Breakout From the Hedgerows:
A Lesson in Ingenuity
by Walter S. Zapotoczny
The defeat of Germany was still a long way off for the United States, British
and Canadian troops on July 1, 1944. The invading armies of the Western Allies
had crossed the English Channel and landed on the beaches of Normandy in
Northern France to strike at the heart of Germany and to end the war in Europe.
The cross-Channel attack, launched on D-Day, June 6, 1944, had accomplished the
first phase of the invasion by July 1, 1944. Ground troops had broken through
the German coastal defenses and had established a continental abutment for an
eventual bridge that was to carry men and supplies from the United Kingdom to
France. At the beginning of July, the Allies looked forward to executing the
second stage of the invasion, expanding their continental foothold to a size
that could support an assault on Germany. Before the Allies could launch their
definitive attack, they had to assemble enough men and material on the
Continent to assure success.[1] To expand their foothold, the Allied soldiers
had to overcome a tenacious enemy and a stubborn terrain.
Within a few days after the Allied invasion of Normandy, the U.S. Army found
itself facing a stubborn terrain that favored the defender. Units fought
desperately for hills, towns, and bridges that had become of strategic
importance. At every turn, the Americans faced the seasoned veterans of the Wehrmacht
(German Army). The effects of weather and the terrain of the French countryside
had a particularly strong influence on the conduct of operations. A significant
tactical dilemma facing the U.S. Army in Normandy was the local terrain, called
Bocage in French. Bocage refers to farmland separated by
thick coastal hedgerows. These hedgerows are denser, thicker, and higher in
Normandy than elsewhere along the French coast or in the British countryside on
the opposite side of the English Channel. From a military perspective, they
were ideal for defense, since they broke up the local terrain into small fields
edged by natural earthen obstacles. They provide real defense in depth,
extending dozens of miles beyond the coast. The Bocage undermined the
U.S. Army’s advantages in armor and firepower, and the hedgerows gave the
German defenders natural shelter from attack. [2]
The Bocage presented a substantial obstacle to tanks. While it was
possible for tanks to charge the hedgerows and push over the top, this exposed
their thin belly armor to German anti-tank weapons. Some hedges were so
entangled with foliage and small trees that a tank could become trapped if
attempting to push through, or could shed a track, effectively immobilizing it.
The whole area was drained by the Taute and Vire Rivers, which empty into the
English Channel near Carentan and Isigny, respectively. The marshlands are
flat, and the ground is soft and moist making travel by foot difficult, with
vehicle traffic being almost impossible. Heavy rains make the marshlands even
less trafficable, restricting movement to the few asphalt roads that traverse
the bogs. On the American right, the terrain was more favorable. Between the
marshes in the center of the sector and the coastline on the extreme right
flank, a group of hills rose up to dominate the northern end of the Cotentin
Peninsula. The most important terrain feature on the American right was the
city of Cherbourg with its extensive port facilities.
As American units advanced inland, they had to conduct attacks to dislodge
German units from the high terrain features on the rim of the plateau. Some of
the bitterest fighting of the Normandy campaign took place around Saint-Lo, as
American units confronted German units, such as the 2nd SS Panzer Division,
that held the high ground around the village. Several miles inland, the low
terrain throughout the First Army sector rose into a plateau with average
heights of 200 meters above sea level. The swamplands restricted all
cross-country maneuver, making the use and control of the road network a
necessity for offensive operations. The natural, uneven lay of the land in the
rest of the American sector made command and control of deployed combat forces
extremely difficult. Despite these natural obstacles, the most pervasive and
formidable barrier in the American sector was man-made.[3]
Of all the factors that influenced Allied operations in the summer of 1944,
none was more significant than the German Army's determination and defensive
abilities. Since June 6th, German soldiers had fought desperately to contain
the expanding Allied beachheads. Most were unaware of heated controversies
taking place in the German High Command over the best way to repel the Allied
invasion. The German commander in chief in Western Europe, Field Marshal Gerd
von Rundstedt, favored a mobile defense. Rundstedt disagreed with his most
trusted subordinate, Field Marshal Erwin Rommel. Rommel commanded Army Group B
and bore direct responsibility for the defense of the northern coastlines of
