|
Bicycle Blitzkreig
The Japanese Conquest of Malaya and Singapore 1941-1942
by Allen Parfitt
On the first day of 1941 a bespectacled Japanese staff Colonel named Tsuji
Masanobu reported to a modest building in Taipei. His job was to head a
military small research department. The task of this unit of 30 officers,
enlisted men and civilian workers was to plan a possible southward attack by
the Japanese Army to conquer South Asia and the East Indies. As the year passed
Colonel Tsuji himself began planning an attack on the British stronghold of
Singapore.
The prospect was daunting. Singapore is an island off the southern coast of
Malaya. The seaward side was heavily fortified, and could hardly be taken by
direct attack. The landward side was vulnerable, but to get there an army would
have to traverse the five hundred mile length of the Malay peninsula. The
peninsula is accessible from both sides at its narrowest point, the Isthmus of
Kra, where Malaya and Thailand meet. But further south the peninsula widens
out, and the center is rugged jungle. The route south lies along the west
coast. The Japanese would have to advance those hundreds of miles on the Indian
Ocean side, where their naval strength could not help them. They would have to
cross rivers and fortified positions. Then at the end of this odyssey, they
would attack the Island of Singapore, considered by the British to be the
keystone of their defenses in the far east.
Tsuji himself was a controversial figure, and would become more so. He had been
heavily involved in the disastrous war with Russia in Nomonhon, on the borders
of Mongolia and Manchuria. By his own account he was thrown out of China
because of his involvement in a pan-Asian society. At the end of World War II
he vanished to avoid the war crimes tribunal, to surface several years later as
an author and member of the post-war Japanese legislature. A book has been
written branding him as a war criminal ("The Criminal They Called a God", by
Ian Ward). Tsuji wrote a colorful and interesting account of the Malaya
campaign, which was translated into English as "Japan's Greatest Victory,
England's Greatest Defeat", casting himself in a leading role. This book is a
great source on the campaign from the Japanese side.. This article will assume
that Tsuji's book is fairly accurate, keeping in mind that there are some
things he chose to leave out.
The Japanese would have some advantages. They were in the process of seizing
control of French Indochina, heedless of the fact that it was under the
authority of an authoritarian government nominally allied with their friends in
Germany. This would give them air bases that would allow their planes to reach
Malaya and the surrounding waters, and a jump-off place from which to invade
Thailand. The Japanese had no intention of honoring Thai neutrality. Japanese
resources would be stretched, as they planned to attack numerous locations in
the South Pacific simultaneously, but Tsuji could expect to have experienced
troops and leaders assigned to the Singapore operation. Some armor might be
available.
In September Tsuji was transferred to Indochina. War was obviously coming, and
the plan for attacking Malaya and Singapore had not been finalized. Desperate
for information, Tsuji went on two long reconnaissance flights over northern
Malaya and southern Thailand. Looking down he could see large British airfields
at Alor Star and Kota Bharu, as well as an airfield at Singora in Thailand.
After he returned home he considered these airfields with a mixture of fear and
greed. Planes operating from northern Malaya could make a mess of an invasion
fleet if they were aggressively handled. On the other hand, if the fields could
be captured promptly, Japanese air power could be installed right in the
British back yard.
Having looked the situation over, Tsuji created his plan for the attack. He
proposed that the Japanese land almost simultaneously at Singora, in Thailand,
and Kota Bharu, just to the south in Malaya in order to seize the airfields.
Meanwhile a strong force would march through Thailand. He flew to Tokyo to
present his plan in late October. It was accepted. Tsuji reports that Colonel
Hattori, Chief of the Operations Section of the General Staff, told him that
"However excellent your opinions might have been, I would have hesitated to
agree with your intention to modify the plan determined by the Imperial General
Staff according to your own judgments based only on maps. But as the
modifications were suggested as a result of your own observations in the face
of danger, no objections could be raised."
Command of the operation was given to General Yamashita Tomoyuki. General
Yamashita was an able and experienced officer, although mostly in staff
positions. He earned the sobriquet "Tiger of Malaya" in the ensuing operations.
At the end of the war he was convicted and executed for war crimes committed
under his command. However, since atrocities were a way of life for the
Japanese Army during World War II, virtually every senior officer could have
been executed on that basis, and it is generally considered that Yamashita was
no more guilty than most, and less than many.
General Yamashita was given command of the 25th Army. It consisted of three
divisions. The 5th Division had seen extensive service in China, and was
considered one of the best in the Japanese Army. The 18th was also an
experienced and excellent unit. The third division was the Imperial Guards
Division. They were considered an "elite" formation, but had no combat
experience. Tsuji is dismissive: "Over a long period of years they had been
trained for elegant traditional ceremonies, but they had no taste for field
operations and were unsuitable for them. Their staff officers had a tendency to
disobey their superior Army Commander." The 25th Army also contained a tank
regiment, which was to prove very useful, three regiments of engineers, which
were to prove invaluable, and various artillery and supply troops. The total
was about 60,000 men. The invasion troops were gathered at Hainan Island, off
the south coast of China, while the overland group was poised in Indochina. A
good understanding was reached with the navy, which would cover the landings,
and army and navy air units which would try to protect them.
