Raids, Road
Watches, and Reconnaissance: New Zealand's involvement in the Long Range Desert
Group in North Africa, 1940-1943
by Clive Gower-Collins
Road Watches: Non vi sed arte [Not by strength, by guile] [1]
General Wavell recognized the dangerously impoverished state of Britain's
intelligence resources early in the Desert War and made certain that the chief
role of the LRDG was deep reconnaissance.[2] A former British Intelligence
Officer claims that
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The development of effective wartime intelligence takes time, but gets a
particular impetus from defeat in the early years of the war; military men need
a sharp shock to overcome their lack of intelligence interest and competence.
The Allies' disasters in the early stages of the Second World War were more
potent intelligence teachers than success was to the Axis.[3]
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Efforts to expand British intelligence assets did not end with the formation of
the LRDG and a series of Commanders-in-Chief did much to make sure that
intelligence derived from LRDG activity was rapidly complemented by material
from such other sources as prisoners-of-war and signals intelligence (SIGINT).
Until at least the end of 1941, the LRDG was uncontested in its position as the
Middle Eastern Command's foremost provider of reliable tactical
intelligence.[4] Even in the period 1942 onward, LRDG surveillance reports
provided vital corroboration of intelligence acquired from other sources.
In the main, the LRDG contributed two types of information to the intelligence
'pool'; surveillance reports and topographical information. All LRDG reports
commented on the 'going', the state of the terrain the patrol had encountered
and its suitability for various types and volumes of traffic. This
topographical information was summarized by the unit's Intelligence Officer and
passed to GHQ – Middle East, often forming the principal basis of commanders'
plans for lines of advance, retreat, or re-supply.[5] LRDG surveillance reports
were carried out by concealed observation posts known as 'road watches'. This
duty was both the most tedious and among the most valuable of the LRDG's many
services.[6] It owed its existence to the fact that any enemy units or materiel
traveling to and from the front were bound for geographical or logistical
reasons to use the Coast Road, a single tar-seal ribbon extending from Tripoli
to Cyrenaica.[7] Patrols would maintain the road watch for up to a fortnight
before another patrol arrived to take over. By keeping three patrols assigned
to a site, a watch on the ebb and flow of Axis forces on the Coast Road was
sustained for months at a time.[8] The value of road watch information was
confirmed by Intelligence Branch at GHQ – Middle East, which stressed that the
information "was especially useful because the watch was continuous, and so
enabled periods of activity and inactivity to be appreciated".[9]
The practice required the patrols to infiltrate hundreds of kilometers behind
enemy lines unobserved, and then, under the cover of darkness, to take up the
closest position to the road that would afford them sufficient concealment in
daylight. Before dawn, two patrol members would conceal themselves within
300-400 meters of the roadway. These two would remain in position until
evening, when they would be relieved by two of their comrades, who would be
relieved in turn shortly before dawn.[10] Each pair carried enemy tank and
vehicle recognition guides, notebooks and powerful binoculars. They were
expected to record accurately details of every tank, vehicle and gun that
passed. The men also had to determine the nationality of these things, and
additional details such as whether they carried troops or stores, even the fine
points of uniform embellishments so that the Intelligence staff in Cairo could
identify the exact units on the move. This information was then coded and sent
by radio to the Group HQ every twenty-four hours.[11]
The usual desert discomforts of blown sand and extremes of temperature
aggravated the task.[12] In order to remain undetected on the daylight shift,
the men could neither move around nor stand until night fell. The necessity to
be within a few meters of the road at night at least gave the night crew an
excuse to move around, and they needed to in order to keep warm. The monotony
for both the watchers and their comrades waiting at the vehicles was
astonishing. In the words of one patrol member: "You look at your watch at 11,
and look again four hours later and it's 11:15."[13] The perpetual threat of
