Mythos revisited:
American Historians and German Fighting Power in the Second World War
by Thomas E. Nutter
Page 2 of 4
Chapter Eight
John Ellis, Brute Force. Allied Strategy and Tactics in the Second World War
Peter Mansoor lumps together John Keegan, Max Hastings and John Ellis,
contending that they "round out the field of authors who praise the combat
effectiveness of the Wehrmacht at the expense of the victors of World
War II." Mansoor asserts that Ellis, like his two fellow Englishmen, has
swallowed uncritically the alleged contentions of Russell Weigley and Martin
van Creveld that the German army was more competent and combat effective than
those of its opposition. While Ellis apparently remains unknown to Bonn, Brown
and Doubler, nevertheless it is worth dealing, however briefly, with Mansoor's
charge.
John Ellis is neither a soldier nor an academic historian, thus differentiating
him from the authors whose work is the principal focus of this work. He is,
nevertheless, an accomplished author whose works include, among others, The
Sharp End of War, a paean to the individual fighting man. As the title
Brute Force suggests, however, the book of which Mansoor is so
critical takes a broader view of war (in this instance, the Second World War),
focusing on the relative ability of the opposing forces to marshal military
resources and apply them to their respective foes. As he indicates in his
preface, his first major theme is that the stupendous collective industrial
potential of the Allies gave them such a preponderance of the means for
warmaking---weapons and soldiers---that it was incumbent upon the Axis to force
a quick negotiated peace in their favor, and when they did not, their
inevitable defeat was assured by the "prosaic arithmetic of natural resources,
generating capacity, industrial plant and productivity." His second theme is
that in applying this overwhelming force, "American, Russian and British
commanders made considerably less than optimum use of the resources at their
disposal and in almost every theatre serious mistakes were made." The result
was that Allied "commanders seemed unable to impose their will upon the enemy
except by slowly and persistently battering him to death with a blunt
instrument." These are the lines of argument of which Mansoor is so directly
critical, a criticism shared by Bonn, Brown and Doubler, though in the case of
the latter three, the criticism is not particularized to Ellis.[88]
It should be observed, as Mansoor does not, that Ellis does not take the view
that the Allied victory over the Axis was simply a numbers game. Ellis makes
this clear in the preface to his work.
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This book, then, is highly critical of Allied operations throughout the war,
but I would like to make it quite clear that there is absolutely no intention
of casting a slur upon the bravery (or competence) of millions of ordinary men
and women, in uniform and out, who gave mightily that Western democracy might
survive. If it is easy for me, comfortable at my desk, to pontificate about
eventual victory being certain, about such and such an Army moving
unconscionably slowly, this Fleet being in the wrong place at the wrong time,
that aircrew dying in vain, I do not mean to minimize the suffering or in any
way demean the memory of those who perished amidst the nightmare of Huertgen
Forest, Cassino, Stalingrad, Okinawa or Imphal, who burnt to death in the skies
above Germany, or choked in oil in the freezing Atlantic.
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When this commentary is taken into account, along with the fact that Ellis has
devoted an entire work to the sacrifices of the ordinary soldier in wartime, it
must be plain that Mansoor's complaint is ill founded.[89]
It is not too much to say, indeed, that Mansoor's criticism of Ellis is
entirely off the mark. The principal assertion, that Ellis favors the prowess
of the Wehrmacht over that of its enemies, is in fact totally without
foundation. To the extent that Ellis credits the abilities of Germany's
soldiers and their leaders, he does so by raising the question, quite properly
asked it would seem, of how it was that such a force, miserably led as it was
by the Nazi regime and its toadies, chronically under and poorly equipped, and
pressed on all sides by lavishly supplied soldiers in overwhelming numbers, was
able to "stay in the game" for as long as it did. Ellis' answer is not, as
Mansoor would suggest, that the Wehrmacht was a superior fighting
machine, but that the Allies failed to use their preponderance of resources to
the best effect. That this occurred was not the result of cowardice or
incompetence on the part of the men in the field, but of a want of determined
and aggressive leadership at the highest levels in the Allied camp.
Moreover, there is no lack of criticism of the Wehrmacht in Ellis'
work. The very first section of Brute Force is devoted to a
consideration to that greatest of German follies in the Second World War, Operation
Barbarossa and its aftermath. In a passage reminiscent of more recent
scholarship on failure of German leadership to manage the war, Ellis observes
that the speed and totality of the Allied collapse in the West in 1940 led
Hitler and his high command to the wrongheaded conclusion that war was a
psychological contest in which the side with superior tactics and an
"inflexible will to win" would prove victorious. The Germans ignored the
Wehrmacht's shortcomings, namely its reliance upon aircraft with limited
payloads, undergunned and underarmored tanks, and infantry formations that
moved at the same pace as Caesar and Napoleon. More importantly, and again in a
vein consistent with the views expressed by more recent scholars, Hitler and
his generals willfully ignored the logistics of modern warfare. Typical of this
lack of foresight was the Marcks plan for the invasion of Russia, in which the
plan's author, then Generalleutnant Erich Marcks, opined that the Red
Army "will soon succumb to the superiority of the German troops and
leadership." Likewise, the OKH Deployment Directive of 31 January 1941 blithely
asserted that the Russian armies would be separated and destroyed by the
Wehrmacht. As Ellis observes, these assumptions were made less upon the basis
of detailed analysis, of which there was little or none, than upon simple
wishful thinking.[90]
Ellis points out, furthermore, that the ultimate failure of the Ostheer
was the result not merely of an almost criminal level of overoptimism on the
part of the German high command, but also of the inherent incapacity of the
German war economy to match the industrial capacity of even this single
opponent, a factor compounded by totally irrational policy decisions made by
the German leadership. The conviction that the war in the East would be quickly
won at relatively little cost meant that the Germans failed to appreciate the
strain that the new campaign would place on the personnel replacement system.
The result of this miscalculation was immediate. In the first two months of the
eastern campaign the German army sustained approximately 440,000 battle
casualties; in the same period, German replacements totaled only 217,000. Over
time this disparity only grew worse, and the German army never recovered from
it. Of equal importance were two decisions made by Hitler, one in September
1940, and the second in late July 1941, when the eastern campaign was little
more than a month old. In the first, Hitler ordered a reduction in aircraft
production, so that by February of 1941 it had been cut by 40%. The second
involved cutbacks in the production of fundamental weapons systems---infantry
weapons of all kinds as well as field and anti-aircraft guns---so that the
production of field artillery, to give one example, was reduced by nearly 70%.
Added to all of this was the logistical problem already mentioned. The Germans
unaccountably failed to appreciate the rate of expenditure of ammunition and
fuel that would be required by the eastern campaign. Equally disastrous was
their failure to understand the kind of strain that the new war would place
upon motor and rail transport. This lack of understanding was equally criminal,
given the fact that it was well known to the military leadership that the
Russian rail system operated on a different gauge, a fact that would require
either the complete rebuilding of the rail net as the German forces advanced,
or reliance upon a time consuming system of offloading and reloading of
supplies and equipment at the point where the two systems intersected.[91]
If Ellis were in fact the apologist for the German army that Mansoor says he
is, it is reasonable to assume that he would not have concluded that for all of
the above described reasons, as well as the fighting qualities of the Russians
and their ability to learn from their foes, "the Wehrmacht was simply
not powerful enough to conquer Russia." Anyone with a modicum of familiarity
with the field knows that this is decidedly not the view of the Wehrmacht's
champions, who raise a variety of excuses---the Balkan campaign and the rainy
spring of 1941, the meddling of Hitler, the perfidy of the Italians, Romanians
and Hungarians---to explain the victory of the Red Army. Indeed, Ellis is at
some pains to refute these contentions out of the mouths of German officers who
were there. He relies, for example, upon the words of SS Gruppenfuhrer
Max Simon, who admitted that the German failure before Moscow was due not to
the vastness of the terrain, but to the resistance of the Red Army; upon Generalfeldmarshall
Fedor von Bock's chief of staff, then Generalmajor Hans von
Greiffenberg, who denied that the German defeat at the Russian capitol was due
to weather conditions, assigning the blame upon the German command's
misjudgment of the relative combat strength and efficiency of their own and the
Russian troops; and upon Generalfeldmarshall von Bock himself, who gave it as
his opinion that the German failure resulted from their underestimation of the
strength and resilience of the Russian enemy.[92]
As previously noted, Mansoor takes the position that Ellis denigrates the
fighting qualities and competence of the "victors of World War II" in favor of
those of the Wehrmacht. Yet, in the second chapter of his work, Ellis details
the tremendous contribution to Germany's defeat made by the Soviet Union.
Leaving aside the investment in productive capacity and human blood made by the
Russians, the author points out that from the beginning of the Russo-German war
until November, 1942, when the western Allies invaded North Africa, the Red
Army consistently confronted 70 percent of German combat formations, and an
even higher percentage of German panzer and panzergrenadier units. Even after
the invasion of France, and until the end of 1944, the Russians still faced 70
percent of German armored and motorized formations. When only German combat
units are considered, these figures rise to even more embarrassing heights,
from a high in June, 1941of 98.5 percent to a low in May, 1944 of 87.1 percent.
And as is well known, over the course of the war the Red Army inflicted 90
percent of the casualties suffered by the Wehrmacht, namely 4,900,000 German
dead and wounded in the east, as against 580,000 suffered in North-West Europe,
Italy and Africa. It is worth noting that one searches in vain in the works of
Mansoor, Bonn, Brown and Doubler for such a bloody accounting.[93]
Ellis focuses on other German failures as well. In his prologue, for example,
Ellis discusses the critical shortcomings, both quantitative and qualitative,
of the Luftwaffe in 1940-41, and the consequent German defeat in the
Battle of Britain. Ellis demonstrates that far from being outnumbered, the
Royal Air Force benefited from an advantage of 15.5 per cent in total fighter
production in 1940, a figure that rose to 49.3 per cent in the following year.
When the relative production of single engined fighters during the same period
is considered, the British advantage was 130 per cent and 150 per cent
respectively. Total production of single engined fighters between June 1940 and
April 1941 was 5,249 for Britain, and 2,500 for Germany. The Germans were
faced, however, not merely with a disparity in production of aircraft, but also
with a qualitative deficit in the aircraft with which it fought the battle.
Practically the only aircraft the Germans possessed that was comparable to the
Spitfires and Hurricanes fielded by the RAF was the Messerschmidt Bf 109, and
even this plane was inadequate to the task of protecting German bombers because
its limited fuel capacity rendered it capable of "loitering" in British
airspace for only a relatively short period of time, with the result that the
German bombers they were detailed to escort were rendered virtually defenseless
against RAF fighters. This was an unenviable situation for the German bomber
force, since every single one of its aircraft---the Ju 87, Ju 88, He 111 and Do
217---was woefully inadequate to the task set for it, being equally deficient
in the critical characteristics of speed, bombload and defensive armament.[94]
Equally disastrous for Germany was its inability to conduct a successful naval
campaign against Britain. In this campaign the Germans were forced to rely, as
they had in the Great War, upon the submarine rather than a surface fleet. And
whereas then Kommodor (later Grossadmiral) Karl Doenitz, the
commander of the U-Bootwaffe, had opined in August 1939 that a force
of 300 submarines would be necessary to conduct a successful offensive against
British shipping, when the war began the following month, only 57 boats were on
hand for the task. In addition, no particular emphasis was placed upon the
manufacture of U-boats in the early stages of the war, so that for the first 16
months of the war the number of boats at sea averaged well below 20, month in
and month out. This chronic shortage of boats meant that their tactical
deployment in groups, the so-called Rudeltaktik (in Allied parlance, the "wolf
pack"), was seriously undermined. That the German submariners enjoyed
significant success during the period in question, sinking almost 3 million
tons of shipping in the Atlantic up to the Spring of 1941, was due, as Ellis
points out, more to the shortcomings in resources deployed by the British in
countering the German offensive. Ellis argues, indeed, that had the Germans
employed any foresight whatever in 1938 and 1939, and produced a U-boat fleet
anywhere near the size envisioned by its commander, the inability of Coastal
Command to provide anti-submarine aircraft, and the failure of the Royal Navy
to deploy adequate escort ships, might well have so wrecked the British
merchant marine in the first 18 months of the conflict that Britain would have
been unable to continue the struggle. In fact, however, Ellis demonstrates that
Britain was never in any danger of being strangled by the Kriegsmarine.
First, in 1942, the first year of American participation in the war, combined
US and UK merchant shipbuilding was only just exceeded by the tonnage sank by
the U-boats. Yet, although this was the period of greatest relative German
success, it was precisely during this period that the U-Bootwaffe suffered
its greatest weakness in numbers of boats available for sea duty. Having failed
to gain victory in this period, the German campaign at sea was now doomed to
failure. Second, and perhaps more significantly, Ellis demonstrates that the
British merchant fleet remained steady in size throughout the entire war,
including its period of most dire travail between 1940-42. The British merchant
marine, Ellis concludes, was never close to extinction. Comparative figures for
the Atlantic and Pacific wars are telling. Between 1942 and 1945, the Japanese
merchant fleet lost 8,616,000 tons of shipping, reducing it at the end of the
war to a mere 1.5 million tons afloat. During the same period, the Allies lost
a total of 12,590,000 tons of shipping; yet the size of their fleet rose from
32 million tons to 54 million tons. The inadequacy of the German naval campaign
could hardly be more well demonstrated.[95]
Nor is Ellis particularly "anti-American" in assigning blame for the failure of
the Allies to crush Nazism with more dispatch. The principal targets for his
criticism, in fact, are Air Chief Marshal Arthur Harris and Field Marshal
Bernard Law Montgomery. His criticism of these individuals, moreover, is just
that---a finding of fault with Allied leadership, rather than praise for the
martial qualities of the Germans, as Mansoor suggests. Indeed, the contrary is
actually the case, since part of Ellis' criticism of Harris, for example, is
directed to that officer's failure to appreciate and exploit not only the
inherent weaknesses in the German economy, but also the disadvantages placed
upon the Luftwaffe through the lack of foresight and poor management
by its leaders, both military and political. It will be recalled that at the
Casablanca Conference in 1943, the Combined Chiefs of Staff directed the U.S.
