Raids, Road
Watches, and Reconnaissance: New Zealand's involvement in the Long Range Desert
Group in North Africa, 1940-1943
by Clive Gower-Collins
Reconnaissance
|
Since it is good not to neglect any one of the factors which contribute to the
common benefit of the army, it is necessary to have experienced and intelligent
guides . . . men who, in addition to knowing roads are able to conduct the army
through mountain passes, who can plan ahead, and who know the proper distances
for the campsites, locations which are suitable and which have plenty of water,
so the camp will not find itself in dire straits. They should know the
topography of the enemy's country in detail, so they can lead the army into it
to plunder and take captives. Byzantine General, Nikephorus Ouranos, AD 994 [1]
| |
At the beginning of the desert war, British commanders were not only lacking
information regarding their enemy, they were also desperately short of vital
topographical knowledge. Despite the activities of pre-war explorers, all but a
fraction of the Libyan Desert was unknown territory to Europeans, with serious
implications for the commanders' understanding of what was possible in moving
troops and support materiel in this difficult country. Collection of the
necessary information was complicated by a widespread lack of ability to
navigate and move over the desert terrain. The formation of the LRDG
concentrated the handful of experienced desert travellers in a single unit that
enabled the Army command to draw readily upon their combined expertise. The
LRDG's ongoing operations added repeatedly to the commands' understanding of
the terrain, and thereby the ability to recognise and seize opportunities, thus
adding significantly to the successful outcome of the North African campaign.
LRDG Intelligence and Topographical Officer, Bill Kennedy Shaw, asserted
"Nothing in the way of intelligence interests the modern commander more than
'going'. In the LRDG no question was asked us more often than 'what's the going
like there?' "[2] This statement reflects the fact that in any theatre of
operation the physical geography is of critical importance. Variations in the
terrain are a major factor influencing the nature and conduct of war. For this
reason, clever use of the ground is a distinguishing characteristic of good
generalship. The predominantly mobile nature of land warfare in the Second
World War, with its high volumes of increasingly heavy wheeled and tracked
equipment, made greater demands on the topographical knowledge of commanders
and their staff than any previous conflict. Achieving success necessitated a
keen understanding of the land over a wide area. The size of theatres, depth
and frontage of battle lines, and potential to be fighting hundreds of
kilometers away within days also placed a premium on the capacity to collect
and assimilate further information in a timely manner.[3]
Map reading is normally the principal source of such information, but as Shaw
explained, "map-reading presupposes maps, and in Libya there was the rub."[4]
Bagnold recalled that in 1939
|
In the General Staff offices in Cairo I could find only one small-scale map
that extended westward beyond the frontier of Egypt. It was dated 1915, and
contained little more up-to-date information than Rohlfs[5] brought back in
1874.[6]
| |
It was true that the Italian Instituto Geografico Militare had produced some
maps of significant oases and routes, but the errors these contained were of
legendary proportions and LRDG personnel seriously questioned whether the
Italian surveyors had in fact braved the desert conditions in preparing them.
Shaw wrote of these maps
|
The mountains were all high, as became the dignity of Fascist Italy. Making our
way anxiously towards an obviously impassable range of hills, we would find
that we had driven over it without feeling the bump . . . It is just possible
that the absurd inaccuracies were a deep plot to mislead our attacking forces,
but it seems hardly likely that the Italians had thought of that as long ago as
1931.[7]
| |
The possession of largely misleading information, or more frequently none at
all, was extremely serious. This is clearer once the character and extent of
the desert are appreciated. Approximately 1900 by 1600 kilometers, the Libyan
Desert forms the most arid part of the Sahara. Its northern half is mostly
limestone and consists largely of flat gravel plains, broken only by a couple
of plateaux and bereft of vegetation except on its coastal fringe. Below
latitude 26°, the terrain is mainly sandstone with patches of broken hilly
country separating the huge 'Sand Seas'. Wind acts to form these areas into a
vast series of parallel sand dunes, whose ridges can run unbroken for many
kilometers and have as much as 150 meters separating the troughs from the
crests. Apart from areas adjacent to the northern coast, rain might fall in the
desert only once in every ten to twenty years. A handful of artesian-fed oases
were the sole sources for water of somewhat varying quality. Some of these
appeared to function solely as a breeding-ground for sickness. One New
Zealander recalls his patrol being ordered to set out for Siwa Oasis, "It
appeared Y Patrol [Yeomanry] had sixty percent casualties from Malaria and we
were to relieve them."[8] The temperatures in this land could easily reach 50°
Celsius in the shade in summer, and fall slightly below freezing during winter.
A former patrol member wrote to the author
|
I doubt anyone who chances to read this will really understand the effect the
[summer] heat has on people. A vehicle in motion creates its own wind, but
travel was not possible between 10 a.m. and around 3.30 p.m. because the high
temperature caused the radiator water to boil and if an attempt was made to
continue, the petrol would vaporise in the fuel lines. Our practice was to
scoop a shallow depression in the sand and drive the vehicle over it. We could
then shelter [underneath it] from the sun until it was cool enough to move
on.[9]
| |
Such conditions were aggravated by desert winds that drove dust and fine
particles of grit into eyes, ears, mechanical and electrical equipment. On
occasion, these would build into ferocious sandstorms of such intensity that
they could strip paint from vehicles, leaving the metal completely bare. During
the summer of 1942, patrol members indoors at their Siwa Oasis Base during such
a storm were unable to read without artificial light.[10]
The difficulties of desert travel did not end with the rigors of the climate.
