The Development of Amphibious
Assaults during World War II
by Larry Parker
Introduction
As American capabilities and experience grew during World War II amphibious
assaults evolved from the close run, shoestring operation at Guadalcanal
[1] into the incredibly complex and massive invasions of Normandy and
Okinawa involving thousands of ships, planes and men and vast supply chains. To
defend against the growing American sea borne juggernaut German and Japanese
counter landing strategies also evolved reaching their epitome in the Atlantic
Wall of Festung Europa (Fortress Europe) and the Fukkaku (Endurance Engagement)
/ Kamikaze (Suicide) tactics of Okinawa. To better understand this process this
paper will briefly describe the five major landings in Europe (North Africa,
Sicily, Salerno, Anzio and Normandy) and five of the seven 'storm landings' of
the Pacific (Tarawa, Saipan, Peleliu, Iwo Jima and Okinawa). Utilizing that
background information this paper will then analyze the improvements in
amphibious assaults as well as the changes in defensive tactics that took place
between 1941-1945. This paper will also compare and contrast the differences
between methodologies in the Atlantic and the Pacific Theatre of Operations
concluding with a few observations on current and projected amphibious
capabilities.
Background
European Theatre of Operations
| North Africa |
Operation Torch |
08 Nov 42 – 13 May 43 |
| Commanders |
Dwight D Eisenhower |
Jean Darlan |
| Opposing Forces |
Western TF 35,000
Central TF 39,000
Eastern TF 33,000
400 Ships
1000 aircraft
|
120,000 Vichy French,
Colonial & Legionary Forces
Static Defense
|
It is said a camel is a horse designed by committee. If so the Allied
Mediterranean strategy is an apt example of that analogy. Adamantly opposed by
the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) who favored a direct assault on Germany as soon
as possible, General Marshall and Admiral King were overruled by President
Roosevelt. Anxious to see American troops in action for political and morale
reasons FDR embraced Churchill's stratagem for a thrust at the 'soft underbelly
of the Axis' when it became apparent a cross channel invasion was not feasible
in 1942. French hostility toward the British for their attack on the French
fleet at Mers-el-Kebir meant the landings would have to have an American face.
Due to the shortage of aircraft carriers the availability of land based air
support became a major factor in invasion planning. The range of fighters
flying out of Gibraltar and Malta precluded invasion sites at Bizerte or Tunis,
which offered the best chance of trapping Rommel's Afrika Korps. After much
debate and much compromise Casablanca, Oran and Algiers were chosen for
America's entry into the European Theatre of Operations.
The Allied forces assembled for Operation Torch were opposed by approximately
120,000 Colonial, Legionary and Vichy troops of unknown quality and uncertain
loyalty to the Reich. Fortunately the Allies met only sporadic resistance for
limited planning time, hurried preparation and inadequate training alone were
sufficient to jeopardize the landings.[2] By later standards the available
landing craft were primitive – Higgins Boats, LCP(R)s, LCVs, and LCMs carried
the troops, jeeps, artillery and light tanks ashore from civilian cargo ships
and passenger liners hastily pressed into service. So scarce were assault craft
at this point in the war the Allies even attempted to use flat-bottomed oil
tankers as makeshift LSTs.[3] None of the assault vessels were large enough to
transport a medium tank or heavy cargo directly to the beach necessitating the
immediate capture of an operational port with facilities to offload bulk
supplies. On D-Day the combination of rough surf and inexperienced coxswains
took its toll. Troops landed haphazardly, scattered across as much as forty
miles of beaches, miles from assigned objectives, badly mixed with other units.
Nearly fifty per cent of the landing craft at Casablanca and ninety per cent of
the assault vessels at Algiers were disabled on D-Day critically hindering the
delivery of food, fuel, ammunition and other urgently needed supplies and
delaying the evacuation of the wounded.[4] Braving mines and shallow water
daring German U-Boats compounded the logistics nightmare. Only the landings at
Oran went smoothly. By the time the Allies secured their objectives, came to
terms with the Vichy French and were suitably organized to mount a drive on
Tunisia Hitler had rushed an entire field army commanded initially by
Generalleutnant Walther Nehring[5] to Africa precipitating a six month campaign
vice the lightening stroke originally planned.[6]
TORCH led inexorably to HUSKY, AVALANCE and SHINGLE. No doubt the lessons
learned from these Mediterranean operations paid dividends at Normandy.
Logistics and planning for OVERLORD was vastly improved as were landing craft
designs and assault training. Whatever the merits of the Mediterranean strategy
however, diversion of German units from France was not one of them. The Italian
campaign tied down twice as many Allied troops as German for the remainder of
the war.
| Sicily |
Operation Husy |
10 JUL – 17 AUG 43 |
| Commanders |
Sir Harold Alexander |
Alfredo Guzzoni |
| Opposing Forces |
Patton 7th US Army
Montgomery 8th Br Army
1375 warships, landing craft supply and support vessels
|
2 German Divisions
2 Italian Divisions
6 It Coastal Defense Units 270,000 men total
|
| Casualties |
4958 KIA
16,666 WIA
|
29,000 KIA / WIA
140,000 POW
100,000 men & 10,000 vehicles evacuated
|
An assault on Messina offered the best chance to trap the Axis forces stationed
in Sicily. At this point in the war however the Luftwaffe was still a force to
be reckoned with. Consequently the range of Allied land based air support
limited the choice of invasion sites to the southeastern tip of Sicily.
American industry was beginning to answer the call for equipment in vast
quantities. New landing craft (LSTs, LCTs, LCIs and DUWKs) and enhanced
training vastly improved the ship to shore movement of men and materiel. That
and the wholesale surrender of Italian Coastal Defense units ensured success on
D-Day in spite of the same heavy surf conditions that had plagued Operation
Torch. Sicily was no cakewalk however. A strong German / Italian armored
counterattack at Gela pushed within yards of the beach. Artillery brought in by
DUKWs dueled point blank with the onrushing tanks. The sheer determination of
the 1st Infantry Division aided by outstanding Naval Gunfire Support from the
six-inch guns of the cruiser USS Boise finally repulsed the attack.