The British were not unaware of the threat to their far eastern possessions. In
theory, Singapore was the second most important point in the British Empire
(after London), and considerable money had been spent in the thirties
developing and protecting the naval base there. The plan was that if Singapore
was attacked, a powerful fleet would be sent to the rescue. However, from 1939
through the middle of 1941 Britain was fully occupied with the struggle against
Nazi Germany. The Royal Navy was heavily engaged in the Atlantic and
Mediterranean, and the only ships that could be spared for the Indian Ocean
were a few obsolete battleships and cruisers, and the old carrier Hermes.
In his perceptive book "The Command of History", David Reynolds points out how
little mention there is of far eastern affairs in the first two books of
Winston Churchill's monumental history of the Second World War. As 1941 wore
on, however, Washington made the British aware of the deteriorating diplomatic
situation in the far east and the urgent need to prepare for possible war with
Japan The easiest thing to find was troops. Soldiers were available from that
huge reservoir of manpower: British India. The III Indian Corps was in Malaya,
including the 9th and 11th divisions, and the 28th and 45th brigades. There
were also two British brigades, the 53rd and 54th. The Australian government
was watching the situation carefully, especially concerned because all of their
best divisions were fighting in North Africa. They agreed to send their
recently formed 8th division to Singapore. There were also plans to send a
further British division, and when it arrived, the army totaled about 120,000
men.
Britain's man on the spot was the commander of General Headquarters Far East,
Air Chief Marshall Sir Robert Brooke-Popham. As an airman he encouraged the
development of the airfields Tsuji had spotted, and the deployment of the army
north to protect them. The army commander did not quite see this, so he was
replaced by Lt. General Arthur Percival. Percival was a tall gawky man, with
considerable military experience, but no charisma at all. He was to prove
completely unequal to the difficult task before him. Actually, the man who
turned out to be Britain's most capable combat leader of the war was available,
commanding a division in Syria. But Slim's time had not yet come, and it is
possible that the British situation in Malaya and Singapore was too dire for
even his prodigious abilities, It would have been unfortunate for him to have
spent the war as a prisoner.
Although the British had plenty of men, equipment was another matter. There
were no tanks at all, and a shortage of anti-tank guns. There was some
mechanized transport in the form of lorries and bren carriers. The air force
for whom those nice airfields had been built was using the Brewster Buffalo as
its first line fighter. Back in the thirties the United States Navy was looking
for a new fighter to replace its biplanes. The Buffalo was designed to this
specification, only to be rejected in favor of the Grumman F4F Wildcat. However
the Brewster company sold quite a few to other countries in need of a modern
monoplane fighter. The Finns bought some, and liked them. No one else did. By
1941 the Buffalo was definitely obsolete. To make matters worse the Brewster
people had supplied many of the far eastern Buffalos with engines recycled from
commercial transports. Some of the planes were being flown by British pilots,
some by Australians. They hated each other. When squadron Leader W.J. Harper,
veteran of the Battle of Britain, arrived to take command of the 453 RAAF
(Royal Australian Air Force) squadron, he later reported that "I was amazed to
notice amongst many of the Australian personnel on the Station the prevalent
dislike that some of them bore for the English--Englishmen were spoken of as
‘Pommies' with an air of contempt.....It should be noted in turn that RAF
personnel elsewhere ostracized the Australians." Harper was so unhappy with the
quality of some of his men that he asked for and received permission to go to
Australia to beg for some more experienced pilots. For heavier aircraft the RAF
and RAAF squadrons were using Bristol Blenheims and Lockheed Hudsons. The
Blenheim was nothing special when it was new, and by 1941 had been relegated to
training on most fronts. The Hudson was a military version of the Electra
transport, and was useful mainly for reconnaissance. The British had capable
planes--Spitfires, Hurricanes, Beauforts, Halifax heavy bombers, the matchless
Mosquito, but they didn't feel they could spare any of them for Malaya. There
was also a huge ignorance of the capabilities of Japanese air power. It was
generally felt that Buffalos and Blenheims were good enough for the far east.
Although he was focused on the struggle with Nazi Germany, in late August
Winston Churchill gave some thought to what could be done to strengthen the
British position in south Asia. He came up with a very Churchillian idea: send
a battleship. Better yet, send two, and maybe a carrier. Call it "Force Z".
Admiralty was very dubious, feeling that all the Royal Navy's battleships were
needed in European waters, but Churchill was insistent, and, as usual, he got
his way. Orders were given for the newest battleship in the navy, HMS Prince of
Wales to proceed to Singapore. Prince of Wales had been
launched in May, and was a 32,000 ton ship mounting 10 14" guns. She had
already been in action. So new that civilian workers were still aboard, she had
proceeded in company with HMS Hood on a mission to intercept the
German battleship Bismarck. Having successfully done so, her crew watched in
horror as the Hood blew up after an exchange of salvos. Prince of
Wales' captain decided to withdraw, making her perhaps the only Royal
Navy battleship in history to refuse combat with an enemy battleship. There was
not a lot of adverse comment:, the untried condition of the Prince of Wales,
the fact that the Bismarck was accompanied by the powerful heavy cruiser Prinz
Eugen, and the eventual destruction of the Bismarck by other units of
the Royal Navy may have helped mute criticism. Joining Force Z was the battle
cruiser Repulse. Repulse had been built during the First
World War, but unlike many older ships she was very speedy. She was armed with
6 15" guns. Her main defects were comparatively light armor, and a lack of
anti-aircraft weapons. She was already in the Indian Ocean on convoy duty. The
old battleship Revenge was also in the Indian Ocean, but was too slow to keep
up with Prince of Wales. The carrier Indomitable was supposed to be
part of the Force Z, but she accidentally grounded near Jamaica, and the need
for repairs made it impossible for her to arrive on time. No other carrier
could be spared, so none was sent. At that time the carrier Hermes was
operating in the Indian Ocean, and, in fact, crossed paths with the Prince
at Capetown. Hermes was an old ship, the first ship ever built as a
carrier, but she was quite fast and could have kept up with the battleships.