Army Air Force and the Royal Air Force to undertake a combined bomber offensive
against the Third Reich. The principal targets for this offensive were
submarine construction yards, the aircraft industry, the transportation system,
and oil production facilities. Obtaining the compliance of Harris, in charge of
the RAF's Bomber Command, with these directives was less than successful. Ellis
points out that Harris was convinced of the ability of the bomber alone to
bring Germany to its knees, and that he never ceased to urge this point of view
on his colleagues. More important still, Harris was the champion of so-called
"area bombing", a tactic distinguished from the concept of "strategic bombing"
long favored by the U.S. Army Air Force by the former's assumption that the
most efficacious way of destroying a specific target was to saturate the entire
vicinity with bombs, thereby assuring that not only the strategic target but
all of its supporting infrastructure, notably the living quarters of its labor
force, would be annihilated. From the point of view of Harris and his
supporters, such a policy had several advantages over precision strategic
bombing; it could be employed at night and without the need for either tight
bomber formations or a sophisticated bombsight, all of which were consistent
with the approach adopted by Bomber Command early in the war. In addition,
night area bombing was not dependent upon the provision of fighter cover.
Finally, area bombing had the distinct attribute, greatly desired by Harris and
its other advocates, of generating widespread terror among the German civilian
population.[96]
Ellis argues that Harris alone was not at fault. Culpable too were his senior
officers in the RAF, principally his superior Air Marshal Sir Charles Portal,
who failed to bring him to heel. The result was that while the USAAF devoted
its attention to attacking nearly 65% of the targets designated by the Combined
Chiefs of Staff, RAF Bomber Command attacked only 31% of such targets. Among
the targets studiously ignored by Bomber Command were the enemy's oil
manufacturing facilities and transportation network, target sets whose vigorous
pursuit by both Allied air forces would likely have measurably shortened the
war. Meanwhile, although in spite of everything the Germans had managed to
greatly increase their production of fighters in the last two years of the war,
in the same period of time the Allied production of such weapons at least
quadrupled that of the Reich. In addition, not only was the US Eighth Air Force
steadily reducing the number of German fighter pilots by its relentless bombing
campaign in daylight, but the Germans were proving wholly incapable of
replacing their pilots, owing to their pitiful lack of foresight and
mismanagement of the pilot training system. It is the failure of Harris to
exploit these weaknesses in the German economy and defense capability that
Ellis finds so inexplicable, and for which he is particularly critical. There
is nothing in his analysis amounting to praise of the Luftwaffe .[97]
As to the Western Allies' war on the ground against the Reich, Ellis
reserves his strongest criticism for General (later Field Marshal) Bernard Law
Montgomery, Viscount Alamein. Ellis refers to Montgomery's tactical handling of
armor in North Africa, where the opportunity for a truly dynamic and successful
war of maneuver presented itself as a result of Rommel's weakness and the
possession by the British of Ultra wireless intercepts detailing the
German commander's condition and military intentions, as "execrable". In North
West Europe as well, Montgomery and his adherents failed to "finish off a
distinctly groggy opponent" at the Falaise Gap, Antwerp and the Seine, when
according to Ellis more "dash" might have rolled up the German line and forced
an early collapse. Ellis' conclusions about Montgomery are telling:
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Even in North Africa Montgomery's plans for his corps de chasse and for his
armoured hooks and end-runs have a curiously half-hearted feel about them, and
one constantly has the impression that it was in the frontal infantry assault,
with lots of artillery and a generous lead time, that Montgomery felt most at
ease. Whilst I do not suggest that Montgomery was careless of the lives of his
men, the fact remains that his style of generalship was more appropriate to the
Western Front in 1914-18. This impression is not dispelled by Montgomery's
record in Europe, where Operations Charnwood, Goodwood and Totalise smack of
naked attrition, where the failures at the Breskens Pocket and Arnhem suggest a
complete inability to conduct mobile operations, and where the deliberation
with which the Rhine Crossings and the subsequent advance to Lubeck were
planned and conducted seem to indicate a quite debilitating lack of verve or
even self-confidence.
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Nothing like this sort of criticism is made of any American commander by
Ellis.[98]
What is particularly disquieting about Mansoor's criticism of Ellis, and
likewise of the criticisms of his theses offered by Bonn, Brown and Doubler, is
that in the mountain of books that have been written about the Second World
War, the same arguments---that Allied commanders lacked aggressiveness, and
that the Allies prevailed because of their capacity to swamp the Axis forces
with their productive resources---have been made by many historians whose works
have found widespread favor. It would be possible to identify many of them
here, but only two will suffice. In 1983, Carlo D'Este published his Decision
in Normandy, a study of Montgomery's so-called "master plan" for the Normandy
campaign and its implementation. It would be fair to say that D'Este is both
objective and critical of Montgomery; his work focuses on the unraveling of the
"master plan", and on the Allied ground commander's subsequent efforts to
explain away its fundamental failure. In D'Este's analysis the key element in
that failure was Montgomery's inflexibility in the face of sustained and
vigorous German resistance, the effects of which were compounded by such
factors as the ineffectual efforts of some British troops and commanders and
serious shortages in British manpower. Critical though he was of one of the
"victors of World War II", D'Este is not among those routinely vilified for
denigrating Allied military prowess in relation to that of their German
adversaries. Likewise, Paul Kennedy's The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers
, first published in 1987, was not only a best selling book, but one widely
acclaimed by academic historians as well, among them the renowned English
military historian Sir Michael Howard. As the title of this work suggests, it
is broad in scope, covering the expansion and decline of imperialist powers
from the sixteenth through the twentieth centuries. Because of the breadth and
depth of the subject, and because of the truly fleeting histories of the
Japanese and German empires of the mid-twentieth centuries, Kennedy devotes
only a small portion of his book to that particular subject. It is nonetheless
significant that Kennedy entitled that portion "The Proper Application of
Overwhelming Force", a phrase taken from Winston Churchill's recollection of
his reaction to the news of America's entry into the Second World War following
the attack on Pearl Harbor. Kennedy quotes Churchill as saying that "Hitler's
fate was sealed. Mussolini's fate was sealed. As for the Japanese, they would
be ground to powder. All the rest was merely the proper application of
overwhelming force." While Kennedy concedes that there was obviously much hard
fighting in the offing before the Axis succumbed,
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Churchill's basic assumption was correct. The conversion of the conflict from a
European war to a truly global war…totally altered the overall balance of
forces once the newer belligerents were properly mobilized. In the meantime,
the German and Japanese war machines could still continue their conquests; yet
the further they extended themselves the less capable they were of meeting the
counteroffensives which the Allies were steadily preparing.
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Kennedy asks whether the success of the Allies, in the final analysis, was
merely the result of their capacity to overwhelm the Axis with material
resources. Like Ellis, he concludes that much more was at work than a mere
numbers game.
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[T]here were far too many examples of where the German and Japanese leadership
made grievous political or strategical errors after 1941 which were to cost
them dear. In the German case, this ranged from relatively small-scale
decisions, like pouring reinforcements into North Africa in early 1943, just in
time for them to be captured, to the appallingly stupid as well as criminal
treatment of the Ukrainian and other non-Russian minorities in the USSR, who
were happy to escape from the Stalinist embrace until checked by Nazi
atrocities. It ran from the arrogance of assuming that the Enigma codes could
never be broken to the ideological prejudice against employing German women in
munitions factories, whereas all Germany's foes willingly exploited that
largely untapped labor pool. It was compounded by rivalries within the higher
echelons of the army itself, which made it ineffective in resisting Hitler's
manic urge for overambitious offensives like Stalingrad and Kursk. Above all,
there was what scholars refer to as the ‘polycratic chaos' of rivaling
ministries and subempires (the army, the SS, the Gauleiter, the economics
ministry), which prevented any coherent assessment and allocation of resources,
let alone the hammering-out of what elsewhere would be termed a ‘grand
strategy'. This was not a serious way to run a war.
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Yet, Kennedy's conclusion is identical to that reached by Ellis:
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No matter how cleverly the Wehrmacht mounted its tactical
counterattacks on both the western and eastern fronts until almost the last
months of the war, it was to be ultimately overwhelmed by the sheer mass of
Allied firepower. By 1945, the thousands of Anglo-American bombers pounding the
Reich each day and the hundreds of Red Army divisions poised to blast through
to Berlin and Vienna were all different manifestations of the same blunt fact.
Once again, in a protracted and full-scale coalition war, the countries with
the deepest purse had prevailed in the end.[99]
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It is perhaps not too much to say that the principal theme binding together the
works of Bonn, Mansoor, Doubler and Brown is the argument, forcefully made in
each case, that the victory of the Allies over the Axis was not dependent upon
the overwhelming industrial capacity of Germany's enemies. Such an argument, in
turn, provokes at least two important questions. First, how can such a
contention be advanced by professionally trained historians, in the face of the
unchallenged (and indeed unassailable) evidence to the contrary documented by
Ellis, Kennedy and others. Second, and perhaps more importantly, why do Mansoor
and the others perceive such evidence to constitute a negative reflection upon
the courage and fighting qualities of Allied (particularly American) soldiers.
In the first place, the Allied powers certainly had nothing to be ashamed of
from the fact that they were capable of swamping the Axis nations with their
industrial might. Indeed, in any other context the advocates of the American
point of view would willingly acknowledge their justifiable pride in their
country's industrial might. Moreover, it is readily apparent that the relative
productive capacity of the combatants is an entirely different question from
the bravery and fighting qualities of the soldiers who benefited from that
industrial capacity. To put it another way, there is no inverse relationship
between the level of courage and skill of American soldiers and the industrial
capacity of their homeland, in spite of the efforts of Mansoor and his
colleagues to demonstrate the existence of such a relationship.
Chapter Nine
Keith Bonn and the Level Playing Field
In 1994 Keith E. Bonn published his tendentiously titled work, When the Odds
Were Even.[100] Bonn is a 1978 graduate of the U.S. Military Academy,
and at the time his book was published, was serving as an infantry officer at
Fort Lewis, Washington. When the Odds Were Even grew out of Bonn's
doctoral dissertation in history at the University of Chicago. While it would
appear from Bonn's Acknowledgments that he had access to original German
documents in both the U.S. National Archives and the Bundesmilitargeschichtliches
Forschungsamt in Freiburg, Germany, in fact he relies upon primarily
American sources to tell the German side of the story. His Acknowledgment also
reveals that he interviewed only American veterans in the preparation of his
work.[101]
In his Introduction, Bonn sets the tone for When the Odds Were Even ,
and indeed for the entire genre of which it is a part. In the process of
decrying the "selective" use of history, Bonn states that
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[O]ne of the most recent and unquestionably most alarming trends in the
historiography of World War II in the ETO [European Theatre of Operations] is
the use of the events of this era by certain military reformers to justify
recommendations that the contemporary U.S. Army should discard its own uniquely
evolved institutions and doctrines and instead simply imitate the Wehrmacht.[102]
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Particularly offensive to Bonn in this regard are works which "inaccurately
represent the facts bearing on the respective combat accomplishments of the
American and German armies" or compare those accomplishments unfairly.[103]
Bonn must at least be credited with admitting that the Unites States Army
enjoyed certain critical advantages over the Wehrmacht in the ETO,
namely (i) tactical air superiority, if not supremacy; (ii) a gradually
improving logistical situation; and (iii) a relatively favorable manpower
situation, advantages which "colored the outcome of very campaign, every
battle, and every engagement in which they (the Americans) participated".[104]
Because of these significant disparities, a "truly fair and accurate
comparison" of the two armies is difficult to construct. Bonn finds his ideal
field for comparison, however, in the Vosges campaign of the Fall-Winter,
1944/1945. Having reached this conclusion, however, Bonn immediately moves to
debunk it. In the early portion of the campaign, for example, the Germans not
only enjoyed the benefits of prepared positions in terrain naturally suited to
defense, but also disposed of veteran troops who, though "sometimes
outnumbered…still had their full complement of mortars and machine guns",
weapons the author describes as the most important under the
circumstances.[105] On the other hand, the American units involved are
described as either totally green or burned out from campaigning in Italy. In
spite of these disadvantages, the "mixed bag of American units" succeeded in
prevailing over their opponents in the first phase of the battle, as well as
its succeeding phases.
Bonn begins his work with a brief discussion of the then existing historical
literature touching on his subject, with regard to much of which he is very
skeptical. Bonn is highly critical of Martin van Creveld, whom he describes as
"notorious". After condescendingly referring to Creveld's "admirers" as
"well-intentioned but uninformed", he decries the latter's work as historically
inaccurate and "the worst kind of revisionist history". Bonn claims that
Creveld's work is shot through with historical inaccuracies about the U.S.
Army. To illustrate this, he claims that Creveld represents that U.S. combat
divisions used such things as pigs, bees, monkeys, centipedes, and belligerent
dogs for their unit insignia, and that these "whimsical" designs embarrassed
American troops and adversely affected their morale.[106] In fact, the passage
in Creveld's work to which Bonn alludes reads as follows:
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Like their German counterparts, American units were known by either roman or
Arabic numbers. Most also had nicknames, though the enormous variety of
whimsical designs---belligerent dogs, ducks, centipedes, spiders, bees, bulls,
birds, monkeys, wolves, bears, horses, pigs and cats, among others---that
accompanied American units into combat suggests that these meant little to the
troops. Except for Meril's Marauders, an outfit operating against the Japanese,
I know of no case in which an American formation was known after its
commander.[107]
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At least two things are evident from the foregoing passage. First, Creveld does
not refer to U.S. combat divisions, as Bonn claims, but to "units", a fact
which is evident from not only the paragraph in question, but from the
surrounding context as well. Such "units" could include something as small as
an armored company or platoon, or a fighter or bomber squadron, or even an
individual aircraft. Second, at least one of the animals referred to by
Creveld---"birds"---was in fact used as a divisional symbol by at least two
U.S. combat formations---the 45th Infantry Division and the 101st Airborne
Division---and at least as far as is known, the soldiers in those formations
were not "embarrassed" by those symbols. Moreover, one need only consult any
one of a number of works on the Eighth Air Force to determine that many of its
units bore symbols such as belligerent dogs, bees and hornets, ruptured ducks,
bulls and the like.