aerial detection meant that even around the camouflaged vehicles movement had
to be kept to a minimum, with men restricted to listening to the radio,
reading, and swatting the interminable flies.[14] Lloyd Owen later recalled:
"We hated it so much because we disliked being pinned down on a sedentary job
when we knew other patrols were doing something far more exciting."[15] The
boredom weighed more heavily on some men than others. Lloyd Owen remembers
Bagnold suggesting that "the New Zealanders were more dashing in aggressive
operations and a little restive in those that required more patient
qualities".[16]
Despite precautions, the risk of discovery was constant, and not always
occasioned by ground or air patrols. Enemy vehicle convoys turned off the
highway from time to time, looking for an overnight campsite or place to break
for a meal. On occasions they halted a short distance from the watchers, who
were unable to withdraw until nightfall. Wandering local people, apparently
more attuned to the presence of strangers, at times attempted to engage
watchers in conversation before moving on, leaving the patrol members to wonder
whether they would be reported to their enemy. In one instance, a school bus
pulled up near the watchers and discharged its passengers, who started playing
a game similar to baseball.[17]
The 8th Army's staff caused a problem for the LRDG by issuing concurrent orders
for road watches on the Tripoli-Benghazi stretch of the Coast Road, and
'beat-ups' of the Coast Road traffic by Stirling's SAS. These orders increased
the likelihood of concealed patrols being flushed out in the enemy's efforts to
track down fleeing raiders.[18] Like the LRDG, the SAS had been rewarded for
their successes by increased size and support. It did not take long before the
enlarged scale of SAS operations began to impinge on the LRDG's more subtle
tasks. In an effort to manage the situation, GHQ – Middle East issued an
Operation Instruction that: "LRDG should carry out the Long Range
reconnaissance tasks, and the SAS the shorter range attacks on enemy
communications and aerodromes . . . it was left open for the LRDG to make
similar attacks on long range targets."[19] The boundary was set at Long. 20?
E, which effectively entailed the LRDG working all desert tasks west of the
line, and the SAS undertaking all work to its east.[20] The arrangement did not
entirely solve the problem. Despite strenuous efforts on the part of LRDG
commanders to get the message through at GHQ meetings, the patrols were still
unable on occasion to establish road watches due to aggressive enemy patrolling
resulting from an earlier SAS 'beat-up' of the area.[21] Lloyd Owen recalls
that
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We had some difficulty some times in keeping Stirling's marauders away from our
much more sophisticated operations of gaining information. It would be fair to
say that much as we admired the tremendous success of Stirling and Paddy Mayne
[2IC SAS] and assisted them very successfully, we sometimes wished they were
not always in such a hurry and, through lack of organisation, so dependent on
our goodwill and expertise.[22]
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Nevertheless, the patrols were generally highly successful in remaining
undetected in enemy-held country. Partly for this reason, they became the
delivery method of choice for most personnel going into the desert with a
clandestine purpose, Arabs and Allied servicemen alike. The range of passengers
'taxied' in both directions by the LRDG was surprising, extending from officers
of various intelligence organisations and Arab irregulars conducting
reconnaissance, to escaped prisoners-of-war (POW). On more than one occasion,
aircrew able to report their position before baling-out or making a forced
landing were picked up by patrols.[23] Following Axis advances, troops cut off
would often find shelter among the local Arab population, regularly finding
their way into the hands of organisations that could assist them to escape,[24]
and signal to Cairo to arrange for their collection. On one such occasion, a
Guards patrol under Alastair Timpson was ordered to make a pick up and a few
days later his four trucks staggered into Siwa Oasis under the weight of
forty-seven passengers. They included six British soldiers, eleven members of
the Libyan Arab Force, the Mudir of Slonta, his two wives and child, their
chickens, and the ubiquitous goat.[25] The patrols commitment to ferrying the
SAS declined when the latter acquired improved desert skills and its own
desert-worthy vehicles.