Her tiny and obsolescent air group could not have provided much protection from
Japanese bombers, but she would have given the task force much needed
reconnaissance capability. The failure to include her in Force Z was probably a
mistake, especially since she was pounced on and overwhelmed by Japanese
carrier aircraft near Ceylon the following year. Command of the force was
entrusted to Admiral Sir Tom Phillips. He was a very short man, with a
reputation for being opinionated and autocratic. He and General Percival must
have looked like Mutt and Jeff together. Phillips had very little sea
experience, having served most of the war in staff positions. His orders were
not specific. Churchill said later that his squadron was "....sent to these
waters to exercise that kind of vague menace which capital ships of the highest
quality whose whereabouts is unknown can impose on all hostile naval
calculations." However, the Japanese had a pretty good idea where Force Z was,
and Admiral Yamamoto ordered an additional 40 bombers to southern Indochina to
deal with it. Force Z arrived in Singapore on December 2, 1941. Prince of Wales
immediately underwent boiler repairs, but waited a week to inform the RAF that
her surface radar was not working. It was not until December 8th that
technicians came aboard, and were unable to fix the radar on short notice.
Phillips himself flew to the Philippines on December 4th to confer with the
Americans, and did not return to Singapore until December 7th.
Unlike the navy, the army had a specific plan. It was called Operation Matador.
As soon as the Japanese invaded Thailand, units south of the border would also
enter Thailand and occupy a strategic position called the "Ledge", where the
road was cut through a high ridge. Unlike the Americans in Hawaii, the RAAF was
flying reconnaissance over the Gulf of Siam. About midday on December 6th, they
discovered the Japanese attack convoy, which had left Hainan Island the day
before. This would have been a good time to sortie Force Z and start Operation
Matador. But Admiral Phillips was still in Manila, the Prince was not
ready to sail, and Brooke-Popham was not prepared to violate Thai neutrality
until the Japanese did so. He did notify London, which in turn notified
Washington, but somehow the significance of this Japanese convoy did not make
it to Pearl Harbor.
At 4 AM on December 8th, local time, Japanese troops went ashore at Singora.
Colonel Tsuji, was there with the first wave. Because of the time difference,
this was actually a couple of hours before the attack on Pearl Harbor, so this
landing may be considered to have started what the Japanese refer to as "The
Pacific War". The Japanese had hoped that the Thais would not resist, but the
troops at Singora were met with machine gun fire, and the first Japanese
officer to enter Bangkok was pulled from his car and killed by an angry mob.
But soon elements of the Guards division were marching into the city, and the
Thai government accepted the inevitable. First came the cease-fire, then an
alliance with the Japanese. Although this was extorted by force, Thailand did
have strong irredentist feelings about land in Malaya and Indochina, and hoped
that the Japanese would help them to recover it. By being a co-belligerent,
Thailand was spared some of the worst features of Japanese occupation. Thai
military units did not do much actual fighting.
Almost at the same time as the landing at Singora, Japanese troops came ashore
fifty miles south at Kota Bharu. They met a warm reception. The British had
prepared positions covering the airfield, and they resisted the Japanese
landings effectively. RAAF and RAF bombers attacked the transports at low
level, and in spite of having several aircraft shot down by anti-aircraft fire,
they sank one transport and set two others on fire. Now that hostilities had
definitely started, quick action was needed from Singapore. But nothing much
happened. General Percival found time to attend a meeting of the Legislative
Assembly in Kuala Lumpur, Brooke-Popham couldn't decide whether Operation
Matador was on or off, and Force Z was still at anchor. By afternoon the
Japanese had penetrated to the edge of the Kota Bharu airfield against heavy
resistance, and attacks by Japanese aircraft operating from Indochina had made
flight operations there impossible. At 6 PM British and Indian troops were
ordered to retreat. The Japanese had suffered about a thousand casualties, the
British about five hundred.
Force Z had missed its chance. The Japanese troops were ashore, their attack
was underway, and they could bring up supplies and reinforcements by land. In
London Churchill convened a meeting on the evening of December 9th to "review
the naval position." The big question was what to do with Force Z. Churchill
tells us that he favored sending the ships across the Pacific to join the
American Fleet. Heading south for Australia was also a possibility. But it was
all academic.