The nature of desert terrain, with its mixtures of soft sand dunes and rocky
areas, forced tortuous routes onto the traveler, who could not be expected to
keep to a pre-determined course for any distance. This was a problem because
the army's navigational method was based upon the use of magnetic compass
bearings in conjunction with mapped landmarks, which entailed plotting a course
and then following it accurately.[11] There were further problems with the use
of magnetic compasses. To navigate with precision, the continual course changes
had to be recorded correctly by the navigator, but the mass of the vehicle,
weapons, and other metal equipment around the compass caused inaccuracies in
the readings. The use of compensated aero-type compasses was simply not
realistic as the loads, and therefore the metallic mass, varied constantly. The
presence of large ore deposits in the surrounding terrain could add to this
problem significantly. In addition, the lack of geographical features to relate
to meant that any dead reckoning performed in this way would be useless for all
practical purposes.[12] The challenge of measuring a daytime position was
overcome by the LRDG's use of a sun-compass of Bagnold's pre-war design.[13] To
compensate for any errors that accumulated throughout the daytime, astronomical
fixes were taken when the patrols camped for the night. In this way, patrol
navigation had more in common with maritime than military practice. In fact,
Dick Croucher, one of the earliest officers to join the patrols, had been a
ship's officer prior to joining the Army and had much to do with the subsequent
training of patrol navigators.[14]
As one might expect, specialized methods demanded specialized equipment, some
of which was beyond the Army supply system's capacity to deliver. Navigational
items such as theodolites[15] were borrowed from the Egyptian Survey Office,
and according to Shaw, "school-mistresses gave us books of Log. Tables and
racing men their field-glasses, and in half-forgotten shops in the back-streets
of Cairo we searched for a hundred and one (to the Army) unorthodox needs."[16]
Suitable vehicles were also scarce. The original patrols were kitted out with a
mixture of trucks purchased from the Chevrolet dealer in Alexandria and some
loaned by the Egyptian Army, all of which were extensively modified. Open-cab
conversions entailed removing hoods, windscreens and doors, extra leaves were
fitted to 'beef up' the suspension, and a condenser was fitted to save engine
cooling water.[17] These and numerous other alterations were required before
the vehicles could be considered desert-worthy.
Fortunately for the British, the precious desert-lore of Bagnold and his fellow
interwar explorers provided solutions to all these and many other problems. For
much of the desert campaign, these specialized vehicles and their uniquely
trained crews were the sole operators in the so-called 'impassable' reaches of
the desert. The effectiveness of the equipment and training can be measured by
the fact that not one patrol ever became lost during the three years of LRDG
desert operations.[18]
LRDG reconnaissance commenced before the first batch of recruited New
Zealanders had even completed their initial patrol training. The "restless"
Captain Pat Clayton had searched out all his pre-war Bedouin acquaintances in
his attempts to acquire some advance information on the Italian garrison at
Kufra Oasis.[19] However, they were of little use, not having visited Kufra
since the Italian occupation began some ten years earlier. Nevertheless, the
knowledge that the Kufra garrison was supplied from Jalo enabled the planning
of an early reconnaissance of the Jalo-Kufra track.[20] At the time, the Long
Range Patrol had yet to take delivery of their vehicles. However, two were
ready for pickup, "new, untried, and not run-in."[21] A New Zealand
'Driver/Mechanic' on loan from the Ordnance Corps, Merv Curtis, recalls being
sent into Cairo "to obtain 2 suitable vehicles and spares necessary for a
journey which could be of some thousand miles."[22] Curtis was Clayton's driver
in the lead vehicle throughout the trip.[23] Another five New Zealanders
handpicked by Clayton and a Bedouin acquaintance of Clayton's made up the rest
of the party.[24]
The party initially made its way to Siwa Oasis. Here Clayton persuaded his old
friends in the Egyptian Frontier Districts Administration to loan six trucks
with Sudanese crews under an Egyptian officer to act as petrol carriers for the
first leg of the journey, ostensibly to check on "old frontier cairns."[25]
According to Shaw, "the Sudanese crews were happy to get a trip into the
desert", and were tireless in "unsticking" vehicles which became bogged in the
sand.[26] One former patrol member said of these early days, "being
inexperienced we had a lot of digging, tray and mat work to do." He explained,
"When a vehicle sank into the sand, one had to dig out [the sand around the
wheels] and put steel trays under the wheels, and lay long canvas mats which
had bamboo pieces at intervals along their length."[27] This process was
repeated until the vehicle was driven onto firmer ground.
Clayton's enlarged party proceeded through the Great Sand Sea to the frontier
where the extra fuel was transferred to the Long Range Patrol vehicles. The
Sudanese crews then retraced their tracks to Siwa. Having successfully
maintained security with his ruse, Clayton's original party then turned
westward. Although heading for a fairly precise location, the route chosen was
new and in this way the party made discoveries of significance for subsequent
patrol operations. Once through the northern end of the Great Sand Sea, they
encountered a flat gravel plain that extended for one hundred miles from its
western edge before entering the Kalansho Sand Sea. Shaw later claimed that
|
The discoveries of this reconnaissance were some of the most useful that LRDG
ever made. For many months afterwards . . . we used this route across the
gravel plain guarded by the horseshoe of sands to the north. Across it we used
to pass between Siwa and Kufra in 1941; over it ran the Kufra-Siwa air route
with its chain of landing grounds and emergency dumps of water; in 1942
Easonsmith's [LRDG] raid on Barce and Mayne's [SAS] attacks against the enemy's
lines of communication before 'Alamein profited by this knowledge.[28]
| |
The heavy use made of this route reflected the British commanders' early
preoccupation with Kufra. This appeared to last until the enemy was clearly not
in any position to exploit Kufra's potential as a staging-post for attacks on
the Allied Khartoum-Cairo resupply route. The degree of importance attached to
LRDG reconnaissance of the area is indicated by a letter written to Bernard
Freyberg by General Arthur Smith.[29] Smith stated that the Long Range Patrol
"is definitely carrying out a very important role in our war effort in that it
watches the Western Desert towards the Kufra Oasis".[30]
The difficulties of deep reconnaissance were not confined to issues of
negotiating the terrain and coping with the climate. An example of the
considerable ingenuity that was applied to other problems is seen in an early
investigation of the Italian garrisons and airfields in the vicinity of
Uweinat. The poor going in this area had prohibited any approach except from
the direction of an open plain with the attendant high risk of observation. Any
ideas of approaching on foot were ruled out by the midsummer heat and the
distance involved. The ideal alternative was to use the traditional mainstay of
desert travel, the camel. However, this presented a problem because the
distance to the objective entailed a return journey of approximately 1100
kilometers, too far for a camel to manage without water and rest along the
route. Clayton got around this by purchasing a camel, then packing it into a
truck and driving it most of the way to Uweinat. Once there, two Bedouin
friends of Clayton's pre-war acquaintance spent a week wandering around the
Italian outposts before the camel was packed into the truck once more, and the
patrol returned to base with their cunningly-acquired intelligence.[31]
The 'camel' operation was an example of deep reconnaissance with the aim of
direct observation of the enemy. Another example was the use of patrols during
Allied offensives such as 'Crusader'.[32] Shaw recalled that at the time the
LRDG's orders were "to report on enemy reaction to our advance and with this
end in view the patrols were in position on various routes behind the front
line and south of the Gebel [Akhdar] when the advance began."[33] On other
occasions a less direct approach was used, such as when patrols examined
newly-vacated Axis campsites in order to gain information on the enemy's
forces.[34]
Reconnaissance with the aim of observing specific individuals or sub-units was
rare. An exception to this rule was made in the case of Hungarian Count,
Ladislaus Edouard de Almasy. Highly-educated and polyglot, Almasy had been well
known in Egypt in the 1930s for his many desert explorations.[35] Shaw claimed
that prior to the war, Almasy "never made any bones about his admiration for
totalitarianism",[36] and his subsequent allegiance to the Axis came as no
surprise. The LRDG were constantly alert to the possibility of Almasy's raising
a similar formation on the German side, but initial indications were that
Almasy had no such plans. This was not to last, as Shaw suggested
|
From a sign here and there, from a letter foolishly preserved by a German
soldier, from a careless word in a prisoner of war cage, from those other
sources of information which the Censor would strike out if I set them down, we
realised that Almasy was on the move.[37]
| |
The British Army's inability to account for sightings of small patrols of
'British' vehicles in remote areas raised suspicion to near certainty.