France. Rommel favored a strong forward defense that would defeat the Allied
invasion on the beaches. Adolf Hitler was aware of the disagreement between his
western commanders, but he failed to settle the dispute. Consequently, the
Germans adopted neither the forward nor the mobile defense concepts as a
distinct course of action.[4]
After D-Day, Rundstedt and Rommel cooperated in concentrating forces to
eliminate the Allied beachheads. They proposed to Hitler that the Germans fight
a series of defensive battles while assembling forces for a massive
counterattack. However, on June 25th, a major British attack near Caen forced
the Germans to commit all of their reserves. The Germans now found themselves
defending along a static line with few forces left to mount any large-scale
counterattacks. Both Rundstedt and Rommel's previous operational concepts for
the defense of Normandy were now irrelevant. On June 29th, Adolf Hitler himself
intervened and announced a new plan for the defense of France. The Fuhrer
believed that German forces had to prevent the Allies from gaining an
opportunity to conduct mobile warfare in the west. Before they could conduct a
blitz campaign, the Allies needed sufficient space to deploy their formations
and favorable terrain on which to maneuver. Hitler believed the best way to
prevent an Allied blitzkrieg was to contain the expansion of the British and
American beachheads. He ordered German forces to engage the Allies in a savage
battle of static warfare along a strong line that would capitalize on the
defensive characteristics of the Bocage . Hitler knew his units
occupied extremely favorable defensive positions, so he ordered the German Army
to stay and fight to the last in Normandy. The German Seventh Army, under the
command of General Paul Hausser, opposed the U.S. First Army. The German
Seventh Army consisted of three fresh infantry divisions, the remnants of four
more infantry divisions that had suffered heavy casualties during the early
fighting in Normandy, a parachute regiment, and three regimental-size combat
teams. The Germans lightly manned their forward defense line, keeping the bulk
of their combat troops in reserve. These reserves were grouped into
counterattack units and were supported by tanks and assault guns. Once the
German forward lines identified the main American assault, reserves would
counterattack the flanks and rear of the Americans. Well aware of the hedgerows
that favored their defensive efforts, the Germans coined their tactics bush
warfare.[5]
Landing in France on June 6th, the U.S. First Army under General Bradley
quickly consolidated its foothold on the Normandy beaches. Elements of VII
Corps seized Utah Beach, while units of V Corps assaulted Omaha Beach. Moving
to complete the first phase of Allied strategy by securing and expanding their
beachheads, the V and VII Corps began to push inland. By June 12th, the
Americans had captured Carentan and affected a linkup between the separate
beachheads. Meanwhile, combat units of XIX Corps arrived in France to reinforce
the U.S. effort.[6] Confident that the First Army had sufficient forces in
France to prevent the Germans from eliminating the beachheads, General Bradley
moved to implement the second phase of Allied strategy. On June 14th, VII Corps
launched an offensive to seize the badly needed port facilities at Cherbourg.
The offensive was successful, and Cherbourg fell on June 26th. While VII Corps
moved against Cherbourg, consuming the majority of available supplies, the
remainder of the First Army stood on the defensive warding off German attacks
and preparing for future operations.[7] By July 1st, with the American
beachheads secure, the First Army prepared to resume the offensive. The U.S.
Army was deployed along a wide area that stretched from Chaumont to the west
coast of the Cotentin Peninsula near La Haye-du-Puits. General Bradley's
mission was to continue the expansion of the area and to relieve German
pressure against the British by conducting a full offensive against the German
Seventh Army. Scheduled for July 1st, the attack was designed to push the
Germans out of Normandy and to open the way for American operations into
Brittany. For the attack, Bradley had available the equivalent of thirteen
divisions organized into four separate corps.[8]
The successful breakout of the low country would depend on the ability to
overcome the Bocage. The urgency of the situation resulted in the
development of improvised methods that allowed tanks to maneuver in the Bocage.
The first field-expedient solution to the mobility problem came from the 747th
Tank Battalion assigned to the 29th Infantry Division. The 747th was not
equipped with dozer tanks, so instead of trying to drive directly over the
hedgerows, someone suggested that demolitions be used to blow gaps in the
hedgerows. After experimentation, the tankers discovered that demolitions could
indeed breach the hedgerows. Two 24-pound explosive charges placed eight feet
apart and eighteen inches above ground level blew a sizable hole in a hedgerow.