Admiral Phillips was unwilling to leave Singapore without taking some action,
but the city had already been bombed, and it was obviously unsafe just to sit
in the harbor. He decided to head north along the east coast of Malaya. It is
unclear what he was hoping to accomplish. Perhaps he thought that there would
be further landings, although the Japanese had no need to put troops on the
relatively isolated east coast. He requested fighter cover and reconnaissance
off Singora, but since he was determined to maintain radio silence at sea, and
the RAF and RAAF were in full retreat in northern Malaya, it is hard to see how
this could have been practical, even if the airmen were willing to try. The two
battleships and four destroyers sailed the evening of the 8th, and made their
way north all the next day. The weather was bad, rainy and cloudy, which hid
the force from Japanese aircraft, but made it hard for it to find anything.
They were spotted by a Japanese submarine, which reported their position but
was unable to get in position to attack. At about 8 PM Force Z turned back to
the south. Admiral Phillips did not know it, but he was very close to Japanese
cruisers that were covering the flank of the invasion. Had Phillips any idea
that the Japanese task force was so close to him, there would have been a major
battle. It might not have turned out well for the British. Although the
Japanese force was composed of cruisers and destroyers, visibility was very
poor, and the Japanese were armed with the famous Long Lance torpedoes.
During the night Admiral Phillips received a message that the Japanese were
invading at Kuantan, about halfway down the east side of the peninsula. He
decided to slow the task force so he could investigate. Although this proved to
be a fatal mistake, it is hard to see how he could have done otherwise. Having
sortied to interfere with the Japanese invasion, he could hardly ignore one
that might be happening right under his nose. He probably thought that he was
already out of range of torpedo bombers, not knowing that the Japanese had
provided their very long-legged medium bombers with that ability. At 8 AM a
destroyer was off Kuantan. Nothing at all was happening. There have since been
varying accounts of what happened: a water buffalo blundered into a minefield,
some fisherman were fired on. The nervous garrison had been spooked, but not by
Japanese. Force Z headed for Singapore.
Early that morning almost a hundred Mitsubishi G3M and G4M twin-engined
bombers, later code named "Nell" and "Sally" took off from bases in Indochina
in search of Force Z. About a third were armed with bombs, two-thirds with
torpedoes. About 11 AM the bombers, at the end of even their prodigious range,
sighted the Force Z. The level bombers attacked first, scoring a hit on the Repulse.
Then came the torpedo planes. Two torpedoes hit the Prince of Wales,
one doing fatal damage to her propellers. The next group of attackers focused
on the Repulse. She maneuvered desperately, evading 20 torpedoes, but
with Japanese planes attacking from every angle, it was just a question of
time. She was hit first about noon; four other hits followed, and she quickly
rolled over and sank. Now the Japanese could concentrate on the already
crippled Prince of Wales. Six more torpedo hits, and she too was on
her way to the bottom. None of the accompanying destroyers was damaged, and
they managed to rescue many survivors, but not Admiral Phillips. British sea
power in the far east was temporarily extinguished. Churchill says, "in all the
war, I never received a more direct shock.". And, "Over all this vast expanse
of waters, Japan was supreme, and we were naked."
With the navy and the air force defeated, the defense of Malaya was now up to
the army. They planned to resist the Japanese advance at Jitra, just south of
the Thai border on the west side of the peninsula. A column had been finally
sent to try and occupy the "Ledge", but it was too late. Japanese forces
accompanied by light tanks had beaten them to it, and sent them tumbling back
into Malaya. After driving in British forces screening the Jitra position in a
pouring rain, the Japanese arrived in front of the main positions the evening
of December 10th. A Japanese officer, Lieutenant Oto, penetrated the British
positions, killed a sentry, and reported that there were gaps in the defenses,
and a night attack was advisable. But when the Japanese tried to advance, they
were met with severe resistance and turned back. British artillery fire began
falling about them and the attack seemed to be in trouble. Colonel Tsuji went
back to hurry reinforcements forward. But as morning dawned the British and
Indian troops were looking over their shoulders. The airfield at Alor Star
which was covered by the Jitra position was being abandoned by the RAF, and the
soldiers couldn't help wondering why they were defending it. General Heath,
commanding the III Corps, went back to Singapore to request permission for his
forces to withdraw. Percival was reluctant, but as the Japanese began forcing
the British defenses, the order to retreat was given. A position which was
expected to hold out for weeks, or even months, was lost in a few hours. How
could this happen? The most important cause was the Japanese troops, who were
experienced in combat and advanced with the elan which characterized their
operations throughout the war. The British and Indian soldiers, by contrast,
were seeing the elephant for the first time. The British commanders were also
caught wrong-footed by the failure of their operations in southern Thailand,
and had not carefully prepared their defenses at Jitra. Finally, the British
forces were unsettled by the possibility of being outflanked by Japanese forces
coming over from the east coast. They also greatly overestimated the forces
against them, as they were to do throughout the campaign.
The defeat at Jitra started a trend which continued clear down the five hundred
miles of the Malay Peninsula. The British would try to make a stand, the
Japanese would attack, the British would retreat. It is often true that
soldiers retreating toward their base can move faster than their pursuers.