Disaster averted Patton's 7th Army dashed across Sicily to Palermo, then raced
along the northern coast. A plodding advance by Montgomery however allowed the
Germans to escape from Messina, retreating to Italy in good order with the
majority of their vehicles. Although communications / coordination between air,
ground and naval forces was poor and Air Marshall Tedder's decision to allocate
all air assets to an interdiction role caused serious deficiencies in tactical
air support the Allies were gaining valuable experience. For US forces Sicily
was especially important. Any lingering doubts about the fighting quality of
American troops after the debacle at Kasserine were erased at Gela.
Strategically HUSKY paid other dividends. Occupation of Sicily drove Axis air
and naval forces from the central Mediterranean, opening Allied lines of supply
with Egypt and the invasion caused Hitler to cancel Operation Citadel, the
titanic tank battle at Kursk designed to regain Axis initiative on the Russian
front.
| Salerno |
Operation Avalanche |
09 SEP 1943 |
| Commanders |
Dwight D Eisenhower
|
Albert Kesselring
|
| Opposing Forces |
Clark 5th US Army Salerno
450 ships
Montgomery 8th Br Army
Taranto & Reggio di Calabria
|
2nd Parachute Div
3rd Panzer Grenadier Div
15th Panzer Grenadier Div
Herman Goering Pz Div
16th Panzer Div
28th Panzer Div
1st Parachute Div
Mobile Defense
|
Now utterly enmeshed in Churchill's Mediterranean strategy Eisenhower began
planning the invasion of Italy. Once again the range of air cover limited the
choice of invasion sites, in this case to areas south of Naples. On 03
September the British crossed the Straights of Messina while making a
simultaneous airborne assault on Taranto. Six days later the Americans landed
at Salerno hoping to trap enemy forces drawn into the Reggio Di Calabria. Once
the two armies linked the Allies planned to capture the major Italian port at
Naples. Line of supply thereby secured they would then begin a drive on Rome.
Anticipating the Italian surrender, officially announced on 08 September,
German troops were prepared to disarm their former Allies and assume defensive
positions. Forgoing a preliminary bombardment as they had in North Africa and
Sicily in order to achieve surprise, Allied troops in LCVPs headed to the beach
anticipating little resistance. An acceptable risk in North Africa and Sicily
due to limited opposition; in this case it was a poor decision. At Salerno
Allied forces ran headlong into the very experienced, very tough and well
prepared 16th Panzer Division. Of all the Allied assaults in the European
Theatre of Operations Salerno came closest to being hurled back into the sea.
The first wave met stiff resistance in the form of well-directed machine gun,
mortar, artillery and tank fire. At dawn the Luftwaffe strafed and bombed the
landing area and launched radio controlled glide bombs at the invasion fleet
severely damaging two cruisers and one battleship. In stubborn fighting the
beaches held and both sides rushed reinforcements to the area. Over 12-16
September Kesselring launched an all out counterattack to eliminate the Salerno
beachhead before the British 8th Army could relieve the hard pressed 5th Army.
Individual bravery, effective close air support and highly accurate Naval
Gunfire Support turned back the German attack. Realizing he could not succeed
under the guns of the Allied fleet Kesselring authorized a withdrawal to the
Gustav line. There the Italian campaign stagnated due to stout German
resistance, excellent defensive terrain and terrible weather. Heavy traffic and
nearly continuous rain and snow turned supply routes into rivers of mud and
battlefields into quagmires.
| Anzio |
Operation Shingle |
22 JAN – 04 JUN 1944 |
| Commanders |
John P Lucas
|
Albert Kesselring
|
| Opposing Forces |
British
1st Infantry Div
46th Royal Tank Reg
9th Commando
43rd Commando
US
1st Ranger Bn
3rd Ranger Bn
4th Ranger Bn
504th Para Inf Reg
509th Para Inf Bn
3rd Infantry Div
751st Tank Bn
5 CA, 24 DD, 238 Landing Craft, 62 support ships 2600 aircraft
|
4th Parachute Div
Herman Goering Pz Div
3rd Panzer Grenadier Div
71st Infantry Div
2000 aircraft
|
|
Casualties
|
4400 KIA
18000 WIA
6800 MIA / POW
37000 Combat Fatigue
|
5500 KIA
17500 WIA
4500 MIA / POW
|
Hoping to break the Italian deadlock Eisenhower considered an invasion near
Rome to outflank the superbly entrenched Germans and cut their line of supply.
Convinced he did not have the necessary resources due to the build up for
Overlord Ike dismissed the idea and soon departed to take command of the
Normandy operation. Frustrated with the lack of progress in the Mediterranean
Churchill insisted the assault be revived. Resurrected for political reasons
Operation Shingle proceeded under the command of John P Lucas. An excellent
concept given sufficient troops and bold execution Anzio was doomed from the
onset by inadequate means and reluctant leadership. General Lucas did not trust
his superiors or the operational plan. As he noted in his personal diary
shortly before the attack, "Unless we can get what we want, the operation
becomes such a desperate undertaking that it should not, in my opinion, be
attempted." He continued with a direct reference to Churchill, architect of the
Gallipoli debacle during World War I, proponent of the current Mediterranean
strategy and advocate of Shingle, "(The operation) had a strong odor of
Gallipoli and apparently the same author was still on the coach's bench." Lucas
did not get the troops or landing craft he wanted and in a case of
self-fulfilling prophecy the operation indeed became a desperate undertaking.
Allied forces met little opposition initially and by 2400 hours 36,000 soldiers
and 3000 vehicles were ashore. Anzio fell the first day as well as Nettuno
forming a shallow beachhead. Unfortunately no attempt was made to take the
commanding heights on the Alban Hills. Orders from General Clark directed Lucas
to "land, secure the beachhead and advance." Having successfully landed, having
no confidence in the mission and believing his resources inadequate to safely
advance the literal minded and unenthusiastic Lucas now paused to consolidate
his lines and secure the initial gains. Bestowed the precious gift of time
Kesselring rushed the 3rd Panzer Grenadier Division, 71st Infantry Division and
Herman Goering Panzer Division to the Anzio perimeter. Five additional
divisions soon joined these units ringing the beachhead with German steel. With
every inch of the lodgment subject to heavy German artillery fire conditions
for the Allied soldiers were hellish indeed. Six months of vicious attacks and
counterattacks ensued as each side vied to gain the upper hand. General Lucius
Truscott relieved Lucas 23 February but any opportunity for quick success had
already been lost. As an extremely displeased Winston Churchill noted, "I had
hoped we were hurling a wildcat into the shore, but all we got was a stranded
whale." Anzio continued to drain both sides until June 1944 when the stalemate
was finally broken.