Following such a sighting in June of 1942, the LRDG lent its Survey Officer to
act as a guide for patrols of the Sudan Defence Force from Kufra who were to go
out 'hunting' Almasy.[38] They were unsuccessful, and they discovered signs in
the desert passes that he had returned eastward prior to their arrival. In the
event, Almasy achieved little of real value, the few German spies he dropped
off were quickly detected and while his accomplishments (which included
reaching the Nile on one occasion) were impressive on a personal level, the
Germans seemed unconvinced of the merits of their "ersatz Bagnold" and there
seems to be no evidence of any continuing interest beyond a couple of early
excursions.[39]
The nature of deep reconnaissance meant that patrols were often ideally placed
to put various types of deception plans into action. Typical of these was
'Operation Bishop', a plan in November of 1941 to plant a fake map where it
would fall into enemy hands.[40] The false information on the map indicated an
attack on the Italian garrison at Jalo from a specific direction by a
substantial British force. Under the command of New Zealander, Tony Browne, a
patrol made its way to a spot due east of Jalo and made camp. They were not in
position long before being approached by a single Arab on a camel, at which the
patrol "left in a hurry leaving behind some odds and ends and a petrol box
under which Browne had 'forgetten' [sic] his map board, scale and
protractor."[41] The result was clear at the end of the month when the British
over-ran the area. The LRDG Intelligence Officer visited Jalo and found that;
"On to a large map in the Italian Commander's office the details of the planted
map had been faithfully copied."[42] Other 'dropped' items included propaganda
leaflets which assured the reader of the inevitability of defeat for the Axis
powers and urged them to give themselves up. On at least one occasion, a patrol
left "specially doctored boxes of Italian MG amn [machine-gun ammunition]"
where they would be easily found.[43] Whilst deep in enemy-held territory, the
LRDG was often called upon for a variety of duties like acting as a "wireless
link" between forces whose radio equipment was unable to reach across the
distances separating them.[44] This was used to particularly good effect
between the Free French forces in the Fezzan and their allies further
north.[45]
Some 'deep' patrols were conducted for matters of LRDG 'house-keeping',
including the constant need to check on dumps of fuel, water and supplies in
the desert interior. Inevitably, in the to-and-fro of Axis advances and
retreats, a number of the dumps were discovered and removed; their importance
to LRDG operations was such that it could not be left to chance to ensure that
they were intact.[46] A further routine requirement was to maintain a watch on
the condition of various wells and oases which had to be factored into 8th Army
plans,[47] requiring an assessment of potability and flow which could be added
as 'going' information to the force's maps.[48] Much of this was derived from
the written report produced at the conclusion of every patrol by its commander.
It was expected to comment at length on the going the patrol had encountered.
It included general observations about the terrain, its suitability for the
passage of various types and volumes of traffic, estimated travel times, and
references to the availability of water, possible landing-grounds, and cover in
the area. Where applicable, it would comment on the reliability (or otherwise)
of existing information sources such as maps or testimony from those claiming
some knowledge of the area.[49] The importance of this information was not
confined to simple questions of accessibility, but was also crucial to
estimating the speed, or tempo, which a force might maintain. If a formation
could move consistently faster between tactical actions than its opponents, it
could seize the initiative and dictate the terms of an engagement.[50] The
detailed information provided by the LRDG was vital in exploiting opportunities
for rapid maneuver. Hand in hand with this went a fundamental principle of
warfare, which asserts that logistics dictates the boundaries of the
possible.[51] Sound topographical commentary was vital in assessing feasible
lines of communication for the feeding, arming, maintenance and movement of men
and materiel through the desert. It took skilled personnel to advise
effectively on topography and the LRDG reports were highly valued.[52]
On occasion, units specifically requested the LRDG to perform reconnaissance in
advance of their operations.[53] More usually, GHQ would order a full
reconnaissance along its projected axes of advance, often months ahead of
time.[54] The importance of the topographical aspects of the LRDG's role were
recognized from the outset. In response to Bagnold's request for a Royal
Engineers Survey Officer, the army provided Ken Lazurus, an interwar surveyor
with the Colonial Office who had worked for the army since hostilities
began.[55] Lazurus headed the LRDG's Survey Section that managed to produce
accurate map sheets of the region from the Fezzan to the northern coast, and
from the Nile to Tunisia. His senior officer wrote in a 1942 report
|
In April and May the Survey Section (Lazurus) was working in the country
between Bir Zelten, Tazerbo and Bir Haaruf, and completed a survey of some
25,000 square miles of country, all of it, as far as Longitude goes, well
behind the enemy lines.[56]
| |
As Shaw commented later, "there cannot be many instances of continued survey
work behind the enemy lines in war-time."[57] The Survey Section were every bit
as vulnerable to the hazards of enemy action as the 'fighting' patrols, and
added to the 'normal' dangers of operating so far behind the enemy 'lines' was
the likelihood of discovery by the Royal Air Force (RAF). RAF fighters strafed
LRDG patrols frequently. There were a few deaths as a result of these attacks,
and the cost in destroyed vehicles and equipment throughout the campaign was
substantial.[58] The use of recognition signals did little to rectify the
problem, as pilots believed these were simply enemy forces' attempts to deceive
them.[59] Despite these and other risks, the LRDG's performance was such that
it developed a solid reputation for accomplishing objectives.[60] As the unit's
standing grew, so did the variety of tasks it was asked to undertake.