Ample evidence attests to the value of the road watch reports for the staff at
GHQ - Middle East.[26] However, any deeper analysis of the significance of LRDG
surveillance activity for theatre operations requires a measurement of the
degree of success, and in speaking of intelligence activities, 'success' is
primarily a relational term. Judgments which perceive intelligence assets in
terms of those which 'delivered', against those which 'failed to deliver', miss
the point that intelligence producing sufficient certainty to dispel the "fog
of war",[27] often does so because of a congruence of time and location
favoring a particular collection method, rather than some permanent advantage
that inheres in its use. It is in the light of this idea that the LRDG enjoyed
substantial success relative to the other assets available to the Allied
commanders. It is hardly surprising that the results of LRDG surveillance were
so well thought of early in the Desert War, given the high degree of
reliability in its reports, and the general lack of effective
intelligence-collection competition. That it continued to play an important
role throughout the campaign despite the rise in availability and effectiveness
of other collection methods requires explanation.
The other major providers of information in the theatre were POWs, aerial
photo-reconnaissance, and sigint. Following early British successes, the number
of POWs available for interrogation increased significantly. POWs and, in some
cases, local civilians in areas newly captured from the enemy can prove a
sizeable source of information, but have a number of drawbacks.[28] Firstly,
military personnel rarely possess valuable information other than that directly
relating to their position. Secondly, the information may be simply erroneous,
or in some rarer cases, deliberately false. The outcome, Herman suggests, is
that at best they "contribute pieces of the intelligence jigsaw, rather than
highlights".[29] In contrast to the civilian informants, the LRDG patrol
members were skilled observers and unlike the servicemen, they were not subject
to the pressures acting upon a POW.[30]
Throughout the war aerial photo-reconnaissance played a consistent role as an
intelligence collection method. From somewhat humble beginnings in World War I,
significant advances in aerial photography and subsequent interpretation of the
results gave it the means to deliver generally satisfactory results and the
occasional bounty by the time of the Second World War.[31] However, a number of
serious limitations attended its use. The first was meteorological; the weather
simply had to be clear enough to produce usable results. The analysis of the
images then depended heavily upon the capabilities of human operators, who,
despite intensive technical training,[32] found that "what one could see in a
photograph was often a matter of subjective interpretation".[33] Coupled to
this was the limitation imposed by the simple fact that something must be
physically present in order to register in the photograph, the information
could seldom indicate enemy intentions. Furthermore, the cunning use of
camouflage and deception techniques could impose serious restrictions upon
photo-reconnaissance's usefulness.[34] These constraints give the lie to
Bennett's description of photo-reconnaissance evidence as "factually
incontestable".[35] Lastly, in order to observe changes in a given location the
site must be revisited,[36] which entails the risk of the aircraft being
brought down and of alerting the enemy to the precise intelligence objectives
of the mission, thus enabling them to introduce counter-measures or deceptions.
SIGINT has become the twentieth century's richest intelligence collection
source.[37] The term sigint includes the interception of messages on hard-line
based communication, such as telephone and telegram, and, radio
direction-finding, signal interception and the cryptanalysis of enciphered or
coded messages. The speed of radio-based SIGINT's development was remarkable
between the World Wars. Extensive resources were placed in the hands of Allied
specialists working on the interception, decryption and interpretation of enemy
material. The programme which delivered intelligence derived in this way was
named ULTRA.[38] At the heart of ULTRA was a copy of a German enciphering
machine called Enigma. The refinement of a Dutch prototype, Enigma was offered
to the commercial market in the 1920s without success by German engineer,
Arthur Scherbius.[39] However, in 1926 the Kriegsmarine began using the
machine, followed by the German Army three years later.[40] This was consistent
with a movement toward automated enciphering machines by many countries
including Britain, France, Italy and the United States, all of which
immediately complicated the mechanisms and procedures to heighten security, and
began working on methods of decrypting other nations' machine-based ciphers. At
the forefront of attempts to break enciphered traffic were the Poles, who, in
collaboration with the French, managed to read German signals produced on
Enigma machines by the early 1930s.[41] With the advent of war, the Poles
passed all their information and equipment over to the British and the French.