| Normandy |
Operation Overlord |
06 JUN – 22 AUG 1944 |
| Commanders |
Dwight D Eisenhower
Bernard Montgomery
|
Gerd von Rundstedt
Erwin Rommel
|
| Opposing Forces |
British
6th Airborne Div
1st & 4th Spec Svc Bde
50th Infantry Div
3rd Infantry Div
8th Armored Bde
27th Armored Bde
Canadian
3rd Infantry Div
2nd Armored Bde
US
1st Infantry Div
29th Infantry Div
2nd Ranger Bn
4th Infantry Div
101st Airborne Div
82nd Airborne Div
6000 ships
13000 aircraft
|
21st Panzer Div
716 Infantry Div (static)
352nd Infantry Div
6th Parachute Reg
91st Infantry Div
709th Infantry Div
243rd Infantry Div
30th Infantry Bde
17 U-Boats
4 Destroyers
24 E (torpedo) Boats
900 aircraft
|
|
Casualties
|
37,000 KIA
154,000 WIA
18,000 MIA
|
Approximately
200,000 KIA / WIA
200,000 POW
|
Drawing upon the experience of North Africa, Sicily, Salerno and Anzio and the
lessons learned in the Pacific, Normandy was a masterpiece of detailed planning
and remarkable logistic innovation. In spite of extensive preparations,
unprecedented supply and support capabilities and overwhelming air and naval
superiority there were glaring errors in execution however. Preliminary
Combined Arms Support proved inadequate due to the short duration of Naval
Gunfire and the delayed release of bomb loads due to cloud cover over the
target areas. Most incredibly the vast Allied intelligence apparatus failed to
appreciate the tactical significance of the Norman boscage or hedgerow country
in which the campaign bogged down for months.
The German Kriegsmarine had never been adequate to challenge the Royal Navy
much less the combined Allied fleet. Therefore a naval defense of France was
not feasible. And by 1944 the bulk of the Luftwaffe served on the Eastern Front
where it still maintained rough parity with the Soviet air force. Consequently
German strategy shifted from the mobile defense of Sicily and Italy to a
defense at the waters edge.
Fuhrer Directive number 40 ordered the creation of an 'Atlantic Wall'
stretching from Spain to Norway. Covering some 2800 miles this series of
fortifications was one of the largest construction projects in human history.
Special emphasis was given to the Pas-de-Calais, the shortest route from
England to France and most direct line of march from the landing site into the
German heartland. Significantly this was the only area completed by June 1944.
Recognizing the vital importance of harbor facilities to any invasion Hitler
also insisted each port city be heavily fortified and strongly garrisoned.
Typical of operations in the Third Reich part of the work was undertaken by
Organization Todt, part by the Army, part by the Air Force and part by the Navy
with no coordination of effort. Consequently when Rommel made his first
inspection tour in the fall of 1943 he found the wall to be, in his words, "a
figment of Hitler's Wolkenkucksheim" (cloud-cuckoo-land).[7] Of the 23,000
structures erected approximately half followed some standard design. The
remaining bastions were built haphazardly per strictly service needs or local
commanders discretion. Little or no thought was given to integrating defensive
systems or coordinating efforts.
Rommel immediately set about to rectify the situation. At his command Army
units dedicated three days per week laboring to improve fortifications.
Hedgehogs,[8] Belgian gates [9] and stout wooden posts angled toward the
sea, all topped with mines, were erected in the tidal zone. Soldiers strung
hundreds of miles of barbed wire and laid millions of mines designed to channel
invasion forces into killing zones. Artillery was calibrated, firing arcs
established and machine guns emplaced to sweep the beaches. While not yet
complete, by June 1944 the Atlantic Wall had been vastly improved. As necessary
as this work was it did impact combat readiness. Work and guard details left
little time for training. This was a reasonable trade off however considering
Allied mastery of the sea and air.
An incomplete defensive system was not the only problem facing the Germans.
Rommel's immediate superior, Field Marshall Gerd von Rundstedt, did not share
his subordinate's tactical views. Rundstedt clung to the concept of a mobile
defense and opted to hold the panzer divisions in a central reserve. As to how
the motorized units would move to the front in the face of complete Allied air
superiority, he had no answer. In typical fashion Hitler divided the armored
formations between the two satisfying neither and allowing the Allies a toehold
in Europe. Once ashore the outcome became a race to build up combat power, a
race Hitler could not win.
Pacific Theatre of Operations
| Tarawa |
Operation Longsuit |
20 – 23 November 1943 |
| Commanders |
Julian Smith |
Shibasaki Keiji |
| Opposing Forces |
17 CV, 12 BB, 8 CA, 4 CL, 66 DD, 36 Transports 2nd MARDIV, 27th ID
|
2600 Imperial Marines
1000 Japanese workers
1200 Korean laborers
|
|
Casualties
|
1115 KIA
2292 WIA
|
4690 KIA
17 Japanese POW
129 Koreans liberated
|
The Japanese Imperial General Headquarters (IGHQ) was well aware of Tarawa's
strategic location and invested considerable time and effort in fortifying the
island. Fourteen costal defense guns and forty artillery pieces were dug in,
many in concrete emplacements. These hard points were protected by some 500
mutually supporting concrete pillboxes and bunkers constructed from logs and
covered with several feet of sand. Trenches connected all points of the island,
allowing the defenders to move about under cover. An air and naval defense of
Tarawa was planned to augment the ground defense however that portion of the
strategic plan never materialized. Those air and naval forces not destroyed by
American attacks on Rabaul were diverted when MacArthur invaded Bougainville.
A short but intense preliminary bombardment knocked out some of the large
caliber coastal defense guns but had little impact otherwise. When the assault
craft grounded on Tarawa's barrier reef the Marines of 2nd Division were forced
to wade ashore under a withering fire. Consequently D-Day on Tarawa was a close
run thing. Only the tenacity of the Marines supported by those LVT's that
survived the gauntlet of fire and the inability of the Japanese to organize an
effective counterattack the first night ensured success.