Bonn's flawed methodology in approaching his topic is apparent very early in
the book. For example, he asserts that the personnel strength of German units
(which he claims are not available from German sources) may be gleaned from
American sources. This can be done, according to Bonn, by "meticulously
screening available U.S. intelligence reports" and comparing these to the
estimates provided by German veterans of the Vosges campaign in the manuscripts
they wrote for the U.S. Army in the immediate postwar era. The numbers thus
yielded are then cross-referenced with German tables of organization and
equipment to give "accurate hard quantities or numbers". There are at least two
serious drawbacks to this method. First, as Niklas Zetterling has shown, while
numbers of personnel and weapons may not be available from the records of a
large German formation (such as Heeresgruppe G), those numbers are
often available, either directly or by "patching together" from subordinate
formations such as divisions or army corps.[108] Second, no one with anything
more than a passing familiarity with the German army would suggest that
cross-checking against a German table of organization and equipment in 1944
would be a meaningful exercise. The fact of the matter is that such tables were
fanciful characterizations of what the OKW and OKH would have
liked for their formations to look like. For example, on 1 August 1944 Panzer
Divisions underwent a complete reorganization, into the so-called "Type 44
Panzer Division". A Panzer Division included one Panzer regiment of two
battalions; the first battalion included four companies of 17-22 Panther
tanks each, while the second battalion possessed four companies of 17-22 Mk IV
tanks each.[109] 21.Panzer-Division engaged the Allies during the
Normandy fighting. On 8 August 1944 its Panzer-Regiment 22 fielded a
total of 20 combat ready Mk IV tanks, over sixty fewer than its
maximum authorized strength. More interesting still is the makeup of 21.Panzer-Division
on the eve of the Normandy campaign, at which time it was organized as a "Type
43 Panzer Division". According to this organizational structure, it should have
had two Panzer battalions, the first consisting of four companies of 22 Mk IVs
each, and the second comprising four companies of 22 Panthers each. In fact, on
1 June 1944 the first battalion of Panzer-Regiment 22 had four
companies of 17 Mk IVs each, while the Regiment's second battalion
broke down as follows: 5 Kompanie, 5 Mk IV (long barrel), 9
French Somua; 6 Kompanie, 5 Mk IV (long barrel), 13 French Somua,
2 British Hotchkiss; 7 Kompanie, 5 Mk IV (long
barrel), 13 French Somua; 8 Kompanie, 6 Mk IV (short
barrel).[112] These discrepancies between the nominal strength of the 21.Panzer-Division
and its actual makeup are typical of the distinctions between ideal and reality
which characterized all formations in the German army at this stage of the war.
It is indeed on this fundamental issue of German combat organization that Bonn
runs aground very early. In his section entitled "German army Organization",
Bonn discusses the makeup of German infantry, panzer, mountain and
panzergrenadier divisions, suggesting that the organization of these various
formations did not change from 1939 onward.[113] Of the reorganization of
panzer divisions in 1943 and 1944 he gives no inkling whatever. Likewise, he
indicates that German infantry divisions included three infantry regiments of
three battalions each. In fact, since at least the middle of 1943 many German
infantry divisions, including those taking part in the critical battle of Kursk
on the Eastern Front, fielded only six infantry battalions.[114] This structure
was formalized in 1944 by the organization of the "Type 44 Division".[115] For
example, on 18 October 1944 198.Infanterie-Division, which took part
in the Vosges campaign, included Grenadier-Regiment 305, 308 and
326, each having two battalions.[116] Formations such as 198.Infanterie-Division
therefore had much the same character as the Volks-Grenadier divisions
created by the German army in late 1944, the character of which Bonn adequately
describes.[117]
In the introductory portion of his work, Bonn acknowledges several facts
concerning the condition of the Wehrmacht in 1944, which facts
evidently elude him later in the book. Describing the coastal defense divisions
(Kustenverteidigungsdivision) guarding the French coast, he observes
that they were composed of "older troops, convalescing wounded, or somehow
otherwise physically disabled soldiers of little value in a field environment."
He notes further that they had no transport capability. Referring to the Volks-Grenadier
divisions, he points out that they possessed diminished reconnaissance
capability and severely reduced artillery assets, and that normally they
trained for only ten weeks before being deployed in combat. He comments also
upon the fact that the reduced strength of German divisions, particularly their
reduction from three to two battalions per regiment, meant that such units
could not be relied upon to accomplish the sort of tasks called for by German
doctrine, namely counterattacks. These changes, and others, resulted in "a loss
of operational flexibility and increased friction in battle."[118]
In a brief passage, Bonn also recognizes shortcomings in the German training
regime brought about by the exigencies of war, and in particular by the losses
sustained since the beginning of the Russian campaign in 1941. He notes, for
example, that the traditional reliance upon the regimental Erzatzbataillon
to train recruits had been undermined by the pressure to replace losses as
quickly as possible from any sources available, so that the "feeling of
belonging to a specific unit from the outset of a soldier's military service
was diminished if not altogether lost." The same stresses led, as the war
continued, to wholesale conversion of Luftwaffe personnel into field
combat troops, in many cases comprising what came to be known as Luftwaffen-Feld-Divisionen.
Likewise, extraneous naval personnel became replacements for army formations.
In both situations, Bonn recognizes, there could be no expectation that
training in infantry combat techniques would be sufficient. Bonn also
acknowledges the increasing German reliance on Volksdeutsche, the
growing tendency to commit training units to combat, and the resort to
draconian techniques of discipline, all of which contrived to reduce the combat
effectiveness of the Wehrmacht .[119]
It is noteworthy that in his brief remarks on the deficiencies of the German
army in the autumn of 1944, Bonn focuses upon symptoms instead of causes. This,
it will become plain, is a characteristic of the genre. A reader lacking
sufficient historical background, upon being confronted with Bonn's evidence,
might well conclude that the German army and its leadership had simply lost
contact with reality, and wantonly reconstituted their field formations in ways
that would render them incapable of fulfilling the tasks called upon them by
German doctrine. The root cause of the disconnect between the war the Germans
were fighting and their ability to fight it, namely the fundamental destruction
of the German army by the war in the East, is only alluded to. There are, of
course, scattered references to the fact that the German army had been at war
continuously since the autumn of 1939, and indeed even that it had been engaged
against the Red Army for three years before Allied troops ever set foot on
Western Europe. In fact, however, there is no recognition that the Red Army had
simply gutted the Wehrmacht in those three years of bitter fighting.
Indeed, the reverse is true---Bonn and his cohorts purposefully lead the reader
to the inference that the United States and German armies were somehow fighting
on equal terms from June 1944 to the end of the war. Conveniently left out of
the story is the fact, for example, that since the beginning of 1942 the German
army had never been capable of replenishing the personnel losses sustained in
the East, that its mobility, which had never been great in the first place, had
been severely reduced by attrition over five years of warfare, that its combat
units were persistently short of manpower, weapons and munitions, and that it
had been forced to rely upon foreign conscripts whose loyalty and combat
effectiveness were both highly suspect.
Bonn begins his narrative with a description of the so-called Battle for the
High Vosges. While the premise of Bonn's work is that the Vosges campaign was
fought on equal terms, a detailed reading of his own description of it shows
that it was not. For example, he admits that the defensive positions
constructed in the area of the German LXIV.Armeekorps, built by, among
others, Russian prisoners, members of the Hitler Jugend and RAD,
and the Organization Todt, were ill suited to German doctrine. In
particular, they were not constructed in a manner which would facilitate mutual
fire support. Likewise, the condition of the German units comprising 19.Armee
was not good. The premier unit, 21.Panzer-Division, "was in the best
shape it had been in since the Normandy campaign."[120] As has been noted
previously about this formation, such a statement does not say much. Compared
to the other German units involved, however, it may in fact have been of
noteworthy quality. While Bonn is at some pains to describe these other German
units, and does so with some frankness as to their shortcomings, he hardly does
them justice. He describes the tactical organization of 16.Volks-Grenadier-Division
as "chaotic", pointing out that it had been created out of troops from
destroyed and disbanded units. In fact, the division's Grenadier-Regiment 221,
223 and 225 each disposed of only one battalion of troops. As
Bonn notes, the division included security, fortress and jaeger troops; it
also, however, included a motley array of Kriegsmarine, Luftwaffe
and army training formations. All in all, 16.Volks-Grenadier-Division did
not hold promise for high combat effectiveness.[121]
As has been previously observed, an essential part of Bonn's methodology is to
rely not upon German records, but upon contemporary U.S. Army intelligence
reports, for evidence about the constitution of German units in the Vosges
campaign. This is well demonstrated by his treatment of the so-called 716.Volks-Grenadier-Division,
also purportedly subordinate to LXIV.Armeekorps. Noting that it
included remnants of a variety of units, including men from the Kriegsmarine
and the Luftwaffe, Bonn observes that its major subordinate units were
Volks-Grenadier-Regiment 726 and 736. In fact, there is no
evidence that 716.Volks-Grenadier-Division ever existed. There was,
instead, a 716.Infanterie-Division in the German order of battle
during the Vosges campaign, whose principal maneuver elements were Grenadier-Regiment
726 and 736. 716.Infanterie-Division had been formed
as an occupation division in 1941, and was virtually annihilated in the
Normandy fighting. It was reorganized in August 1944. At that time, the
companies of Grenadier-Regiment 726 possessed a total of 14 machine
guns and no infantry support or anti-tank guns. At the same time, the companies
of Grenadier-Regiment 736 managed 12 machine guns, no infantry support
guns, and a single 75mm PAK 40 anti-tank weapon. Likewise, the division's Artillerie-Regiment
1716 had no guns. At the beginning of November 1944, 716.Infanterie-Division
absorbed troops from no less than 17 different battalions and 9 different
regiments and companies. It is no wonder that American intelligence officers,
upon whose reports Bonn relies for his information, produced incorrect
information about 716.Infanterie-Division, since most of the captured
Germans interviewed by them probably had no real idea of the identity of the
division to which they belonged. Even Bonn admits that this disparate
collection of Luftwaffe, Kriegsmarine and over-aged troops
"received only rudimentary infantry combat training", an evaluation that is
probably generous in the extreme.[122]
Bonn describes 198.Infanterie-Division, also part of LXIV.Armeekorps,
as being in "a difficult personnel predicament", even though it supposedly
fielded some 3800 infantrymen at the start of the campaign. He avers that the
division had two infantry regiments (Grenadier-Regiment 305 and 308)
composed mainly of Reichsdeutsche, but that many of the soldiers "had
been previously adjudged unfit for combat duty". 198.Infanterie-Division
had been destroyed in Russia and rebuilt in southern France at the beginning of
June 1944. It actually fielded three infantry regiments (Grenadier-Regiment 305,
308 and 326), each containing two battalions, as well as Artillerie-
Regiment 235, Fusilier-Bataillon 235 and Feldersatz-Bataillon
198. In a fashion similar to 716.Infanterie-Division, on the
eve of the Vosges campaign 198.Infanterie-Division absorbed troops
from six different battalions and five regiments and companies, including men
from two Kriegsmarine units, 8.Schiffs-Stamm-Abteilung and leichte
Marine-Artillerie-Abteilung 687 . A less worthy opponent for the U.S.
Army can scarcely be imagined.[123]
Bonn includes several situation maps for specific dates during the Vosges
campaign. Each of these situation maps is associated with an order of battle
for the same period, in which the American and German units involved are set
out. The first of these situation maps covers the period 15 October-21 October
1944. The German portion of the order of battle includes, under Heeresgruppe G,
19.Armee (IV.Luftwaffen-Feldkorps, LXIV. Armeekorps) and 1.Armee
(LXXXIX.Armeekorps, LVIII.Panzerkorps). The further breakdown depicts IV.Luftwaffen-Feldkorps
controlling 338.Volks-Grenadier-Division; LXIV.Armeekorps directing
198.Infanterie-Division (reinforced with (Kosaken-) Festungs-Grenadier-Regiment
360) and 716.Volks-Grenadier-Division; LXXXIX. Armeekorps
including 21.Panzer-Division and 16.Volks-Grenadier-Division;
and LVIII. Panzerkorps commanding 11.Panzer-Division (committed
primarily against U.S. XII Corps), 15.Panzer-Grenadier-Division (withdrawn
16 October) and 553.Volks- Grenadier-Division. This work has
previously outlined the structure of 198.Infanterie- Division on 16
October 1944. We have also discussed the composition of 16.Volks-
Grenadier-Division, as well as that of the nonexistent 716.Volks-Grenadier-Division
(in fact 716.Infanterie-Division ).[124]
There is certainly a discrepancy between the order of battle set forth by Bonn
for the German forces on the date in question and that shown in the Kriegsgliederung
dated October 13, 1944. The latter shows LVIII.Panzerkorps (subordinate
to 5.Panzerarmee, not 1.Armee) including 11.Panzer-Division
and 15.Panzer-Grenadier-Division (and not 553.Volks-Grenadier-Division);
LXIV.Armeekorps having 198.Infanterie-Division and
716.Infanterie-Division; and IV.Luftwaffen-Feldkorps including 338.Infanterie-Division.