Requests for LRDG patrols to act as guides for larger fighting formations were
common. This was actively encouraged by GHQ – Middle East who often appended
comments to topographical guides that stated, "experienced LRDG navigators with
knowledge of the country are available."[61] The guiding task might be as
routine as when Browne's patrol led a Sudan Defence Force supply convoy from
Wadi Halfa (Sudan) to Kufra Oasis to prevent them becoming lost,[62] to
something as specialized as taking an RAF Squadron Leader into the desert to
reconnoitre suitable sites for establishing forward "fighter dromes".[63] At
one point, the number of such 'passengers' the LRDG was required to ferry about
the desert prompted one patrol commander to begin calling his patrol "Libyan
Taxis", a nickname which stuck.[64] Many of these 'fares' were intelligence
operators, Arab and European, for whom the LRDG was not only a means of
reaching their distant objectives, but often their only means of subsequent
resupply.[65]
Of all the LRDG's reconnaissance services, that of 'operations reconnaissance'
– the specific reconnaissance of an area as a preliminary to an advance – was
probably the most valuable. On two occasions in particular, at El Agheila and
Mareth, such LRDG work was of critical importance to Allied success. New
Zealanders had a central role in these two outflanking manoeuvres which
involved the LRDG in the reconnaissance phases, and both the LRDG and the New
Zealand Division in their successful execution.
By early December 1942, the Axis forces were retreating toward Tripolitania
with the 8th Army hard on their heels.[66] Approaching El Agheila, General
Montgomery claimed he "sensed a feeling of anxiety in the ranks of Eighth Army"
as "many of them had been there twice already; and twice Rommel had debouched
there when he was ready and had driven them back."[67] In his ‘Despatches’,
Field-Marshal Alexander suggested, "At Agheila Eighth Army was facing the
strongest position in Libya."[68] Protected by salt marshes, soft sand dunes
and an escarpment, the position’s natural defences alone prompted Montgomery to
describe it, with masterful understatement, as a "difficult position to
attack", and he resolved to force Rommel out of it by "bluff and manoeuvre",
hoping in this way to "then attack him in the easier country to the west".[69]
LRDG road watchers provided evidence showing that the enemy was still
retreating and did not seem at all intent on making a firm stand at Agheila,
despite the fact that Rommel had received clear instructions that, "the Mersa
el Brega Line [the Axis forces' name for Agheila] was to be held at all
costs."[70] One signal from the road watch position read
|
November 8 to 14. Westbound. Motor cycles 528 and sidecar 18. Cars 1,264.
15-cwt 407. 30-cwt 607. 3-ton 2,316 and trailer 474. 5-ton 2,697 and trailer
899. 10-ton 125 and trailer 117. Tractors 3. Transporters 2. Troop carriers 13.
Tankers 23 and trailer 3. Tanks light 8. Armoured cars 24. Guns 68, mostly
light A/T [anti-tank]. Miscellaneous 400. Troops estimated 42,500 – repeat
42,500.[71]
| |
Nonetheless, Montgomery wished to avoid a costly frontal attack, and in a
manoeuvre typical of warfare in North Africa, decided to turn his enemy's
southern flank.[72] The New Zealand Division and the 4th Light Armoured Brigade
were chosen to carry out the sweep around Rommel's defences,[73] and Browne's
patrol of New Zealanders were appointed as guides.[74]
The territory around El Agheila was familiar to the LRDG which had previously
conducted both raids and road watches in the area.[75] In response to the
Eighth Army request for guides, Browne's patrol was dispatched on 4 December:
"To advise on going and navigate 2 NZ Div with 4 Lt Armd Bde attached from El
Haseiat to Marble Arch, thence west to Nofilia."[76] In this way, Montgomery
hoped to encircle the German forces, which, in recognition of the hopelessness
of their position, would surrender or, at the very least, be dealt with on
terms more favourable to the Allies.[77] The initial plans called for the 'left
hook' to commence on 15 December, but on being advised that Italian
reinforcements were being moved into a good defensive position to the rear of
Agheila, Montgomery moved plans forward, and on 13 December, Browne's New
Zealanders began leading their parent division in a 400 kilometre arc around
the German defences.[78] Over the next four days, the LRDG patrol led forces
around Agheila and on 17 December guided the New Zealand Division in another
flanking manoeuvre around Nofilia to the north.[79] Montgomery's 'bluff and
manoeuvre' tactics paid off. Despite the New Zealand Division being spread too
thinly to prevent the escape of some enemy units,[80] these did not escape
lightly, being later described by Montgomery as, "severely mauled by the New
Zealanders".[81] In a communication with Wellington, Freyberg stressed that,
"success of the operation depended upon negotiating a hitherto [by such a large
formation] uncrossed desert."[82] This movement was made possible by the work
of the LRDG, which also enabled the tempo of the manoeuvres to be maintained by
guiding another (smaller) turning movement at Nofilia.
LRDG topographical reconnaissance of the country through which the 8th Army
would advance continued unabated until 29 March 1943, at which point LRDG
operations in North Africa ended.[83] Its final service was another combined
reconnaissance and 'guiding' task, this time to lead a substantial force in
outflanking the so-called 'Mareth Line'. Following the success at Agheila,
Montgomery tasked the LRDG with reconnoitering all the country to the north and
west, with emphasis upon the Matmata Hills.[84] New Zealander, Captain Ron
Tinker understood that: "The recce was to be done with a view to passing a
force of at least divisional strength over this territory."[85] This entailed
another circling movement, and as before, the New Zealand Division under
Freyberg would have a central role.
The New Zealand Division were advised that the French-built Mareth defences
constituted a
|
MAGINOT Line in miniature, designed to oppose an enemy whose chief strength
appeared to be in motorised divisions. Broadly speaking, it consists of several
independent self-contained strong-points with all-round defence . . . running
from Matmata to the sea . . . so sited that they command all rds [sic] and
tracks leading to GABES NORTH of the escarpment and were designed to hold out
for a considerable period.[86]
| |
One of Field-Marshal Alexander's intelligence officers described this
fortification between the sea and the mountains as, "a formidable proposition
for a frontal attack," adding, "on the other side of the mountains the desert
was believed by the French to be impassable."[87] Montgomery did not agree,[88]
and interestingly, neither did his major opponent.[89] In his diary, Rommel
described the Mareth defences as, "a line of antiquated French block-houses
which in no way measured up to the standards required by modern warfare."[90]
His principal objection to it as a line of defence was based on the possibility
of "being outflanked – though it is true, with some difficulty."[91] Rommel
wanted instead to occupy the Wadi Akarit Line some 70 Kilometres to the rear of
Mareth because he believed it could not be outflanked. His superiors disagreed.