For a variety of reasons – untested doctrine, insufficient time to train on new
equipment, ineffective Combined Arms Support, poor communications, a determined
and resilient Japanese defense, etc. – fighting on Tarawa was bloody. The 2nd
Marine Division suffered 1115 KIA and 2292 WIA, the highest casualty rate of
any Marine unit during World War II (thirty per cent the first day, seventeen
per cent overall.) Of the 4836 Japanese defenders only 17 soldiers and 129
Korean laborers survived. As a result of the problems encountered changes were
made in amphibious doctrine, Naval Gunfire and Close Air Support were improved,
Underwater Demolition Teams were expanded, AMTRACs and LVTs were up armored and
up gunned, communications were improved with the advent of purpose built
command and control ships and Marine Divisions were reorganized greatly
increasing firepower.
| Saipan |
Operation Forager |
15 June – 09 July 1944 |
| Commanders |
Holland Smith |
Yoshitsugu Saito |
| Opposing Forces |
15 CV, 10 CVE, 14 BB, 26 CA, 144 DD, 326 transport, amphibious & cargo
ships, 891 Aircraft 2nd MARDIV
4th MARDIV
27th INF DIV
|
9 CV, 5 BB, 13 CA, 28 DD, 430 Aircraft
25,469 Army 6,160 Navy
|
|
Casualties
|
3500 KIA
13160 WIA
|
21,000 KIA
8,000 Suicide
921 POW
22,000 civilian KIA/suicide
|
On 15 June 1944 the 2nd Marine Division landed just north of Charan-Kanoa, the
4th Marine Division just south. Within twenty minutes 8000 Marines were on the
beach. By nightfall 20,000 Marines held a perimeter roughly 10,000 yards long
and 1500 yards deep. The Japanese resisted fanatically inflicting 2000
casualties on D-Day but suffered far more themselves. In spite of fierce
resistance by 24 June the 4th Marine Division had cleared Nafutan Point and
driven to Magicienne Bay where it wheeled left and faced north. At this point
Holland Smith inserted the 27th Infantry Division commanded by General Ralph
Smith into the line. With the 2nd Marine Division on the left or west coast and
the 4th Marine Division on the right or east coast and the 27th Infantry
Division in the center the Americans began a drive that would end at Marpi
Point on 09 July. The Japanese bitterly contested every foot of ground.
Deprived of planned air and naval support however all they could do was die
gallantly.
Located 1500 miles east of Manila and 1300 miles southeast of Tokyo the
Japanese realized the strategic importance of Saipan, Tinian and Guam.
Declaring the Marianas part of the Absolute National Defense Sphere IGHQ
attempted to fortify the islands accordingly. 25,469 soldiers and 6,160 sailors
were stationed on Saipan, 18,500 troops garrisoned Guam and 8000 personnel
protected Tinian. By 1944 however U. S. submarines were ravaging the Japanese
merchant fleet. One of every three cargo ships bound for the defensive
perimeter was sunk severely impacting defensive preparations. On Saipan the
projected completion date of the various fortifications had been pushed back to
November 1944. Accordingly when the Americans landed in June they found 8-inch
coastal defense guns awaiting emplacement and many redoubts lacking concrete
covers.
In this respect the Americans were fortunate for what artillery had been
emplaced had been well sited and accuracy aided by preset range markers. In
addition Japanese gunners were well trained and maintained good fire
discipline. Holding fire until the landing craft were well within range they
savaged the troop laden AMTRAC's.
At this point in the Pacific war the Japanese still clung to a defense at the
water's edge followed by immediate counterattacks to dislodge the enemy.
Failing in this due to the tenacity of the Marines and excellent naval gunfire
support the remnants of the garrison withdrew slowly toward Marpi Point taking
advantage of the rugged terrain and exacting a heavy toll on the attacking
soldiers and marines.
Throughout the war the Japanese seized every opportunity to lure the American
fleet into a decisive engagement hoping to repeat the battle of Tsushima
Straits. Therefore in addition to the ground defense of Saipan IGHQ planned a
strong naval defense of the island termed A-GO (Operation A) as well. Under
this plan Admiral Ozawa's 1st Mobile Fleet was ordered to rendezvous with
Admiral Ugaki's battleship force east of the Philippines then steam to the
relief of Saipan. This gave the Japanese a striking force of nine carriers
(three fleet, two medium and four light), five battleships including the super
dreadnoughts Yamato and Musashi , thirteen cruisers,
twenty-eight destroyers and 430 carrier aircraft supplemented by strong land
based air forces on Saipan, Tinian and Guam. According to the plan after
attacking Task Force 58 the carrier planes would refuel and rearm on Guam then
joined by Admiral Kakuta's land based planes make a second attack as they
returned to their carriers. Through a series of such raids the Japanese hoped
to deal a devastating blow to Task Force 58 Fleet and the accompanying
transports of V Amphibious Force with their precious cargo of soldiers and
marines thus reversing the outcome of Midway.
Things did not go as planned for the Japanese. A series of hit and run strikes
by Task Force 58 had destroyed Imperial air power in the region prior to
Forager. And navy intelligence tracked the 1st Mobile Fleet from the time it
weighed anchor - allowing Spruance to prepare his much larger and
better-trained fleet. Lacking the expected land based air support and short
experienced aviators the resultant Battle of the Philippine Sea or "Great
Mariana's Turkey Shoot" was a disaster for the Imperial Navy. At a cost of two
oilers and 130 planes American pilots and submariners sank three Japanese
carriers (Taiho, Shokaku, Hiyo), damaged two
additional carriers (Chiyoda, Zuikaku), a battleship (Haruna
) and a cruiser and, most importantly, destroyed 436 enemy aircraft. This left
what remained of the 1st Mobile Fleet with only thirty-five aircraft and
pilots. Planes could be quickly replaced. Pilots could not. The disaster in the
Philippine Sea set the stage for the final destruction of the Imperial Japanese
Navy at Leyte Gulf and the ground forces in the Marianas isolated. Without hope
of supplies and reinforcements, faced with the might of Task Force 58, the
garrisons of Saipan, Guam and Tinian, no matter how well dug in or determined,
could not long resist.
| Peleliu |
Operation Stalemate |
15 SEP – 25 NOV 1944 |
| Commanders |
William Rupertus |
Kunio Nakagawa |
| Opposing Forces |
1st MARDIV
81st INF DIV
500 ships
|
2nd Inf Reg / 14th Div
2 Bn of the 15th Inf Reg
1 Bn of the 53rd Bde
1 Tank Bn
1 Naval Guard Unit
Misc Artillery & AA units
1 81mm Mortar Co
1 155mm Mortar Co
1 Labor Bn
|
|
Casualties
|
1500 KIA
6700 WIA
|
10695 KIA
202 POW (19 Japanese,
183 Korean & Okinawan laborers)
|
Six miles long and two miles wide Peleliu is dominated by the Umurbrogols, a
jumble of sharp coral ridges and steep draws covered with dense jungle
vegetation. In spite of extensive reconnaissance very little accurate
intelligence had been gathered prior to landing. Not until the thick growth had
been burned and blasted away did the Marines fully realize what they were up
against. Taking advantage of naturally occurring caves the Japanese constructed
over 500 interconnected and mutually supporting tunnels and hardened fighting
points. Some positions held only a few men, others, four or five stories deep
and well provisioned, housed several hundred battle tested Japanese troops.