The Kriegsgliederung does show 21.Panzer-Division and 16.Volks-Grenadier-Division
to be part of Heeresgruppe G's order of battle, but as part of 5.Panzerarmee's
XXXXVII. Panzerkorps. On the date in question, LXXXIX.Armeekorps
belonged to Heeresgruppe B's 15.Armee .[125]
What German forces, then, did the troops of the U.S. 7th Army's VIth and XVth
Corps actually encounter between 15 and 21 October 1944? According to the
Kriegsgliederung for 13 October 1944, the German 1.Armee consisted of LXXXII.
Armeekorps (416.Infanterie-Division, 462.Infanterie-Division and
19.Volks-Grenadier- Division) and XIII.SS-Armeekorps [17.SS
Panzer-Grenadier-Division "Gotz von Berlichingen", 559.Volks-Grenadier-Division
and 48.Infanterie-Division, along with the remnant of
553.Volks-Grenadier-Division). On the same date, the Kriegsgliederung shows
19.Armee as having had LXIV.Armeekorps (716.Infanterie-Division [bodenstadig]
and 198.Infanterie-Division), IV.Luftwaffen-Feldkorps (338.Infanterie-
Division) and LXXXV.Armeekorps z.b.V. (159.Infanterie-Division,
189.Infanterie-Division and Panzer-Brigade 106). A detailed consideration of
these German units is warranted, in order to properly evaluate Bonn's thesis
that the Vosges campaign represented one in which the opposing forces were
equally matched.[126]
LXXXII.Armeekorp's 19.Volks-Grenadier-Division was two weeks old when the
Vosges campaign began, having been constituted on 1 October 1944 from
19.Grenadier-Division (formed 8 August 1944) along with Ersatz und Ausbildungs
Bataillon 463. It included the remnants of 19.Luftwaffe-Sturm-Division, which
had been destroyed in Italy. Its three regiments (Volks-Grenadier-Regiment 59,
Volks-Grenadier-Regiment 73 and Volks-Grenadier-Regiment 74) each fielded two
battalions of four companies each. The division also included
Panzer-Jaeger-Bataillon 119 and Artillerie-Regiment 719, as well as
Pionier-Bataillon 119, signals and support units. Panzer-Jaeger-Bataillon 119
was noteworthy for having not only 12 towed 75mm antitank guns, but also the
services of Sturmgeschutz-Abteilung 1119.[127]
LXXXII.Armeekorp's 416.Infanterie-Division had been on garrison duty in Denmark
before the Allied invasion. It included Grenadier-Regiment 712, 713 and 774
with a total of six battalions, Artillerie-Regiment 416,
Panzer-Jaeger-Abteilung 416 and pioneer, signals and support units.
416.Infanterie-Division was composed of men whose average age was thirty-eight.
It had been nicknamed the "whipped cream division" as a reflection upon the
special diets that many of its soldiers required. When it encountered the U.S.
7th Army in the Vosges at the beginning of October, it possessed roughly 8500
troops and little in the way of artillery. 462.Infanterie-Division was composed
of Grenadier-Regiment 1215, 1216 and 1217 and Artillerie-Regiment 1462. It had
no organic panzerjaeger unit. While this division (redesignated in November
1944 as 462. Volks-Grenadier-Division) was listed on the order of battle of
LXXII.Armeekorp, in fact it was engaged in the defense of Metz, where it was
destroyed.[128]
XIII.SS Armeekorp's 48.Infanterie-Division fielded Volks-Grenadier-Regiment
126, 127 and 128, each with two battalions of infantry. The division also had
Panzer-Jaeger-Abteilung 148, which consisted of two companies. The division's
Artillerie- Regiment 148 had three batteries of light and medium howitzers.
553.Volks-Grenadier-Division was created on 9 October 1944 by renaming
553.Grenadier-Division, which itself had been created on 11 July 1944. There
were a total of five battalions in the division's Grenadier-Regiment 1119 and
1120, along with four battalions in its Artillerie-Regiment 1553. The reason
that the Kreigsgliederung shows this formation as a "remnant" is that its core
element, 553.Grenadier-Division, had been destroyed near Nancy. Whatever was
left of 553.Grenadier-Division was reinforced with an amalgam of formations
including Festungs-Infanterie-Bataillon 1416, Festungs-MG-Bataillon 51,
Festungs-MG-Bataillon 56, Sicherheits-Bataillon 960, Grenadier Ersatz und
Ausbildungs Bataillon 110 and Pionier-Bataillon 243. It is far from likely that
553.Volks-Grenadier-Division was a cohesive force when it was encountered in
the Vosges Mountains. Likewise, 559.Volks-Grenadier-Division had been formed on
9 October 1944 by renaming its core formation, 559.Grenadier-Division (formed
11 July 1944). 559.Volks-Grenadier-Division had six battalions in
Grenadier-Regiment 1125, 1126 and 1127 as well as four in Artillerie-Regiment
1559. 17. SS Panzer-Grenadier-Division "Gotz von Berlichingen" had been formed
as an elite division in October 1943. It had been virtually destroyed in
Normandy and was withdrawn and reformed, absorbing SS Panzer-Grenadier-Brigade
49 and 51 from Denmark. In October 1944 it had not completed the process of
reformation.[129]
German 19.Armee included LXIIII.Armeekorps, whose constituent units
(716.Infanterie-Division and 198.Infanterie-Division) have previously been
described. It is worth mentioning, however, that the Kriegsgliederung denotes
716.Infanterie-Division as "bodenstadig" (static) the military implication of
which is that the unit had no organic means of transportation. 19.Armee's
IV.Luftwaffen-Feldkorps had only one division, 338.Infanterie-Division. It had
been created in November 1942 as a coastal defense unit. There were six
battalions in its Grenadier-Regiment 757, 758 and 759 and three in its
Artillerie-Regiment 338. It had suffered considerably in the retreat across
France, and was reformed in October from a number of battalion-sized formations
from the Luftwaffe and Kriegsmarine, as well as Landeschutzen and fortress
troops. LXXXV.Armeekorps' 159.Infanterie-Division had also been formed less
than a week before the U.S. 7th Army encountered it in the Vosges. There were
six battalions in its Grenadier-Regiment 1209, 1210 and 1211 and four in
Artillerie-Regiment 1059. It also had Panzer-Jaeger-Bataillon 1059. Also less
than a week old on its first contact with the Americans was
189.Infanterie-Division, comprised of Grenadier-Regiment 1212, 1213 and 1214
with a total of six battalions, Artillerie-Regiment 1089 of four battalions and
Panzer-Jaeger-Bataillon 1089, as well as support troops. Grenadier-Regiment
1212 had been reformed from Sicherheits-Regiment 1000; Grenadier-Regiment 1213
was constituted of ad hoc units including the so-called Jung, Hollermeier and
Muller Bataillonen; Grenadier-Regiment 1214 was as well created from an ad hoc
unit, the so-called Menke Regiment. The Armeekorps' last unit, Panzer-Brigade
106, had been formed at the end of August 1944 and contained Panzer-Abteilung
2106 (four companies) and Panzer-Grenadier-Bataillon 2106 (five companies). On
12 September 1944 its armored element consisted of 11 Jagdpanzer IV and 36
Panther tanks.[130]
The forces encountered by the U.S. Vlth and XVth Corps between 15 and 21
October 1944, therefore, included units typical of those found throughout the
German army in this last six months of war. 716.Infanterie-Division was one of
the Army's weakest formations, having been totally destroyed in the Normandy
battles, and by Bonn's own admission consisted of, among others, former
Luftwaffe and Kriegsmarine personnel who were overage and without adequate
infantry training. Its sister formation in LXIV.Armeekorps,
198.Infanterie-Division, was a similar amalgam of inexperienced and untrained
personnel, again by Bonn's own admission previously adjudged unfit for combat
duty. None of the infantry formations on the German side fielded more than six
battalions of infantry. Four of the German formations (553. and
559.Volks-Grenadier-Division and 159. and 189.Infanterie- Division) had been in
being less than a week before the American campaign began, while another
(19.Volks-Grenadier-Division) had been created two weeks before the start of
the American effort in the Vosges. One German unit (416.Infanterie-Division)
consisted of less than robust soldiers whose average age exceeded thirty-eight
years, while at least one other (48.Infanterie-Division) was composed of a
large number of foreign nationals with no personal loyalty to the Third Reich.
Not even Keith Bonn would assert that, faced with such opposition, the American
soldiers carrying out the assault between 15 and 21 October were at a
quantitative or qualitative disadvantage. He does assert, however, that obvious
disparities between these German forces and the Allied troops involved (3rd,
36th, 45th and 79th U.S. Infantry Divisions, 106th U.S. Combat Command and 2nd
French Armored Division) were leavened by two principal elements, namely the
higher rate of fire of the German machine guns, and the advantages offered by
the terrain to the German defenders. Nevertheless, he admits that the Americans
outnumbered their opponents in both men and weapons. The outcome of this
struggle, as Bonn describes it, was a draw---the Americans achieved their
objectives, while the Germans traded space and troops for three weeks'
time---"time to further prepare the positions that constituted the last barrier
before the Vosges passes and the Alsatian Plain, time that would bring the
winter snows and fog to completely stymie American air support and superior
quantities of armor, and time that would bring relief as a result of the
Germans' December Ardennes counteroffensive."[131]
Bonn goes on to describe the so-called "fight for the Vosges winter line"
between 5 November 1944 and the end of the month. According to Bonn, on 5
November 19.Armee included IV.Luftwaffen-Feldkorps (198.Infanterie-Division)
and LXIV.Armeekorps (21.Panzer-Division and Panzer-Brigade 106, 716. and
16.Volks-Grenadier-Division), while 1.Armee had LXXXIX.Armeekorps (361. and
553.Volks-Grenadier-Division). The Kriegsgliederung, however, shows that
1.Armee on this date disposed of three corps, namely LXXXII.Armeekorps (416.
and 49. [bodenstadig] Infanterie-Division, 19.and 462.Volks-Grenadier-Division
and 17.SS Panzer-Grenadier-Division "Gotz von Berlichingen" ), XIII.SS
Armeekorps (48.Infanterie-Division and 559.Volks-Grenadier-Division), and
LXXXI.Armeekorps (361. and 553.Volks-Grenadier-Division). On the same date the
Kriegsgliederung shows 19.Armee as including LXIV.Armeekorps
(716.Infanterie-Division [bodenstadig] and 16.Volks-Grenadier-Division,
21.Panzer-Division and Panzer-Brigade 106), IV.Luftwaffen-Feldkorps (198. and
269.Infanterie-Division) and LXXXV.Armeekorps (159., 189.and
338.Infanterie-Division).[132]
Bonn includes another order of battle for the German forces for the period
between 12 and 26 November, in which the only change from that of 5 November is
the exchange of 708.Volks-Grenadier-Division for 21.Panzer-Division in
LXIV.Armeekorps. His narrative, however, sets forth yet another order of battle
for 26 November in which 19.Armee has lost IV.Luftwaffen-Feldkorps, but retains
LXIV.Armeekorps, now consisting of 708., 716.and 16.Volks-Grenadier-Division.
According to this order of battle, the character of 1.Armee has changed
completely. Its XIII.SS Armeekorps is shown to command 11.Panzer-Division and
17.SS Panzer-Grenadier-Division "Gotz von Berlichingen". The Armee's other
corps is identified as "Hoehe Kommando der Vogesen", possessed of
Panzer-Lehr-Division, 25.Panzer-Grenadier-Division, and 256. and
361.Volks-Grenadier-Division.[133]
The Kriegsgliederung for 26 November 1944 reflects a different picture
of the German forces involved than does Bonn's narrative. 19.Armee possessed
three corps, LXIV.Armeekorps (708.Volks-Grenadier-Division and
716.Infanterie-Division [bodenstadig]), LXXXX.Armeekorps
(16.Volks-Grenadier-Division and 269.Infanterie- Division) and LXIII.Armeekorps
(159., 189., 338. and 198.Infanterie-Division; Panzer-Brigade 106 and
30.Waffen-Grenadier-Division der SS (Russische #2). 1.Armee's subordinate units
were LXXXII.Armeekorps (416.Infanterie-Division, 19.Volks-Grenadier-Division
and 21.Panzer-Division), XIII.SS Armeekorps (48.Infanterie-Division and
347.Infanterie-Division [bodenstadig]; 559. and 36.Volks-Grenadier-Division;
17.SS Panzer-Grenadier-Division "Gotz von Berlichingen" and 11.Panzer-
Division) and LXXXIX. Armeekorps (245. Infanterie-Division [bodenstadig]; 553.
and 256.Volks-Grenadier-Division). 1.Armee also had attached to it Hohere
Kommando Voges, commanding 361.Volks-Grenadier-Division, Panzer-Lehr-Division
(which together constituted Gruppe Bayerlein) and a Kampfgruppe of 25.
Panzer-Grenadier-Division.[134]
In November 1944, therefore, a number of different formations appeared in the
German order of battle, particularly in 1.Armee. 48.Infanterie-Division had
been formed as a static infantry division in February 1944. It was destroyed in
the retreat across France. Its ranks included a battalion of Armenians, a
regiment of former Luftwaffe trainees and troops from replacement and fortress
units. It had six battalions of infantry, three of artillery and a panzerjaeger
battalion.[135]
36.Volks-Grenadier-Division came into being on 9 October 1944, created from 36.
Grenadier-Division, a unit which in turn had not become operational until 15
September and traced its lineage to an infantry division bearing the same
number that had been destroyed by the Red Army in Operation Bagration.
36.Volks-Grenadier-Division had six infantry battalions in Grenadier-Regiment
87, 118 and 165, and four battalions in Artillerie-Regiment 268.[136]
Another unit that formed as a bodenstadig division was 245.Infanterie-Division.