In particular, Field-Marshal Kesselring argued for a defence in depth.
Kesselring later recalled
|
The most favourable prospects for defence will be found in a defence zone which
is sub-divided into several positions. The natural configuration of the terrain
of Southern Tunisia offered such a defence zone, the foremost position of which
was the Mareth and the hindmost the Akarit. It would have been operationally
incorrect to have withdrawn immediately to the latter.[92]
| |
It was against this background that the LRDG were instructed to find a way
through the Matmata Hills for an outflanking force which would co-ordinate with
a frontal attack designed to pin the Axis defenders down. In Freyberg's words,
patrols went out and "criss-crossed the whole area",[93] in what was one of the
single largest undertakings in the LRDG's history. An advanced HQ-LRDG was
established at Azizia to make possible daily conferences between
representatives of NZ Division staff, 8th Army, LRDG and SAS.[94] Each day's
going was radioed back to this headquarters by the patrols. This was added to
the results of photo-reconnaissance and passed to the NZ Division and 8th
Army,[95] which built up a scale model that was used throughout the planning of
Operation Pugilist, as the outflanking operation had been dubbed.[96] Of
particular importance was the fact that the patrols were not simply seeking a
way through the hills. After all, patrols had passed through them on dozens of
covert missions prior to this. They were actually in search of a route capable
of withstanding the passage of almost 30,000 troops and some 6000 wheeled and
tracked vehicles and heavy guns.[97]
Such a passage was discovered in late January by a patrol under the command of
New Zealander, Nick Wilder, and was subsequently known as 'Wilder's Gap'.[98]
To the dismay of members of Wilder's T1 patrol, they were denied the
opportunity of leading the New Zealand Corps through the Gap as he had been
recalled for duty with the New Zealand Divisional Cavalry[99] when 8th Army
released the LRDG from its command.[100] However, Captain R Tinker and Corporal
D Bassett remained to act as guides for the outflanking operation. In early
March, Montgomery issued a personal message to the men of the 8th Army:
|
In the battle that is now to start, the Eighth Army will destroy the enemy now
facing us in the Mareth position; will burst through the Gabes gap [to the
north]; will then drive northwards on Sfax, Soussem and finally, Tunis. We will
not stop, or let up, till Tunis has been captured, and the enemy has given up
the struggle or been pushed into the sea.[101]
| |
The New Zealand 'Corps' began the 'left hook' on Mareth on 19 March, guided by
Tinker and Bassett, who remained until Gabes was reached after fierce fighting
on 29 March.[102] The following morning, in an address greeted with cheers in
the British House of Commons, Winston Churchill stated, "General Montgomery's
decision to throw his weight on to the turning movement [at Mareth] instead of
persisting in a frontal attack has been crowned with success."[103] Montgomery
afterward remarked, "It was obvious that the end of the war in Africa would now
come quite soon. The Eighth Army had only to burst through the Gabes gap and
join hands with the American forces."[104] In a letter to the Commanding
Officer – LRDG, Montgomery wrote of the reconnaissance work performed prior to
'Pugilist'
|
Without your careful and reliable reports the launching of the "left hook" by
the N.Z. Div would have been a leap in the dark; with the information they
produced, the operation could be planned with some certainty and as you know,
went off without a hitch . . . please give my thanks to all concerned and best
wishes from EIGHTH ARMY for the new tasks you are undertaking [reference to the
upcoming Dodecanese operations].[105]
| |
With the close of the North African campaign, the LRDG's desert operations came
to an end. By overcoming the difficulties associated with desert travel, the
LRDG had provided substantial quantities of accurate and valuable topographical
information, and reports on enemy activity and capabilities throughout the
period June 1940 – March 1943. Aside from acting as a vital communication link
between Allied forces, and arranging passage of essential personnel throughout
the theatre, the LRDG also contributed significantly to several outflanking
operations in the closing stages of the campaign that undoubtedly enabled the
Allied command to save lives which might otherwise have been lost in mounting
frontal attacks on Axis positions.
Show Footnotes
[1]. P. Tsouras, Warriors' Words: A Dictionary of Military Quotations ,
London: Arms and Armour Press, 1994, p.355.
[2]. William Boyd Kennedy Shaw, Long Range Desert Group: The Story of its Work
in Libya, 1940-1943 , London: Collins, 1945, p.26.
[3]. Heinz Guderian, Achtung-Panzer! , (translated by Christopher
Duffy), London: Arms and Armour Press, 1995, p.191.
[4]. William Boyd Kennedy Shaw, Long Range Desert Group: The Story of its Work
in Libya, 1940-1943 , London: Collins, 1945, p.24.
[5]. Bagnold is referring to the German explorer, Rohlfs, who attempted several
camel-borne expeditions into the desert in the previous century. Whilst
impressive as human accomplishments, these expeditions yielded little of value
in meeting the military problems of the 1940s. William Boyd Kennedy Shaw, Long
Range Desert Group: The Story of its Work in Libya, 1940-1943 ,
London: Collins, 1945, pp.45-46.
[6]. R. A. Bagnold, "Early Days of the Long Range Desert Group" The
Geographical Journal , [Evening Meeting of the Society, 15 January
1945], Vol.: CV, No 1 & 2, Jan-Feb 1945, p.31.
[7]. William Boyd Kennedy Shaw, Long Range Desert Group: The Story of its Work
in Libya, 1940-1943 , London: Collins, 1945, p.25.
[8]. Letter to author from A. D. (Buster) Gibb, June 1999.
[9]. Letter to author from M. Curtis, 15 June 1999. Emphasis in original.
[10]. William Boyd Kennedy Shaw, Long Range Desert Group: The Story of its Work
in Libya, 1940-1943 , London: Collins, 1945, p.43.
[11]. R. A. Bagnold, Notes on Long Range Desert Patrols for Operations in the
Interior of LIBYA , Cairo: Long Range Desert Group, 11 February 1941,
p.8 (note 11), NZ National Archives: WAII, 1, DA304.1/10/1.
[12]. Bagnold, R. A., Libyan Sands: Travels in a Dead World , London:
Hodder and Stoughton, 1935, p.69.
[13]. Letter to author from M. Curtis, 15 June 1999. R. A. Bagnold, Notes on
Long Range Desert Patrols for Operations in the Interior of LIBYA ,
Cairo: Long Range Desert Group, 11 February 1941, p.8, NZ National Archives:
WAII, 1, DA304.1/10/1.