Elaborate defenses were just the beginning of the agony that was Peleliu.
Realizing they could no longer count on air and naval support to defend the
outer ring of islands the Japanese had also changed their tactics. Colonel
Kunio Nakagawa told his men, "Make the American Marines come to you – and when
they do, kill them." For seventy-two days his men, fanatically obedient to the
last, did just that. An attack by fifteen tanks with supporting infantry on the
afternoon of D-Day was the only time the Japanese defenders ventured into the
open. For the remainder of the campaign they had to be burned, blasted and dug
out from concealed positions exacting a terrible price from the 1st Marine
Division.
After three days and 1400 tons of preliminary bombardment Admiral Jesse
Oldendorf declared, "There are no more targets. I have destroyed everything."
and the Marines went in. He was decidedly wrong. After one week of bitter
fighting the 1st Battalion / 1st Regiment of the 1st Marines had suffered 70%
casualties. Not since the civil war had casualty figures run so high. Over the
strenuous objections of Colonel 'Chesty' Puller and the inflexible General
Rupertus, who stubbornly insisted on costly frontal assaults, General Geiger
ordered the unit withdrawn replacing it with a Regimental Combat Team from the
81st Infantry Division. At this point the attack became a siege. Close air
support was crucial. After the airfield was captured Marine Corsairs would take
off, make bombing or strafing runs and land again within five or ten minutes to
rearm. Many pilots didn't bother to raise their landing gear. Peleliu also saw
extensive use of Napalm. On the ground men used bazookas, tanks and
flamethrowers to blast the Japanese strong points. Manhandling 75mm pack
howitzers to the top of ridges to fire point blank into cave openings; the
soldiers and Marines destroyed the Japanese positions one by one. Enduring a
deadly crossfire from seemingly all directions men climbed to the top of caves
and lowered satchel charges of TNT into the openings to collapse them. Armored
bulldozers completed the job of sealing the hapless defenders inside.
Given sixty years to reflect many now claim Peleliu was an unnecessary battle.
Air and naval forces had effectively isolated and neutralized the Carolines
eliminating the threat to MacArthur's flank when he liberated the Philippines.
Perhaps they are correct but the lessons learned at Peleliu would prove
invaluable in preparing for Iwo Jima and Okinawa.
| Iwo Jima |
Operation Detachment |
16 FEB – 26 MAR 1945 |
| Commanders |
Harry Schmidt |
Tadamichi Kuribayashi |
| Opposing Forces |
3rd MARDIV
4th MARDIV
5th MARDIV
880 supporting ships
|
109th Inf Div
2nd Independent Mixed Bde
145th Inf Reg
1 Bn of the 17th Inf Reg
26th Tank Reg
7000 Naval Personnel
|
|
Casualties
|
6821 KIA
19217 WIA
2648 Combat Fatigue
|
21,000 KIA
1083 POW
|
Roughly triangular in shape Iwo Jima consists of eight square miles of volcanic
rock and sand dominated by Mount Suribachi. Strategically significant to the
Japanese as an early warning station and fighter base to protect the home
islands from American air raids its three airfields were equally coveted by the
U. S. Army Air Force. The struggle for Iwo Jima was not a battle in the
conventional sense of the term. The struggle is better described as an
especially vicious fight between gladiators staged deep in the bowels of the
earth. No quarter was asked and none was given. In a brutal thirty-six day test
of wills 21,000 Japanese soldiers would perish on Iwo Jima and one of every
three Marines who landed there became a casualty.
General Tadamichi Kuribayashi had orders to delay the Americans as long as
possible, exacting maximum casualties, buying time for the home islands to plan
for invasion. He prepared his forces well. Sixteen miles of tunnels connected
approximately 1500 rooms, bunkers and pillboxes. Some spaces, up to 75 feet
underground and provided with electricity, water and ventilation, served as
barracks, ammunition and fuel dumps, command posts and galleys. As they had on
Peleliu, the fighting positions were mutually supporting with interlocking
fields of fire. In this carefully prepared labyrinth of death the enemy could
not attack one position without coming under fire from several others.
Critical mistakes were repeated on the American side. Reconnaissance missions
revealed the extensive construction under way on Iwo Jima. Still, in a gross
miscalculation of Japanese strength, Navy intelligence estimated the number of
enemy troops at 4,000-11,000 when in fact 22,000 soldiers garrisoned the
island. For seventy-two days B-17's, B-24's and B-29's rained 5,800 tons of
bombs on the hapless island. This was followed by an intense preliminary
bombardment the morning of D-Day. It was all sound and fury signifying nothing.
According to plan Kuribayashi allowed several waves to land unmolested. When
the beaches were crowded with men and equipment his troops cut loose inflicting
ten per-cent casualties by the end of the first day. At night small patrols
emerged from their underground lairs to terrorize the Marines. Using
infiltration tactics rather than the wasteful Banzai charges of previous
battles, they crept into American positions ensuring the weary Marines got no
rest.
The Marines were not the only American forces to suffer at Iwo Jima. At Peleliu
the Japanese introduced the tactic of Fukkaku or 'Endurance Engagements.' At
Iwo Jima IGHQ increased the number of Kamikaze attacks first seen at Leyte
Gulf. Kamikazes disabled the aircraft carrier Saratoga and sank the
escort carrier Bismark Sea . Many other ships were damaged. The navy
endured and using grenades, satchel charges of TNT and flamethrowers, the
Marines prevailed. Those Japanese they could not blast or burn out they buried
alive. Unfortunately worse was to come.
