Mythos revisited:
American Historians and German Fighting Power in the Second World War
by Thomas E. Nutter
Page 3 of 4
Chapter Ten
Michael Doubler, Closing with the Enemy
At the time Michael Doubler published Closing with the Enemy: How GIs Fought
the War in Europe, 1944-1945, in 1994, he was a serving Lieutenant
Colonel in the United States Army. Doubler characterized his book as having a
purpose similar to that of Infantry in Battle , a volume published by
the U.S. Army Infantry School at Fort Benning, Georgia in 1934 for the purpose
of reintroducing the experience of battle to an officer corps then suffering
from a steady decline in active duty veterans of the First World War. Referring
to the "drawdown" of the American armed forces in the aftermath of the Cold
War, the author draws the reader's attention to the evidently incompatible
facts that while soldiers with combat experience would be disappearing from the
armed services as a result of the "drawdown", threats from regional powers to
the national security of the United States would remain. Doubler's stated
purpose, then, is to use military history to stimulate "disciplined thinking"
about the challenges of the future battlefield, while promoting "the viewpoint
of the veteran" among officers trained in peacetime.(168]
While at some level Doubler may have had in mind the didactic purpose discussed
above when he wrote Closing with the Enemy , it is clear that he had
another and perhaps more significant motive. This can be seen literally from
the very beginning of the book, in the third page of the Introduction, in which
Doubler comments as follows:
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"The notion that the American army achieved victory in World War II only
because of its employment of overwhelming numbers of lavishly supplied troops
against an exhausted Wehrmacht is untrue. American combat power had definite
limits imposed by constraints on resources and time. The decision to limit the
size of the army to ninety divisions, the soldier replacement system, and the
organization of some combat formations reduced the army's effectiveness.
Inexperience blunted the fighting ability of many units, and some commands had
much more difficulty than others in making the transition from novice to
veteran. Senior American commanders were adept at operational maneuver and
concentrating firepower, but inadequate numbers of combat formations and
occasional manpower and logistical shortages hampered operations."
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It is no exaggeration, in fact, to say that these themes, much more than
"lessons learned", lie at the core of Doubler's work.[169]
Doubler turns immediately to the theme of the apparently unique difficulties
besetting the U.S. Army in the ETO. Among these were "combat exhaustion", a
condition that bedeviled the Americans in Europe because of a lack of
experience in evaluating and treating this malady, as well as more fundamental
difficulties stemming from inadequate schooling in mine clearance, the
maintenance and use of weapons, and intelligence gathering. More grievous still
were shortcomings in the quality and supply of personnel replacements, both
officers and enlisted men. By the autumn of 1943, American divisional
commanders were complaining that the officer replacements they were receiving
were "lacking in aggressive leadership, self-reliance, and the ability to meet
emergencies." Doubler observes that one most aggravating aspect of this problem
was that personnel policies prevented the reclassification of officers who
failed in combat, with the result that men who were relieved of duty in one
command often were reassigned to identical leadership positions in another
combat formation. An even greater difficulty was the poor quality of
replacements among enlisted soldiers. An apparently universal complaint was
that these men required remedial training at the front, because they "did not
hate the enemy enough, lacked the killer instinct, and tended to fraternize
with enemy prisoners of war…". Doubler identifies several reasons for this
lamentable situation. The first was that because of policies embraced early in
the war, "ground combat units failed to receive their proportionate share of
high quality volunteers and draftees" because the Navy, Marine Corps and Army
Air Force were receiving a far greater number of such personnel. The second
reason cited by Doubler was the "excessive transit time within the replacement
system". This meant that the average replacement spent five months traveling to
his new unit, losing morale, discipline, training and physical conditioning
along the way. This situation was exacerbated by the fact that it often could
not be cured; many replacements found their way into units heavily engaged with
the enemy and consequently unable to invest the time and resources necessary to
recover the soldier's fighting edge. The frequent result was that the
replacement became a nearly instant casualty. By the spring of 1944, Doubler
contends, it was unclear whether the American replacement system would be
adequate to the challenge that would surely confront it when the Allies invaded
continental Europe.[170]
Doubler's work is a tribute to the qualities of the American soldier
demonstrated by his ability to overcome these difficulties. The first occasion
on which this might be observed was in the bocage country of Normandy. Here the
U.S. First Army encountered the German 7.Armee, which Doubler characterizes as
consisting of "three fresh infantry divisions, the remnants of four more
infantry divisions that had suffered heavy casualties during the early fighting
in Normandy, a parachute regiment, and three regimental-sized combat teams
known in the German army as kampfgruppen." This force, says Doubler, included
35,000 troops supported by "a wide assortment of heavy weapons and
approximately eighty tanks." It was ordered and prepared to take advantage of
the benefits offered by the hedgerows, and to make the Americans "die for every
inch of ground".[171]
Doubler's thesis is perhaps best expressed in his final chapter, entitled The
Schoolhouse of War. The essence of it is set forth in the following passage:
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"The many tactical and technical adaptations that occurred in the ETO
invalidates the popular notion that the army won battles because of
overwhelming material superiority. If the army had been able to crush the
Germans with an abundance of resources alone, there would have been no need for
changes in battle techniques. Clearly, the materiel advantages the army
possessed did not mean much during close combat in the Normandy hedgerows, in
the Huertgen Forest, or during urban battles. The army was adequately equipped,
but in many cases a variety of shortages hampered operations. In early 1945
General Patton complained that he was being forced to fight with ‘inadequate
means' and told the War Department that shortages in replacements, ammunition,
and the number of combat divisions were hindering the war effort. Huge
expenditures of firepower and munitions during certain large, key operations
are usually held up as examples of American logistical superiority and the
heavy reliance on firepower. But to create stockpiles for firepower
extravaganzas in support of critical battles, air and artillery units had to
husband their ammunition. Most of the time, artillery units fired under very
strict ammunition rationing plans, and manpower and gasoline shortages hampered
several operations….Innovations in tactics and the use of weapons were the main
reasons American forces were able to turn their limited advantages in materiel
into good effect against the Germans."[172]
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In addition to the foregoing, Doubler enumerates several other impediments
overcome by the U.S. Army in defeating the Wehrmacht. For example, he dismisses
the notion that the Americans possessed an advantage in mobility. "Historians
and military analysts," Doubler maintains, "have put too much emphasis on the
army's mobility, believing that the use of tracked and wheeled vehicles gave
the army a degree of mobility that was inappropriate for the heavy fighting in
Europe. Trucks did give the army operational mobility, but motorized movement
had no influence on the battlefield." In this vein, Doubler argues that in the
ETO, American trucks were used to move supplies and replacements from Normandy
to the front, and to move units laterally between corps and army sectors, but
not to enhance the tactical mobility of the infantry in battle. For these
reasons, Doubler concludes, "[I]n reality, the army's means of logistical and
operational mobility had no direct influence on combat." Likewise, the author
endorses Eisenhower's broad front strategy as "the best way to defeat Germany
while reducing unnecessary risks to Allied troops", thereby solving the dilemma
plaguing American commanders, namely the need to stay on the offensive, while
at the same time minimizing casualties.[173]
In addition to these political constraints on the aggressiveness of the
American military leadership, there were logistical and terrain impediments
upon them. While Doubler concedes that the army was "adequately supplied and
sustained", he also argues that the American campaign in western Europe was
beset by personnel, ammunition and fuel shortages from beginning to end. In
addition to these problems, the ability of American forces to conduct maneuver
warfare was hindered by such factors as "rain, mud, swollen rivers, thick
forests, broken and compartmentalized ground, and urbanized terrain…". The most
serious difficulty for the Americans, however, was the shortage in replacement
personnel for combat units, a problem so critical that it motivates Doubler to
conclude that "Creveld's critical views on the army's soldier replacement
system [as expressed in Fighting Power] are more than justified."[174]
There are a number of problems with the logic employed by Doubler. There can be
no doubt whatever that the U.S. Army successfully modified its training and
doctrine in coming to grips with its German adversary in Western Europe. That
this is so, however, is not necessarily indicative either of the superiority of
Yankee ingenuity or of the invalidity of the argument that the Wehrmacht was
overcome in the West by the overwhelming materiel and personnel superiority of
its Allied adversaries, particularly the U.S. Army. It is a truism, it would
seem, that military establishments which shun innovation in training and
doctrine often do not survive life and death struggles with adversaries of a
less conservative bent. For example, for reasons of political orthodoxy,
western historians long cherished the notion that the Red Army of the Great
Patriotic War prevailed over the Wehrmacht solely because of its apparently
inexhaustible human and materiel resources, coupled with a callous indifference
to the fate of either. It is safe to say that the more recent scholarship of
John Erickson and David Glantz has laid to rest prejudiced view of the Soviet
war machine. Again, innovation marked the efforts of both the British and
German armies during the closing stages of the Great War, as each side sought,
with varying degrees of success, to institute tactical changes that would
enable them to break the deadlock on the western front. In the case of the
German army, at least, these changes eventually led to the combined arms mode
of combat that so enhanced its combat power in the Second World War. Indeed,
significant incidents of innovation in the history of war and military science
are too numerous to mention.[175]
In addition to the fact that the American army, like any other successful
force, must perforce have engaged in a purposeful course of self-examination
and change in order to deal with the realities of combat, it is beyond doubt
that it and its British and other western allies enjoyed substantial advantages
over the Wehrmacht in terms of human and materiel resources. Contrary to the
inference that Doubler and others would have us draw, these advantages made a
difference. They did so because they were both numerical and, at least with
regard to personnel, qualitative as well. By late July 1944, after nearly two
months of fighting in the Normandy lodgment area, there were nearly 1.5 million
US and British combat troops in France. At that time, German effectives in the
area totaled not more than 380,000, thus providing the western allies with a
numerical advantage of almost 4:1. There can be no doubt of the numerical
superiority enjoyed by the western allies in terms of equipment. On D-Day
alone, for example, the U.S. army landed six tank battalions and a battalion of
tank destroyers; on the same day, the British placed on French soil 900 tanks
and other armored vehicles. Within striking distance of the beachhead on that
day were only four battalions of German tanks capable of successfully engaging
the Allied mobile forces.[176]
Nor were the advantages enjoyed by the western allies numerical only. Taking
the Normandy campaign as an example (and the German situation can only be
characterized as deteriorating thereafter), the details about the German
divisions confronting the invaders illustrate this point.