It was unusual in that it contained nine battalions of infantry
(Grenadier-Regiment 935, 936 and 937), as well as three battalions of artillery
(Artillerie-Regiment 245). It lacked, however, organic transport facilities, as
well as organic pioneer, signals and other support units. A similarly immobile
unit was 256.Volks-Grenadier-Division, which had been formed on 17 September
1944 by the redesignation of 568.Volks-Grenadier-Division. Like
245.Infanterie-Division, 256.Volks-Grenadier-Division had no pioneer, signals
or other support units common to most German infantry divisions. It did,
however, have six battalions of infantry (Grenadier-Regiment 456, 476 and 481)
and four of artillery (Artillerie-Regiment 256).[137]
361.Volks-Grenadier-Division was formed on 21 September 1944 from
569.Volks-Grenadier-Division. It was another unit of six infantry battalions
(Grenadier-Regiment 951, 952 and 953) and four artillery battalions
(Artillerie-Regiment 361). Like others of its kind, it lacked any organic
pioneer, signals or panzerjaeger units. Its core formation,
361.Infanterie-Division, had been one of those destroyed in June 1944 while
forming part of Heeresgruppe Centre in Russia. It had fought in the Arnhem
battles before being posted to the Vosges region. A similar unit was
708.Volks-Grenadier-Division (Grenadier-Regiment 728, 748 and 760;
Artillerie-Regiment 658), formed on 4 September 1944 by merging
573.Volks-Grenadier-Division with the remnants of 708.Infanterie-Division,
which had been destroyed at Falaise by the French 2nd Armored Division. The
parent formation had been formed for coastal defense, and had included, at the
time of the Allied invasion, (Kossacken) Grenadier-Regiment 360.[138]
We have already spoken at length about the condition of 21.Panzer-Division on
the eve of the Vosges campaign. It is worth mentioning, however, that during
the Normandy campaign 21.Panzer-Division took about 8000 casualties, or about
50% of its authorized strength. By the end of August, it had a total of ten
combat ready tanks. The division was destroyed in the Falaise encirclement and
reformed in September by incorporating Panzer-Brigade 112. Another formation to
make its first appearance in the field was 30.Waffen-Grenadier-Division der SS
(Russische #2). This formation had its roots in occupied Belorussia, and
included a large portion of Russian, Ukrainian and White Ruthenian
Schutzmannschaften, locals recruited by the Germans for so-called "police"
duty, in which capacity they were employed against Russian partisans in the
German rear. The division was activated in the summer of 1944, but was
considered (for good reason) unreliable as a fighting force. Its order of
battle comprised Waffen-Grenadier-Regiment der SS 75, 76 and 77,
Waffen-Artillerie-Regiment der SS 30, an anti-tank battalion, pioneer battalion
and an anti-aircraft battalion. In August it absorbed 2300 mutineers. In
September its Artillery regiment comprised only a staff and a staff battery,
two batteries of 122mm Russian guns, and a nebelwerfer battery. On November 2
Waffen-Grenadier-Regiment der SS 77 was disbanded.[139]
11.Panzer-Division was a veteran unit that had spent a considerable portion of
its active life fighting on the Eastern Front. Its order of battle included
Panzer-Regiment 15, Panzer-Grenadier-Regiment 110 and 111,
Panzer-Aufklarungs-Abteilung 11 and Panzer-Artillerie-Regiment 119. In February
1944, after having been decimated in the Cherkassy pocket, it was reorganized
and rebuilt by troops from 273.Reserve-Panzer-Division. It was severely
battered during the Normandy fighting. In August it had possessed 79 Panthers;
by the first of September its armored component consisted of 30 Panthers, 16
MkIVs and 4 MkIIIs. In September it was rebuilt again, this time by absorbing
Panzer-Brigade 113. This may have added a maximum of 10 Panthers and 3 MkIVs to
the tank inventory of Panzer-Regiment 15, thus providing the regiment with a
total of 40 Panthers, 19 MkIVs and 4 MkIIIs. Even with these additional
vehicles the division's tank park was far below its authorized strength of 91
MkIVs, 79 Panthers and 21 StugIIIs. In November 1944 1.Armee's Hohere Kommando
Voges had under its command a Kampfgruppe of 25.Panzer-Grenadier-Division,
which also had been destroyed on the Eastern Front. Indeed, so decimated had
25.Panzer-Grenadier-Division been that it was reduced to the status of a
Kampfgruppe.[140]
At the time of the Allied invasion of Normandy, Panzer-Lehr-Division was
perhaps the strongest formation in the German army. Its principal units
comprised Panzer-Lehr-Regiment 130, Panzer-Grenadier-Lehr-Regiment 901 and 902
and Panzer-Artillerie-Regiment 130. It possessed 237 tanks and assault guns,
among them 99 long-barreled Panzer Mk IVs, 89 Panthers and 10 StugIIIs, as well
as more exotic weapons such as 31 Jagdpanzer IVs and 8 Tigers (including 5
Tiger IIs). Moreover, unlike any other panzer division in the German army, all
four of its panzergrenadier battalions were mounted on half-tracks, as was its
pioneer battalion. At the beginning of June, it mustered 14,699 soldiers. By
August, however, over 50% of these men had become casualties, and its
complement of combat ready armored vehicles had been reduced to a dozen Mk IVs
and 5 Panthers. It was withdrawn from the invasion front and reformed in
October. Whereas previously the division had included two panzer battalions,
now it was reduced to only one, with a nominal establishment of 28 Panthers and
28 Mk IVs. In November, on the eve of its commitment against the US 7th Army,
the division's tank inventory included 34 Mk IVs and 38 Panthers.[141]
19.Armee's 269.Infanterie-Division had been formed in 1939 and had
Infanterie-Regiment 469, 489 and 490, each of three battalions, as well as
Artillerie-Regiment 269 of four battalions. It participated in the invasion of
France in 1940, and was on occupation duty in Denmark until the advent of the
campaign in Russia. It fought with XL.Panzerkorps through the autumn of 1941,
and in the Battle of the Vokhov in early 1942. The division was decimated by
these battles on the Northern Front, and in December 1942 what was left of the
division was reformed from various units and went to Norway, where it remained
until November 1944. On November 6, 1944 the Division included
Infanterie-Regiment 469 and 489 (six battalions) and Artillerie-Regiment 269
(three battalions), as well as divisional service units, including a company of
Russian "volunteers". It had been planned to reform Infanterie-Regiment 490,
but this was never done.[142]
347.Infanterie-Division (bodenstadig) had been formed in late 1942 for garrison
duty in Holland. In April 1944 it had received (Nordkaukasische)
Infanterie-Bataillon 803 and (Turkestanische) Infanterie-Bataillon 787, which
made up the fourth battalion of Festungs-Infanterie-Regiment 860 and 861
respectively. It was committed to the fighting in the Normandy campaign and
destroyed. On October 21, 1944 it had been reorganized to include three
regiments of two battalions each. Grenadier-Regiment 860 was formed from
Erganzung und Ausbildungs Bataillon 77 and 412; Grenadier-Regiment 861 from the
staff of Erganzung und Ausbildungs Regiment 536, Erganzung und Ausbildungs
Bataillon 454 and Landwehr-Festungs-Bataillon VII; and Grenadier-Regiment 880
from the staff of Reserve-Grenadier-Regiment 36, as well as
Reserve-Grenadier-Bataillon 80 and 107. The division's Artillerie-Regiment 347
had four battalions.[143]
Bonn's orders of battle for the German formations confronting the Americans in
the High Vosges are, therefore, wrong. This, of course, can be attributed to
his failure to rely on any original German source for his information. More
importantly, however, as this detailed review of the units involved shows, the
motley assemblage of German forces arrayed against the Americans was not equal
to the task presented it by its commanders. As was the case in the struggle for
the Low Vosges, the German formations engaged can best be described as
"ragtag". Among all of the German infantry and Volks-Grenadier divisions
assembled by 1.Armee and 19.Armee for the defense of the High Vosges, only one
(269.Infanterie-Division) had been in existence for more than two months; most
had been formed for half that period of time. Again with the exception of
269.Infanterie-Division (and possibly 245.Infanterie-Division, a static
formation), all of the German infantry formations were reformed from units that
had been destroyed in combat, and included hodgepodge collections of reserve,
replacement, fortress and Landwehr troops, as well as sizeable numbers of
foreign nationals. Most were virtually immobile, and lacked even a pretense of
the TO&E called for by the operative Wehrmacht regulations. The few panzer
units under the command of 1.Armee and 19.Armee were panzer in name only. All
had recently been destroyed either in the Normandy fighting or on the Eastern
Front. None had even a semblance of its authorized strength.
The irony of Bonn's discussion of the battle for the High Vosges is that he is
aware of most of the foregoing, yet clings to the fiction that the match he
describes is one among equals. He admits that "many of the First and Nineteenth
Army combat units in the Vosges were made up largely of soldiers who had
received only four to six weeks of infantry training prior to being committed
to battle." He makes similar, but more detailed comments, about
708.Volks-Grenadier-Division, one of the principal units in his story.
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Much of the division had been wrecked while fighting Third Army units in
September, and the entire division had been pulled back to Czechoslovakia to
refit, receive new personnel, and train for six weeks prior to being deployed
in the Vosges. Although the cadre consisted largely of experienced Kriegsmarine
and Luftwaffe noncommissioned officers, few of them had much experience in
ground combat. The greater bulk of the ranks were filled by recruits varying in
age from eighteen to forty-five. The infantry companies of this division had
about 125 men each, so, including the divisional Fusilier company,
708.Volks-Grenadier-Division could field about 3,200 men in its combat infantry
units.
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Of this division Bonn also avers that "[A]lthough well equipped and close to
authorized strength for a division of its type, the 708th's training period was
hardly adequate for the development of the cohesion so important for success in
rigorous mountain warfare." Bonn also remarks that 716.Volks-Grenadier-Division
"was so weak from the pummeling its troops had taken that it was hardly able to
do more than defend strongpoints along the Vosges line…with its thousand or so
remaining infantrymen" and that 16.Volks-Grenadier-Division "defended an even
smaller sector, in recognition of its strength of barely more than a reinforced
battalion." He also admits that even though the German troops were fighting at
the borders of their homeland, many of them now believed the war to be lost.
Further, he notes the fact that the Germans were forced to rely upon polyglot
formations of Germans, foreign nationals and German speaking foreigners
"contributed significantly to the weakening of the social bonds between unit
members in pressure situations. Similarly, lacking extensive unit training and
missing the cohesive bonds born of shared hardships and living experiences with
their comrades prior to commitment to combat…many German soldiers felt no
particular loyalty to their units or comrades." Indeed, he recounts that the
U.S. 103rd Infantry Division captured Russian and Polish nationals in German
uniform who confessed to having murdered their German officers in order to
surrender.[144]
Bonn continues to set the stage for his story by providing details concerning
two American units engaged, the 100th and 103rd Infantry Divisions. The
so-called "Century Division" had been activated in November 1942 and took part
in the Second Army maneuvers in the Cumberland Mountains of Tennessee in the
winter of 1943-1944, "during which its soldiers received superb preparation for
their eventual commitment to the Vosges winter campaign." Although it lost 3000
of its infantrymen, taken as replacements for units already in action, the
100th Infantry Division had received nearly six months' supplementary training
at Fort Bragg before embarking for Europe. The 103rd Infantry Division ("Cactus
Division") had also been activated in November 1942, and participated in Third
Army maneuvers in Louisiana in the fall of 1943. It received supplementary
training in Texas between November 1943 and September 1944, in part for the
purpose of acclimating replacements for infantrymen taken out as replacements
for units in combat. Bonn points out that these two divisions, in addition to
Combat Command A of the fresh 14th Armored Division, helped give the attacking
US VI Corps an infantry force ratio of 2.9 to 1 against the enemy, as well as
greater unit cohesion as compared to the Germans.[145]
Having laid out all of these facts about the strengths and condition of the
opposing forces, however, Bonn then descends into the realm of fantasy. In the
area of the US VI Corps, he explains, the disparities he has been at pains to
outline are rendered meaningless---"the odds in the battle for the High Vosges
and the German winter line were much closer than the force ratios
indicated"---because, inter alia, the Germans were on the defensive, on ground
well suited for it, Allied airpower was nullified by fog, and Americans were
forced to suffer in the open while the Germans enjoyed the comforts of
fortifications and buildings. The American infantrymen, says Bonn, lived a
terrible existence, exposed to the elements, subsisting on cold C rations and K
rations, never able to build a fire, always cold and wet. It is in this context
that Bonn recounts the clash between the 100th Infantry Division and
708.Volks-Grenadier-Division, which he characterizes as important because it
describes a conflict between two equally "green" formations. In that clash,
says the author, the "odds were virtually even, although the Germans held the
advantages of terrain and position." In it, as well, he argues that "[T]raining
and the tactical proficiency and cohesion borne of ‘community of experience'
would make the difference in the outcome."[146]
Bonn's comments on the outcome of the struggle are revealing. He observes, for
example, that "[A]lthough the Americans…had gained overall numerical
superiority, they did not need it; battalion on battalion, company on company,
they were outfighting the Germans and overrunning them." For the first time in
history, he notes, an army defending the Vosges had failed in its task. Despite
being free of interference from Allied aircraft, German "forces of often
comparable---and always adequate---size failed to halt their adversaries."