On June 24th, engineer squads from the 29th Division's 121st Engineer Combat
Battalion emplaced demolition charges on hedgerows during a limited attack by
elements of the 747th Tank Battalion and the 115th Infantry. The attackers
discovered that the 24-pound charges did not always create a hole large enough
for the Sherman tanks. After the attack, the engineers decided to increase the
size of the explosive charges from twenty-four to fifty pounds. They hoped the
increased charges would consistently blow breaches large enough to accommodate
the attacking tanks.[9] Several problems resulted from increasing the size and
weight of the explosive charges. The commander of the 121st Engineer Combat
Battalion, Lieutenant Colonel Robert R. Ploger, conducted an informal study of
the logistics involved in supporting a tank attack with fifty-pound explosive
charges. Ploger assumed that in a typical attack, a tank company moving a
distance of one and one-half miles through the Bocage would encounter
thirty-four separate hedgerows. As a result, each tank company needed seventeen
tons of explosives. Demolitions were not readily available in such quantities,
and the problems involved in the transport and emplacement of enough explosives
seemed insurmountable. Apparently, other techniques were needed to breach the
hedgerows.[10] The engineers then suggested that the explosives be buried
within the hedgerow embankments. Burying the charges would greatly increase the
efficiency of the demolitions, allow the use of smaller charges, and alleviate
problems associated with availability, transport, and emplacement.
Unfortunately, other conditions prevented the burying of explosive charges.
Digging holes large and deep enough for the explosives in earthen embankments
covered with vines and filled with roots proved too laborious. During an
attack, digging holes and emplacing charges would simply take too long. Since
an attack could proceed only as fast as charges were emplaced and detonated,
slow moving American attacks would allow the Germans to coordinate their
hedgerow defense better. Engineers and infantrymen would also be dangerously
exposed to German mortar fire while planting demolitions. Though technically
feasible, burying explosives by hand was a procedure both too difficult and
tactically unwise.[11]
Determined to find a way to get through the hedgerows, the tankers and
engineers finally developed an effective technique for using explosives. In a
conference between officers of the 747th Tank Battalion and Lieutenant Colonel
Ploger, someone suggested that the tanks be equipped with a mechanical device
to gouge holes in the hedgerows for the explosives. After some experimentation,
the tankers finally equipped an M-4 Sherman with two pieces of commercial pipe,
each four feet long and six and one-half inches in diameter. The tankers welded
the pipes onto the front side of the Sherman's final drive assemblies and
reinforced the weld with angle irons. Sherman’s, equipped with the device,
simply rammed into a hedgerow embankment and then backed away leaving two
sizable holes for the explosives. Ploger's engineers also learned to pack the
demolitions into expended 105-mm artillery shell casings, thereby greatly
increasing the efficiency of the charges. The engineers found that two charges
of only fifteen pounds each could blow a gap large enough for a Sherman tank.
Placing explosives in shell casings also made the transport and handling of
charges much easier. The method proved so successful that the 747th outfitted
numerous tanks with the pipe devices.[12]
By late June, many units throughout the First Army had developed a variety of
means to breach the hedgerows. The 83rd Infantry Division in VII Corps used two
25-pound explosive charges. Engineers packed the explosives in a sandbag,
buried them by hand two feet into the hedgerow embankment, and then tamped the
hole full of dirt to increase the effectiveness of the charge. Other units
copied the techniques developed in the 29th Division. The 703rd Tank Battalion,
attached to the 4th Infantry Division in VII Corps, adopted the 747th's
hedgerow busting techniques and found them highly successful. In VIII Corps,
the 79th Infantry Division also developed another type of hedgerow cutter for
use on its Sherman tanks.[13] Soldiers of the 2nd Armored Division's 102nd
Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron invented the hedgerow device that gained the
widest publicity. During a discussion between some of the 102nd's officers and
enlisted men, someone suggested that they get saw teeth, put them on their
tanks, and cut through the hedgerows. Many of the troops laughed at the
suggestion, but Sergeant Curtis G. Culin took the idea to heart. Culin designed
and supervised the construction of a hedgerow-cutting device made from scrap
iron pulled from a German roadblock.