Supply lines shorten, and the advancing enemy must contend with blown bridges
and obstructed roads. However, in the Malaya campaign the Japanese were able to
stay right behind the retreating British, never giving them time to catch their
breath. There were at least two reasons for this. First, the British abandoned
vast quantities of stores and supplies. Tsuji refers to theses as "Churchill
Supplies", and the Japanese helped themselves to food, transport, and
munitions, which greatly eased their somewhat tenuous logistical situation. The
second reason was that the Japanese had issued their soldiers thousands of
bicycles. Western Malaya had good hard surfaced roads, and the Japanese
soldiers rode down them, as much as twenty hours at a stretch. The Japanese had
sold many bicycles in Malaya before the war, so they were able to find parts
and repairs in most towns and villages. When they could no longer repair the
tires, they rode on the rims. If the Japanese soldiers came to an unbridged
stream, they slung their bikes over their shoulders and waded through. When
larger bridges were blown, the Japanese engineers performed prodigies of quick
repair, so that not only bicycles, but tanks and lorries as well could pass
over in a surprisingly short time. "Even the long-legged Englishmen could not
escape our bicycles", says Tsuji, "This is the reason they were continually
driven off the roads and into the jungle where, with their retreat cut off,
they were forced to surrender".
What could General Percival have done? The most obvious thing would have been
to move replacement troops up to man defense lines well to the rear. There were
plenty of troops available in Singapore. But Percival was concerned, especially
after the demise of British sea power, that the Japanese might bypass the whole
Malay Peninsula and attempt a landing directly on Singapore. He also seemed
gripped by a sort of lassitude where problems upcountry seemed far away, and
the idea that the defense of Malaya was absolutely essential to the holding of
Singapore never really penetrated. In theory, although the British did not have
strong naval forces available, they should have owned the sea flank, since the
Japanese did not have a single vessel in the Indian Ocean. But the threat of
air power deterred the Navy, and it was the Japanese who managed to make
amphibious end runs, often using captured small boats.
The next possible defensive position after Jitra was on the Slim River. It was
overrun in a matter of minutes by a Japanese tank charge. The Japanese tanks
were not very good--their medium tank mounted a 57mm gun, their light tank a
37mm, and neither was very well armored. The Japanese tankers were lucky they
did not have to face the Russian T34's, with their 76mm cannon and powerful
sloped armor. But the Japanese tanks were too much for the British, who had
none, and the Gotenda Regiment roared down the road for several miles,
spreading panic and destruction.
Squadron Leader Harper returned from Australia in mid-December. He did not have
any new pilots with him. The Australians quite sensibly felt that the few
experienced pilots they had were needed as instructors and cadres, and should
not be wasted in what was shaping up to be a hopeless battle. He found his
squadron in complete disarray. They had been sent up to Ipoh, about halfway up
the peninsula, to assist another squadron that had been severely handled by the
Japanese. Morale was terrible, logistics were a mess, and one maintenance group
was trying to do the work of two. The only possible way the Buffalo could fight
with the Japanese planes was by using zoom and boom tactics, diving through
enemy formations from a great height, and using the speed gained to climb
again. Dogfighting with Zeros was suicide. But there was a total lack of any
warning system at Ipoh, and Buffalos were being destroyed on the ground, or
shot down while taking off and landing. The success that American P-40s and
F4F's of the Cactus Air Force on Guadalcanal had later in the year was due in
large part to the devoted effort of coastwatchers up the Slot, who were able to
give warning of Japanese raids. Without such a network in Malaya, Harper's men
were helpless. He also commented that "The ex civil Airline engines on the
Buffalos were quite unsuited to the treatment they were getting in combat and
on the ground..." Just about the time Harper began to establish an observer
system and bring some order to the situation, the squadron was forced to
retreat again. The one saving grace to the air situation was that the Japanese
air units were not coordinated with the army, and tended to raid civilian
targets. There was a horrific raid on Penang City on December 11, and daily
attacks on Singapore. In mid January a reinforcement convoy brought in 60
Hurricane fighters in crates. The arrival of these planes was greeted with
great optimism, but although the Hurricane was a capable fighter, certainly a
big improvement on the Buffalo, it was not better than the Zero. The Japanese
had over four hundred planes available by that time, and the Hurricanes were
too few in number to make much of a difference. However Colonel Tsuji notes,
"...the Hurricanes flying low over the rubber forest were a serious challenge.
Their intrepid pilots continually machine-gunned our roads, shooting up our
motor transportation and blocking traffic....."
At the end of December Brooke-Popham was relieved, probably much to his relief.
General Henry Pownell was appointed to take his place, but soon after that the
Far Eastern Command was shut down, and everything from India east was placed
under the command of Field Marshal Earl Wavell. Pownell became his Chief of
Staff. Wavell and Pownell flew to Singapore in January. They were not impressed
with Percival. "He is an uninspiring leader, and rather gloomy…" noted Pownell
in his diary. But they couldn't think of anyone to replace him, so he was left
in charge. Meanwhile the Japanese continued to move south. Kuala Lumpur,
capital of Malaya, fell on January 11th.
