Mythos revisited:
American Historians and German Fighting Power in the Second World War
by Thomas E. Nutter
Introduction
This work endeavors to explore the historiography surrounding a controversial
and emotionally charged subject, namely the comparative combat performance of
the United States and German armies in the European Theatre in World War II.
While the subject has been of interest to soldiers and military historians for
over fifty years, and hence would seem to be a likely candidate for reasoned
debate, nevertheless it continues to incite strong interest among partisans on
both sides. Indeed, in recent years the topic has generated some rather heated
work, particularly from those who advocate the view that the United States Army
was more than a match for the Wehrmacht in that elusive quality known
as "fighting power". One reading the literature on the subject published within
the last ten years or so is in fact struck by the aggressively adversarial tone
adopted by the authors. One might reasonably inquire why such a stridently
partisan tenor has asserted itself in this area of military history.
The answer to this question lies, it may be reasonably argued, not with the
performance of the U.S. Army in World War II, but with its experience in the
Vietnam War. Anyone who experienced firsthand the passage of the United States
through the long period during which that conflict progressed cannot fail to be
aware of its profound effect upon nearly every aspect of American life and
culture. Although it obviously was not the only historical force at work in the
period, nonetheless it can be said to have contributed mightily to a number of
significant negative phenomena with which Americans continue to struggle. These
include such things as the diminution in value of higher education through
grade inflation; the more or less permanent distortion of the American economy
resulting from the consistent policies of succeeding presidential
administrations in following a "guns and butter" economic policy throughout the
course of the conflict; the degradation of moral authority in sexual and social
relationships; and, not least of all, disrespect for and suspicion of all
things governmental.
Perhaps nowhere were the pernicious effects of the Vietnam War felt more
profoundly than in the U.S. military establishment. This can be observed not
only in personal memory and the literature devoted to the subject, but also in
the experiences of those who served. Delve into the subject with any officer or
enlisted man who went through this crucible. You will find not only the
horrific recollections common to those who have experienced combat, but also a
litany of other horrors not previously associated with military service in the
American experience. The examples are many and diverse. In perhaps the ultimate
form of military disrespect, American soldiers "fragged" their officers in the
combat zone. American soldiers perceived themselves as being pilloried by the
American news media. Returning soldiers in uniform were humiliated by their
fellow citizens. In the aftermath of the war, indeed even to the time of this
writing, so-called "veterans" have debased the experiences of those who
actually served by bogus claims not only to veteran status itself, but also to
battle honors.
For the American military, however, the most significant fact about the Vietnam
War was and is that, by any objective standard, from the American perspective
it was not successfully concluded. It is true, of course, that the United
States did not emerge from the war a defeated nation, in the manner of those
countries on the losing side in the First and Second World Wars. In relative
terms, the number of Americans who perished in the cause was small. American
territory and industry were not ravaged. With few exceptions, American soldiers
and politicians have never been charged with war crimes. The United States has
not been compelled to pay reparations. On the other hand, unlike even in the
case of the Korean War, there has been not even a pretext that the United
States was the victor in Vietnam. The last Americans fled ignominiously from
Saigon. And South Vietnam, the nation on whose behalf so much American blood
and treasure were expended, has ceased to exist, having been absorbed into the
body politic of its former foe.
The irony of this situation can only have been exacerbated for the American
military by subsequent events. By 1990, the Cold War, the historical backdrop
against which the Vietnam War had taken place, had ended, rendering the United
States the sole great power in the world. Far from curing the ills engendered
for the U.S. military by the Vietnam conflict, this event seemed only to
magnify them. Not only did the successful conclusion of the Cold War fail to
eradicate the negative public image of the Vietnam War and the military which
had fought it, it also brought about a drastic reduction in military force.
With the exception of those whose lives would be directly affected by base
closings and the like, the American public greeted this reduction in force with
indifference. Not even the hugely popular Gulf War could rectify this
situation.
The increasingly fractious debate over the relative quality of the U.S. and
German armies during the Second World War has its roots in this decline in the
fortunes of the U.S. military establishment. It is a truism that human
frustration in one area often expresses itself in another. As will be seen,
this work focuses on four works published within the last fifteen years, each
of which seeks, in strident tones, to lay to rest once and for all what they
characterize as "the myth of German superiority". All four were written by (at
the time of their writing) serving officers in the United States Army. Each
officer was at least a Lieutenant Colonel in rank, and thus likely to have
served at the time of the Vietnam War. What is certain is that each of them
served in the U.S. Army in the aftermath of that war. Each of them thus
matriculated through the Army's staff college and advanced schools at a time
when those institutions attempted to come to terms with the "lessons learned"
from that conflict. In that time and place rising officers were educated, at
least in part, with a body of work written during the 1950's and 1960's by
historians whom one prominent military historian of more recent vintage is
pleased to call "German lovers".
A defeated army cannot hope to gain much capital by dwelling on the military
deficiencies of its former foe, particularly when, in spite of its "lost
victories", that army has subsequently emerged as THE dominant military force
in the world. Unseemly though it might be to criticize the Army of the Republic
of Vietnam, however, there is no likelihood of opprobrium attaching to one who
criticizes the Wehrmacht, particularly when the fall of the Evil
Empire has reduced to nil the likelihood that the U.S. Army might have to fight
side by side with Germans to defend western Europe against the Red hordes. The Wehrmacht,
indeed, is an easy target. The Nazi regime for which it fought ranks among the
most vicious in the twentieth century. Some of the Wehrmacht's soldiers
committed, or had complicity in, heinous war crimes and crimes against
humanity. Finally, two generations of publicity, including written works,
television shows and films, has succeeded in creating an image of the German
soldier as a Nazi automaton, an image fostered and encouraged by such eminent
historians as Gerhard Weinberg and Omer Bartov, as well as successful
non-historians such as Daniel Goldhagen. [1]
There is more to the partisanship of the American officer corps and its
adherents in this debate than mere opportunistic frustration. While the outcome
of the Vietnam War deeply wounded the self-image of the American military, more
recent events have had the opposite effect. The disappearance of the Soviet
Union as a credible military threat, and the overwhelming victory of the United
States-led coalition in the Gulf War have engendered in the U.S. military a
tremendous sense of hubris. As against their contemporaries, whether friend or
potential foe, this arrogance on the part of the American officer corps is
somewhat understandable. The armed forces of many other countries contain elite
elements, some of which may even be the equal in skill and bravery to members
of the U.S. Marines, Navy Seals and Army Rangers. No other armed force in the
world, however, has the resources to utterly crush an enemy. More difficult to
understand is the intellectual process by which this pride of place has found
its way into the historical literature dealing with America's enemies of the
past. The motivating logic seems to be, however, that since no existing armed
force can be considered a match for the American military, it must have always
been so. A corollary to this principle is that the historical record needs must
be "corrected" to reflect this elemental truth.
It is the purpose of this work to examine the literature of the apologists for
the U.S. Army in World War II, and determine whether the authors of that
literature have met their burden of proof.
Copyright © 2004 by Thomas E. Nutter.
Written by Tom Nutter. If you have questions or comments on this
article, please contact Nutter at:
tenutter@gmail.com.
Last Modified on: 12/03/2006.
* Views expressed by contributors are their own and do not necessarily represent
those of MHO.
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