Finally, "[I]n the best possible weather for defense, fighting on the doorstep
of their homeland, against an enemy far from his, the commanders of the German
army organized and trained their soldiers so poorly and provided such
impoverished leadership that their units could not accomplish a mission in
which no army had ever before failed." In spite of these successes, however,
Bonn has to admit that the German LXIV.Armeekorps, or at least parts of it,
including 716.Volks-Grenadier-Division, were able to fight off their American
assailants and retreat into the Alsatian plain to fight again another day.[147]
What is truly striking about Bonn's narrative is the contrast between what he
knows, or seems to know (or perhaps ought to know), about the opposing forces,
and his conclusions about the combat in which they engaged. This is well
demonstrated by his retelling of the following incident:
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"Outside Ville, a small incident occurred that illustrates the difference
between the opposing sides' success in integrating noninfantry replacements
into their combat formations. On or about 27 November, Pfc. Will Alpern, a
nineteen-year-old automatic rifleman in Company I, 410th Infantry, was speaking
with a just-captured German prisoner. The German complained that he was not
supposed to be fighting in infantry combat, because he had originally been a
ground crewman in the Luftwaffe. He went on to say that he was sure the
Americans would never do anything so stupid or desperate as reassign such
troops to the infantry. Private Alpern informed the prisoner that he had been
brought into the army through the ASTP and had been assigned to an Army Air
Forces unit before his assignment to the Cactus Division at Camp Howze, Texas,
for duty as an infantryman."
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The fundamental problem with this comparison is that Private Alpern, like
everyone else in the U.S. army during World War II, began his career with
sixteen weeks training as an infantryman regardless of the fact that he was
assigned, after his training as an infantryman, to the Army Air Force. Had Pfc.
Alpern been a sailor (as many German "infantrymen" were at this stage of the
war), the story would, of course, have been different. But Pfc. Alpern was not
a sailor; he was a member of the U.S. army. In the Wehrmacht, the same was not
the case. Luftwaffe personnel were not trained as infantrymen. Theirs was a
service entirely separate from the German army (as the US Air Force would
someday become), and with the exception of those members of Luftwaffe
Fallschirmjaeger and panzer formations (as apparently the captured German in
this instance was not), Luftwaffe personnel did not receive basic training as
infantrymen. That was one of the reasons why Luftwaffen-Felddivisionen, those
sops to Reichmarschal Goering's ego formed of extraneous Luftwaffe personnel
when the war turned against Germany, were so often literally blown to bits when
thrown into combat with their adversaries.[148]
The story of Pfc. Alpern and the captured German is but one example of the
strain of unreality that pervades Bonn's work, as well as that of others of
this genre, in his effort to invidiously compare the US and German armies in
the time and place in question. For example, Bonn describes the encounter of
the US 100th Infantry Division with 708. Volks-Grenadier-Division as one
between equals, taking particular note of their common status as units "green"
to combat. How, one might reasonably inquire, can such a comparison be made?
100th Infantry Division, Bonn has told us, trained as a unit for almost two
years before being committed to action in the Vosges, including six months
supplemental training to enable it to acclimate new soldiers. In addition, Bonn
has observed, the division had received "superb preparation" for its combat in
the Vosges, by virtue of having participated in maneuvers in the Cumberland
Mountains. Much the same was true of the 103rd Infantry Division, another
"green" American unit in its first combat. On the other hand,
708.Volks-Grenadier-Division, the 100th Infantry Division's principal opponent
in the battle and a unit typical of German infantry divisions at this juncture
of the war, was immobile, rebuilt from a wrecked division and contained a
hodgepodge of personnel and units. 708.Volks-Grenadier-Division had trained as
a unit for four-six weeks before being committed to battle. Its NCO cadre
consisted of many former NCOs from the Luftwaffe and Kriegsmarine, whom Bonn
observes lacked experience in ground combat. Its training was inadequate to
establish unit cohesion and loyalty, and it contained a significant number of
foreign nationals. Can one really assert that combat between these two units
can be described as an equal one? A unit whose personnel, many of whom had
difficulty communicating with one another, and who had received at the most six
weeks infantry training from NCOs with no experience as infantrymen themselves,
against another that had trained together for two years, and whose personnel
were so homogeneous in nature that not even men with common backgrounds and a
common language were permitted to serve with them because of the color of their
skin?
Bonn seems to realize that his comparison is an absurd one, because he goes on
to explain away to failure of the American forces to utterly annihilate their
opponents by arguing that whatever distinctions between the forces may have
favored the Americans were rendered meaningless by other factors beyond their
control, such as the fact that the Germans were on the defensive, were in
prepared positions while their adversaries were exposed to the elements, and
were free from air attack because of the weather. These, unfortunately, are
nothing but excuses, and not very good ones at that. Lack of air cover, of
course, is a two way street---the Germans did not suffer from air attack during
the Vosges campaign, but neither did the Americans. Indeed, the Americans had
virtually never been harassed by German aircraft since first setting foot on
the continent six months earlier, because the Eighth Air Force had driven the
Luftwaffe from the skies.
The argument that the Germans were favored by being on the defensive is equally
unavailing---defensive positions, no matter how formidable, are of little
practical consequence if, as in this case, they are manned by untrained,
irresolute troops, many of whom are incapable of communicating with one
another, some of whom have no commitment to the army or the regime that put
them in harm's way, and most of whom already believe their cause to be lost.
Finally, there is not in fact much to choose between being exposed in the open
to foul weather in the dead of winter and being in prepared positions in the
same ground. It is highly doubtful, for example, that the Germans in such
positions, any more than their American adversaries, made fires to warm
themselves or cook hot meals, since to do so would have obviously drawn down
upon them the unwanted attention of American artillery. Nor would the Germans
have been much better off for simply having roofs over their heads, so long as
they had mud under their feet. No one who has ever read anything about trench
warfare, either in the First or Second World Wars, would conclude that a
soldier in a wet, cold, stinking hole in the ground, whose position is well
targeted by enemy artillery, holds an advantage great enough to make him the
assured victor in a struggle of the kind that ensued in the Vosges.
Finally, there is the suggestion, made by Bonn, that one notable failure of the
Germans in general, as compared with the Americans, is that the former chose to
rebuild divisions from the burnt out hulks of others, and did so with amalgams
of disjointed personnel whom they gave six weeks training and then committed to
combat. Anyone with the least knowledge of the position in which the Germans
found themselves in during the latter stages of World War II knows that the
measures they resorted to, as exemplified by the sort of units encountered by
the Americans in the Vosges, were forced upon them by the exigencies of a war
long lost. The German army had no recourse but to throw together whatever
formations it could, as fast as it could, and get them into the field as fast
as possible, in order to stem the tide of Allied advance. The idea that it
chose to field so-called infantry units made up from the detritus of a lost war
is so silly as to hardly warrant comment.[149]
The balance of Bonn's book is devoted to the Battle for the Low Vosges, which
extended from late November 1944 to mid-January 1945. It included a period of
movement warfare in the Low Vosges between the last week of November and 20
December; an attack by the Americans against the Maginot Line at Bitche,
contemporaneous with a battle in the Siegfried Line; and the repulse by the
Americans of the German Nordwind counteroffensive. At the beginning of this
period, according to Bonn, 1.Armee consisted of LXXXIX.Armeekorps, including
361.Volks-Grenadier-Division and 245.Infanterie-Division; and XIII.SS
Armeekorps, with 25.Panzer-Grenadier-Division and 11.Panzer-Division, later
replaced by 257.Volks-Grenadier- Division. We have previously described all of
these units, with the sole exception of 257. Volks-Grenadier-Division. This
formation was created on 13 October 1944 by the redesignation of
587.Volks-Grenadier-Division (the so-called Gross-Goerschen Schatten-
Division). It had Grenadier-Regiment 457, 466 and 477 each of two battalions,
Artillerie-Regiment 257 of four battalions, and divisional support units,
including Fusilier Kompanie 257. It was of the same ramshackle quality as
others of its ilk. It should be noted that, as related above, Bonn's reference
to 25.Panzer-Grenadier-Division as being in action at this point is incorrect;
only a truncated Kampfgruppe of 25. Panzer-Grenadier-Division existed.
Likewise, the Kriegsgliederung for 26 November 1944 describes a different order
of battle than that recited by Bonn. The Kampfgruppe of
25.Panzer-Grenadier-Division was under the command of Hohere Kommando Vogensen,
as were 361.Volks-Grenadier-Division and Panzer-Lehr-Division (which
constituted Gruppe Bayerlein). LXXXIX.Armeekorps controlled
245.Infanterie-Division (bodenstadig) as well as 553.Volks-Grenadier-Division
and 256 Volks-Grenadier-Division. XIII.SS Armeekorps was composed of
48.Infanterie-Division, 559.Volks-Grenadier-Division, 347.Infanterie-Division
(bodenstadig), 36.Volks-Grenadier-Division, 11.Panzer-Division and 17. SS
Panzer-Grenadier-Division "Gotz von Berlichingen". LXXXII.Armeekorp consisted
of 416.Infanterie-Division, 21.Panzer-Division and
19.Volks-Grenadier-Division.[150]
Bonn's description of the various stages of the Battle for the Low Vosges is
somewhat less partisan than the first part of his work. He does concede, for
example, that the German forces there were significantly outnumbered, but that
nevertheless they "gave ground grudgingly" during the first two weeks of
December. He also admits that 1.Armee "displayed similar proficiency" to that
shown by 19.Armee in defending the High Vosges, using proper doctrine,
tenaciously defending, vigorously counterattacking and showing an ability
"even…to inflict significant reverses" on the Americans. Indeed, the Germans
inflicted high casualties on their opposite numbers. Significant resistance by
the Kampfgruppe of 25.Panzer-Grenadier-Division and other German troops in
little villages like Ratzwiller in the area of the 324th Infantry Regiment and
Enchenberg in that of the 114th Infantry Regiment effectively neutralized
support for the American infantry by the 749th Tank Battalion and 776th Tank
Destroyer Battalion, so that the footsoldiers were forced to rely upon
themselves alone to wear down the enemy. More success was had in the area of
the U.S. 45th Infantry Division, reinforced by elements of the 103rd Infantry
Division, where the Americans attacked the "heavily outnumbered" German
245.Infanterie-Division. The 245.Infanterie-Division, bereft of armored
support, was "ripped open" by the attackers[151]
A measure of the ferocity of the fighting in the Low Vosges, and the relative
ability of the antagonists to tolerate its results, is revealed in Bonn's
discussion of the impact of the struggle on the combat power of the German and
American forces involved. In a chart depicting the average strength of American
infantry rifle companies before and after the pursuit in the Low Vosges, he
shows that the numerical strength of these units "had been protected to a
significant degree", although he does not explain how this result was obtained.
Moreover, "[N]ot only had the strengths of the rifle companies been largely
preserved, but those of the heavy-weapons companies and supporting units were
almost completely intact." For the defending Germans, however, this was not the
case. 361.Volks-Grenadier-Division, for example, had scoured its rear echelon
for troops, many of whom then became casualties, so that by mid-December its
infantry battalions had dwindled to an average strength of 675 men. The
infantry component of the Kampfgruppe of 25.Panzer-Grenadier-Division suffered
similarly. 245.Infanterie- Division, which had started off at a disadvantage,
"had ceased to exist as a coherent formation" by the middle of December. For
all of this, however, Bonn concludes that in these so-called "Battles of
Movement" in the Low Vosges during the first two weeks of December, both sides
accomplished their assigned missions concurrently. "First and most
indisputable", Bonn says, the German forces accomplished their mission of
delay, preventing a breakthrough into the Palatinate, and allowing the German
command to retain its mobile reserve for the Ardennes counteroffensive. The
Americans, on the other hand, are said to have accomplished their mission of
relentless pursuit of the enemy, while at the same time preserving their forces
for the ultimate mission of penetrating the German frontier defenses.[152]
Whereas Bonn is even-handed in his treatment of the "Battles of Movement" in
the Low Vosges, his discussion of the attack of the U.S. XV Corps' 44th and
100th Infantry Divisions upon the Maginot Line bastions of Fort Simserhof and
Fort Schiesseck respectively descends to the realm of the absurd. As with
others of his ilk, Bonn attempts to set up an invidious comparison between the
assaults of these American formations on these positions and the attack of the
German 257.Infanterie-Division on the same position in 1940. Simply put, Bonn
contends that the superiority of American over German arms is proven by the
fact that the U.S. 44th and 100th Infantry Divisions were successful in their
attacks, while the German 257.Infanterie-Division failed in its efforts. Bonn's
comparison, however, begins with a faulty premise, one that leads him to a
false conclusion.
Bonn begins his description of this interlude by asserting that 257.Infanterie-
Division had the opportunity to attack all of the fortifications of the
so-called Ensemble de Bitche, including the two Forts described above, from the
same direction as that followed by the 44th and 100th Infantry in 1944, namely
from France toward Germany. 257.Infanterie-Division's Infanterie-Regiment 457,
says Bonn, did the attacking, first on 21 June 1940 in the abri d'intervalle on
the Grand Kindelberg near Bitche, and then on the following day on the
casemates and blockhouses under the control of Fort Grand Hohekirkel east of
Bitche. Both assaults were without avail; thereafter all attacks were
suspended, and the Germans waited out the acceptance of the armistice by the
garrison of the Ensemble de Bitche on June 30. Bonn concludes that "[T]he
Germans were unable to penetrate the outer rear defenses of these massive
fortifications, and they never progressed against them to the extent necessary
for an assault on the fortresses proper." A brief look at the facts about 1940
explains the actions of the Germans, and undermines completely Bonn's attempt
to disparage German arms. On 21 June 1940, the day on which Bonn claims
Infanterie-Regiment 457 first attacked the Ensemble de Bitche, the French
surrendered to the Germans in a formal ceremony in the Forest of Compiegne. On
24 June, French troops holding out in the Vosges Mountains laid down their
arms. On 25 June all fighting in France ended. Given these facts, one must
question Bonn's assertions and conclusions. Bonn is a professional soldier, and
presumably therefore recognizes that one of the guiding precepts of all career
soldiers is to preserve the lives and general welfare of the soldiers under
their command. The German officers commanding 257.Infanterie-Division and
Infanterie-Regiment 457 in 1940 were also professional soldiers, recognizing
the same precept. Why, then, would they have behaved in the manner Bonn
evidently suggests that they should have done, namely thrown away the lives of
their soldiers in a war already won? The very low casualties alleged by Bonn to
have been sustained by the Germans in their two attacks (15 killed and 63
wounded), and their suspension of attacks after 22 June, suggest that the
German officers commanding were indeed aware of their obligations to their
troops. How, in light of these facts, can Bonn reasonably argue that the
Germans failed in an effort they never made, and had no reason to make?[153]
The absurdity of Bonn's position on this case is further emphasized by his
description of the attacks on the Maginot forts in question by the 44th and
100th Infantry Divisions beginning on 14 December. The fortresses, says Bonn,
were defended by 1.Armee fortress troops and 25.Panzer-Grenadier-Division. Here
it must be noted once again that when Bonn asserts that
25.Panzer-Grenadier-Division was involved in the defense, he is incorrect, for
only a Kampfgruppe of that unit was involved, and by Bonn's own admission (p.