[14]. Long Range Desert Group (LRDG), Original Long Range Patrol: Nominal Roll
as at 5 December 1940 , Abbassia (Egypt). NZ National Archives: WAII,
DA 304.1/15/12. Letter to author from M. Curtis, 15 June 1999.
[15]. Sextants had been tried but proved insufficiently robust to cope with
desert travel. R. A. Bagnold, Notes on Long Range Desert Patrols for Operations
in the Interior of LIBYA , Cairo: Long Range Desert Group, 11 February
1941, p.8, NZ National Archives: WAII, 1, DA304.1/10/1.
[16]. William Boyd Kennedy Shaw, Long Range Desert Group: The Story of its Work
in Libya, 1940-1943 , London: Collins, 1945, p.17.
[17]. Letter to author from A. D. (Buster) Gibb, June 1999. A former NZ Patrol
member and mechanical engineer, suggests that the condensor was another of
Bagnold's pre-war inventions. Letter to author from M. Curtis, 15 June 1999.
[18]. William Boyd Kennedy Shaw, "LRDG Activities in North Africa", Unpublished
report Held at the Imperial War Museum, London, p.3. This was probably given as
an address to officers in Middle East in early 1943, p.4.
[19]. R. A. Bagnold, "Early Days of the Long Range Desert Group" The
Geographical Journal , [Evening Meeting of the Society, 15 January
1945], Vol.: CV, No 1 & 2, Jan-Feb 1945. p.34.
[20]. William Boyd Kennedy Shaw, Long Range Desert Group: The Story of its Work
in Libya, 1940-1943 , London: Collins, 1945, p.32.
[21]. R. A. Bagnold, "Early Days of the Long Range Desert Group" The
Geographical Journal , [Evening Meeting of the Society, 15 January
1945], Vol.: CV, No 1 & 2, Jan-Feb 1945. p.35.
[22]. Letter to author from M. Curtis, 15 June 1999.
[23]. Curtis had the responsibility of keeping the vehicles going hundreds of
miles from their base under all possible conditions. He suggests, with
justifiable pride, "they did. 1600 miles in 10 days of travel in that climate
says it all." Letter to author from Curtis, 15 June 1999.
[24]. Gunner Hamilton, Navigator Dick Croucher, Driver (eventually Colonel) Ron
Tinker, Gunner 'Spottie' Spottiswood, Gunner Jack Emslie & Ali Said Fudail.
Long Range Desert Group (LRDG), Original Long Range Patrol: Nominal Roll as at
5 December 1940 , Abbassia (Egypt). NZ National Archives: WAII, DA
304.1/15/12.
[25]. R. A. Bagnold, "Early Days of the Long Range Desert Group" The
Geographical Journal , [Evening Meeting of the Society, 15 January
1945], Vol.: CV, No 1 & 2, Jan-Feb 1945. p.35.
[26]. William Boyd Kennedy Shaw, Long Range Desert Group: The Story of its Work
in Libya, 1940-1943 , London: Collins, 1945, p.33.
[27]. Letter to author from A. D. (Buster) Gibb, June 1999.
[28]. William Boyd Kennedy Shaw, Long Range Desert Group: The Story of its Work
in Libya, 1940-1943 , London: Collins, 1945, pp.33-34.
[29]. Smith was Deputy Chief of General Staff.
[30]. General Headquarters, Middle East, CAIRO, Subject :Withdrawal of LRDG
Personnel - 'PERSONAL AND SECRET', Letter to B.C. Freyberg GOC NZ Division
(MAADI), dated 11 October 1940 . NZ National Archives: WAII 8/33.
[31]. R. A. Bagnold, "Early Days of the Long Range Desert Group" The
Geographical Journal , [Evening Meeting of the Society, 15 January
1945], Vol.: CV, No 1 & 2, Jan-Feb 1945, p.35.
[32]. Operation Crusader was launched on 18 November 1941 with the twin goals
of defeating the enemy in Cyrenaica and relieving Tobruk. Adrian Gilbert, The
Imperial War Museum Book of the Desert War , London: Sidgewick and
Jackson, 1992, p.xiii.
[33]. William Boyd Kennedy Shaw, "LRDG Activities in North Africa", Unpublished
report Held at the Imperial War Museum, London, p.3. This was probably given as
an address to officers in Middle East in early 1943, p.11.
[34]. General Headquarters, Middle East, Subject :Report on Going Map - Libya,
dated 14 October 1941 . NZ National Archives: WAII DA 21.1/9/G21/9
[35]. Vladimir Peniakoff, Popski’s Private Army , London: The Reprint
Society, 1953, p.215.
[36]. William Boyd Kennedy Shaw, Long Range Desert Group: The Story of its Work
in Libya, 1940-1943 , London: Collins, 1945, p.170.
[37]. William Boyd Kennedy Shaw, Long Range Desert Group: The Story of its Work
in Libya, 1940-1943 , London: Collins, 1945, p.168.
[38]. G. L. Prendergast, Phase Reports, (6), 27 May – 28 June 1942
.
[39]. William Boyd Kennedy Shaw, Long Range Desert Group: The Story of its Work
in Libya, 1940-1943 , London: Collins, 1945, p.168.
[40]. L.H. Browne, (Captain - LRDG), Notes From Diary, September 1939 – March
1943 , NZ National Archives: WAII, DA 304.1/15/12.
[41]. William Boyd Kennedy Shaw, Phase Reports, [giving an account of
the part played by the LRDG in the operations of the 8th Army, November 1941-
March 1943], (1) 1 November – 6 December 1941 , p.2.
[42]. William Boyd Kennedy Shaw, Phase Reports, [giving an account of
the part played by the LRDG in the operations of the 8th Army, November 1941-
March 1943], (1) 1 November – 6 December 1941 , p.2.
[43]. Long Range Desert Group (LRDG), Report on 'A' [NZ] Squadron Operation #6,
October 1941, by Captain J. R.. Easonsmith – Commander R Patrol ,
p.11. [extracted from 2NZEF Daily Log], NZ National Archives: WAII, DA
304.1/13/1.
[44]. William Boyd Kennedy Shaw, Phase Reports, (2), 6 – 24 December
1941 , p.3.
[45]. G. L. Prendergast, Phase Reports, (9), 24 October – 23 January
1943 , p.3.
[46]. G. L. Prendergast, Phase Reports, [giving an account of the part
played by the LRDG in the operations of the 8th Army, November 1941- March
1943], (4), 6 February – 18 April 1942 , p.4.