Nearly 7000 Marines lost their lives on Iwo Jima. Nearly 20,000 were wounded.
To put these figures into perspective consider this image: The 5th Marine
Division sailed to Iwo Jima on twenty-two very crowded transports. The
survivors berthed comfortably on eight departing ships. As Oliver North notes
in War Stories II: Heroism in the Pacific , "More Marines died there
than in any other battle in the Pacific in WWII. And more U.S. Marines earned
the Medal of Honor on Iwo Jima than in any other battle in U.S. history." Over
the next four months however more than 2400 B-29's crewed by some 27,000
aviators made emergency landings on Iwo Jima saving far more lives than were
lost.
| Okinawa |
Operation Iceberg |
01 APR – 21 JUN 1945 |
| Commanders |
Simon Bolivar Buckner, Jr.
10th Army |
Mitsuru Ushijima
32nd Army |
| Opposing Forces |
1st MARDIV
6th MARDIV
2nd MARDIV
7th INF DIV
27th INF DIV
77th INF DIV
96th INF DIV
1300 ships including 40 carriers and 18 battleships
430 AMTRACs
|
24th Inf Div
62nd Inf Div
44th Independent Mxd Bde
5th Artillery Command
11th Shipping Group
27th Tank regiment
Boetai - Home Guard
|
| Opposing Forces |
1st MARDIV
6th MARDIV
2nd MARDIV
7th INF DIV
27th INF DIV
77th INF DIV
96th INF DIV
1300 ships including 40 carriers and 18 battleships
430 AMTRACs
|
24th Inf Div
62nd Inf Div
44th Independent Mxd Bde
5th Artillery Command
11th Shipping Group
27th Tank regiment
Boetai - Home Guard
|
| Casualties |
15,900 KIA
38,000 WIA
26,000 Combat Fatigue
34 ships sunk
368 ships damaged
763 planes destroyed
|
Approximately
107,500 KIA
(23,750 sealed in caves)
10,750 POW
140,000 CIV KIA / primarily by suicide
7830 aircraft destroyed
16 ships sunk
|
April Fool's Day 1945 was also Easter Sunday. It was L-Day (Landing Day) on
Okinawa as well. It would be the first time foreign invaders set foot on what
the Japanese considered sacred soil, the first major Allied amphibious assault
in the Pacific [10], the largest sea-air-land battle in history and, although
no one realized it at the time, the last battle of World War II.
Okinawa was a repeat of Iwo Jima on a vastly larger scale. Sixty miles long,
hilly and pierced with an extensive cave system the Japanese had enlarged many
of the caves, excavated new caverns and connected these bombproof shelters with
an elaborate network of tunnels all supporting strategically placed artillery
positions and machinegun nests. The underground galleries were provisioned with
enough food, water, ammunition and fuel for a prolonged siege, which was
exactly what General Mitsuru Ushijima had in mind. While his army savaged the
American forces on the ground, the remnants of the Japanese navy and air force
would ravage the supporting Allied fleet at sea. Perhaps this calculated
sacrifice would deter an invasion of the Home Islands and lead to a negotiated
peace settlement. Or so Tokyo hoped.
Beginning in March the Allies unleashed what the natives termed a "tetsu no
bow"[11] or Storm of Steel. On L-Day the Navy followed with the heaviest
concentration of naval gunfire ever expended in support of an amphibious
landing. Ten older battleships (including the Pearl Harbor survivors Tennessee,
Maryland and West Virginia), nine cruisers, twenty-three
destroyers and 117 rocket gunboats hurled 3,800 tons of ordnance at Okinawa in
the first twenty-four hours. Surface structures were obliterated but the 32nd
Army weathered the storm in safety. Once again the navy had overestimated the
impact of a general bombardment and once again intelligence assets had
underestimated the number of Japanese defending the island. Once again the
Japanese allowed an unopposed landing. Not only the beachhead but also two
airfields were secured on the first day. In five days 10th Army advanced to the
east coast and cleared the northern portion of the island. Then, on 06 April,
they encountered the 120,000 men (vice an estimated 50,000 men) entrenched on
the Shuri line. For seven weeks the battle raged on land as the Japanese
launched thousands of Kamikaze and conventional air attacks on the supporting
fleet. At a cost of nearly 8,000 men and aircraft these attacks damaged the
British carriers Indefatigable and Illustrious and the
American carriers Wasp and Franklin , killed nearly 5,000
sailors and wounded nearly 5,000 more but sank nothing larger than a destroyer
utterly failing to drive off the Allied fleet.
In one of the most ill considered missions of the war the super battleship Yamato
, the light cruiser Yahagi and eight destroyers sortied to support the air
assault. American carrier planes destroyed these doomed warships hundreds of
miles from their intended target. It was the last action of the Imperial
Japanese Navy in the war.
Although stridently urged by the Marines to use the amphibious forces at his
disposal to land behind the Shuri line and shorten the battle General Buckner
on Okinawa proved even more obdurate than General Rupertus on Peleliu
obstinately persisting in costly frontal attacks. As the conflict drug on
torrential rains turned the battlefield into a fetid mire of decomposing
bodies, rotting garbage, human waste and noxious mud. In spite of the appalling
conditions the 10th Army pushed on. Heavy pressure and rising casualties
finally convinced General Ushijima he could no longer hold the Shuri line. On
23 May his army began withdrawing to its final defensive position on the Kiyamu
peninsula. It would take two more weeks of hard fighting and an additional two
weeks of 'mopping up' before Okinawa was declared secure.
Okinawa generated two more firsts in the closing days of the battle. Cut down
by shrapnel on 18 June Lieutenant General Buckner became the highest-ranking
American officer killed in action during the war. Temporarily relieving him,
Major General Roy Geiger became the only Marine and the only American aviator
to command a field army.
Appalled by the casualty figures on Iwo Jima and Okinawa President Truman
cancelled the planned invasion of Japan opting instead to use the atomic bomb
to end the war. It was a wise decision. When the war ended occupation forces
found 12,000 aircraft of all types including advanced jet and rocket powered
fighters stored in secret underground factories. In yet another failure this
came as a complete surprise to Allied intelligence officers who thought the
Japanese aircraft industry had been completely destroyed by the strategic
bombing campaign. Had Operation Olympic taken place IGHQ was prepared to launch
Kamikaze attacks on a truly massive scale, sacrificing the entire population of
Japan if necessary. Considering the alternative, the two atomic weapons were
the most humanitarian way to end the war.