5.Fallschirm-Jaeger-Division, supposedly an elite formation, was pitifully
weak. Less than 10% of its soldiers had received parachute training by the time
of the invasion; no more than 20% of its officers had received infantry
training or had combat experience. It had an authorized strength of 17,455, but
possessed only 12,253 effectives; overall it lacked 50% of such basic weapons
as machine guns and antitank guns. Its Pionier battalion had 38 rifles, 700
less than it was authorized; the antitank battalion had 3 75mm. antitank
weapons when it was supposed to have 36. One of its regiments lacked 1800 of
its authorized rifles. The division had virtually no motor vehicles.
77.Infanterie-Division, which moved to the invasion front beginning on June 8,
1944, possessed on that date 9,095 officers and men and 1,410 Russian
"volunteers". It had two infantry regiments of three battalions each. All of
the infantry battalions fielded 40 machine guns and 7-8 81mm. mortars. There
was one heavy weapons company in each regiment; together, they possessed a
total of 8 Russian infantry guns. The division's artillery regiment had 16
105mm. howitzers and 12 88mm. antitank guns. By the end of June it had suffered
about 2000 casualties; much of the remainder of the division went into
captivity at St. Malo in August. The division was disbanded on 15 September. A
unit that was immediately engaged on D-Day, counterattacking American
paratroopers on the Cotentin Peninsula, was 91.Luftlande-Division. It possessed
no more than about 8,000 men; its three artillery battalions were equipped with
a mountain howitzer, the 105mm. Gebergs-Haubitze 40, whose ammunition was not
interchangeable with that of the standard 105mm. field howitzer. Between 6-24
June, the division lost 85% of its infantry, 21% of its artillery personnel,
76% of its engineers and 48% of its antitank personnel. It was then reduced to
five Kampfgruppen; of these, one was composed of Russians and another of Turks.
By August, the division had suffered 5000 casualties.[177]
The German forces described above were typical of those which met the Allied
invasion. By no stretch of the imagination can they be considered comparable to
the British, American and other Allied forces that engaged them. Likewise,
Doubler's attempt to discount the other advantages enjoyed by the U.S. army are
unavailing. For example, his assertion that "motorized movement had no
influence on the battlefield" is patently absurd, as is his corollary statement
that "the [US] army's means of logistical and operational mobility had no
direct influence on combat". The U.S. army employed a superabundance of wheeled
vehicles to supply its combat forces at the front, and to move those combat
forces from one point to another, as Doubler freely admits. At the same time,
the German army was virtually without mobility, and thus was without the
capacity either to adequately supply its combat forces, or to move them about
the battlefield for tactical purposes. Would Doubler exchange the mobility
possessed by the U.S. army, as evidenced by its employment of copious numbers
of trucks and the like, for the virtually static character of the Wehrmacht,
dependent as it was upon horse transport and a polyglot collection of wheeled
vehicles of dubious origin and quality?
Unavailing too are the other reasons Doubler offers for the performance of the
U.S. army. He asserts that the ability of the U.S. army to bring into play its
overwhelming capacity to engage in maneuver warfare was constrained by terrain
and weather conditions, such as rain, mud, thick forests, swollen rivers and
other natural impediments. Apart from the fact that the German forces faced
exactly the same obstacles to their employment, since when have military forces
of any origin not been trained and equipped to deal with such conditions? Yet
further, Doubler complains that the U.S. army was bedeviled throughout its
campaign in Western Europe by chronic personnel shortages, particularly among
its infantry forces. More recent scholarship has shown, however, that the U.S.
army was fully capable of taking remedial action to successfully address such
shortages, even in such a notorious contest as that in the Huertgen Forest in
1944-1945. As this work has made clear, however, German efforts to rectify
personnel shortages at the same time involved them in resorting to the use of
convalescents, foreigners, the ill-trained and the ill-equipped.[178]
To give examples of the prowess of the U.S. army, and particularly its ability
to successfully adapt to various combat conditions, Doubler turns his focus on
individual incidents. To illustrate the army's ability to deal with the
difficulties of urban combat, for example, the author refers to the battles of
Brest and Aachen. These are worth examining in some detail. The port of Brest,
at the tip of the Brittany peninsula, was of strategic importance to the
Allies, because of its excellent deep-water port. The Allied scheme called for
the capture of the city as quickly as possible, and the army assigned the task
of doing so to the US VII Corps under Maj. Gen. Troy H. Middleton. VII Corps
consisted of the 2d, 8th and 29th Infantry Divisions, whose total strength for
the operation, including supporting troops, Doubler puts at 50,000 soldiers.
Middleton's plan was to surround the city and crush its garrison. The Germans
assigned command of the Brest defense to Generalleutnant Herman B. Ramcke, an
experienced and resolute parachute officer who had fought with distinction in,
among other places, Crete and North Africa. The German forces consisted of
343.Infanterie-Division and 2.Fallshirm-Jaeger-Division. According to Doubler,
Hitler had instructed Ramcke to defend Brest to the last man.[179]
Doubler estimates the size of the German garrison force at Brest at 30,000 men.
This figure appears to be significantly inflated; at the end of July 1944,
2.Fallschirm-Jaeger-Division mustered 162 officers and 7,389 other ranks; the
strength of 343. Infanterie-Division on 1 June 1944 was 11,021. Moreover, even
these figures are deceiving, since they do not account for the troops not
attached to these units when the Americans moved to reduce the fortress on 21
August. Parts of 343.Infanterie-Division, including two infantry battalions
(III./Infanterie-Regiment 898 and III./Infanterie-Regiment 897), an engineer
company (1./Pionier-Bataillon 343), an artillery battery
(7./Artillerie-Regiment 343) and part of 14./Infanterie-Regiment 898 with two
75mm. antitank guns, had been detached for service with 352.Infanterie
Division.
Similarly, 2.Fallschirm-Jaeger-Division lacked its Fallschirm-Jaeger-Regiment
6, which was serving with 91.Infanterie-Division. It was also without II. and
III./Fallschirm-Artillerie-Regiment 6, both of which were at the artillery
school at Luneville, as well as its Flak-Abteilung, then serving with
II.Fallschirmkorps. Also missing were I./Fallschirmjager-Regiment 2 and a
mortar battalion, Fallschirm-Granatwerfer-Bataillon 2. Further details on these
formations are also illuminating. One reason for the weakened condition of 2.
Fallschirm-Jaeger-Division was that at the time of the Normandy invasion it was
recovering from a severe mauling recently received on the Eastern Front. On 1
July its engineer battalion was reported at 42% of its authorized strength. The
Division was far below its authorized strength in heavy antitank guns (4 out of
60), mortars (28 out of 108), machine guns (497 out of 739) and motor vehicles
of all kinds. As noted by Doubler, 343.Infanterie-Division was a static
formation, and consequently had only a limited number of motor vehicles and
about 1200 horses. Its ability to defend itself against tanks was extremely
limited, for it possessed only two 75mm. and six 50mm. antitank guns. Its
static artillery weapons included a variety of captured French and Russian
guns.[180]
Another important contest recounted by Doubler is the American assault on Metz
between September and December 1944. The principal American forces involved the
US XX Corps from Patton's Third Army, particularly the US 7th Armored and 5th
and 90th Infantry Divisions. The defense of the Metz "fortress" fell to
Division Nr. 462, which Doubler estimates to have been 14,000 strong and
composed of "fortress troops and students, staff, and faculty members of the
numerous military schools located in Metz. Many of these soldiers were among
the best the German army had to offer, having been selected for additional
schooling based on their exemplary performance on the battlefield." Doubler
also characterizes the division as "experienced".
While it may be accurate to describe as "experienced" some of the soldiers who
comprised Division Nr. 462, this term is clearly inappropriate when applied to
the division as a whole. The unit was formed in October 1942 as a replacement
formation. In December, 1943, it was composed of the following units:
Grenadier-Ersatz-Regiment 246; Grenadier-Ersatz-Regiment 552;
Grenadier-Ersatz-Regiment 572; MG-Ersatz-Bataillon 14;
Artillerie-Ersatz-Regiment 35; Bruckenbau-Ersatz und Ausbildungs Bataillon 3.
All of these units, as their names imply, were replacement formations only.
During September and October 1944, there was a continuous interchange of units
between Division Nr. 462 and other units; some units of the division were sent
as replacements to units in the field; at the same time, new replacement
formations from other locations were amalgamated in to the division. On October
19, 1944, in the midst of the American assault on Metz (which began September 7
and concluded with the capture of the city on November 28) the division was
renamed 462.Infanterie-Division, and still later, 462.Volks-Grenadier-Division.