Testing showed that the device allowed a Sherman to cut easily through the
hedgerows. Because the hedgerow cutter's blades made a tank resemble a large
pachyderm with tusks, troops called the device a rhinoceros, and Sherman’s
equipped with Culin's invention became known as rhino tanks. [14]
Culin's device soon got the attention of the chain of command within 2nd
Armored Division and V Corps. On July 14th, General Bradley attended a
demonstration of Culin's hedgerow cutter. Bradley watched as Sherman’s mounting
the hedgerow device plowed through the hedgerows "as though they were
pasteboard, throwing the bushes and brush into the air." Very impressed by the
demonstration, Bradley ordered the chief of the First Army's Ordnance Section
to supervise the construction and installation of as many of the hedgerow
cutters as possible. The First Army Ordnance assembled welders and welding
equipment within the beachhead and from the rear areas in England to assist
with the project. Welding teams used scrap metal from German beach obstacles to
construct most of the hedgerow cutters. In a remarkable effort from 14th to the
25th of July, the First Army Ordnance Section produced over 500 hedgerow
cutters and distributed them to subordinate commands for installation. By late
July sixty percent of the First Army's Sherman’s mounted the hedgerow-cutting
devices. Though the most famous of the hedgerow-reducing devices, Culin's
rhinoceros was only one of many such contrivances invented and employed
throughout the First Army. [15]
With the problems of armored mobility largely solved, infantry commanders
finally realized that firepower from their supporting M-4 Sherman’s could place
heavy suppressive fires on the Germans, thus allowing their units a chance to
maneuver. Properly employed, the machine guns of an M-4 Sherman delivered the
direct fire needed to suppress German machine guns, while a Sherman's main gun,
used at point-blank range, substituted for indirect artillery fire. As tanks
suppressed the German defenders, infantry units could clear out the hedgerows
and maneuver to assault the main German defensive positions. Infantry could
also provide tanks with protection against German close assaults. Throughout
the First Army, units worked to develop new combined arms tactics. Commanders
at all levels began to experiment with methods that permitted infantry and
tanks to work closely together. Units trained and conducted rehearsals in rear
areas before trying new tactics in combat. The result was the implementation by
the First Army units of several methods that allowed the combined arms team to
overcome the enemy. Frustrated by their failures in the hedgerows, leaders
within the 29th Division realized they had to find ways to defeat the Germans.
The division commander, General Gerhardt directed the assistant division
commander, Brigadier General Norman D. Cota, to supervise the development and
implementation of tactics to overcome the German method of hedgerow defense.
The tactics developed by the 29th Division were a departure from normal Army
doctrine in that neither the tanks nor the infantry led the attack but fought
closely together and protected one another while closing with the enemy.[16]
On July 11th, XIX Corps attacked southward toward Saint-Lo as part of a First
Army offensive to push the German Seventh Army out of Normandy. The attack
started at 0600 on July 11th after a furious twenty-minute preparatory
bombardment by five battalions of artillery. Initial progress was slow and
discouraging. The 2nd Battalion advanced with two companies abreast and
encountered determined resistance from enemy positions in the first hedgerows.
The tank-infantry-engineer teams, however, continued to push forward, and by
1100 they finally broke through the organized German defense, which eased and
then collapsed. The 2nd Battalion then made rapid progress, seized the
ridgeline to its front, wheeled to the right, and continued to move. Before
nightfall, the 2nd Battalion advanced another mile toward Martinville and was
in an excellent position to continue the attack toward Saint-Lo.[17]
In late June the 3rd Armored Division devised hedgerow tactics that emphasized
coordinated, combined efforts by tanks and infantry. Mobility and firepower
were the key elements in the tactical formula. Like other units in the First
Army, the 3rd Armored Division discovered that dozer tanks and engineer teams
with demolitions could breach the most formidable hedgerows. Tank platoons
operating with infantry squads and supported by artillery and mortar fire were
expected to deliver enough direct firepower to root out the most determined
defenders.[18] Unlike infantry divisions that developed hedgerow tactics for
single tanks and infantry squads, the 3rd Armored Division devised a method of
assault based on the coordinated action of a tank company and an infantry
company. Units attacked on a front usually three fields wide and always
assaulted the center field last. The attack began as engineer teams or dozer
tanks gapped the first hedgerow and indirect fire fell on and behind the
forward German positions. An entire tank platoon then attacked with one section
moving forward along each hedgerow paralleling the axis of advance. The Sherman
tanks put main-gun fire into the hedgerow to their front and sprayed the side
hedgerows with heavy machine-gun fire. During the early phase of the assault,
the tanks moved slowly enough so that supporting infantry could move with them
and provide local security. The tanks also tried to protect themselves against
German close infantry assaults by always staying at least twenty yards away