163) the Kampfgruppe mustered only 800 infantrymen and 13 armored vehicles in
the wake of the fighting in the Low Vosges. On the other hand, the attacking
American units, the 71st and 398th Infantry Regiments, again according to
Bonn's own figures, had in their respective infantry companies average
strengths of 146 (81% of authorized strength) and 127 (71% of authorized
strength) soldiers each, thus giving them an overwhelming superiority in
manpower alone. In addition, while the 71st and 398th Infantry Regiments made
their frontal assaults on the fortresses, their sister regiments (the 44th
Infantry Division's 324th Infantry Regiment and the 100th Infantry Division's
397th and 399th Infantry Regiments) made supporting attacks to fix the enemy in
position and prevent counterattacks.[154]
The Americans began their assault on 14 December with a massed artillery
barrage from the guns of the 44th and 100th Infantry Divisions' own organic
105mm and 155mm howitzers, along with the fire of five battalions of XV Corps
artillery, including 8 inch howitzers, 4.5 inch and 155mm guns and 240mm
howitzers, "largely to no avail." Over the next two days, the works were
subjected to 78 P-47 fighter-bomber sorties, dropping 500lb bombs, "also with
little effect." The hard work of reducing the fortresses thus fell to the
infantrymen. The 398th Infantry Regiment took six hard days of fighting to
silence the guns of Fort Schiessek. In this they were assisted by their combat
engineers, who expended five thousand pounds of dynamite destroying the works
and its artillery, and by the attached 781st Tank Battalion, one of whose
bulldozers buried the defenders under tons of earth and rock. The 71st Infantry
Regiment also took six days to reduce Fort Simserhof, using the same
combination of engineers and armor.[155]
Again, what is noteworthy about Bonn's account of these struggles, and
indicative of the tendentious nature of his work in general, is the negative
comparison he makes about the relative performance of the U.S. army in 1944 and
the German army in 1940. He avers that the 71st Infantry Regiment suffered
casualties that "were roughly the same as those" taken by the 398th Infantry
Regiment in attaining its objective. As to the latter, Bonn claims that 16 men
were killed and 120 wounded in suppressing Fort Schiesseck, numbers that he
asserts are "especially significant" because roughly the equivalent (although
57 more Americans were wounded) to the casualties suffered by the German
Infanterie-Regiment 457 in its failed attempts to take the same objective in
1940. His verdict is that "a regiment that was a product of the U.S. Army
Mobilization Training Plan, without special training or experience,
accomplished what a regiment of the vaunted 1940 German army had utterly failed
to do: penetrate the Ensemble de Bitche. Moreover, they accomplished it without
the months of training and minute intelligence that had been available to the
Germans in 1940." As the foregoing discussion has demonstrated, however, this
comparison may most charitably be described as silly. The Germans had no need
to waste the lives of their troops in reducing the Maginot forts in 1940, and
did not do so. The valor and skill of American troops in destroying those forts
in 1944 require no enhancement through false comparisons.[156]
Bonn's last significant topic is the German Nordwind offensive that occurred in
late December 1944 and early January 1945. This operation was intended to
assist the contemporaneously ongoing German offensive in the Ardennes by tying
down, and destroying if possible, potential American reinforcements for the
Allied troops defending there. The German order of battle, according to Bonn,
included Attack Group #1 consisting of XIII.SS Armeekorps (17.SS
Panzer-Grenadier-Division "Gotz von Berlichingen", 36.Volks-Grenadier-Division
and 19.Volks-Grenadier-Division) and Attack Group #2 comprising XC.Armeekorps
(257.Volks-Grenadier-Division and 559.Volks-Grenadier-Division) and
LXXXIX.Armeekorps (256.Volks-Grenadier-Division and
361.Volks-Grenadier-Division, 6.SS Gebirgs-Division "Nord"). 1.Armee
operational reserve included the Kampfgruppe of 25.Panzer-Grenadier-Division
and 21.Panzer- Division.[157]
Bonn characterizes 17.SS Panzer-Grenadier-Division as having been brought to
full strength shortly before the commencement of Nordwind, so that its SS
Panzer-Grenadier-Regiment 37 and 38 fielded a total of slightly over 4000 men,
many of whom were apparently Volksdeutsche, namely soldiers of German descent,
but not German nationals. Bonn also alleges that this division included a
heavily reinforced panzer battalion with about 70 assault guns, as well as a
company of 21.Panzer-Division's Panther tanks. It should be noted that if SS
Panzer-Grenadier-Regiment 38 was indeed present for Nordwind, it was in
considerable disarray at best, having been destroyed near Metz on or about
November 22, 1944. It was apparently reconstituted only on January 1, 1945 by
the simple expediency of renaming three battalions from the SS
Panzer-Grenadier-Ausbildungs-Regiment, along with the remnants of the
division's heavy panzerjaeger company, flak company and pioneer company. Bonn's
figures for the division's panzer battalion also appear exaggerated; it appears
actually to have had no more than 34 assault guns in its inventory for the
beginning of Nordwind, along with 10 Flakpanzer. If a company of Panthers from
Panzer-Regiment 22 (21.Panzer-Division) was indeed attached to 17.SS
Panzer-Grenadier-Division, that company consisted of no more than 19 armored
vehicles.[158]
We have previously described most of the German divisions involved in Nordwind,
but it is worth mentioning some of the admissions Bonn makes about them. Of
19.Volks-Grenadier-Division, Bonn estimates its infantry strength at a paltry
1800, and describes it as "clearly the weakest of the units taking part in the
western thrust of Nordwind." Bonn mentions that 559.Volks-Grenadier-Division's
infantry strength was approximately 2600 men, although he says that one of its
regiments (Volks-Grenadier-Regiment 1125) was "practically nonexistent".
According to Bonn, the division had sustained heavy losses in the previous two
months in battles against the U.S. Third Army in Lorraine and along the
Westwall; furthermore, it had trained as a unit for only one week, and its
organic engineer unit was especially poorly trained in the critical skill of
mine clearance. Bonn describes 257.Volks-Grenadier-Division as having been
"battered to unimportant remnants" in Russia before being reorganized in late
October 1944. It had been filled to authorized strength, Bonn says, "from a
variety of sources" including veterans returning from convalescent leave (40%
of the total) and former Luftwaffe and Kriegsmarine personnel, and went into
the attack with about four weeks of actual training.
361.Volks-Grenadier-Division was "still smarting" from its losses during the
first two weeks of the month; its 2000 infantrymen lacked experience and
training as a team. Bonn describes the condition of
256.Volks-Grenadier-Division as even worse than that of 361.Volks-Grenadier
Division, having been ground down by combat earlier in the month so that it
fielded about 1655 infantrymen; its soldiers were principally former
Kriegsmarine and Luftwaffe personnel, as well as men who had previously been
exempt from military service because of the significance of their civilian
occupations. Overall, the division was fit only for defensive operations,
although its role in Nordwind was an important offensive one. [159]
In Bonn's view, the only truly battle-worthy unit in the German attack force
for Nordwind was 6. SS Gebirgs-Division "Nord", which Bonn characterizes as
"probably the best German infantry formation on the entire western front in
early January 1945." Bonn is fairly effusive in his description of this
division, calling it a full-strength, fully equipped mountain division
"perfectly suited for the upcoming attack in the Low Vosges." He mentions that
its two infantry regiments, SS Gebirgs-Infanterie-Regiment 11 "Reinhard
Heydrich" and SS Gebirgs-Infanterie-Regiment 12 "Michael Gaissmair" included
"at least 5,700 highly motivated, well-trained, superbly equipped infantrymen."
Bonn's estimates of the strength and motivation of the Nord division are based
upon the post-war reminiscences of its commander during Nordwind, SS
Gruppenfuhrer Karl Brenner. In this connection it is worth mentioning that,
while mountain divisions were generally considered elite formations within the
German army, it is striking that when elite divisions of the Waffen SS are
discussed in the relevant literature, the Nord division is not one of those
listed. Indeed, it had performed rather poorly early in the course of
Barbarossa, unlike the other Waffen SS units that partook in the early stages
of the campaign, and had suffered from a negative reputation thereafter. Thus,
while it may have been of a higher quality than the other German infantry
formations taking part in Nordwind (a status not particularly difficult to
achieve), it was not by any means representative of the cream of the
Wehrmacht.[160]
Bonn's description of the ensuing conflict, and his conclusions about it, are
another exercise in fantasy. It begins with his recitation of the comparative
infantry strengths of the opponents at the beginning of the assault. While the
overall numbers (29,102 American, 29,930 German) are roughly even, Bonn argues
that there was actually a German advantage of 1.21 to 1 because the initial
attack would come from 25,430 Germans against 21,002 Americans; in addition, he
contends that at the main point of German effort the attackers would enjoy a
superiority of 4.25 to 1, soon to be drastically increased by the commitment of
the Nord division to the fray at this critical juncture. By Bonn's own
admission, however, these raw numbers are largely without meaning, since almost
without exception the German units were composed of new troops who were not
only per se lacking in training as infantrymen, but also lacked anything more
than infinitesimal training with their units as a whole. Moreover, and again by
Bonn's own admission, "the Seventh Army's units in the area greatly outnumbered
their adversaries in quantities of tanks." The units supporting 44th (749th
Tank and 776th Tank Destroyer battalions) and 100th Infantry Divisions (781st
Tank and 824th Tank Destroyer battalions) contributed at least 180 tanks and
tank destroyers, while the tanks available with the 12th and 14th Armored
Divisions and the 2nd French Armored Division totaled at least another 250
more, giving the American defenders what Bonn describes as "overwhelming odds"
in terms of available armored fighting vehicles. Further, Bonn points out, the
Americans would be supported by overwhelming Allied air superiority in the
event the weather turned fair during the course of the battle.[161]
Based upon Bonn's description of the condition of the opposing forces, one
would expect the battle to have miscarried from the German point of view, and
of course it did so. The "spin" that Bonn places on this situation, however, is
most interesting. While admitting that the operation "proceeded with tired and
inadequately trained troops", Bonn criticizes the German command for having
gone forward "without doctrinally mandated reconnaissance or mid-and low-level
planning." Exactly why "doctrinally mandated" planning and reconnaissance would
have altered the situation from the German point of view, when the attack was
the result of a Fuhrerbefehl and would have been pressed forward in any case
and under any circumstances, is not clear. In any event, having recognized the
obstacles confronting the attacking force, Bonn is at pains to reiterate as
often as possible the alleged numerical superiority of the Germans at various
points in the struggle. Perhaps this is done to take the "edge" off of some of
the more uncomfortable facts about the contest. For example, Bonn describes the
thwarting of German "limited objective attacks" against Rimling and Gros
Rederching by "dozens" (precisely how many "dozens" is unclear) of armored
vehicles through the intervention of the 2nd French Armored Division. One might
reasonably ask how this particular struggle could have ended otherwise, taking
into account Bonn's previous description of the French 2nd Armored Division as
including a large number of tanks, and the fact that this unit had been
deliberately held in readiness for just such a contingency. There were, in
addition, successful attacks by 256.Volks-Grenadier-Division at Philippsbourg
and by the "Michael Gaismair" regiment at Wingen, where the latter unit drove
the 179th Infantry Regiment back 3500 meters and captured over 100 American
prisoners.[162]
More striking still are Bonn's conclusions about the overall Battle for the Low
Vosges. He begins with acknowledging the prowess of the forces in Heeresgruppe
G in delaying the advance of their numerically superior adversaries, but goes
on to denigrate them by repeating his mischaracterization of the respective
German and American assaults on the Maginot defenses in 1940 and 1944, claiming
that the Seventh Army "penetrate[d] the same fortified positions their
opponents had failed to dent four and a half years earlier." The deliberate
twisting of fact continues, as Bonn sums up Nordwind by claiming that "[W]hen
provided with an opportunity to exert the advantages of numerical superiority
themselves, the soldiers of Army Group B failed utterly", as reflected in the
fact that "[P]oorly trained and organized units conducted attacks in amateurish
and wildly wasteful manners, sustaining such heavy casualties that they
exhausted themselves in two or three days of combat." The American forces, on
the other hand, are described in glowing terms.
|
"American units, made up in part
of ex-Army Air Forces, antiaircraft artillery, and technical services' troops,
led by officers and noncommissioned officers with little combat experience
(less than seventy-five days for the 44th Division, forty-seven in the 100th),
stonewalled attacks by numerically superior formations of soldiers of similarly
mixed background, led by veteran combat leaders. The difference, obviously, was
training and the cohesion born of it. Even highly seasoned, previously
undefeated SS mountain troops could not defeat like numbers of similarly
experienced Americans…The ersatz ‘American Volksturm Grenadiers' threw back the
best that the Landsers of the genuine article could offer. Few more telling
comparisons could be made."[163]
|
|
If the relative performance of the German and American forces engaged in the
Battle for the Low Vosges constitutes a "telling comparison", as Bonn suggests
that it does, then some serious questions about the fighting power of the
American units need to be addressed. Bonn's work is replete with references to
the fact that the Vosges Mountains represent "some of the most eminently
defensible terrain in all of Western Europe." Since for the most part the
Germans were on the defensive throughout the period covered by his book, the
obvious inference that Bonn wishes the reader to draw is that German army was a
good deal less competent than its reputation would suggest, because it could
not successfully defend the territory in question against its American
adversaries. Yet during the Nordwind offensive the Americans were on the
defensive against an ineptly led, poorly trained German force, and were
nevertheless forced to give ground and depend upon their overwhelming
superiority in armored fighting vehicles to withstand the onslaught. This is
contrary to Bonn's own suggestion, made with reference to the Germans, that the
successful defense of such "eminently defensible" terrain should have been a
foregone conclusion, no matter what the odds.