Although German changes to the machines and ciphers set the Allied projects
back for some time, the work of the Polish mathematicians was central to later
Allied decryption successes.[42]
Given the remarkable strategic advantage attributed to ULTRA,[43] the
reluctance of some British commanders to accept and act upon uncorroborated
intelligence derived in this requires explanation. The commanders' reluctance
may be viewed partly as a response to incessant pressure from Winston Churchill
for action that they often considered rash and ill-advised.[44] The seriousness
of the problem is indicated by Mckee's suggestion that: "ULTRA together with
Churchill's impulsive reading of it, played a large part in the continual
British defeats in the desert".[45] This problem arose from Churchill's
insistence on seeing decrypted messages 'in the raw'. Although the Joint
Intelligence Committee held the responsibility for providing considered advice
on matters of intelligence,[46] Churchill remembered, "I had not been content
with this form of collective wisdom, and preferred to see the originals
myself".[47] On 5 August 1940, Churchill wrote to General 'Pug' Ismay:
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I do not wish such reports as are received to be sifted and digested by the
various Intelligence authorities. For the present Major Morton [a member of
Churchill's personal staff] will inspect them for me and submit what he
considers of major importance. He is to be shown everything, and submit
authentic documents to me in their original form.[48]
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Betts draws attention to this phenomenon and offers the explanation that
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Principals tend to believe that they have a wider point of view than
middle-level analysts and are better able to draw conclusions from raw data.
That point of view underlies their fascination with current intelligence and
their impatience with the reflective interpretations in 'finished'
intelligence.[49]
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Added to this in Churchill's case was a personal impatience Churchill himself
admitted, "I am certainly not one of those who need to be prodded . . . In
fact, if anything, I am a prod . . . my difficulties lie rather in finding the
patience and self-restraint to wait through many anxious weeks for the results
[of military operations] to be achieved."[50] Whilst it was certainly
particularly characteristic of warfare in the Second World War (and since) that
analysis could be outpaced by events, Churchill's demands, tinged as they were
with impetuosity, would not have endeared him to his commanders.[51] Commanders
were logically bound to question the basis of Churchill's insistence (ULTRA) if
they were to argue for alternative courses of action.
There were, however, additional reasons for their apparent unwillingness to
place their faith in ULTRA decrypts. Hinsley's description of sigint as "always
incontestable" echoes Churchill's over-confidence in 'special' sources.[52]
Yet, like any source, ULTRA demanded corroboration.[53] There was never any
certainty that the Axis had not discovered the Allied penetration of their
encryption system and were using the breach to pass misleading information.[54]
Moreover, on occasion the information was simply wrong. The commander of the
United States Ninth Tactical Air Command, General Elwood Quesada, later
recalled, "we went on many wild goose chases as a result of ULTRA . . . [it]
was a very fine tool that also had its drawbacks."[55] In the earlier part of
the war, ULTRA's shortcomings were accounted for in a variety of ways.