from the nearest hedgerow. After reaching the main German defensive position,
the tanks turned inward and worked their way toward the center of the field,
covering the hedgerows with heavy machine-gun fire. Together, the tanks and
infantry cleared the German defensive position and then prepared to continue
the attack.[19]
The 2nd Armored Division also developed special tactics for use in the
hedgerows, but its techniques differed radically from those developed by other
divisions within the First Army. In mid July 2nd Armored Division began to
prepare for its role in Operation Cobra, the First Army's offensive designed to
rupture the defenses of the German Seventh Army and precipitate a major
breakout into the Brittany peninsula and the interior of France. In the Cobra
plan, the First Army assigned a rapid exploitation mission to the 2nd Armored
Division. The tactical challenge facing the 2nd Armored was to develop
techniques that allowed infantry and armor to work closely together during
high-speed maneuvers through the Bocage . By July 25th, Combat Command
A of the 2nd Armored and the 22nd Infantry had developed a novel way for tanks
and infantry to cooperate during fast-moving operations. The infantry rode on
the back decks of tanks and only dismounted when the attack met stiff enemy
resistance. The overall tactical plan developed by Combat Command A and the
22nd Infantry called for units to attack in three assault waves. The first
echelon consisted solely of tanks and relied on its own mobility and firepower,
along with supporting artillery, to eliminate enemy positions. A second wave of
tanks and infantry closely followed the lead elements. Eight infantrymen rode
on the back deck of each Sherman in the second wave. The infantry had two main
purposes. They provided tanks in the second wave with local security, and
whenever the tanks in the first wave encountered stiff resistance, the infantry
dismounted and worked with the lead tanks to conduct a coordinated combined
arms attack. The third echelon also consisted of tanks and infantry and had the
mission of eliminating positions bypassed or not detected by the leading
elements.[20]
Between the 19th and the 25th of July, the 22nd Infantry and Combat Command A's
66th Armored Regiment conducted mock attacks and rehearsals in preparation for
Operation Cobra. Tankers conducted classes on the proper distribution of
main-gun and machine-gun fire and the correct way to use the rhinoceros hedge
cutters mounted on 75 percent of the 66th's tanks. Platoons from the 22nd
Infantry constantly practiced tank-infantry coordination with the 66th Armored.
Infantry units learned how best to mount, dismount, and ride on tanks and
taught their soldiers how to use the new external telephones mounted on most of
Combat Command A's tanks. Infantrymen also found ways to camouflage themselves
with vegetation while riding on the Sherman’s. Leaders generally found that
infantrymen easily adapted to the new tasks involved in working with armor.[21]
On the morning of July 26th, the day after the saturation bombing that marked
the opening of the Operation Cobra offensive, Combat Command A, applying some
of its new techniques, conducted a forward passage of lines through the 30th
Infantry Division and attacked southward. Their mission was to seize high
ground in the vicinity of Hill 193 and le Mesnil-Herman and then establish
defensive positions to repel German counterattacks aimed at American follow-on
forces. Combat Command A's attack was the type of action most preferred by
American commanders, a highly fluid situation in which mobile forces overran or
bypassed enemy resistance. As a result of their new tactics and an intensive
pre battle-training period, Combat Command A and the 22nd Infantry made
spectacular gains during the attack. The combined arms team worked closely
together. Artillery observers rode in the lead tanks and brought accurate,
indirect fire down on the enemy. Infantry battalion commanders rode in command
tanks with man pack radios to better coordinate tankers and riflemen. The
commander of the 22nd Infantry reported that his soldiers were enthusiastic
about riding the tanks. The infantry found that riding on tanks gave them
several advantages. The height of the tanks put the riflemen above grazing fire
and gave them better observation. Riding on tanks that moved at irregular
speeds also made the infantry more difficult targets. In two days, Combat
Command A penetrated more than six miles into the German Seventh Army's sector.
Cobra's preparatory bombardment, sporadic German resistance, and the
coordination and swift execution of Combat Command A's attack resulted in light
casualties for the Americans. By nightfall of July 27th, the infantry and tanks
were on the objective, having lost only 3 tanks and less than 200 men.[22]
Since landing in France, the First Army had devised numerous technical and
tactical solutions for the conduct of battles against the German Army. The
greatest transformation took place in combat units where tankers, infantrymen,
engineers, and artillery forward observers became close knit partners in a
coordinated effort. In the pre-invasion period, tankers probably could not have
visualized the hedge cutters and back-deck telephones that were to be on most
of their tanks by the opening of the Cobra offensive. Nor could commanders have
imagined the tactical combinations that had to be developed for combat in the Bocage.
By the end of July, the First Army routinely used a large number of combat
techniques and procedures that were unheard of in the pre-invasion period.