As has been previously discussed, the suggestion made by Bonn that the forces
engaged were on an equal footing because both were composed of men recently
converted from other military formations is a gross misrepresentation of the
facts. As far as is known, there were no ex-U.S. Navy personnel converted into
infantrymen in the ranks of the Seventh Army, as there were large numbers of
former Kriegsmarine sailors throughout the German formations engaged. Likewise,
in the U.S. army, antiaircraft artillery, technical service troops, and indeed
even Army Air Force soldiers were fundamentally trained as infantrymen; the
same was not true for former members of the Luftwaffe, who made up large
numbers of the so-called infantrymen in the German forces in the Vosges.
And Bonn's characterization of the Nord division as "highly seasoned,
previously undefeated SS mountain troops" is wholly inaccurate. In fact, the
division had its origins in the SS Kampfgruppe "Nord", formed from two
Totenkopfstandarten (police) units, and had its baptism of fire in July 1941 on
the Northern sector of the Eastern Front, where it assaulted a Russian
stronghold at Salla along with a Finnish and a German army division. On that
occasion, the Russians turned back two assaults by Nord, inflicting heavy
losses on the attackers, and then counterattacked to throw them back beyond
their start lines. Nord disintegrated; its soldiers threw away their weapons
and ran in terror through their own artillery lines. The Kampfgruppe was saved
from annihilation by the successful assaults of their Finnish and German army
comrades. In the end, Nord's infantry battalions were broken up and distributed
among its rescuers. A measure of its poor reputation may be gleaned from the
fact that in the subsequent years, it remained on the Northern front, and was
not committed where other Waffen SS formations of elite status were sent.
The final bit of silliness is Bonn's effort to explain away the poor
performance of certain Seventh Army units (Task Force Hudelson ["bastardized"]
63rd and 70th Infantry Divisions ["erratically trained"]), which he says
sustained the highest casualties and came the closest to failing of all the
Army's units engaged. The reason cited by Bonn for the inability of these
formations to perform up to the standard set by other American units is that
they "were not organized with attention paid to cohesion and extensive
training." One needs must simply ask how American units can be exonerated for
their failures on this basis when German units suffering from the same (and
worse) maladies cannot.[164]
In the Introduction to When the Odds Were Even, Keith Bonn condemns Martin van
Creveld's Fighting Power as a work "most useful mainly for instruction in how
not to write comparative history." (emphasis in original). Such a sentiment
takes on a charitable quality when applied to Bonn's own work. Throughout, Bonn
persists in advancing arguments which, if subjected to the least bit of
thoughtful consideration, rapidly reveal their ethereal nature. Bonn concludes,
for example, that toward the end of the war, "both sides were forced to commit
as replacements soldiers whose initial training and military experience suited
them primarily for other roles. The American system was far superior in
retraining such personnel and welding them into effective fighting forces,
however." This argument is fallacious for at least three reasons: first,
because no American soldiers converted from such sources as the Army Air Force,
antiaircraft artillery or service troops had anything less that at least 12-16
weeks training as an infantryman; second, because no American units in the ETO
were replenished by mass levees from the U.S. Navy; and third, all of the sort
of basic training received by American soldiers "converted" to infantrymen
occurred either in the U.S. or some other secure location where interference
from the enemy during the initial training period would not be encountered.
None of this was true of the German formations encountered in the Vosges
campaign.
Bonn also suggests that unlike their German counterparts, the Americans
recognized the importance of morale; it was for this reason, he argues, that
with few exceptions Americans avoided situations in which combat formations
were ground down so that less than 50% of their soldiers remained, while in
contrast the Germans made a regular practice of so doing. This contention
ignores the fact that the oft-maligned U.S. replacement system was capable of
meeting the needs of the forces in the field while the German system was
neither capable of nor designed to do the same thing. As has been amply
demonstrated in the historical literature, after 1941 Germany was totally
incapable of meeting the manpower needs of its fighting forces. If this were
not the case, why would a regime dedicated to the principle of racial purity
have enlisted for its defense the likes of such non-Germanic folk as Italians,
French, Cossacks, Ukrainians, Croats, Serbs, Montenegrins and Russians, to
mention just a few, to say nothing of the tens of thousands of Germanic
"volunteers" (Norwegians, Danes, Finns, Walloons) and Volksdeutsche dragooned
into German service to make up for the manpower shortfall.
What is particularly curious is that Bonn recognizes all of this to be true. He
notes that the training of the German units involved in the Vosges campaign was
vastly inferior to that of the Americans; while Volks-Grenadier units typically
received four to six weeks collective unit training ("Some Volksgrenadier units
didn't even get that much") new American divisions received a minimum of
thirty-five weeks such training. He also observes that German units were filled
with replacements of foreign extraction, among whom even the Volksdeutsche
often lacked the ability to speak or understand German. It is interesting to
note that, having taken cognizance of all of this, Bonn nevertheless takes the
view that all of these German difficulties stemmed from the continuous pressure
exerted on their forces by the Americans. Like others of his ilk, Bonn seems to
have forgotten both that when the first U.S. forces stepped on the European
continent, the Germans had already been at war for nearly five years, and that
the Red Army, to its own great cost, had long since ground up the cream of the
Wehrmacht, reducing it to the shell that now confronted the western
Allies.[165]
Equally disturbing are Bonn's other conclusions. Speaking of the combined arms
operations undertaken by the U.S. army in Western Europe, Bonn concludes that
"[B]y the time of the Vosges Mountains campaign, the Americans had developed
tactical organizations that facilitated the fighting of modern wars to an
extent far superior to their adversaries." It is unclear upon what theory Bonn
makes this quite remarkable statement. As far as is known (perhaps Bonn has
better evidence not shared in his work), German panzer divisions were in the
field long before any American units of a like composition. From the start of
the war, the panzer division was a combined arms organization, comprising an
armor element, an infantry element, an artillery element and support units such
as an organic engineer battalion. During the course of the war these combined
arms formations enjoyed what might be described as a modicum of success against
a variety of opponents, including even the U.S. army. More generally, Bonn
criticizes the German army for having a "chaotic" organization at both the
tactical and operational levels, contrasting this with the more stable American
command and control system. His basis for doing so is the use of foreign
troops, the constant reorganization of TO&E for German divisions and the
frequent changes in command at the level of division and above. As to the root
causes of these developments, namely the effects upon the German army of nearly
six years of war, and the deleterious influence upon that army by the German
political leadership, Bonn says not a word.[166]
There is much else that one could criticize in When the Odds Were Even, but two
final points will suffice. First, the underlying premise of the work is
fundamentally flawed. Not to put too fine a point on it, the notion that the
terrain and prevailing weather in the Vosges Mountains in the winter of
1944-1945 made the contest (or "odds") between the Germans and Americans "even"
is totally without foundation. Bonn is certainly correct to admit, as he does
early in the book, that the Allied preponderance in armored fighting vehicles,
and its complete air superiority over the battlefield, stacked the odds heavily
against the German defenders. It is quite illogical, however, for Bonn to argue
that the neutralization of these two elements by terrain and weather somehow
turned the struggle in Western Europe into one between evenly matched foes.
There are many reasons why this is so, indeed perhaps too many to adequately
enumerate. Some of them are, however, patently obvious. First, while it has
become fashionable for military historians to discount the pernicious effect of
Adolf Hitler's influence on the conduct of the war as mere whining and
excuse-making by members of the German officer corps, the fact of the matter is
that at least after the failed attempt on the Fuhrer's life on 20 July 1944,
German officers of all ranks lived in mortal fear that their leader's fury
would be turned against them personally, an emotion well grounded in fact. To
cite only one example, the film that Hitler ordered taken of the death throes
of his would-be assassins as they hung from piano wire was widely shown to his
troops in order to discourage even the thought of "treasonous" activity. The
effect of such terror was not merely that German officers were influenced to
obey orders from OKH/OKW (i.e., Hitler) without question, but also that they
anticipated his orders, as well as his response if such orders were not obeyed.
It is in this context that one must view what Bonn interprets as the failure of
the Germans to follow their own military doctrine in the Vosges campaign. As
Bonn points out, many of the German divisional commanders in the Vosges were
veterans of long service in both World Wars. Bonn's reason for highlighting
this point, however, seems to be to persuade the reader that these officers
were not really as good as their reputations suggest; in fact, the inference
that Bonn would like us to draw from their alleged failure to follow German
tactical and operational doctrine is that they were really incompetent, and
certainly in no wise as competent as their American counterparts. This myopic
view of the situation ignores the record of these same officers over five long
years of warfare, much of it under very difficult circumstances. It also
ignores the fact that in the winter of 1944-1945 those officers knew that in
order to survive, they needed to follow, and if necessary intuit, Hitler's
orders to the letter, even when it meant they were required to ignore their own
doctrine.
Finally, Bonn (and others of his ilk) seems blissfully unaware of the effect
that the loss of the Great War had upon Germans in general, and the officer
corps in particular. It was, after all, the German defeat in World War I that
contributed in no small way to the popularity of the Nazis and Hitler, who
ruthlessly exploited the alleged treason of the "November criminals" in order
to seize power in Germany. Throughout the interwar period, Hitler and the
Nazis, (and others on the political Right as well) had excoriated those Germans
whom they considered to have betrayed Germany. Many, perhaps most, senior
German officers had served in the Great War and experienced its aftermath. Is
it conceivable that such men would willingly have failed to do their duty to
the utmost?
Other reasons why Bonn's premise is unfounded abound. There is, for one thing,
the manpower problem, and the concomitant training issue, both of which we have
explored at some length already. In addition, a significant point that Bonn and
his ilk ignore is the effect of the Allied strategic bombing campaign on the
ability of the Germans to make war. That campaign had continued in earnest for
over two years, and its effects upon the Germans, particularly those fighting
in the west, was profound. By the time of the Vosges campaign the Luftwaffe had
been virtually annihilated, so that the Allies had command of the air not only
over the battle zone, but deep into the Reich as well. In short, it was of no
importance whatever that Allied airpower was neutralized by weather during the
Vosges campaign. Not only did the same situation obtain on the German side (but
for a different reason----there were no clouds of German fighter-bombers to
darken the skies, even if the weather had been fine), but Allied airpower had
affected and was affecting the ability of the Germans to defend the Vosges in
locales remote from the battlefield.
By the winter of 1944-1945 the principal source of German oil, the fields in
Romania, had been destroyed by Allied airpower and in fact were in Russian
hands. The effect of this need not be imagined, for it was fact---the Germans
had little fuel to operate such vehicles, armored or otherwise, as now remained
in their inventories, to say nothing of rendering them virtually incapable of
training new vehicle drivers and pilots. Nor was this the only effect of the
Allied strategic and tactical air campaign against the Reich. As the Allies
soon learned, nearly every bridge over every stream, large and small,
throughout Germany had been dropped, making the movement of troops and vehicles
to the battle zone difficult and dangerous, regardless of the presence or
absence of Allied fighter-bombers. Added to this was the almost total collapse
of the German rail network, the system upon which the mobility of the German
army so much depended. The effects of the Allied strategic bombing campaign
also explain why the expansion of German production, which by the time of the
Vosges campaign had been largely driven underground, in 1944 was of no
practical consequence for the reasons just stated---there was no fuel to
operate the new equipment so produced, and no means by which it could have been
brought to bear against the Allies, even if the fuel had been available.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, while the Vosges campaign and the Battle
of the Bulge raged in the West, Germany continued to wage a desperate struggle
against the Red Army in the East. Bonn ignores all of this in his so-called
analysis of the Vosges campaign.
The second major flaw in Bonn's work is methodology. As has been noted above,
Bonn relies upon American records for evidence of the condition of German
forces. This approach is fraught with difficulties, not the least of which is
inaccuracy. For example, for the makeup of the German forces confronting the
U.S. Army in the Vosges, Bonn relies principally on two sources, the U.S. War
Department's Handbook on German Military Forces and the series of short
monographs written for the U.S. Army in the immediate postwar era by former
German officers, the so-called U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR) Historical Series.
While both of these sources are valuable, they are not so for the purpose of
providing accurate information as to the manpower and weapon strength of
particular German units, the former because it recounts the ideal composition
of units as mandated by the organizational schemes promulgated by OKH/OKW, the
latter because based upon the memories and personal notes of the authors, and
not upon the actual records of the units with which they served. The
consequence is that when Bonn cites figures for available manpower and weapons
for a given German unit in the Vosges campaign, those figures are quite simply
unreliable and not likely to portray an accurate picture. In addition to these
sources, Bonn relies upon the contemporaneous German strength estimates made by
the G-2 section of the U.S. Seventh Army. Such estimates are just that, and are
therefore likewise unreliable as indicators of German strength. Furthermore,
Bonn repeatedly resorts to assumptions about German casualties and
strength---hardly the stuff of reliable historical interpretation.[167]
Copyright © 2004 by Thomas E. Nutter.
Written by Tom Nutter. If you have questions or comments on this
article, please contact Nutter at:
tenutter@gmail.com.
Last Modified on: 12/03/2006.
* Views expressed by contributors are their own and do not necessarily represent
those of MHO.
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