At the time of its reorganization in October, it comprised Grenadier-Regiment
1215, Grenadier-Regiment 1216, Grenadier-Regiment 1217, Artillerie-Regiment
1462, Division Fusilier Kompanie 462, Pionier-Bataillon 1462,
Nachrichten-Abteilung 1462, Feldersatz Bataillon 1462 and divisional service
troops. The division was destroyed at Metz and not reformed.[181]
As the foregoing demonstrates, the attachment of the moniker "experienced" to
Division Nr. 462 and its progeny is a misnomer. The division was never in
combat before or after its ordeal at Metz. Its table of organization changed
almost continuously for the two years of its existence. The units which moved
in and through it were, from beginning to end, intended to be replacement
formations. Nevertheless, this force managed to frustrate its opponents for the
better part of two months, and to exact a heavy toll in American casualties.
Doubler admits that the American commanders misused their troops and acted
unwisely by essentially attacking frontally a heavily reinforced position,
thereby throwing away the advantages they possessed in airpower and artillery.
He credits them, however, for adapting to the situation and devising a more
practical, if not less costly, method for eventually overpowering the
defenders. Precisely how this fits with the author's thesis that the U.S. army
destroyed its German opponents by something else than overwhelming force is
unclear. As observed elsewhere, successful armies do adapt to their enemies and
the conditions in which they fight. If the American commanders had not changed
their approach to this particular situation, what would be our judgment of
them? And, in fact Doubler's account of the reduction of Fort St. Julien, the
last major stronghold in the complex of defenses at Metz, by the Americans is a
tribute to their use of the largest weapon available (a 155 mm. howitzer) to
fire thirty rounds at a range of less than 50 yards to breach the enemy
defenses once and for all. Fort St. Julien was taken by elements of the US 95th
Infantry Division on 18 November; this division was "fresh", according to
Doubler, when it became involved in the fighting at Metz little more than a
month earlier on 16 October. Its commanders had learned much from the mistakes
of the formation that it had relieved, the US 5th Infantry Division, which had
been ground up in its efforts to subjugate Fort Driant, another portion of the
Metz complex. The evidence is that the American victories at Brest and Metz
were the product of the employment of overpowering force against enemy
formations of unequal size and firepower. The Americans should have prevailed
and did, and it would be only appropriate to regard them critically if they had
not.
Doubler devotes a single chapter to a description of the methods adopted by the
American forces to cross rivers against enemy opposition. As the author
observes, "[T]o win the war, American forces had to master the skills required
to cross rivers in the face of enemy fire, often under the most trying weather
conditions." Doubler's work shows how well the Americans succeeded in mastering
those skills time after time as they fought their way to the heart of the Reich
in a series of river crossings, the most notable of which was the celebrated
Rhine crossing at Remagen. It must be observed, of course, that successful
western armies had learned this art repeatedly, from the time of Caesar onward.
The German army, for one, had crossed innumerable rivers under fire during its
years of conquest from 1940-1942; in the summer of 1944 the Red Army was in the
process of crossing the same rivers in reverse, in most cases against fierce
opposition. One of the crossings particularly described by Doubler was that of
the Moselle by the US 80th Infantry Division and 4th Armored Division in early
September 1944. Between 4-16 September, these formations attacked
3.Panzer-Grenadier-Division between the villages of Pont-a-Mousson and
Dieulouard, ultimately forcing the enemy to retreat to the east and give up the
bridgehead to the Americans. The Americans purchased the victory at
considerable cost to themselves, against one of the better armored formations
in the Wehrmacht. Though comparatively strong, however,
3.Panzer-Grenadier-Division still suffered from a number of critical
deficiencies. Its armored elements were noteworthy for their relative strength.
On 1 September the division's Panzer-Abteilung 103 possessed 37 Stug III
assault guns and three tanks; Panzerjaeger-Abteilung 3 included an additional
31 Jagdpanzer IVs, thereby giving the division a total of 71armored fighting
vehicles, of which 13 were in either short or long-term repair. The division's
Artillerie-Regiment 3 was also quite formidable, although it possessed no
self-propelled guns. It had three battalions with a total of 24 105mm.
howitzers, 8 150mm. howitzers and 3 100mm. cannon. The division's
Panzer-Aufklarungs-Abteilung 103 was also a powerful formation, liberally
equipped with armored personnel carriers. There were, nevertheless, substantial
deficiencies in the division. In the previous month, it had suffered 841
casualties. Thus, while its Grenadier-Regiment 8 was at 87% strength, its
sister regiment, Grenadier-Regiment 29, was only at 67% of its manpower
strength; its second battalion was particularly weak and in urgent need of a
refit. The division's total manpower shortage as of 9 September totaled 1390
NCOs and other ranks. The division was short 724 pistols, 2450 rifles, 829
light machine guns, 523 heavy machine guns and 814 vehicles of all types. The
panzergrenadiers were transported in a mixture of light and medium cars and
trucks. Most of these were civilian vehicles of mixed Italian, French and
German origin, and most (75%) lacked cross-country ability, so that the
division's infantry was confined largely to the roads when in action.[182]
Doubler also recounts the historic struggle mounted by the U.S. army in the
Huertgen Forest in the winter of 1944-45. His point of view is that the
American army was in no way prepared to conduct such a struggle, being
ill-fitted either by training or doctrine, while its German adversaries,
schooled in such fighting by the bitter war it had fought in the East, enjoyed
not only this advantage but also the benefits granted by favorable terrain.
Added to this, as Doubler is at pains to point out, was the disadvantage
suffered by the Americans from the inefficiencies of their replacement system.
All of these factors, along with the appalling weather conditions, combined to
produce for the Americans what Doubler refers to as "some of the most gruesome
fighting in the European campaigns."
Doubler recounts the ordeal of the 9th Infantry Division's 39th Infantry
Regiment and 60th Infantry Regiment in the Huertgen during the first two weeks
of October 1944. During this period, the division managed to advance some 3000
yards at a cost of 4500 men. 60th Infantry Regiment suffered a 100% turnover in
combat troops in a struggle that ended in stalemate. Determined to capture the
key village of Schmidt, First Army commander General Courtney Hodges assigned
the task to his V Corps, commanded by General Gerow. The latter, in turn,
selected for the job his most rested unit, 28th Infantry Division. Hodges
assigned to this unit the objective of Vossenack; the division's 112th Infantry
Regiment attacked in the middle of the line, with its sister 109th Infantry
Regiment and 110th Infantry Regiment on the left and right flanks respectively.
These units were to cross the Kall River gorge and capture the village of
Kommerscheidt, preparatory to advancing on Schmidt. Doubler argues that General
Norman Cota, the commander of the 28th Infantry Division, was not only deprived
of initiative by the constraints placed upon him by First Army and V Corps, but
was forced to divide rather than concentrate its effort by advancing its three
regiments over three diverging axes of attack. The result was a fiasco of the
first magnitude.[183]
Doubler identifies the three German units arrayed against 28th Infantry
Division as 275.Infanterie-Division, 89.Infanterie-Division and
116.Panzer-Division. This latter formation he characterizes as "one of the
Wehrmacht's stalwart units in the west". On 1 October 1944, 116.Panzer-Division
rated a Kampfwert (combat value) of II, in a system where the values ranged
from the highest (I) to the lowest (V) in combat value. While the division
therefore was not regarded as ready for any mission, it was nevertheless
considered to be in relatively good condition. It was not, however,
particularly powerful in tanks, having on hand a total of 28 Panthers
(authorized strength 73) and 19 Mk IVs (authorized strength 78), along with 11
Stug III assault guns in its Panzerjaeger-Abteilung 228. In September the
division had suffered 1176 casualties, and now had 11,373 men out of an
authorized strength of 12,467. The division was deficient in armored vehicles
of all types. Its Panzer-Grenadier-Regiment 60 and 156 were nearly at full
personnel strength, as was its Panzer-Artillerie-Regiment 146.
89.Infanterie-Division had been formed in January 1944 and included
Grenadier-Regiment 1055 and 1056, each of three battalions, in addition to
Artillerie-Regiment 189. The division had been destroyed in the Falaise pocket
and was rebuilt with troops from Grenadier-Regiment 1063 and men from various
fortress and replacement battalions. It was once again nearly destroyed in
September, and was in very weak condition by October. 275.Infanterie-Division
had been formed in November 1943, and in the next month was constituted from
four battalions of Reserve-Division 158. At the time of its formation it
included Grenadier-Regiment 983, Grenadier-Regiment 984 and Grenadier-Regiment
985, each of two battalions, Fusilier-Bataillon 275, Artillerie-Regiment 275 of
three battalions, and divisional support units. The division had been
demolished in the Cobra offensive in July 1944 and was caught in the Falaise
pocket in August, where its remnants were practically annihilated. What was
left of it fought again at Aachen in September; by the beginning of October its
strength was listed at five thousand men, with few heavy weapons. It was this
depleted unit that saw action in the Huertgen forest.[184]
Doubler points out that in contemplation of the assault, Major General Leonard
G. Gerow reinforced 28th Infantry Division with "considerable added brawn",
including the three battalions of 1171st Engineer Combat Group, 707th Tank
Battalion, two tank destroyer battalions, as well as eight battalions of
artillery from V and VII Corps. The assault would also have support from six
fighter-bomber groups and forty-seven "weasel" cargo carriers. Doubler
describes the battle which ensued between the regiments of 28th Infantry
Division and the German defenders between 2 November and 7 November. This was a
brutal slugging match that centered around the villages of Vossenack, Schmidt
and Kommerscheidt; each of these hamlets changed hands either partially or
completely during the battle, and at its end the Americans were forced to
retreat in disarray, having suffered substantial casualties. Doubler credits a
number of factors for the American failure: a conceptually flawed plan of
attack that led to dispersal, rather than concentration, of forces; a tenuous
resupply line through the forest; terrible weather that grounded American air
support and turned the ground to little more than a swamp, resulting in an
explosion of cases of trench foot. Most importantly, however, the Americans
suffered from two significant detriments: a high number of inexperienced,
untrained replacements, and an absence of air support, which allowed the
Germans to "concentrate remarkable strength against Schmidt and Kommerscheidt."