Calvocoressi recalled that the decrypts tended to be "scrappy and puzzling",
and that not much of the material coming into Allied hands was clearly
understood.[56] Its very 'newness' contributed to this as intelligence
databases against which the material might be compared were non-existent. The
intercepted material frequently merely alluded to previous signals on the
subject matter and often constituted "a random sample of the complete
exchanges".[57] As the ability of the Allies to decrypt German Army messages
improved, an altogether different problem came to light, based on the Allied
assumption that the Germans were telling the truth.[58] It is a truism of the
military everywhere that in making requests for manpower or materiel, one will
only ever receive a fraction of what is asked for. Rommel knew this as well as
any soldier did. For this reason he tended to exaggerate his material
deficiencies to strengthen his demands for further equipment and troops.[59]
The differences in intelligence appreciation this could cause are typified by
an occasion on which Whitehall inaccurately insisted that Rommel's armored
formations were in such a parlous condition that he was in no position to repel
an offensive (even a hastily prepared one), and Cairo's counter-claim that the
reverse was the case. Cairo's conclusion was partially based upon reports from
LRDG patrols which had actually counted tanks, rather than estimated them. A
further difficulty was that commanders seemed rapidly to reach a point where
they tended to exaggerate the precariousness of their own situation in order to
deny Whitehall's demands for immediate half-baked offensives.[60] Evidence that
sigint was not "incontestable" was provided by Rommel's resounding defeat of
Allied forces at Kasserine Pass. In this engagement Allied losses included 10
000 men (6 500 American), 183 tanks, 208 artillery pieces, 500 assorted
vehicles and tons of ammunition and supplies.[61] This came about because after
issuing his original battle directives, which were duly intercepted and
interpreted by the Allies, Rommel changed his mind and issued new orders of
which the Allies were unaware.[62]
There were also difficulties caused by over-supply of information. It is
certainly the role of intelligence collection methods to help move towards
sufficient certainty to support decision-making, and as Betts suggests,
"uncertainty reflects inadequacy of data, which is usually assumed to mean a
lack of information", however, "ambiguity can also be aggravated by an excess
of data."[63] Hinsley describes the situation in the Middle East in 1941 where
the cipher office "was so completely swamped by the amount of intercepts being
transmitted . . . that a million groups of undeciphered backlog had to be
destroyed in January 1942."[64] This is hard to reconcile with SIGINT
supporters' belief in its "immediacy, the ability to read messages almost as
quickly as the legitimate recipients".[65] German Naval historian Jürgen Rohwer
cautions historians against believing that messages were decrypted and analyzed
this promptly. He points out that there were often delays, "sometimes of days,
between interception and the solution, which meant that often those solutions
were practically useless to the commands."[66]
Finally, there was a problem with the 'fragility' of ULTRA.[67] The need to
exercise extreme care with the intelligence gained this way often led to
situations where to respond to the information appropriately would have given
the Germans cause to question the security of their system.[68] The high volume
of Axis shipping losses in the Mediterranean did in fact cause an investigation
that, fortunately for the Allies, concluded that security had been
maintained.[69] Field Marshal Montgomery's tendency to boast was a constant
cause for concern. More than once alarm ran through Whitehall following his
inclusion in speeches to his troops of information gained through ULTRA,
instigating changes to the handling of decrypts and admonishments over
security.[70]
ULTRA was of significance, and made an increasingly valuable contribution after
1943.[71] For the period under study, however, the above problems contributed
to commanders' reservations about proceeding on single-source information. The
surveillance information supplied by the LRDG was therefore invaluable, not
merely in itself, but also because it allowed the best possible use to be made
of other sources by providing the necessary degree of corroboration.[72]
Non-fragile and embodying security and continuity, the intelligence derived
from LRDG activities was indispensable until the close of the African campaign.
Show Footnotes
[1]. Unofficial motto of the Long Range patrol, attributed to the LRP's first
medical officer, New Zealander, Dr Frank Edmondson. Note: This spelling is
taken from, Long Range Desert Group (LRDG), Original Long Range Patrol: Nominal
Roll as at 5 December 1940, Abbassia (Egypt). NZ National Archives:
WAII, DA 304.1/15/12. The official records carry at least three variations on
the spelling of this name which are then repeated across the range of secondary
sources. B. Jenner, and D. List, The Long Range Desert Group , London:
Osprey Publishing Ltd., 1983, p.3.
[2]. R. A. Bagnold, Notes on Long Range Desert Patrols for operations in the
Interior of LIBYA , Cairo: Long Range Desert Group, 11 February 1941.
NZ National Archives: WAII, 1, DA304.1/10/1.
[3]. M. Herman, Intelligence Power in Peace and War , Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1997, p.151.
[4]. R. Bennett, Behind the Battle: Intelligence in the War with Germany,
1939-1945 , London: Pimlico, 1999, p.xviii.
[5]. David Lloyd Owen, The Desert My Dwelling Place , London: Cassell
& Co. Ltd., 1957, p.162.
[6]. David Lloyd Owen, Providence Their Guide: The Long Range Desert Group,
1940-45 , London: George G. Harrap & Co. Ltd., 1980, pp. 86-87.