The onrushing Japanese received a check on January 14th. The Australians were
finally in action. Their flamboyant commander, General Gordon Bennett, was
anxious for his men to have a crack at the enemy, and the 27th Brigade was
given responsibility for blocking the main road south through Lohore. At a
hamlet called Gemas the Australians ambushed the Japanese, letting several
bicycle-riding groups ride by, then catching them from the rear. The Japanese
5th Division suffered casualties, but it is still not clear how many--certainly
more than a hundred The tanks also took a beating. Australian Sergeants Ken
Harrison and Charlie Parsons set up a pair of anti-tank guns near the main
road. They remained there in spite of being told by the commander on the spot,
Lt. Colonel Galleghan, that the Japanese wouldn't be attacking with tanks, and
that the guns were not needed or wanted. Sure enough, the tanks of the Gotanda
Detachment came roaring up the road in their usual aggressive style. T-34's,
American Grants, or German PkW IV's would have laughed at the sergeants' 2
pounder popguns, but the thin-skinned Japanese tanks were vulnerable, and the
Australians shot them to pieces. "The Gotanda Tank Detachment came under heavy
fire in a mined zone", says Tsuji, "and lost its ten tanks one after the
other..."
But although the Australians had a strong position astride the main road, their
flanks were shaky. Japanese advancing up the coast, and along the jungle were
able to force them out. This would have been a great time for General Percival
to commit some of those troops he was saving in Singapore, but, like all
generals who are getting licked, he was convinced that he was heavily
outnumbered, and that falling back was the only option. Another problem with
operations in the southern part of the Malay peninsula was the vast rubber
plantations on either side of the main road. Crisscrossed with little access
roads, they made it very hard to establish a flank. Of course, this could have
worked both ways, but the Japanese were going forward, and the British were
going back. On the last day of January the Argyll regiment filed across the
causeway to Singapore, which was blown up behind them. The battle of Malaya was
over. The battle of Singapore was about to start.
The RAF and the RAAF were just about at the end of their strength. The last
major operation was on January 26th, when the decision was made to attack a
Japanese reinforcement convoy landing on the lower east side of the peninsula
using Hudsons and antiquated biplane Vildebeest torpedo bombers, escorted by
the remaining Buffalos and Hurricanes. Some damage was done to the Japanese
shipping, but the Vildebeests in particular were massacred by Japanese fighter
cover. Early in February all remaining flyable planes were flown off to
Sumatra. Ground crews were instructed to remain to be issued weapons and fight
as infantry. Flight Lieutenant Harper remained with the ground crews, who were
upset at being abandoned this way, and at Harper's stiff upper lip attitude. A
couple of days later it occurred to someone that trained ground crew were as
necessary to flight operations as trained pilots, and the whole unit was
evacuated by ship. The Japanese also transferred a major part of their air
strength to the attack on the Netherlands East Indies. Colonel Tsuji was very
indignant about this, ascribing it to jealousy at General Headquarters. This
may have been true, but it was also possible that GHQ saw the Singapore
campaign as almost over, and while the capture of Singapore was an important
objective, it was even more vital to capture the oil fields of Sumatra and
Borneo quickly, before they could be destroyed by the allies.
At this point the situation on Singapore was hopeless. If there was one lesson
from World War II, it was that islands could not be held under determined
attack when air control above them was lost. Crete, Pantellaria, Tarawa,
Peleliu, Iwo Jima, Okinawa, it was the same story every time. And the one
occasion--Wake--when the attack was fought off, the Japanese simply returned
with enough strength to do the job. And Singapore had several disadvantages
that many of islands listed above did not have. Although General Percival's
strategy, if he had one, seemed to be to husband his strength for a final
defense of Singapore, surprisingly little had been done to fortify the beaches
on the landward side. No pillboxes dug and poured, little wire strung, etc.
Singapore is not very far from Malaya, so the entire island could be commanded
by artillery sited on the mainland. And worst of all there was a huge number of
civilians, maybe as many as a million, all needing food and water. The British
kept pushing in reinforcements: the British 18th division, the 44th Indian
Brigade, 7000 Indian replacements, and 1700 Australian replacements all came in
on convoys. The ships that brought them in also took refugees out, mostly
Europeans, but only a tiny percentage of Singaporeans could leave. The rest
were just another worry for an already very worried General Percival.
Having said that, however, there is no reason why Singapore could not have held
out for weeks, perhaps even months. While their morale was sky high, the
Japanese troops were exhausted from their long trek down the peninsula. The 5th
Division had been given two days rest, which it badly needed. There were few if
any reserves. The Japanese army was committed to operations in the Philippines,
East Indies, and as far as New Britain and the Solomons, and had no troops in
the area to spare. There was a serious shortage of artillery ammunition, and,
as indicated above, a major part of their air support had been moved. And the
Japanese were still outnumbered two to one. General Yamashita Tomoyuki stood in
the glass-enclosed observation tower in the palace of the Sultan of Johore
looking out over Singapore. He wanted it. He wanted it now. He knew all the
problems that have just been listed, but he was determined to assault the
island as soon as possible. Nothing he had seen of the British impressed him,
and he felt that a sharp attack might lead to success. He approved a simple but
effective plan. The Guards Division would carry out a feint to the northwest,
the 5th and 18th Divisions would cross the straits at their narrowest point and
attack the east and north coasts of Singapore. The Guards would follow. The
commander of the Guards Division objected to this plan on the grounds that his
troops did not have a prominent enough role, and it was adjusted to give them a
little more to do.