Ideas on how to achieve better results against the Germans came from a wide
variety of sources. In general, ideas flowed upward from the men actually
engaged in battle and were then either approved or rejected by higher
commanders. Within the bottom ranks of the Army, individual soldiers suggested
ways that enabled their units to move against the enemy. Sergeant Culin's
hedgerow cutter is the best example of a single soldier's idea that influenced
all of the First Army. At the top end of the chain of command, general officers
also produced ideas on how to defeat the Germans. General Cota's supervision of
the development of hedgerow tactics in the 29th Division typifies the
contributions made by general officers. The effort to gather ideas on how to
beat the Germans was decentralized. There was almost no effort to work out an
Army wide solution to the tactical problems of combat in the Bocage .
The First Army staff made no distinct attempt to devise tactical solutions for
the whole command to use in overcoming the German defenses. The First Army did
publish and distribute to all units a series of Battle Experiences, reports
that contained information and lessons learned in battle. The bulletins were
not directive in nature, but subordinate commanders were expected to use the
information to assist them in finding ways to defeat the Germans. In fact, in
only one area did the First Army headquarters take an active role in dealing
with tactical problems, the production and distribution of Sergeant Culin's
hedgerow cutter.[23]
More than anything else, the Normandy campaign is an excellent example of how
the U.S. Army adapted itself to unforeseen circumstances and a hostile
environment. Individual soldier initiative and injunity were welcomed and
fostered. American operations in the Bocage prove that a successful
army must have the ability to change and adapt under fire in order to develop
correct methods for overcoming the enemy. In this respect, the First Army
performed well in Normandy and laid the foundation for operations that
eventually carried U.S. armies beyond the Rhine River and to victory.
Show Footnotes and
Bibliography
Footnotes
[1]. Martin Blumenson. Breakout and Pursuit . (Center of Military
History. Washington, DC, 1961) p. 3.
[2]. Ibid.
[3]. United States Forces European Theater, Reports, Study No. 50 ,
"Organization, Equipment, and Tactical Employment of Separate Tank Battalions”
(U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 1945) pp. 6-7.
[4]. Ibid.
[5]. Ibid.
[6]. Ibid.
[7]. Gordon A. Harrison, Cross-Channel Attack , United States Army in
World War II (Office of the Chief of Military History, U.S. Army, Washington,
DC, 1950) pp. 381-84.
[8]. Ibid.
[9]. Major Forrest W. Creamer. Operations of the XIX U.S. Army Corps in
Normandy . Armor School Library Report 42-8 (Advanced Officers' Class
no. 1, U.S. Army Armor School, Fort Knox, Kentucky, 1947) p. 31.
[10]. Ibid.
[11]. Ibid.
[12]. Ibid.
[13]. Blumenson. pp. 58-69.
[14]. Ibid.
[15]. Ibid.
[16]. Steve Zaloga. Normandy Legends . (Osprey Publishing, Military
History Books. Oxford, UK, 2005) ( http://www.ospreypublishing.com/content1.php/cid=169).
[17]. Ibid.
[18]. Ibid.
[19]. Ibid.
[20]. Blumenson. pp. 205-246.
[21]. Ibid.
[22]. Ibid.
[23]. Ibid.
Bibliography
Blumenson, Martin. Breakout and Pursuit . Washington, DC: Center of
Military History, 1961.
Creamer, Forrest W., MAJ. Operations of the XIX U.S. Army Corps in Normandy
. Armor School Library. Report 42-8. Advanced Officers' Fort Knox, Kentucky,
Class No. 1. Fort Knox, KY: U.S. Army Armor School, 1947.
Harrison, Gordon A. Cross-Channel Attack , United States Army in World
War II. Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, U.S. Army,
1950.
United States Forces European Theater, Reports, Study No. 50 ,
"Organization, Equipment, and Tactical Employment of Separate Tank Battalions,”
Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army Military History Institute, 1945.
Zaloga, Steve. Normandy Legends . Military History Books. Oxford, UK:
Osprey Publishing, 2005.
(http://www.ospreypublishing.com/content1.php/cid=169).
Copyright © 2005 Walter S. Zapotoczny.
Written by Walter S. Zapotoczny. If you have questions or comments on this
article, please contact Walter Zapotoczny at:
 wzap@yahoo.com.
To read more from the author, go to his web site at http://www.wzaponline.com.
About the Author:
Walter lives in Pennsylvania. He is pursuing his masters degree in history and
writes articles for numerous publications. He is currently writing an historical
fiction novel about the Einsatzgruppen (a task force of mobile killing units
that operated in German-occupied territories during World War II).
Published online: 08/22/2005.
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