[185]
Doubler's explanation for the disaster absorbed by the 28th Infantry Division
lacks substance. The difficult terrain and terrible weather affected both
attacker and defender equally. It is questionable, to say the least, whether
the feet of the American infantrymen suffered worse from the cold and wet than
those of their German counterparts, shod as they were in their hobnail boots so
well known for conducting the cold. The notion that the American force was
burdened by a high proportion of inexperienced and untrained replacements also
fails to resonate. As noted above, neither 89.Infanterie-Division nor
275.Infanterie-Division was composed of trained and experienced soldiers. Both
units had been virtually destroyed in the Falaise pocket, and had nonetheless
been in more or less continuous combat since then. By the time they were
committed to battle in the Huertgen, they were divisions in name only, having
been scratched together from fortress and replacement units of dubious quality.
Even the vaunted 116.Panzer-Division was of little value to the defenders; its
troops were being husbanded for the coming Ardennes offensive, and its depleted
armored element was committed only partially and piecemeal to the battle. Like
the Americans, the Germans lacked air support; even if the weather had been
fine, however, the Luftwaffe would not have been there to assist the defenders.
Doubler's assertion that the Germans "were free to concentrate remarkable
strength" to the battle, therefore, is on truly shaky ground.
Doubler goes on to describe the ordeal endured by other American formations,
notably the 1st Infantry Division, 4th Infantry Division and 8th Infantry
Division, in the holocaust of the Huertgen forest. They ultimately prevailed,
of course, but at an appalling cost---24,000 American battle casualties, with
another 9,000 men down with a mixture of battle fatigue, trench foot and
sickness. Doubler finds a number of reasons for this apparent failure of
American arms. The Americans had no opportunity to train adequately for
fighting in dense forests. Their combat engineer units were not up to the tasks
of clearing minefields and keeping supply lines open. Because the American
formations were committed seriatim and under dangerous and difficult
conditions, they were unable to learn from one another. The army's leadership
was wanting, both at the higher and lower levels of command. Most importantly,
the army suffered from the manifold deleterious effects of its inadequate
replacement system. Ultimately, however, Doubler's verdict is that the battle
in the Huertgen forest was one that should never have been fought. This was so
for two principal reasons. First, the Germans possessed an almost decisive
advantage in fighting on terrain of their choosing in an environment that gave
every advantage to the defender." Second, the battle showed
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"that weather and terrain alone can force an army to search for new tactics and
combat techniques. More than anything else, thick trees, difficult ground, and
atrocious weather determined the torturous course of events….Close-quarters
combat and poor observation prevented American units from bringing artillery
and CAS [close air support] to bear. The dense forest made it difficult for
units to maintain proper direction and orientation. Poor trails and a lack of
roads made resupply and medical evacuation difficult. Rain transformed the
entire forest into a slippery morass, and fog and early morning mists reduced
visibility. Mud and snow concealed mines and booby traps while adding frostbite
and trench foot to the other discomforts troops had to withstand. In addition
to losses from enemy fire, the stress of combat, bad weather, horrid living
conditions, and gloomy surroundings inflicted psychological and physical
casualties at alarming rates." [186]
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The problem with Doubler's analysis of the Huertgen Forest battle is that
nearly all of the difficulties described by him plagued both attacker and
defender alike. As has already been mentioned, the weather does not play
favorites among combatants. If the
Americans suffered physically from the effects of mud, fog and snow, and the
associated conditions of trench foot and frostbite, so too did the German
defenders; both sides were engaged in a running battle for key villages and
hamlets, in which first one side and then the other advanced and then retreated
over the same exposed ground. Both sides were equally affected by close combat
in deep forests; both struggled over the same forest paths to revictual
themselves and carry off their wounded. Each army suffered from a lack of air
support; the Americans because of the weather conditions, the Germans as a
result of the total suppression of the Luftwaffe. Lastly, as Doubler himself
admits, the fact that this battle took place at all was the result of
decision-making on the part of the Allies, not the Germans. It can hardly be
argued, then, that the fight was conducted over ground of the Germans'
choosing. In this tragedy, both parties did the best they could with the hand
dealt them.
Doubler's last substantive chapter deals with the Battle of the Bulge, a
struggle that will ever be regarded as one of the most sterling moments in the
military history of the United States. "The ultimate outcome of the titanic
struggle in the Ardennes," says Doubler, "lay in the skill and determination of
the opposing forces. The Germans managed to mass the equivalent of twenty-nine
infantry divisions and twelve panzer divisions organized into four separate
armies….Compared to the huge German forces massing for the offensive, American
units in the Ardennes were spread thin." As Doubler notes, the driving forces
behind the German offensive were 5.Panzerarmee and 6.Panzerarmee; 7.Armee and
15.Armee protected the southern and northern flanks of the attack respectively.
[187]
How were the "twenty-nine infantry divisions and twelve panzer divisions" that
comprised the "huge German forces massing" for the Ardennes offensive composed?
5. Panzerarmee had under its command XXXXVII.Panzerkorps, LXXXI.Armeekorps and
XII.SS Armeekorps. The latter formation included 59.Infanterie-Division,
176.Infanterie- Division, 183.Volks-Grenadier-Division, 9.Panzer-Division and
15.Panzer-Grenadier-Division. 59.Infanterie-Division was a static division
consisting of Grenadier-Regiment 1034, 1035 and 1036, each of two battalions,
Fusilier-Bataillon 59, Panzer-Jaeger-Bataillon 59 and Artillerie-Regiment 159
of three battalions. It had fought in the withdrawal from France, and by
September 1944 its strength amounted to less than fifty anti-tank guns and
howitzers and 1000 infantrymen. Nevertheless, it continued to fight against the
Americans and British in Operation Market-Garden until November, when it was
placed in Heeresgruppe B reserve. 176.Infanterie-Division had been formed on 31
October 1944, and included Grenadier-Regiment 1218, 1219 and 1220, totaling six
battalions, Fusilier-Bataillon 176, Panzer-Jaeger-Bataillon 176 and
Artillerie-Regiment 1178 of four battalions. In September 1944 the division had
a strength of seven thousand men, most of whom were of poor quality; one
battalion consisted of men with serious hearing maladies, two comprised
Luftwaffe personnel, while many others in the ranks were convalescents and
semiinvalids. In spite of this, the division fought in the Battle of
Maastricht, at Arnhem during Operation Market-Garden, and along the Roer River.
It was actually refitting and reequipping during the Battle of the Bulge.
183.Infanterie-Division had come into existence on 15 September 1944, having
been formed from the so-called Dollersheim-Schatten-Division of the 31st Wave,
and included Grenadier-Regiment 330, 343 and 351, each of two battalions, as
well as Artillerie-Regiment 219 of four battalions. The composition of the
division was enhanced on 19 October 1944 by the absorption of
XVI.Landwehr-Festungs-Bataillon and Festungs-MG-Bataillon 42. Much of the
division was made up of raw and ill-trained Austrians; it was engaged in the
Siegfried Line battles and at Aachen, and near the end of November
Grenadier-Regiment 330 was annihilated at Geilenkirchen.[188]
The two armored formations under the control of XII.SS Armeekorps were in poor
condition for the Ardennes offensive. 9.Panzer-Division was rated a kampfwert
II as of 1 November 1944. Although its authorized personnel strength was 13495,
its actual strength amounted to 12364 men; likewise, while its authorized
strength of Mk IV tanks was 78, it had none of these vehicles in its inventory,
and it had only 45 Panthers out of an authorized strength of 73. On that date,
it also possessed 17 Panzerjaeger IV tank destroyers. Its Panzer-Regiment 33
was at 97% of authorized personnel strength; comparable figures for its
Panzer-Grenadier-Regiment 10 and Panzerjaeger-Abteilung 50 were 74% and 86%
respectively. On 14 December 1944 the first battalion of Panzer-Regiment 33 had
three companies of Mk IV tanks (total 28 vehicles) and one company of Stug IIIs
(14), while its second battalion fielded four companies of Panthers (57
vehicles). On 1 November 1944, 15.Panzer-Grenadier-Division was also rated a
kampfwert II, with 12956 men out of an authorized strength of 14818. While the
division's Panzer-Abteilung 115 was not actually authorized to have any Mk IV
tanks, on that date it possessed 29 of these vehicles; conversely, the
battalion was authorized to have 42 Stug IIIs, but had only 5. This situation
was somewhat compensated for by the fact that the battalion had 36 Panzerjaeger
IVs, 5 more than its authorized strength. On 9 December 1944 the battalion
possessed 14 Mk IV tanks, as a result of combat losses, and 30 Stug IIIs. The
division's manpower, as a percentage of authorized strength, stood at 98% for
Panzer-Abteilung 115, 77% and 70% respectively for Panzer-Grenadier-Regiment
104 and 115, and 92% for Panzer-Artillerie-Regiment 33. Both divisions,
therefore, were understrength in terms of manpower, and while
15.Panzer-Grenadier-Division had its full complement of armored vehicles,
9.Panzer-Division was well below its nominal authorized strength in tanks and
assault guns.[189]
LXXXI.Armeekorps of 5.Panzerarmee included 340.Volks-Grenadier-Division,
12.Volks-Grenadier-Division, 47.Volks-Grenadier-Division and
3.Panzer-Grenadier- Division. 340.Volks-Grenadier-Division was constituted on
15 September 1944 from 572.Volks-Grenadier-Division, a unit raised in the 32nd
Wave. It comprised Grenadier-Regiment 694, 695 and 696, each of two battalions,
along with four battalions in Artillerie-Regiment 340.