[7]. William Boyd Kennedy Shaw, Long Range Desert Group: The Story of its Work
in Libya, 1940-1943 , London: Collins, 1945, p.210.
[8]. One patrol traveling homeward, one on site, and one en route to relieve
it.
[9]. G. L. Prendergast, Phase Reports, (7), 29 June – 11 September 1942, P.1.
[10]. Shaw, Long Range Desert Group: The Story of its Work in Libya, 1940-1943
, p.209.
[11]. Lloyd Owen, Providence Their Guide, p.86. In the official
British history of World War II Intelligence, Hinsley makes the bizarre
statement that the LRDG was "not allowed to take W/T transmitters with it on
its operations." F.H. Hinsley, British Intelligence in the Second World War:
Its Influence on Strategy and Operations, vol. I , London: Her
Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1979, p.379.
[12]. Gal and Mangelsdorff explain the effects on the watchers of their
environment: "Heat affects performance of different types of tasks to varying
degrees. Since heat has a cumulative blunting effect, continuous tasks of low
demand, tasks with relatively low arousal value and those of a boring and
repetitive nature tend to be affected most (e.g. vigilance, low-activity sentry
or surveillance duty, routine watchkeeping etc.). R. Gal, & A.D.
Mangelsdorff, (eds.), Handbook of Military Psychology , Chichester:
John Wiley and Sons Ltd., 1991, p.224.
[13]. Quoted in: Shaw, Long Range Desert Group: The Story of its Work in Libya,
1940-1943 , p.210.
[14]. David Lloyd Owen, Providence Their Guide , p.86.
[15]. David Lloyd Owen, Providence Their Guide , p.86.
[16]. David Lloyd Owen, Providence Their Guide , p.59.
[17]. G. L. Prendergast, Phase Reports, [giving an account of the part
played by the LRDG in the operations of the 8th Army, November 1941- March
1943], (4), 6 February – 18 April 1942 , p.2.
[18]. G. L. Prendergast, Phase Reports, (5), 19 April – 26 May 1942
, p5.
[19]. G. L. Prendergast, Phase Reports, (9), 24 October – 23 January
1943 , p.1.
[20]. Shaw, Long Range Desert Group: The Story of its Work in Libya, 1940-1943
, p.221.
[21]. G. L. Prendergast, Phase Reports, (9), 24 October – 23 January
1943 , p.2.
[22]. Letter to author from D. Lloyd Owen, 5 June 1999.
[23]. G. L. Prendergast, Phase Reports, (5), 19 April – 26 May 1942
, p.2.
[24]. Vladimir Peniakoff, Popski’s Private Army, London: The Reprint Society,
1953, p.122. Peniakoff's work carries a full description of this activity.
Unfortunately some parts of his book (e.g. the account of the raid on Barce)
are strongly at variance with the official record and others testimonies.
However, in its general description of the organisation this reference is
adequate.
[25]. G. L. Prendergast, Phase Reports, [giving an account of the part
played by the LRDG in the operations of the 8th Army, November 1941- March
1943], (4), 6 February – 18 April 1942 , p.1.
[26]. D. Hunt, A Don at War, London: Frank Cass and Co., Ltd., 1990,
p.132; and David Lloyd Owen, Providence Their Guide: The Long Range Desert
Group, 1940-45 , London: George G. Harrap & Co. Ltd., 1980, p.87.
[27]. Field Marshal the Earl Alexander of Tunis, quoted in: D. Hunt, A Don at
War , London: Frank Cass and Co., Ltd., 1990, p.xxvii.
[28]. Herman, Intelligence Power in Peace and War , p.62.
[29]. Herman, Intelligence Power in Peace and War, p.62. There are
exceptions, such as the British raid on Tobruk in late 1942. General
Headquarters, Middle East - Military Intelligence (CAIRO), M.I., G.H.Q., M.E.F.