[47]. Long Range Desert Group (LRDG), Report on Reconnaissance of Area bounded
on the NORTH by Lat 33° 30', SOUTH by Lat 33° 15', EAST by Long 9° and WEST by
Long 7° 30', carried out between February 12 and 14 [1943] by "G" Patrol long
Range Desert Group . NZ National Archives: WAII, DA21.1/9/G4/15.
[48]. General Headquarters, Middle East, Subject :Report on Going Map - Libya,
dated 14 October 1941 . NZ National Archives: WAII DA 21.1/9/G21/9
[49]. Long Range Desert Group (LRDG), Report on Reconnaissance of Area bounded
on the NORTH by Lat 33° 30', SOUTH by Lat 33° 15', EAST by Long 9° and WEST by
Long 7° 30', carried out between February 12 and 14 [1943] by "G" Patrol long
Range Desert Group . NZ National Archives: WAII, DA21.1/9/G4/15.
[50]. This is not a question of absolute speed, but rather being 'faster than
they are'.
[51]. The enduring importance of this factor is without question. "The
commander who fails to provide his army with necessary food and other supplies
is making arrangements for his own defeat". The Emperor Maurice, The
Strategikon, c. AD 600. Tsouras, P., Warriors' Words: A Dictionary of
Military Quotations, London: Arms and Armour Press, 1994, p.238.
"Without logistics, a force has no military utility. Of course a force needs
eyes, ears and teeth, but logistics represents the heart, lungs and lifeblood:
it is the life-support system without which the whole force would grind to a
halt." Hayr, K., "Logistics in the Gulf War", in Royal United Service Institute
Journal , 136:3, Autumn 1991, pp.14-18.
[52]. General Headquarters, Middle East, Subject: Report on Going Map - Libya,
dated 14 October 1941. NZ National Archives: WAII DA 21.1/9/G21/9. B.
L. Montgomery, Subject: LRDG Contribution to 'Left-Hook' and turning of the
Mareth Line,– Letter to Lt-Col G.L. Prendergast, CO LRDG , dated 2
April 1943.
[53]. New Zealand Division Headquarters, Signal to HQ 13 Corps re:Qattara
Depression, dated 10 August 1942 . NZ National Archives: WAII,
DA21.1/9/G21/9
[54]. G. L. Prendergast, Phase Reports, (9), 24 October – 23 January 1943, p.3.
'Operations Reconnaissance' will be discussed more fully later in the chapter
with reference to the 'turning movements' about El Agheila and Mareth.
[55]. William Boyd Kennedy Shaw, Long Range Desert Group: The Story of its Work
in Libya, 1940-1943 , London: Collins, 1945, p.25.
[56]. G. L. Prendergast, Phase Reports, (5), 19 April – 26 May 1942
, p.6.
[57]. William Boyd Kennedy Shaw, Long Range Desert Group: The Story of its Work
in Libya, 1940-1943 , London: Collins, 1945, p.25.
[58]. William Boyd Kennedy Shaw, Phase Reports, [giving an account of
the part played by the LRDG in the operations of the 8th Army, November 1941-
March 1943], (1) 1 November – 6 December 1941 , p.2.
[59]. William Boyd Kennedy Shaw, Long Range Desert Group: The Story of its Work
in Libya, 1940-1943 , London: Collins, 1945, p.112.
[60]. A. Hoe, David Stirling; The Authorised Biography of the Creator of the
S.A.S. , London: Little, Brown and Company, 1992, p.472.
[61]. General Headquarters, Middle East, Subject :Topographical Note on Area
SIRTE – RY.0000 – BU NGEM RK.5006 – BENI ULID (R)R 2440 – W. SOFFEGIN, Junction
main road (R) S. 5020, dated 5 December 1942 . NZ National Archives:
WAII DA 21.1/9/G21/9II
[62]. L.H. Browne, (Captain - LRDG), Notes From Diary, September 1939 – March
1943 , p.3. NZ National Archives: WAII, DA 304.1/15/12.
[63]. L.H. Browne, (Captain - LRDG), Notes From Diary, September 1939 – March
1943 , p.6. NZ National Archives: WAII, DA 304.1/15/12.
[64]. Long Range Desert Group (LRDG), Reconnaissance Report – LRDG, September –
October 1941, by Captain J. R.. Easonsmith , [extracted from 2NZEF
Daily Log], NZ National Archives: WAII, DA 304.1/13/1.
[65]. Vladimir Peniakoff, Popski’s Private Army , London: The Reprint
Society, 1953, pp.56-57.
[66]. W. G. Stevens, Official History of New Zealand in the Second World War,
1939-1945: Bardia to Enfidaville , Wellington (NZ): War History
Branch, Department of Internal Affairs, 1962, p.21.
[67]. B. L. Montgomery, The Memoirs of Field Marshal The Viscount Montgomery of
Alamein , K.G., London: Collins, 1958, p.146.
[68]. H.R.L.G. Alexander, "The African Campaign from El Alamein to Tunis, from
10th August, 1942 to 13th May, 1943", a despatch submitted to the Secretary of
State for War on 23rd May 1947, published in, Supplement to the London Gazette
of Thursday the 5th of February, 1948 , pp.839-887, London: His
Majesty's Stationery Office, 1948, p.860.
[69]. B. L. Montgomery, The Memoirs of Field Marshal The Viscount Montgomery of
Alamein , K.G., London: Collins, 1958, p.146.
[70]. B.H. Liddell Hart, (ed.), The Rommel Papers , London: Collins,
1953, p.359. Eighth Army Headquarters, Agheila Notes, dated 3 December 1942.
P.8, NZ National Archives: WAII 8/27
[71]. William Boyd Kennedy Shaw, Long Range Desert Group: The Story of its Work
in Libya, 1940-1943 , London: Collins, 1945, p.213.
[72]. Eighth Army Headquarters, Agheila Notes, dated 3 December 1942 .
P.9, NZ National Archives: WAII 8/27
[73]. B. L. Montgomery, The Memoirs of Field Marshal The Viscount Montgomery of
Alamein , K.G., London: Collins, 1958, p.146.
[74]. G. L. Prendergast, Phase Reports, (9), 24 October – 23 January
1943 , p.3.
[75]. William Boyd Kennedy Shaw, Phase Reports, (3), 25 December – 5
February 1942 .
[76]. L.H. Browne, (Captain - LRDG), Notes From Diary, September 1939 – March
1943 , p.7, NZ National Archives: WAII, DA 304.1/15/12.
[77]. B. L. Montgomery, Subject: "Fire-Eater" – General Plan of Eighth Army,
dated 28 December 1942 . NZ National Archives: WAII 8/28.