12.Volks-Grenadier-Division was created on 9 October 1944 by the redesignation
of the former 12.Infanterie-Division. The division included Fusilier- Regiment
12, Grenadier-Regiment 48 and Grenadier-Regiment 89, totaling six battalions of
infantry, and Artillerie-Regiment 12 of four battalions. On 19 October it
absorbed Erganzung und Ausbildungs Bataillon 473; two weeks later, on 3
November, it absorbed VIII.Landwehr-Festungs-Bataillon. It was virtually at
full strength, with approximately 14800 men, and fully equipped.
47.Volks-Grenadier-Division, on the other hand, had been created on 17
September 1944 by redesignation of 577.Grenadier-Division, a division of raw
recruits from the 32nd Wave. This unit was composed of Grenadier-Regiment 103,
104 and 115, each with two battalions, and the four battalions of
Artillerie-Regiment 147. The Armeekorp's remaining formation,
3.Panzer-Grenadier-Division, was rated at a kampfwert III on 1 November 1944.
It possessed 12185 men out of an authorized strength of 13938. On this date, it
had in its inventory 27 Stug IIIs out of an authorized strength of 42, as well
as 12 Panzerjaeger IVs out of an authorized strength of 31. The division's
Panzer-Abteilung 103 stood at 89% of its authorized personnel strength. Its
infantry components, Grenadier-Regiment 8 and 29, were at 82% and 89%
respectively of their authorized strength, and its Artillerie-Regiment 3 was at
85% authorized strength. On 10 December 1944, the eve of the Ardennes
offensive, Panzer- Abteilung 103 was nearly at full authorized strength, with
41 Stug IIIs in three companies.[190]
5.Panzerarmee also controlled three additional units on 26 November 1944, as
final preparations for the Ardennes offensive began. These were
246.Volks-Grenadier- Division, 10.SS Panzer-Division "Frundsburg", and Division
Nummer 526. The first of these, 246.Volks-Grenadier-Division, had formed on 15
September 1944 by redesignation of 565.Volks-Grenadier-Division, a formation of
the 32nd Wave. Its composition at that time was Grenadier-Regiment 352, 404 and
689 (six battalions); Artillerie-Regiment 246 (four battalions) and
Fusilier-Bataillon 246. On 3 November the division absorbed additional infantry
in the form of Festungs-MG-Bataillon 54 and Schnelle-Bataillon 503, 504 and 506
(these three units now comprising Grenadier-Regiment 404), as well as
Reserve-Grenadier-Bataillon 453 and Trier-Volkssturm-Bataillon. These
replacements, and others, were necessitated by substantial losses sustained by
the division while in action during the battles around Aachen.[191]
Division Nummer 526, also denominated as 526.Aachen-Division, was an Amalgam of
replacement units totaling some 12,711 men. Its principal units were Grenadier
Ersatz und Ausbildungs Regiment 211 (3 battalions of 12 companies), Grenadier
Ersatz und Ausbildungs Regiment 536 (4 battalions of 16 companies, a pioneer
company, a panzerjaeger company and a Flak company), Grenadier Ersatz und
Ausbildungs Regiment 253 (4 battalions of 16 companies), Artillerie Ersatz und
Ausbildungs Regiment 16 (1 battalion of 4 companies of infantry and 1
detachment of 4 batteries of artillery) and Pionier Ersatz und Ausbildungs
Battalion 253 (3 companies). By far the most formidable unit of the three was
10.SS Panzer-Division "Frundsberg". On 1 November 1944 this formation was rated
as kampfwert III, possessing 15329 men out of an authorized strength of 17425.
Relative manpower strengths of the division's principal units stood at 83% of
authorized strength for its SS Panzer-Regiment 10, 75% for SS
Panzer-Grenadier-Regiment 21, 71% for SS Panzer-Grenadier-Regiment 22, 44% for
SS Panzer-Aufklarungs-Abteilung 10 and 60% for SS Panzer-Jaeger-Abteilung 10.
The division was woefully understrength in terms of armored fighting vehicles;
out of an authorized strength of 101 Mk IV tanks, it possessed only 4; it also
possessed only 14 Panthers out of an authorized strength of 79. By 10 December
this position had deteriorated further; there were 10 Panthers and 2 Mk IVs in
the division's inventory, with 25 Panthers and 34 Mk IVs in transit.[192]
The second primary striking force for the Ardennes offensive was 6.Panzerarmee,
which on 26 November 1944 was designated Panzer Armeeoberkommando 6, and
controlled only four formations, namely 1.SS Panzer-Division "Liebstandarte
Adolf Hitler", 2.SS Panzer-Division "Das Reich", 9.SS Panzer-Division
"Hohenstauffen" and 12.SS Panzer-Division "Hitlerjugend". The senior Waffen SS
formation was 2.SS Panzer-Division "Das Reich", a unit with a formidable
reputation for combat prowess and ferocity. By the autumn of 1944, however, it
was in rather diminished circumstances; on 1 November it rated a kampfwert III,
even though its then total manpower strength of 18499 was higher than its
authorized strength of 17797. In weaponry, however, it was in woeful condition.
It was without tank destroyers of any kind, and possessed only 2 tanks out of
an authorized complement of 180. Both SS Panzer-Grenadier-Regiment 3 and 4
stood at 50% of authorized strength; the figures for SS
Panzer-Aufklarungs-Abteilung 2 and SS Panzer-Artillerie-Regiment 2 were 65% and
88% respectively. By 10 December the division's weapons situation had improved
somewhat; it then had 58 Panthers (authorized strength 79) and 28 Mk IVs. Of
these latter vehicles the division was authorized to have 101; the shortfall
was partially compensated for by the presence of an additional 28 Stug
IIIs.[193]
1.SS Panzer-Division "Liebstandarte Adolf Hitler" was in rather better
condition than its sister formation, although it too rated only a kampfwert III
on 4 November. Its manpower situation was favorable; overall, with 20500 men it
was nearly 2000 men over its authorized strength, so that each of its
subordinate combat units stood at nearly full strength. While it remained
deficient in armored fighting vehicles, it still possessed 32 Panthers, 25 Mk
IVs and 21 Panzerjaeger IVs. By 3 December the number of tanks available to the
division's organic units had not increased to authorized strength levels (it
now had 42 Panthers and 37 Mk IVs out of a total authorized strength of 180
tanks). However, the division now had attached to it SS
Schwerer-Panzer-Abteilung 501 with 45 Tiger tanks. While this division was
therefore still well below its authorized levels of armored fighting vehicles,
it still possessed a formidable armored component.[194]
On 1 November 1944, 9.SS Panzer-Division "Hohenstauffen" was rated at kampfwert
IV; with 14861 men it was well below its authorized strength of 17817. Although
its armored element, SS Panzer-Regiment 9, was at 100% of authorized personnel
strength, other combat units were debilitated. SS Panzer-Grenadier-Regiment 20,
for example, stood at only 65% of authorized strength, and while SS
Panzer-Aufklarungs-Abteilung 9 had 88% of its authorized manpower, it was
without any vehicles. Of its full complement of 180 tanks, the division
possessed only 5; it also had only one tank destroyer. By 8 December the
division was still not at full strength in terms of armored fighting vehicles;
although authorized to have 79 Panthers, it still had only 33 (with 25 in
transit), and of its authorized 101 Mk IVs it possessed only 32, the deficiency
being only partially corrected by the presence of 28 Stug IIIs in the
division's inventory.[195]
One flank of the German attack formation for the Ardennes offensive was to be
held by 15.Armee, composed of XXX.Armeekorps z.b.V. and LXXXVIII.Armeekorps, as
well as certain other units. On 26 November 1944, XXX.Armeekorps z.b.V.