Periodical Intelligence Notes No. 15, Up to 4.12.42 . NZ National
Archives: WAII DA500/11, p.1.
[30]. Gal, & Mangelsdorff, (eds.), Handbook of Military Psychology
, pp.743-744.
[31]. As with the photographs of the V2 rocket sites at Peenemünde. See: R.V.
Jones, Most Secret War , London: Hamish Hamilton Ltd., 1978.
[32]. Constance Babington Smith, Evidence in Camera: The Story of Photographic
Intelligence in the Second World War , London: Penguin Books, 1961,
pp.78-81.
[33]. R.V. Jones, Most Secret War , London: Hamish Hamilton Ltd.,
1978, p.339.
[34]. C. Cruickshank, Deception in World War II, Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1979, pp.26-33. Rommel's order to manufacture dummy tanks
built over Volkswagons "to enable us to appear as strong as possible and to
induce the maximum caution in the British" was typical of such deceptions. B.H.
Liddell Hart, (ed.), The Rommel Papers , London: Collins, 1953, p.103.
The chances of such deceptions fooling ground-based surveillance were very much
smaller. Even at 3-400 metres a dummy tank mounted on a transporter still tends
to look like a dummy.
[35]. Bennett, Behind the Battle , p.53.
[36]. Herman, Intelligence Power in Peace and War , p.77.
[37]. Herman, Intelligence Power in Peace and War , p.66.
[38]. David Kahn, Kahn On Codes: Secrets of the New Cryptography , New
York: MacMillan Publishing Company, 1983, p.89 & Hunt, A Don at War, p.xi.
Note: Only those histories produced after 1974 contain references to this
programme. The release of Cryptanalyst F. Winterbotham's unreliable memoirs
that year was the first time the government of the United Kingdom had publicly
acknowledged the existence of the ULTRA programme.
[39]. Kahn, Kahn On Codes , p.103.
[40]. P. Calvocoressi, Top Secret Ultra , London: Cassell Ltd., 1980,
p.23.
[41]. R. Woytak, "Polish Military Intelligence and Enigma", in East European
Quarterly 25:1, March 1991, pp.50-51.
[42]. Calvocoressi, Top Secret Ultra , 1980.
[43]. Bennett, Behind the Battle, p.xviii. Historian and former
code-breaker F. H. Hinsley has suggested that ULTRA shortened the war by up to
four years. Herman, Intelligence Power in Peace and War, p.67. This
claim does not find ready acceptance among other commentators (including former
code-breakers) see: Calvocoressi, Top Secret Ultra, pp.70-71, and
Kahn, Kahn On Codes , p.94 & 119.
[44]. B. Pitt, The Crucible of War: Western Desert 1941 , London:
Jonathan Cape Ltd., 1980, p.309. Also: Winston S. Churchill, The Second World
War, vol. III: The Grand Alliance, London: The Reprint Society, 1950, p.319,
& L. Deighton, Blood, Tears and Folly: An Objective Look at World War II,
London: Random House, 1995, pp.248-249.
[45]. Alexander McKee, El Alamein: Ultra and the Three Battles ,
London: Souvenir Press, 1991, p.32.
[46]. F.H. Hinsley, British Intelligence in the Second World War: Its Influence
on Strategy and Operations , vol. I, London: Her Majesty’s Stationery
Office, 1979, pp.36-38.
[47]. Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War, vol. III: The Grand Alliance
, London: The Reprint Society, 1950, p.289.
[48]. Churchill, The Second World War , vol. III: The Grand Alliance,
p.289.
[49]. R.K. Betts, "Analysis, War, and Decision: Why Intelligence Failures are
Inevitable", World Politics , XXXI, (October 1978), pp.61-89,
Princeton University Press, p.68.
[50]. Quoted in: M. Gilbert, Road to Victory: Winston S. Churchill, 1941-1945
, London: Heinemann, 1986, p.255.
[51]. Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War, vol. IV: The Hinge of Fate
, London: The Educational Book Company Ltd., 1951, pp.260-264.
