reinhard and Wegner, Bernd, Germany
and the Second World War; v. VI The Global War: Widening of the Conflict into a
World War and the Shift of the Initiative 1941-1943, pp. 871-873.
[271]. Ibid., pp. 873-882.
[272]. Kroener, Bernhard R., Muller, Rolf-Dieter, Umbreit, Hans, Germany and
the Second World War; v. V Organization and Mobilization of the German Sphere
of Power; Part 2 Wartime administration, economy, and manpower resources
1942-1944/5 (Clarendon Press, 2003), pp. 1008-1026.
[273]. Ibid., pp. 1027-1031.
[274]. Brown, pp. 36-37.
[275]. Ibid., pp. 50-51.
[276]. Ibid., pp. 57-58.
[277]. Ibid., p. 73.
[278]. Ibid., pp. 78-84.
[279]. Ibid., pp. 101-104.
[280]. Ibid., pp. 120-121.
[281]. Ibid., pp. 131-135.
[282]. Ibid., pp. 140-145.
[283]. Ibid., pp. 145-146.
[284]. Ibid., p. 151.
[285]. Ibid., pp. 152-153.
[286]. Ibid., pp. 154-155.
[287]. Ibid., p. 156.
[288]. Parachute divisions, it should be noted, should not be characterized as
"elite" formations, if mobility is regarded as a necessary attribute of an
"elite" formation. Parachute divisions were no more mobile than run of
the mill infantry divisions, which is to say that they were not very mobile at
all.
[289]. Brown's reliance upon the post-war reports of former German officers is
illustrative of an interesting phenomenon in which he and other professional
denigrators of the German army at one and the same time cite such sources as
evidence that the Wehrmacht was not hobbled by anything like the "90 division
gamble" or the American individual replacement system, and as proof that the
German officers who authored the reports were nothing more than self-serving
liars whose purpose in life was to exonerate themselves from any responsibility
for the miscarriage of the German cause by shoving the blame therefor onto
Hitler. In view of this phenomenon, how is the serious student of military
history to decide when the German officers in question are lying, and when they
are telling the truth? May such a student rely upon someone with so obvious a
bias as Brown for guidance in making such a decision?
[290]. Brown, p. 157. On the subject of the German army's losses at Stalingrad
and in Operation Bagration, the reader may consult Erickson, John, The
Road to Berlin: Stalin's War with Germany (Yale University Press,
1999), pp. 38, 228; and Glantz, David M. and House, Jonathan M., When Titans
Clashed: How the Red Army Stopped Hitler (University Press of Kansas,
1995), pp. 214-215.
[291]. Brown, p. 157.
[292]. In using the phrase "other historians", the present author makes the
assumption, perhaps unwarranted, that Brown ought to be regarded as an
"historian" on the ground that he earned a professional degree in the field.
However that may be, it should be obvious that Brown's name cannot be uttered
in the same breath with that of B.H. Liddell Hart and Trevor N. Dupuy; Brown's
meager and shaky contribution to the historical literature is infinitesimal
when compared to the large body of work contributed by each of these men.
Brown's personal attack on S.L.A. Marshall is even more egregious, considering
that in the work complained of (Men Against Fire) the German army is
not mentioned even once.
[293]. Brown, pp. 124, 130, 146, 157.
[294]. The achievements of the 88th Infantry Division, it should be noted, are
not in need of false enhancement.
[295]. Brown, p. 168.
[296]. Ibid. On this point, Brown claims that "German sources available to
English-speaking authors were dominated by official records and the testimony,
and later memoirs, of captured German officers." The inference suggested by
Brown, namely that the only evidence available to the English-speaking
historian in the immediate post-war era consisted of the self-serving testimony
and memoirs of former German officers, is totally untrue. The Allies captured
nearly intact the wartime records of German divisions, corps and armies. These
documents, which do not bear the taint of post-war reminiscences intended to
exonerate their authors, have been available to historians at the National
Archives for half a century. Brown did not make use of these primary source
materials in writing Draftee Division. His ignorance of these
documents is not unique; until very recently most historians have not made use
of them.
[297]. Parenthetically, it surpasses understanding that Brown could make such a
statement, or that such a statement could be published. There is no greater
exemplar of a person "who had a point to prove or an axe to grind" than John
Sloan Brown.
[298]. Brown, pp. 168-169.
[299]. Ibid., p. 169.
[300]. Ibid. What, exactly, is a "candid document"?
[301]. Christopher A. Lawrence is the current Director of the Dupuy Institute.
The full citation for Normandy 1944 is found elsewhere in the present
work. The Response appears at pp. 450-462 thereof. Parenthetically,
consider the arrogance of one who suggests that the "liberal arts community" is
intimidated by the complex calculations in Numbers, Prediction, and War.
Most liberal arts schools in the present author's experience require students
to demonstrate ability in mathematics and the sciences. Hence, such "liberal
arts communities" would include instructors capable of engaging in and teaching
"complex calculations" at the college/university level. Students in such
colleges/universities are even capable of learning about "complex
calculations". Indeed, college/university degrees in such subjects a
mathematics, chemistry, physics and biology are traditionally awarded under the
rubric "liberal arts."
[302]. Brown, p. 175.
Copyright © 2004 by Thomas E. Nutter.
Written by Tom Nutter. If you have questions or comments on this
article, please contact Nutter at:
tenutter@gmail.com.
Last Modified on: 12/03/2006.
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