comprised only one unit, a kampfgruppe of 346.Infanterie-Division. This was
another of the static infantry divisions employed by the Germans in the west,
and included Grenadier- Regiment 857 and 858, Artillerie-Regiment 346,
Fusilier-Bataillon 346, Panzer-Jaeger-Bataillon 346, Pionier-Bataillon 346 and
Nachrichten-Bataillon 346. Although it had been formed in the fall of 1942, the
division had first seen action near Caen during the Normandy fighting, where
its ranks had been considerably thinned. It was involved in the battle of the
Falaise Pocket, and retreated across France and Belgium into Holland, where it
was engaged, with a few howitzers and twenty-five hundred men, in the Battle of
the Scheldt. It was for this reason that it was characterized as a kampfgruppe
only at the end of November. Indeed, in December 1944, the division was
reformed, so decrepit had it become. It now included Grenadier-Regiment 857 and
858, as well as Grenadier- Regiment 1018, Fusilier-Bataillon 346 and
Artillerie-Regiment 346. With the exception of Grenadier-Regiment 858, which
came from the old 346.Infanterie-Division, all of these units were created from
portions of other units.[196]
LXXXVIII.Armeekorps controlled 6.Fallschirm-Jaeger-Division, along with two
additional static formations, 711.Infanterie-Division and
712.Infanterie-Division. 6. Fallschirm-Jaeger-Division had been formed in June
1944. Its table of organization was robust; Fallschirm-Jaeger-Regiment 16, 17
and 18, each of three battalions; Fallschirm-Panzerjaeger-Bataillon 6 (3
companies); Fallschirm-Granatwerfer-Bataillon 6 (3 companies);
Fallschirm-Artillerie-Regiment 6 with three battalions; Fallschirm-Flak-
Bataillon 6, with 5 batteries; Fallschirm-Pionier-Bataillon 6 of 4 companies,
Fallschirm-Nachrichten-Bataillon 6, and divisional support units. All of this,
however, was grossly misleading. Fallschirm-Jaeger-Regiment 16 did not in fact
join the division, but was instead sent to the eastern front. In addition,
formation of Fallschirm-Jaeger-Regiment 17 and 18 was never completed, because
both units immediately went into action in the Normandy battles. These
regiments, and the remainder of the division in kampfgruppe form, were nearly
destroyed in the invasion front. The remnants of the division, along with
elements from XXIX., XXXI., XXXVIII. and XL. Luftwaffen-Festungs-Bataillon,
were reformed on 15 October 1944 in Meppel, Holland. Reference to this unit's
"divisional" status in the German order of battle, therefore, is a matter of
convention only. In fact, it had never been anything more than a kampfgruppe,
and by the eve of the Ardennes offensive it was a very battered one
indeed.[197]
The other two units in LXXXVIII.Armeekorps were 711.Infanterie-Division and
712.Infanterie-Division. Both were static formations which came into being in
1941. 711.Infanterie-Division, including among its soldiers "volunteer" Turks
and Caucasians, had been decimated in the Normandy battles and subsequently
removed to Holland for reconstitution. Its Grenadier-Regiment 731, 744 and 763
were of two battalions each, and were supplemented by Fusilier-Bataillon 1711.
The division's Artillerie-Regiment 1177 had three battalions. The division also
had panzerjaeger, pioneer and signals battalions. 712.Infanterie-Division was
even more thinly populated than its sister unit. It possessed two infantry
regiments, (Grenadier-Regiment 732 and 745) with a total of six battalions,
Artillerie-Regiment 652 (one battalion only) a signals battalion, a pioneer
battalion and a single panzerjaeger company. The division had been badly mauled
in Walcheren prior to the Ardennes battle.[198]
The other shoulder of the offensive was to be supported by 7.Armee. On 26
November 1944 this formation nominally had seven army corps under its command;
however, two of these, LIII.Armeekorps and LXXXV.Armeekorps z.b.V., were staff
organizations only. Two of the corps commands were at least apparently
formidable, having under their command five divisions each. One of these was
LXXIV.Armeekorps, which controlled 275.Infanterie-Division,
344.Infanterie-Division and 89.Infanterie-Division as well as
272.Volks-Grenadier-Division and 277.Volks-Grenadier-Division.
272.Volks-Grenadier-Division was of recent vintage, having been created on 17
September 1944 by redesignation of 575.Grenadier-Division. The division had
three regiments (Grenadier-Regiment 980, 981 and 982) of two battalions each,
and four battalions of artillery under the command of Artillerie-Regiment 272.
277.Volks-Grenadier-Division was a mirror image of its cohort
272.Volks-Grenadier-Division. It had come into being on 4 September 1944 in
Hungary, having been formed from 574.Volks-Grenadier-Division, a unit of the
32nd Wave. There were a total of six infantry battalions in its
Grenadier-Regiment 989, 990 and 991, and four of artillery in
Artillerie-Regiment 277.[199]
Although the Kriegsgliedierung for 26 November 1944 lists both 275.Infanterie-
Division and 344.Infanterie-Division as under the command of LXXIV.Armeekorps,
neither of these units actually took part in the Battle of the Bulge. Indeed,
275.Infanterie- Division had been so battered in the Huertgen Forest battles
that its remnants were simply absorbed into 344.Infanterie-Division. The latter
formation was sent to the Eastern Front before the commencement of the Battle
of the Bulge.[200] 89.Infanterie-Division, however, did stay on to fight in the
battle. This division had been formed in January, 1944, was heavily engaged in
the Normandy battles, and destroyed in the Falaise pocket. It was rebuilt
thereafter, and nominally included Grenadier-Regiment 1055 and 1056 of three
battalions each, and Grenadier-Regiment 1063 of two battalions. During
September and October it absorbed a variety of Landwehr, Luftwaffe, fortress
and replacement battalions. It was with this conglomeration of troops that the
division prepared to confront its opponents in the Ardennes.[201]
Also under the command of 7.Armee on the eve of the Ardennes offensive was
LXXX.Armeekorps, comprising 353.Infanterie-Division and
212.Volks-Grenadier-Division. The latter formation had been created in
September, 1944 and consisted of Grenadier-Regiment 316, 320 and 423 totaling
six battalions, four battalions of artillery in Artillerie-Regiment 212, and a
Fusilier company. 353.Infanterie-Division had been destroyed in the West,
having fought continuously in Normandy, the Falaise pocket and along the
Siegfried Line. It was reformed in November 1944 with a hodgepodge of troops.
Its Grenadier-Regiment 941 had been formed of men from a security regiment
whose average age was 38. The division's Grenadier-Regiment 942 was made up of
troops from replacement battalions and other units in the Trier vicinity; the
men were equipped with a variety of Dutch, French, Belgian and Czech
rifles.[202]
Two more infantry formations, 18.Volks-Grenadier-Division and
26.Volks-Grenadier-Division, made up the body of LXVI.Armeekorps, another
detachment under command of 7.Armee. 18.Volks-Grenadier-Division was a new
unit, formed in Denmark on 2 September 1944 from a 32nd Wave formation,
571.Volks-Grenadier-Division. It had six battalions of infantry in
Grenadier-Regiment 293, 294 and 295, four battalions of artillery in
Artillerie-Regiment 1818, and divisional support troops. 26.Volks-Grenadier-
Division formed in Posen on 17 September 1944, also from a 32nd Wave formation,
582.Volks-Grenadier-Division, along with a cadre from the former
26.Infanterie-Division, recently destroyed in Russia. It had three regiments of
two battalions each in Fusilier-Regiment 39, Grenadier-Regiment 77 and
Grenadier-Regiment 78, Artillerie-Regiment 26 (four battalions), an additional
Fusilier company, and Panzer-Jaeger-Abteilung 26, which included
Sturmgeschutz-Abteilung 1026. In addition to the raw recruits that each of them
absorbed from the 32nd Wave formations from which they sprang, both
18.Volks-Grenadier-Division and 26.Volks-Grenadier-Division seem to have had
substantial numbers of naval and Luftwaffe personnel in their ranks. Indeed,
18.Volks-Grenadier-Division had been created to replace
18.Luftwaffen-Feld-Division, a unit destroyed in the Mons pocket. The remnants
of 18.Luftwaffen-Feld-Division had been folded into
18.Volks-Grenadier-Division.[203]
The last formation under the umbrella of 7.Armee was LVIII.Panzerkorps,
comprising two armored units (2.Panzer-Division and 116.Panzer-Division) and
three infantry divisions (352.Volks-Grenadier-Division,
276.Volks-Grenadier-Division and 326.Volks-Grenadier-Division).
276.Volks-Grenadier-Division had come into being on 4 September 1944 from the
remnants of 276.Infanterie-Division, a unit destroyed in the Normandy fighting
in August. It had six battalions of infantry (Grenadier-Regiment 986, 987 and
988) and four of artillery (Artillerie-Regiment 276). 326.Volks-Grenadier-
Division, like several other formations in 7.Armee, had been created on 4
September 1944 from a 32nd Wave unit, 579.Volks-Grenadier-Division. It was an
unusual formation, with three battalions of artillery (Artillerie-Regiment 326)
and nine of infantry (Grenadier-Regiment 751, 752 and 753). It was equipped,
however, almost entirely from captured French, Russian and Polish weapons of an
incredible variety of calibres. Yet another of these units was
352.Volks-Grenadier-Division, which came into being on 21 September 1944 from
581.Volks-Grenadier-Division of the 32nd Wave. It too was unusual, having six
battalions of infantry (Grenadier-Regiment 914, 915 and 916), four battalions
of artillery (Artillerie-Regiment 1352), a Fusilier company, Pionier-Abteilung
352 and a motorized anti-tank battalion.[204]
2. Panzer-Division was in quite a weakened condition as it prepared for the
Ardennes offensive. On 1 November 1944 it rated a kampfwert III; out of an
authorized strength of 14,716 men, it had 9,884. It was authorized to have 78
MkIV tanks and had 10; of its authorized strength of 73 Panthers it had 9. Only
its Panzerjaeger-Abteilung 38 had its full complement of troops.