[52]. Hinsley, British Intelligence in the Second World War , vol. I,
p.55.
[53]. A. F. Wilt, War from the Top: German and British Military Decision Making
During World War II , Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1990,
p.98.
[54]. David Eisenhower, Eisenhower at War, 1943-1945 , New York:
Random House, 1986, pp.166-168.
[55]. 1975 interview quoted in: A. F. Wilt, War from the Top: German and
British Military Decision Making During World War II , Indianapolis:
Indiana University Press, 1990.
[56]. Calvocoressi, Top Secret Ultra, p.71. See also: F.H. Hinsley, & Alan
Stripp, (eds.), Codebreakers: The Inside Story of Bletchley Park ,
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993, p.3.
[57]. Herman, Intelligence Power in Peace and War , p.69.
[58]. Alexander McKee, El Alamein: Ultra and the Three Battles ,
London: Souvenir Press, 1991, p.30.
[59]. Herman, Intelligence Power in Peace and War , p.96.
[60]. McKee, El Alamein: Ultra and the Three Battles, p.46 &
Hinsley, British Intelligence in the Second World War , vol. II,
pp.354-357. The particular obsession with tank strengths is part and parcel of
desert warfare, but for those with Churchill's penchant for 'action this day '
on the basis of crude decrypts, the results could be disastrous.
[61]. D. Mercer, Chronicle of the Second World War , London: Chronicle
Communications Ltd. And Longman Group UK Ltd, 1990, p.385.
[62]. Herman, Intelligence Power in Peace and War , p.87.
[63]. Betts, "Analysis, War, and Decision: Why Intelligence Failures are
Inevitable", World Politics, XXXI, (October 1978), pp.61-89, Princeton
University Press, p.69. Herman also discusses "the problem of intelligence
over-supply, particularly in single-source material on military subjects
[whereby] . . . the recipient will often be deluged with information that
cannot be usefully employed." Herman, Intelligence Power in Peace and War
, p.296.
[64]. Hinsley, British Intelligence in the Second World War , vol. II,
p.22.
[65]. Herman, Intelligence Power in Peace and War , p.70.
[66]. Proceedings from a November 1978 colloquium at the University of
Stuttgart on, "What Role Did Radio Intelligence Play in the Course of the
Second World War?", quoted in: David Kahn, Kahn On Codes: Secrets of the New
Cryptography , New York: MacMillan Publishing Company, 1983, p.91.
[67]. Herman, Intelligence Power in Peace and War ,p.89. Fragility
being a measure of a collection source's vulnerability to counter-measures.
[68]. For an example of this, see the question of Freyberg's intelligence on
Crete in: Paul Freyberg, Bernard Freyberg V.C.: Soldier of Two Nations
, London: Hodder and Stoughton Ltd., 1991, pp.284-286.
[69]. Hinsley, British Intelligence in the Second World War , vol. II,
p. 413.
[70]. Hinsley, British Intelligence in the Second World War , vol. II,
pp.413-414.
[71]. Hinsley, & Stripp, (eds.), Codebreakers: The Inside Story of
Bletchley Park , p.7.
[72]. Letter to author from D. Lloyd Owen, 13 April 1999.
Copyright © 2006 Clive Gower-Collins.
Written by Clive Gower-Collins. If you have questions or comments on this
article, please contact Clive Gower-Collins at:
Clive Gower-Collins
PO Box 2526
Wellington 6011
New Zealand
About the author:
Clive Gower-Collins lives in Wellington, New Zealand and has served in
the New Zealand Army in both Infantry and Engineer roles. Currently a
manager with Biosecurity New Zealand, He has worked for a number of
years across the public service specialising in leadership and
organisational performance. He has written articles, presented
conference papers and given radio interviews on coalition warfare and
the LRDG. His research interests tend to focus on aspects of
intelligence in warfare (the general focus of his MA in History) and
German aircraft design and production in the inter-war years and
throughout WWII (the focus of his Honours research).
Published online: 07/23/2006.
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