On the other side, General Percival was clueless. Singapore is a fairly large
island, with a circumference of about 70 miles. Unable to discern where the
attack might come from, Percival decided to to spread his troops out along the
entire coast, thus insuring that wherever the Japanese attacked, the defenders
would be too weak to resist them. Nor would there be any significant reserve
available to counterattack. He was convinced as always that the Japanese were
far more numerous than they were, but this made his failure to put his troops
where they could be concentrated at need all the more puzzling. He was never
able to lose his fear that the enemy would swoop in from the seaward flank, and
he told Wavell, that he thought the Japanese would probably attack from the
northwest, down the Johore River.
Troops sent to the northeast coast were discouraged by what they found. Not
only was there nothing in the way of fortifications, but the terrain was
unsuitable for coastal defense, since mangrove swamps limited visibility and
field of fire. The Japanese were shelling the island, and soon set fuel dumps
ablaze, but the British were conserving artillery ammunition for what Percival
was hoping would be an extended siege. When Australian General Bennett was
asked privately by one of his brigadiers about the garrison's chances, he gave
them about ten days. However, he didn't seem to have any ideas about how to
improve that, and ignored the brigadier's request to have at least some reserve
available.
On February 8th the Japanese shelling increased, and the Guards carried out
their feint. This did not affect Percival's depositions in any way, serving
merely to confirm his opinion that the blow would not fall in the obvious
place. That night the 5th and 18th divisions crossed over to the east and
northeast coasts of Singapore in several waves, as all the small boats
available to the Japanese plied back and forth. The thinly spread defenders on
the coast were overwhelmed, in some cases fighting bravely, in others fleeing.
By dawn the Japanese were firmly lodged on the shore, and no British troops
were available to drive them off. The next night the Guards division attacked
near the broken causeway, further to the west. Soon Yamashita's headquarters
received reports that the attack was a failure, and that the British had
flooded the water with burning petroleum. However, the report turned out to be
false, and Tsuji was given another opportunity to dismiss the Guards: "Did not
this incident show the true nature of the Kanoe [Guards] Division?", he asks
rhetorically.
Having succeeded in crossing the water, Yamashita was not in a great hurry. He
knew that time was on his side. The Japanese advanced deliberately toward the
center of the island over the next two days. Their goal was the village of
Burkit Timah, and control of the island's reservoir. The British attempted to
establish a defensive line along the Jurong Creek, but although there was
sporadic heavy fighting, most of the defending troops lacked enthusiasm. At
British headquarters plans were made and orders were given for counterattacks
and heavy resistance, but on the front lines not much was done. The smell of
defeat was in the air, along with the burning oil tanks, and everyone had a
strong whiff of it. Deserters, those unfortunate Australian "replacements", and
desperate civilians were all running around Singapore town getting drunk
rioting, or looking for a way out. The harbor was still full of ships, and they
began leaving. Most made it to some destination, although several were sunk
with great loss of life. Some attempt was made to evacuate military
specialists, such as Squadron Leader Harper's ground crews. It took General
Percival a few days to accept the inevitable, but on February 15th he agreed to
surrender. Most books on the subject have pictures of the surrender at the
damaged Ford Motor Company factory: Percival gaunt, unhappy, Yamashita sleek,
triumphant.
In the short interval before the Japanese were able to establish control quite
a number of people attempted to escape on anything that would float. Some were
lucky. General Gordon Bennett wandered down to the waterfront with his aide and
a couple of other officers, and managed to commandeer a junk. They climbed
aboard, later changed to another vessel, made it to Sumatra, and from there
back to Australia. General Bennett said he had fled to give the Australian
government the benefit of his expertise in fighting the Japanese, but no one
was impressed. There was considerable criticism of his having left his men, but
he probably felt that was a small price to pay for being able to spend the war
in Australia instead of a Japanese prison camp. He eventually wrote a fulsome
introduction for the English translation of Colonel Tsuji's book. Some were not
so lucky. Mr. Vivian Bowden, the Australian Trade Commissioner for Shanghai,
been instructed to close the consulate there in September and go to Singapore
because of the increasing threat of war with Japan. He requested permission to
return to Australia, but was told to "stick to his post." On February 14th he
succeeding in finding a place on a small launch, but the craft was intercepted
by a Japanese naval vessel and forced to return to Singapore. He was seen
arguing with a Japanese guard, was taken outside the movie house where
civilians were being held, and shot.
Once the Japanese did establish control, they moved in to stay. They renamed
the city Shonan "Light of the South", requisitioned various buildings and
facilities, later established the Southern Army headquarters there, and used
its magnificent port facilities to base various units of the Imperial Fleet.