Panzer-Regiment 3, Panzer-Grenadier-Regiment 2 and Panzer-Grenadier-Regiment
304 were at 67%, 60% and 42% of authorized personnel strength respectively. By
14 December the position of Panzer-Regiment 3 had improved; its first battalion
had 64 Panthers in its inventory, but its second battalion had only 28 MkIVs,
with the remaining balance of the regiment's authorized tank strength less than
compensated for by 24 Stug IIIs.[205]
The condition of 116.Panzer-Division was not much better than that of
2.Panzer-Division. It rated a kampfwert II on 8 November 1944. It was
understrength by 2500 men; it possessed 12 MkIVs (authorized 78) and a single
Panther (authorized 73), although the division had attached to it an additional
Panzer battalion with 43 Panthers in its inventory. Conditions were not greatly
improved for the division's Panzer-Regiment 16 by 16 December, when the great
offensive began. On that date, the regiment had a total of 41 Panthers (with 23
en route) and 21 MkIVs (with 5 en route, along with 14 Stug IIIs). An
additional 30 armored fighting vehicles were to be found in the division's
Panzerjaeger-Abteilung 228. Manpower strengths ranged from 93% of authorized in
Panzer-Regiment 16 to 72% in Panzer-Grenadier-Regiment 156.[206]
During the course of the Battle of the Bulge, twelve more German formations
joined their order of battle. These are reflected in the Kriegsgliederung for
31 December 1944. In the 15.Armee, the ranks of LXXIV.Armeekorps were expanded
by the addition of 85.Infanterie-Division. This unit was a 25th Wave formation
created in early February 1944. As originally constituted, it had three
battalions of artillery (Artillerie-Regiment 185) and six of infantry
(Grenadier-Regiment 1053, 1054 and 1064). By December 1944, however, it was a
shell, having been in combat since the invasion almost continuously, and
virtually destroyed in the battle around Aachen. The second unit added to
15.Armee was 3.Falschirm-Jaeger-Division, which joined LXVII.Armeekorps. It
also was present only in kampfgruppe form, having been heavily engaged in
Normandy, partially destroyed in the Falaise pocket, and withdrawn for
rebuilding in September. At that time, its ranks were filled out from seven
different Landwehr fortress battalions, as well as with men from Luftwaffe
formations. The last formation to join 15.Armee was
363.Volks-Grenadier-Division, in LXXXI.Armeekorps. This was another 32nd Wave
unit, formed September 17, 1944 from 566.Volks-Grenadier-Division. It included
six battalions of infantry (Grenadier-Regiment 957, 958 and 959), four of
artillery (Artillerie- Regiment 363.) and Fusilier-Kompanie 363.[207]
Two infantry units joined 6.Panzerarmee. 62.Volks-Grenadier-Division, which
increased the ranks of LXVI.Armeekorps, had been created on 22 September 1944
to replace the former 62.Infanterie-Division, which had been destroyed in
Bessarabia and disbanded. It had ten battalions of troops; four in
Artillerie-Regiment 162, and six in the division's infantry regiments
(Grenadier-Regiment 164, 183 and 190). 560.Volks-Grenadier-Division was added
to II.SS Panzerkorps. It was created in August 1944 from miscellaneous army and
Luftwaffe units in Norway and Denmark. In addition to a pioneer battalion and a
motorized anti-tank battalion, the division had three regiments of infantry
with six battalions total (Grenadier-Regiment 1128, 1129 and 1130) and four
battalions of artillery (Artillerie-Regiment 1560).[208]
Two armored units joined 5.Panzerarmee's XXXXVII.Panzerkorps. Panzer-Lehr-
Division had only the second battalion of its Panzer-Lehr-Regiment 130
available, with 40 Panthers and 37 MkIVs. This regiment was at full strength
(indeed, it had an excess of armored vehicles); the division's two infantry
regiments, however. (Panzer-Grenadier-Lehr-Regiment 901 and 902) were only at
about 80% of authorized personnel strength. The Fuhrer-Begleit-Brigade entered
the battle at full strength in manpower, and with 67 MkIVs in its second
battalion, Panzer-Regiment-Grossdeutschland. While both of these formations had
formidable numbers of armored vehicles, they suffered from the same manpower
issues that beset the rest of the German army at this stage of the war.[209]
Two additional armored units joined 7.Armee. Under the army's direct command
was 11.Panzer-Division, one of the stronger formations in the battle. It rated
a kampfwert II on 1 November 1944, and was nearly at full strength. On the very
eve of the battle it had in its inventory 31 MkIVs (30 en route) and 47
Panthers (37 en route). Although still technically understrength (it was 36
vehicles short of its authorized strength) it was in much better condition than
many of its cohorts. Another strong formation, joining LIIIl.Armeekorps, was
Fuhrer-Grenadier-Brigade. It was somewhat in excess of its manpower
authorization, and had 67 armored vehicles (11 Stug III, 19 MkIVs and 37
Panthers).[210]
Three infantry divisions also joined 7.Armee. 5.Fallschirm-Jaeger-Division and
9.Volks-Grenadier-Division joined LIII.Armeekorps. The condition of
5.Fallschirm-Jaeger-Division was unenviable. It had been severely mauled in the
Normandy battles, where it was reduced to mere remnants. In October it was
reformed in Holland from Flieger-Regiment 22, 51 and 53.
9.Volks-Grenadier-Division was created on October 13, 1944 in Denmark from the
so-called Schatten-Division-Dennewitz, a 32nd Wave unit. The last unit to join
the order of battle was 79.Volks-Grenadier-Division, which had come into being
on 27 October 1944 from the Katzbach (586.) Volks-Grenadier-Division. It was
typical of the type of division formed by the Germans at this stage of the
war----six battalions of infantry (Grenadier-Regiment 208, 212 and 226) and
four of artillery (Artillerie-Regiment 179.). It is reputed to have been at
about half-strength for the battle, with little in the way of artillery, but
nevertheless seems to have given a good account of itself.[211]
One of the more renowned units to take part in the Ardennes offensive was 12.SS
Panzer-Division "Hitlerjugend". This formation, which had experienced its
baptism of fire in Normandy, and then been virtually annihilated in the Falaise
pocket, had been reformed. As of November 1, 1944 it rated a kampfwert IV, with
a total manpower of almost 3,000 in excess of its prescribed maximum of 18,548.
In respect of armored fighting vehicles, however, it was well below
establishment, having 31 MkIVs out of the standard 103, and only 23 Panthers,
well below the 79 that it was supposed to have. On the eve of the offensive,
December 8, 1944, its condition had improved only slightly; it had gained 10
MkIVs and 14 Panthers. It was also able to field 22 Panzerjaeger IVs.[212]
At this juncture, it is useful to consider the system by which the Wehrmacht
filled the ranks of its field armies. Over the course of the war, Wehrmacht
infantry formations, or rather the individual soldiers that made them up, were
called up in thirty-five "waves" (Welle). In general, it can be said that the
higher the wave number, the more reduced in size was the division, and the
lower the quality of the equipment, troops and weapons. There were four basic
incarnations of the German infantry division. Waves 1 through 20 were "M1939"
divisions; these were built along the model of the 1918 German infantry
division, with three infantry regiments totaling nine battalions, and an
artillery regiment, with support troops. The main differences between the 1918
version of the German infantry division and its 1939 counterpart were brought
about by technological advances. Over time, the number of men in a division
steadily dwindled from nearly 18,000 to about 11,000. Beginning in the autumn
of 1943, German infantry divisions began to be formed as "Type 44" or "neuer
Art" divisions. Waves 21 through 28 were formed along this pattern, which was
constructed around three infantry regiments totaling six battalions and an
artillery regiment of four battalions. The nominal strength of a Type 44
division was 12,772 men. After the failed attempt on Hitler's life in July
1944, a third iteration of the German infantry division came into being, in the
form of the Volks-Grenadier-Division. These formations (waves 29-32) had a
nominal strength of 10,072 men in three regiments of two battalions each, and
an artillery regiment of four battalions. An effort was made to compensate for
the shortfall in manpower by a greater use of automatic weapons and personal
anti-tank weapons, namely the panzerschreck and the panzerfaust. The artillery
battalions, however, were of greatly reduced strength, with three of the twelve
batteries consisting of outmoded 75mm light field guns in place of three
batteries equipped with 105mm howitzers. In December 1944 the "Type 45"
division was instituted. Waves 33-35 were to be organized as Type 45 divisions,
which were very like the makeup of the Volks-Grenadier-Divisionen. Very few
such formations took the field before the end of hostilities.
The steady erosion in the size and strength of the German infantry division,
first as a result of necessity, and then as a matter of official policy, had
its roots in the Nazi regime's ill-conceived war against the Soviet Union.
Great as were the Wehrmacht early successes against the Red Army, the true
result of the war in the East was the evisceration of the German army, both in
manpower and equipment. Indeed, it is not too much to say that the Heer never
recovered from the strain placed upon it in 1941-42; the next three years of
war against the Stalinist regime merely caused the German army's condition to
go from bad to worse. The result of this could be seen in the German infantry
divisions that squared up to face the Allies in the Ardennes offensive.
Twenty-three German infantry divisions took part in the Ardennes offensive.