Improvements:
07 December 1941 found the United States totally unprepared for what would be
an amphibious war on a global scale. It possessed little more than an untested
doctrine, Fleet Training Publication 167 – Landing Operations Doctrine, U. S.
Navy, an aroused public and the will to win. The beginnings were sloppy and
costly. But as problems were identified, changes were made in doctrine and
American industry provided the tools required in unprecedented numbers. To list
just a few examples:
• From crude Higgins Boats to an infinite variety of LCVPs, LCMs and LCIs
• From makeshift amphibious ships to purpose built LSTs and LSDs
• From civilian cargo ships and passenger liners hastily refitted and pressed
into service to APAs and AKAs
• From thin skinned, open topped, under gunned LVTs to highly capable LVT(A)4s
mounting 75mm howitzers and flame throwers
• From unreliable communications to purpose built Amphibious Command and
Control ships[12]
• From badly coordinated Combined Arms Support to fully integrated Naval
Gunfire and Close Air Support directed by landing party personnel
• From the reconnaissance disaster at Tarawa to greatly expanded Underwater
Demolition Teams
• From the deadly classroom known as on the job training to hundreds of special
purpose schools such as the Kahoolawe Gunnery School in Hawaii and the
Amphibious Training Center, Camp Gordon Johnston in Florida
• From the logistics disaster of TORCH to complete mastery of the art of combat
loading
Lessons Learned:
To oppose a landing three types of defensive strategies are possible – a naval
and/or air defense, a defense at the waters edge and a mobile defense. A naval
and/or air defense is preemptive in nature – blockading or attacking
embarkation ports, interdicting enemy forces at sea and denying sea and air
control at the invasion point. A defense at the waters edge involves
construction of fixed fortifications. It is exceptionally costly in men and
material but engages the attacker when he is most vulnerable – during the ship
to shore movement.[13] A mobile defense is the most efficient use of men and
material but gives up the best opportunity to destroy the enemy when he is most
at risk. A mobile defense also requires excellent intelligence regarding enemy
intentions in order to make a sound decision on the release of reserves and at
least air parity. Naturally the most effective defense would be some
combination of all three.
During World War II German strategy went from a mobile defense, nearly
succeeding at Gela and Salerno, to a defense at the waters edge at Normandy
necessitated by the declining power of the Luftwaffe and Kriegsmarine. Japan,
on the other hand, went from a defense at the waters edge at Tarawa to an
attempted Air and Naval defense at Okinawa.[14] For a variety of reasons
neither Germany nor Japan were able to mount an effective air and naval defense
fully integrated with a strong ground defense.[15] Germany lacked the naval
strength and never possessed a strategic air force with which to mount a
complete defense. Such a defense would have been most effective in the target
rich environment of the English Channel on 06 June 1944. Japan used its navy
and air force unwisely in 1942/43 and by 1944/45 also no longer possessed the
capability to mount a complete defense forcing IGHQ to resort to the desperate
measure of Kamikaze attacks. Other Axis shortcomings include:
• Neither used submarines or mines as effectively as they could have in an
anti-invasion role.
• Japan especially had problems with target priorities. To the bitter end her
pilots preferred attacking warships vice the more vulnerable and more
strategically important troop transport and supply ships.
• Due to the nature of dictatorships, in which the various organizations of the
state vie for power, inter service rivalries precluded unity of command and
coordination of efforts even when it became imperative to save the Reich /
Empire.
On the Allied side of the equation, after much expenditure of blood certain
lessons learned became accepted practice. Specifics have been addressed in the
body of this paper. To list just a few general observations:
• In the realm of amphibious assaults there is no substitute for overwhelming
superiority on land, at sea and in the air at the point of attack. On an
island, against a well-entrenched enemy, there is no room for maneuver.
Opposition must be crushed and crushed quickly. That requires overwhelming
firepower.
• Combined Arms Support is critical to success. General bombardments are
generally ineffective however. Naval Gunfire Support (NGFS) and Close Air
Support (CAS) are most effective when directed by landing party personnel
against specific targets, i.e. – calls for fire.
• Momentum is everything. The speed of the American advance kept the Japanese
strategically off balance preventing them from fortifying their island bastions
as thoroughly as they desired and from coordinating Army, Navy and Air Force
efforts more effectively.
• Logistics is the key to momentum. Without the unsung heroes of the supply and
support ships [16] 5th Fleet would have been hamstrung presenting the Japanese
with time to devise an even more deadly defense of the Home Islands.
• For every evolution in the Navy there is a checklist. The inexperienced
deride this practice as inflexible or overcautious not realizing every item on
those lists was paid for in blood. Doctrine, training and experience
transformed the chaos of Torch into the controlled and sustained evolutions of
Normandy and Okinawa.
• Even in optimal situations Murphy's First Law of Combat (Anything that can go
wrong will go wrong) will intervene. Junior officers and junior NCO's must be
trained to take the initiative, to exercise what is termed SNAFU leadership.
Differences
Due to the shortage of aircraft carriers amphibious assaults in the European
Theatre of Operations were tied to land based air support. Fortunately the
geography of Europe favored this method of operation. Once ashore campaigns
were generally methodical in nature. Not until Patton's breakout from Normandy
and race across France did the American army move with celerity. Differences in
organization allowed the Army to become proficient in combined arms early on.
Strong points were masked and reduced with massed artillery and air power.
MacArthur's drive through the Southwest Pacific followed similar lines. Each of
his amphibious jumps was calculated based on the range of land-based air cover.
In the Central Pacific operations naturally depended upon carrier air power. A
strong Japanese Navy and Air Force early on and the threat of Kamikazes later
in the war demanded assaults be concluded as quickly as possible. This was in
keeping with the spirit of the Marine Corps as a light infantry force.
Proficiency at combined arms came more slowly to the Marines. The carnage at
Tarawa and the subsequent reorganization of Marine divisions sped up the
process. Maritime geography also mandated the development of LVTs and AMTRACs
to negotiate the barrier reefs that protected most of the Pacific islands.
Commanders in the ETO tended to forgo or abbreviate preliminary bombardments in
order to maintain the element of surprise. The Japanese endured massive sea and
air attacks. These increased in duration and total weight of shot as the
Pacific war continued. Neither tactic achieved the desired results.