The dreaded military police under the leadership of Lt. Colonel Oishi took
control of the city, and immediately rounded up tens of thousands of Chinese
men. They were screened by kempaitai officers against lists of known supporters
of the Nationalist Chinese. In addition anyone with a tattoo, indicating tong
membership, teachers, lawyers, other professionals, community leaders, or
anyone else who gave a wrong answer or had the wrong face was taken outside
town, shot, and dumped into mass graves. Estimates of the number killed range
from 5000 to 50,000. General Yamashita said at his trial that he was unaware
that this was going on, but it seems hard to believe that civilians could be
killed on that scale totally unbeknownst to the man who was nominally in charge
of the whole island. More likely the General chose to be unaware of proceedings
he did not approve of but could not control. There was, of course, no paper
trail, but there is considerable testimony that Colonel Tsuji was involved in
the planning the massacre. Soon he was off to the Philippines, where the defeat
of American forces there was behind schedule, and the "war planning god" was
needed.
Not quite every British serviceman in Malaya was a Japanese captive. Some were
still blundering around in the jungle waiting to be picked up, but the British
had also authorized a few "stay behind" parties to serve as the nucleus for
resistance. One of these was headed by Lt. F. Spencer Chapman. Chapman's group
attempted one ambush, then realized that pinpricks like this were futile once
Singapore had surrendered. They went to ground in the wilds of the central
peninsula. Chapman himself joined up with communist insurgents, who were
doubtful about his politics, but liked his military skills and used him as an
instructor. After many adventures, including being captured and escaping, and
an abortive attempt to set up an intelligence network in Singapore, Chapman was
evacuated by submarine in 1945 and wrote a book about his experiences.
The day after the surrender a large number of Indian Army personnel, officers
and men, were taken to a large open area called Farrer Park. Here they were
addressed briefly by a British officer, and then at length by Captain Mohan
Singh, an officer who had been captured in northern Malaya. He told the
assembled Indians. that they were invited to join the Indian National Army, a
military organization that would, under Japanese auspices, liberate India from
British rule. Reaction was mixed, some enthusiastic, some skeptical. But the
Japanese had no plans to invade India immediately. The Burma campaign was just
under way, so they were patient. Eventually quite a large force--a division and
a good part of another--was recruited. Readers interested in the story of the
Indian National Army should read Peter Ward Fay's objective, detailed and
sympathetic book "The Forgotten Army.": Many other sources are either
dismissive (traitors!) or fulsome (heroes!)
What lessons were learned? The British learned that the Japanese, far from
being contemptible little buck-toothed losers, were dangerous, tenacious, and
aggressive enemies. They learned that the Japanese Army and Navy could strike
far and fast, on the surface and in the air. They also learned that the
Japanese could be extremely cruel and vicious.
The Japanese learned that the Western soldiers and their Asian allies were
poorly led and poorly motivated, and that the Japanese could conduct operations
with inadequate numbers on a logistic shoestring, counting on their matchless
elan and on capturing supplies as they went. When they attempted to apply these
lessons against better soldiers with better leaders at places like Guadalcanal
and Imphal, the results were disastrous.
Perhaps the people of Asia learned the most. They learned that these British
who had been walking around as if God had chosen them to colonize the world
could be beaten and humiliated just like anyone else. But the Asians also
learned that being ordered around by the Japanese could be even more annoying,
and often much more painful. What, they thought, if we were able to run our own
affairs? That thought had to stay on hold for a few years, but it would
eventually come into its own.
Bibliography
Primary:
Warren, Allen. Singapore. Talisman. 2002. (A detailed and well
researched account of the campaign).
Tsuji, Masanobu. Japan's Greatest Victory Britain's Worst Defeat. Sarpedon.
1993, 1997 (The mysterious colonel's story, with himself in the leading role).
Secondary:
Bayley, Christopher and Harper, Tim. Forgotten Armies. Belknapp Press,
2005.
Chant, Chis. Aircraft of World War II. Barnes and Noble, 1999.
Chapman, F Spencer. The Jungle Is Neutral. Chatto and Windus, 1949.
Churchill, Winston. The Grand Alliance. Houghton Mifflin 1950.
Churchill, Winston. The Hinge of Fate . Houghton Mifflin, 1950.
Dunnigan, James F. and Nofi, Albert A. The Pacific War Encyclopedia. Checkmark,
1998.
Fay, Peter Ward. The Forgotten Army. University of Michigan Press,
1995.
Ienaga, Saburo. The Pacific War 1931-1945. Pantheon, 1978.
Reynolds, David. In Command of History. Random House, 2005.
Tarling, Nicholas. A Sudden Rampage , University of Hawaii Press,
2001.
Trewhitt, Philip. Armored Fighting Vehicles . Barnes and Noble, 1999.
Ward, Ian. The Killer They Called a God , Media Masters 1992.
Zich, Arthur. The Rising Sun , Time-Life, 1997.
And a few excellent websites
http://www.microworks.net/pacific/personal/pow_repulse.htm
http://www.ww2australia.gov.au/index.html
http://www.warbirdforum.com/buff.htm
http://www.bbc.co.uk/dna/ww2/A1122391
http://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/fall_of_singapore.htm
Copyright © 2006 Allen Parfitt.
Written by Allen Parfitt. If you have questions or comments on this article,
please contact Allen Parfitt at:
aparfitt@comcast.net.
About the author:
Allen Parfitt is a retired teacher. He has had a life-long interest in military affairs. He lives near Kalamazoo, Michigan with
his wife and four cats. He is continually adding to his library of books on military history.
Published online: 04/01/2006.
|