Thirteen (56%) of these formations (9., 18., 26., 47., 79., 212., 246., 272.,
277., 326., 340., 352. and 363.Volks-Grenadier-Divisionen) were from the 32nd
wave. 560.Volks-Grenadier-Division was from the 30th wave, and
183.Volks-Grenadier-Division was from the 31st wave. 59.Infanterie-Division was
a 27th wave static division. The remaining formations (85., 89., and
176.Infanterie-Divisionen and 12., 62., 276., and
353.Volks-Grenadier-Divisionen) had been without exception created from the
remnants of divisions that had been destroyed recently in either the West or
the East, their ranks filled or supplemented with Luftwaffe, foreign and
Landwehr personnel, ill-trained and armed with motley collections of assorted
obsolescent and exotic weapons. Some idea of the level of training of these
units may be gained from considering that the 30th and 31st waves had been
called up in August 1944, while units in the 32nd wave were called up the
following month. The thirteen divisions in the 32nd wave, therefore, went into
battle with at most four months training; the two formations from the 30th and
31st waves had the luxury of an additional month's instruction. Of the rest,
85.and 89.Infanterie-Divisionen had been reformed in October 1944 after being
mauled in Aachen and Falaise, respectively; 176.Infanterie-Division had been
constituted in November 1944; 62. and 276.Volks-Grenadier-Divisionen were
created in September 1944, and 12.Volks-Grenadier-Division the following month;
and 353.Volks-Grenadier-Division in November 1944. The last-named formation is
worth describing in detail, as an extreme (although not particularly unusual)
example of depths to which the Heer had fallen in its final six months of
existence. 353.Infanterie-Division, from which 353.Volks-Grenadier-Division
sprang, had been destroyed at Falaise. The core of the new division came from
local defense units and remnants of formations escaping from France. The
"cadre" of Grenadier-Regiment 941 consisted of old men from Sicherungs-Regiment
1, a security unit that had garrisoned Paris for two years prior to the Allied
invasion. This regiment had virtually no heavy weapons, and the average age of
its personnel was between 40 and 48; this brought the average age of
Grenadier-Regiment 941 to around 38. Grenadier-Regiment 942 was based on the
former Feld-Ersatz-Bataillon 353, which consisted of alarm and replacement
units from Trier, and was armed with a mixture of Dutch, French, Belgian and
Czech rifles.[213]
It is against this background that we must evaluate Michael Doubler's comments
on the Battle of the Bulge. Doubler is silent as to the quality of the German
formations that opposed the Americans in the Bulge; he says literally nothing
on the subject. His analysis of the battle is also bereft of any mention that
the Americans enjoyed the benefit of being on the defensive, a topic to which
he, Keith Bonn and Peter Mansoor warm easily when explaining the apparently
otherwise inexplicable ability of the German army to defend such places as the
Normandy beachhead and the Huertgen Forest. On the other hand, he is frank to
admit that the Americans enjoyed two supremely important advantages over their
German foes, namely artillery and air supremacy. Of the former, he states:
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The artillery's ability to concentrate and shift vast quantities of firepower
was extraordinary: by 21 December artillery commanders had assembled
twenty-three battalions behind the Elsenborn Ridge. The four infantry divisions
defending the northern shoulder of the Bulge received continuous support from
the 348 guns massed around Eisenborn. This unanticipated gathering of howitzers
and cannons was probably the greatest concentration of artillery firepower in
the ETO, if not in all of U.S. military history.[214]
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Of the profound effect of American air power on the Germans, Doubler has the
following comments:
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Air operations around Bastogne were only a small part of the total air effort
during the Battle of the Bulge. When the weather cleared on 23 December,
fighter-bombers flew 696 sorties to establish air superiority[215], to
interdict German L[ines]O[f]C[ommunication]s, and to assist ground units…On
Christmas Eve, Ninth Air Force P-47s flew 1,100 sorties. By 26 December
American air power was taking a toll on the enemy, as aircraft cratered and cut
highways and railroads, destroyed bridges, rubbled villages that choked German
supply lines, and demolished vast quantities of enemy vehicles and rolling
stock…During 23-31 December Ninth Air Force fighter-bombers and medium bombers
flew 10,305 sorties and dropped 6,969 tons of bombs while losing 158 aircraft.
The Ninth claimed the destruction of 2,323 enemy trucks, 207 armored vehicles,
173 gun positions, 620 railroad cars, 45 locomotives, 333 buildings, and 7
bridges.[216]
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Doubler's work is thus significant for both what it says and does not say about
the great winter battle of 1944-45. Having mentioned the powerful artillery and
air power advantage that the United States' forces possessed in the battle, he
neglects to mention that the Germans lacked adequate resources with regard to
either of these key combat elements. Instead, he returns to his theme of
American superiority---not in terms of materiel, but in terms of doctrine,
ingenuity and adaptability, to say nothing of plain old fighting resolve. On
the subject of improvisation and adaptability, for example, Doubler has the
following comments:
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Infantrymen discovered several ways to ensure their combat effectiveness. Olive
drab uniforms stood out in the snow, so riflemen rummaged through Belgian homes
and tore up white sheets to use as improvised snowsuits…The lack of overshoes
prompted troops to wrap their feet in burlap bags to prevent trench foot and
frostbite…Despite their heavy weight, armored vehicles slid and spun on icy
roads, so tankers and mechanics improvised two methods to give their steel
monsters better traction. Maintenance sections welded a short piece of angle
iron to every fifth or sixth track block that acted like a cleat, gripping snow
and chopping through ice. Other crewmen removed several rubber pads from their
tracks, so the track's steel frame clawed into the ground…Tankers mixed their
own homemade whitewash to camouflage their vehicles. A lack of antifreeze was a
problem throughout the winter, so mechanics learned to add alcohol or kerosene
to cooling systems to keep engines from freezing.[217]
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Without doubt, the ability of the American soldier to improvise, stay alive and
fight under such harsh conditions in the manner described by Doubler is a
powerful tribute to the native ingenuity and toughness of the GI. However,
reading Doubler's description of these incidents, and others like them, gives
anyone with a fair knowledge of the Wehrmacht a sense of déjà vu. In the
terrible winter of 1941-1942 in Russia, the landsers also used bed sheets as
makeshift snowsmocks to provide them with camouflage in the deep snow.[218] In
that first winter in Russia, German soldiers also lacked overshoes, and
suffered from an additional disadvantage never experienced by the GI—the
hobnailed jackboot, footwear without peer in conducting the cold. German
soldiers sought oversized boots and packed them with newsprint to act as
insulation; when this was not possible, they too resorted to wrapping their
boots in whatever material might come to hand.[219] The Germans addressed the
problems which confronted heavy armored vehicles in deep snow and ice by
copying the solution developed by the Russians, namely the wide tank tread used
on the Panther and Tiger tanks and their variants. For use with older-model
vehicles still in production---the MkIV tank and the Sturmgeschutze, both of
which were issued with a tread much narrower than that found on the Panther or
Tiger---the Germans created the so-called Ostkette, a tank tread with a
flexible extension on each link, designed to emulate the performance of wider
tank treads. The first winter in Russia also saw German troops using makeshift
camouflage, in the form of whitewash made from whatever was available, to cover
tanks and other vehicles and thereby reduce their vulnerability. The Germans
too struggled with shortages of antifreeze in 1941-1942, although in their case
the substance was virtually nonexistent rather than merely in short supply. In
Russia, however, the cold was so severe that it froze engine oil—and thus the
engines themselves—absolutely solid. German tankers adapted to this
circumstance by either leaving tank engines running constantly, or building
small fires under the engine crankcase to thaw the oil and the engine.
The present work has already discussed the concluding chapter of Doubler's
book, entitled The Schoolhouse of War. That chapter is a paean to the American
way of making war, standing for the proposition that the decisive defeat of the
Heer by the U.S. Army in western Europe during 1944-1945 may be attributed to a
number of factors, not including materiel superiority. It is also an example of
nonsense substituted for analysis, as well as a classic example of the
application of the double standard.
In his last chapter, for example, Doubler speaks to the failure of the U.S.
army to exploit its advantage in mobility, referring particularly to the
battles in Normandy and the Huertgen Forest, in which the army was unable to
deploy its vast armada of armored vehicles to good advantage. On this point he
remarks that "[R]oad networks are needed to support the logistical
infrastructure required by mechanized forces" and that "[B]ad weather restricts
cross-country maneuver, keeps vehicles roadbound, and adds to soldiers'
miseries." These conclusory statements would seem to be self-evident; for
Doubler, however, they assist in explaining the failure of the western Allies
to decisively thrash the German army before the end of 1944. Yet, the German
army had somehow managed to successfully use the selfsame roadnet in its defeat
of the French in 1940. And if adequate road networks are essential to support
mechanized forces, how do we explain the German army's victories in Russia in
1941 and 1942 (and those of the Red Army in 1943 and 1944) over road networks
that were not only inadequate, but quite nonexistent in any meaningful
sense?[220]
Doubler's final chapter also includes some quite astounding assertions. He
states, for example:
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Historians and military analysts have put too much emphasis on the army's
mobility, believing that the use of tracked and wheeled vehicles gave the army
a degree of mobility that was inappropriate for the heavy fighting in Europe.
Trucks did give the army operational mobility, but motorized movement had no
influence on the battlefield…In reality, the army's means of logistical and
operational mobility had no direct influence on combat.[221]
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One can be forgiven for goggling in disbelief at such statements. Can Doubler
really mean that "motorized movement had no influence on the battlefield" or
that "logistical and operational mobility had no direct influence on combat"?
If he is serious, and correct, then modern armies would be well advised to
embrace the model imposed on the German army by the inability of German
industry to produce sufficient wheeled and tracked transport vehicles, and rely
upon literal horsepower for "logistical and operational mobility". Even if
Doubler is correct in asserting that the mobility of the U.S. army, with its
innumerable trucks, "had no direct influence on combat", it is nevertheless
clear that the indirect influence of the army's incomparable mobility on combat
operations was staggering. It is no exaggeration to say that the ability of the
U.S. army in World War II to supply its logistical needs and move its troops
where they were most needed was without precedent in military history. That
such a capacity was vital to the ability of that army to successfully prosecute
its war cannot be gainsaid by any reasonable student of that conflict, whether
the effect of that capacity was indirect or not. For an example of what it
meant for a modern army to be unable to avail itself of the benefits of such
mobility one need look no further than the German army. In the final analysis,
such assertions, and many others like them in Closing with the Enemy ,
cannot be taken seriously.
Copyright © 2004 by Thomas E. Nutter.
Written by Tom Nutter. If you have questions or comments on this
article, please contact Nutter at:
tenutter@gmail.com.
Last Modified on: 12/03/2006.
* Views expressed by contributors are their own and do not necessarily represent
those of MHO.
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