Conclusion
American efforts during World War II were far from perfect. America suffered
its fair share of fools and inefficiencies. Overall however, thanks to its
tremendous industrial capacity the United States was able to bring irresistible
land, sea and air forces against the Axis powers at any point of its choosing.
The United States also possessed the intellectual flexibility to adapt its
amphibious doctrine to emergent problems and evolving situations. Finally
American workers possessed the mechanical ingenuity to find technical solutions
to the harsh conditions and constantly changing demands of war. No nation
however rich or alliance of nations however powerful could prevail in the face
of such capability. As J. F. C. Fuller noted the amphibious doctrine developed
in the Pacific was "the most far-reaching tactical innovation of the war."
Backed by the industrial might of the United States, American forces proved
unstoppable despite the best efforts of the Axis powers.
That capability was purchased with the blood of thousands, a price beyond
monetary value. Those who claim amphibious assaults have no place in modern
warfare would do well to remember that as recently as 1991 the threat of a sea
borne invasion from the Persian Gulf kept Saddam Hussein's elite Republican
Guard pinned in Kuwait and western Iraq while General Schwarzkopf enveloped
their right flank beginning the rout that was Desert Storm . The
ability to attack by land, sea or air is a tremendous force multiplier. Yet
now, due to budget constraints, Congress is considering a plan that would
reduce the American fleet to 260 ships, cut amphibious forces to seventeen
vessels and eliminate all mine warfare craft.
| * |
2006 |
2014 |
2019 |
2024 |
2035 |
| Carriers |
11 |
11 |
11 |
11 |
10 |
| Surface Combatants |
102 |
126 |
145 |
156 |
130 |
| SSN/SSGN |
58 |
57 |
53 |
49 |
41 |
| SSBN |
14 |
14 |
14 |
14 |
14 |
| Amphibious Ships |
35 |
32 |
31 |
31 |
17 |
| MPF |
0 |
5 |
17 |
19 |
19 |
| Mine Warfare |
17 |
14 |
10 |
1 |
0 |
| CLF |
34 |
30 |
32 |
25 |
24 |
| Support Ships |
18 |
16 |
10 |
8 |
5 |
[*Plan / table prepared by the Navy's Surface Warfare Division at the direction
of Deputy CNO Vice Admiral Joseph Sestak and submitted to Congress 23 March
2005.]
Granted today's ships and aircraft are far more lethal than their World War II
counterparts and LCACs and Helicopters greatly expand amphibious capabilities.
After reviewing the price paid in blood to build an amphibious force second to
none and considering the current state of world affairs however, is it prudent
to voluntarily surrender what Liddell Hart called "the greatest strategic asset
that a sea-based power possesses."
Footnotes
[1]. For the invasion of Guadalcanal Nimitz was able to scrape together a mere 82
ships. An armada of over 1300 ships converged on Okinawa.
[2]. When Germany invaded Poland in September 1939 the United States Army ranked
17th in the world – smaller and less capable than that of Romania. In spite of
the obvious warning signs little was done to change that embarrassing statistic
prior to 07 December 1941. As should be expected of a hurriedly raised and
hastily trained force, when the Allies invaded North Africa American
performance was inept. As Rick Atkinson writes in An Army at Dawn, "TORCH
revealed profound shortcomings in leadership, tactics, martial élan and common
sense. General Truscott concluded that the landings would have been a "disaster
against a well-armed enemy intent upon resistance." Only luck, valor and French
hesitation prevented the Americans from being thrown back into the Atlantic."
Fortunately the American army matured quickly.
[3]. Atkinson, An Army at Dawn, 83
[4]. Ibid, 139
[5]. Colonel-General Jurgen von Arnim relieved Nehring 08 December 1942.
Operating in concert with Rommel's retreating Afrika Korps, Axis forces delayed
the Allies for six months. Hitler ordered Rommel and several other favorites
out of Africa when the outcome became inevitable. The ignominy of surrender
fell to Arnim on 13 May 1943.
[6]. What Rommel might have achieved with these resources a year earlier is one
of the fascinating 'what ifs' of history. He must have cursed the high command
that poured troops into Africa now that it was too late.
[7]. Stephen E. Ambrose, D-Day June 6, 1944: The Climatic Battle of World War II,
63
[8]. Hedgehogs – star shaped, six-foot obstacles, constructed of steel girders
and topped with mines.
[9]. Belgian gates – large pieces of steel ten feet high set perpendicular to the
beach and topped with mines.
[10]. At Okinawa a British force joined the 5th Fleet. Task Force 57 under the
command of Admiral Sir Bernard Rawlings consisted of four carriers, two
battleships, five cruisers and fifteen destroyers. The armored flight decks of
the British carriers would provide a significant advantage in the upcoming air
battle.
[11]. Also called - Tetsu no ame / rain of steel, Tetsu no bofu / violent wind of
steel.
[12]. During TORCH communications were lost every time the main battery of the USS
Augusta fired. In the same manner radios were disabled onboard USS
Maryland during the assault on Tarawa negatively impacting
coordination of NGFS with landing party personnel.
[13]. Helicopters and Air Cushioned Landing Craft (LCACs) have opened 70 per cent
of the world's coastline to invasion making this form of defense even more
costly in terms of allocation of resources and therefore even less attractive.
[14]. For all their horror the Kamikazes were ultimately ineffective. 8000 planes
and pilots were sacrificed in return for 34 ships sunk, none larger than a
destroyer, and 368 ships damaged – not a good exchange ratio. These actions
also helped convince President Truman the atomic bomb was preferable to
invasion.
[15]. Germany came close to victory at Casablanca where its U-Boats wreaked havoc
on Admiral Hewitt's supporting vessels. Combined with a more vigorous air and
ground defense these naval actions might have been decisive. As General Patton
noted, "Had the landings been opposed by Germans we would have never gotten
ashore." The most complete and therefore most formidable Japanese defense came
at Guadalcanal. IGHQ reacted vigorously to the American landings with air
attacks launched from Rabaul and a series of naval engagements (Savo Island,
Eastern Solomons, Cape Esperance, Santa Cruz Island, Guadalcanal and
Tassafaronga). Thanks to a decided superiority in night operations the Japanese
inflicted several crushing defeats on Allied squadrons attempting to stop the
Tok |
Polish
Campaign