[78]. 2 New Zealand Expeditionary Force, Cipher Message (C764) to 2 NZ Div,
dated 22 December 1942 . NZ National Archives: WAII 8/27 B. L.
Montgomery, The Memoirs of Field Marshal The Viscount Montgomery of Alamein,
K.G., London: Collins, 1958, p.147.
[79]. G. L. Prendergast, Phase Reports, (9), 24 October – 23 January
1943 , p.3.
[80]. 2 New Zealand Expeditionary Force, Cipher Message (C764) to 2 NZ Div,
dated 22 December 1942 . NZ National Archives: WAII 8/27
[81]. B. L. Montgomery, The Memoirs of Field Marshal The Viscount Montgomery of
Alamein , K.G., London: Collins, 1958, p.147.
[82]. 2 New Zealand Expeditionary Force, Cipher Message (C764) to 2 NZ Div,
dated 22 December 1942 . NZ National Archives: WAII 8/27
[83]. G. L. Prendergast, Phase Reports, (10), 24 January – 29 March
1943 , p.1.
[84]. B. L. Montgomery, Subject: Talk to Officers of Divisional HQ Services (NZ
Div), dated 4 January 1943 , P.5, NZ National Archives: WAII 8/45.
[85]. Long Range Desert Group (LRDG), Report on Reconnaissance Operations in
the Area South of the Djebel Tebaga, January-February 1943, by Captain
R. Tinker , p.2, NZ National Archives: WAII, DA 304.1/13/1.
[86]. New Zealand Division Headquarters, 2 NZ Division – Notes on Mareth No 1,
dated 29 January 1943 . p.1, NZ National Archives: WAII 21.1/1/38. The
Wadi Zigzou also ran the length of the fortification thereby creating a natural
anti-tank obstacle.
[87]. D. Hunt, A Don at War , London: Frank Cass and Co., Ltd., 1990,
p.170.
[88]. B. L. Montgomery, The Memoirs of Field Marshal The Viscount Montgomery of
Alamein , K.G., London: Collins, 1958, pp.159-160.
[89]. New Zealand Corps, Intelligence Summary No 1, dated 15 March 1943
. NZ National Archives: WAII 8/30.
[90]. B. H. Liddell Hart, (ed.), The Rommel Papers , London: Collins,
1953, p.392.
[91]. B. H. Liddell Hart, (ed.), The Rommel Papers , London: Collins,
1953, p.392.
[92]. K. Macksey, Kesselring: German Master Strategist of the Second World War,
London: Greenhill Books, 1996, p.153.
[93]. B. C. Freyberg, Subject: Turning the Mareth Line, March 1943 .
p.12, NZ National Archives: WAII 8/40.
[94]. L. H. Browne, (Captain - LRDG), Notes From Diary, September 1939 – March
1943 , p.8, NZ National Archives: WAII, DA 304.1/15/12.
[95]. G. L. Prendergast, Phase Reports, (10), 24 January – 29 March
1943. New Zealand Division Headquarters, General Officer Commanding's
Diary (GOC's Diary), Part III, Sept 42 – Sept 43, entries for 13-26 February
1943 , NZ National Archives: WAII, DA21.1/1/38
[96]. B. C. Freyberg, Subject: Turning the Mareth Line, March 1943 .
p.1, NZ National Archives: WAII 8/40.
[97]. New Zealand Army Board, The Diamond Track: From Egypt to Tunisia with the
Second New Zealand Division, 1942-1943, Wellington: Government
Printer, 1945, p.26. B. L. Montgomery, The Memoirs of Field Marshal The
Viscount Montgomery of Alamein , K.G., London: Collins, 1958, p.160.
[98]. Long Range Desert Group (LRDG), L.R.D.G. Diary - 'T1'(NZ Patrol), as kept
by L/Cpl Davis J.L., of Stratford, from Oct 30 to Apr 8/43, Copied by Tpr A.B.
Crawford on 15 Apr 1943 , p.10, NZ National Archives: WAII, DA441.2/6.
[99]. Long Range Desert Group (LRDG), L.R.D.G. Diary - 'T1'(NZ Patrol), as kept
by L/Cpl Davis J.L., of Stratford, from Oct 30 to Apr 8/43, Copied by Tpr A.B.
Crawford on 15 Apr 1943 . p.14, NZ National Archives: WAII, DA441.2/6.
[100]. The bulk of the unit falling back to Alexandria to "reorganise". Long
Range Desert Group (LRDG), "MOST SECRET" - Report on "10th Phase" of Operations
in Support of 8th Army, 24 January - 10 April 1943 , p.1, NZ National
Archives: WAII, DA 304.1/15/12.
[101]. B. L. Montgomery, Subject: Personal Message From The Army Commander to
8th Army, dated March 1943 . NZ National Archives: WAII 8/30.
[102]. G. L. Prendergast, Phase Reports, (10), 24 January – 29 March
1943 . Lloyd Owen, David, Providence Their Guide: The Long Range
Desert Group, 1940-45, London: George G. Harrap & Co. Ltd., 1980, p.121.
[103]. Reuters, Telegram concerning Mr Winston Churchill's address to the House
of Commons advising of the successful turning of the Mareth Line, London, 30
March 1943 . NZ National Archives WAII 8/30.
[104]. B. L. Montgomery, The Memoirs of Field Marshal The Viscount Montgomery
of Alamein , K.G., London: Collins, 1958, p.163.
[105]. B. L. Montgomery, Subject: LRDG Contribution to 'Left-Hook' and turning
of the Mareth Line,– Letter to Lt-Col G.L. Prendergast, CO LRDG, dated 2 April
1943.
Copyright © 2006 Clive Gower-Collins.
Written by Clive Gower-Collins. If you have questions or comments on this
article, please contact Clive Gower-Collins at:
Clive Gower-Collins
PO Box 2526
Wellington 6011
New Zealand
About the author:
Clive Gower-Collins lives in Wellington, New Zealand and has served in
the New Zealand Army in both Infantry and Engineer roles. Currently a
manager with Biosecurity New Zealand, He has worked for a number of
years across the public service specialising in leadership and
organisational performance. He has written articles, presented
conference papers and given radio interviews on coalition warfare and
the LRDG. His research interests tend to focus on aspects of
intelligence in warfare (the general focus of his MA in History) and
German aircraft design and production in the inter-war years and
throughout WWII (the focus of his Honours research).
Published online: 07/23/2006.
* Views expressed by contributors are their own and do not necessarily represent
those of MHO. |
