Battle of the Barents Sea
by Irwin J. Kappes
Introduction
The Battle of Barents Sea on the morning of 31 December 1942 was not
operationally noteworthy. The Nazis lost one destroyer and the British lost one
aging destroyer and a minesweeper. But the battle has continued to intrigue
naval historians and tacticians even after nearly sixty years. It taught many
lessons, the prime one being that one goes into a naval battle resolutely or
not at all.
To understand how this battle--skirmish, really--could have had such
far-reaching consequences we have to consider the dilemma confronting Hitler at
a time when his Sixth Army and Fourth Panzer Army were surrounded at
Stalingrad. The Soviets were counting heavily on materiel from the west which
could be supplied only through a treacherous sea route through the Barents Sea
into Murmansk. During the summer, the edge of the ice pack retreated to 300
miles from the North Cape of Norway, so convoys could pass well clear of a
coastline dotted with German air bases. But the long summer days also made them
vulnerable to u-boat attack. Conversely, in winter when ice-free waters
narrowed to 150 miles and the days were short, the u-boat danger was lessened
but air attacks became more frequent. The Luftwaffe had been successful in
sinking large numbers of Allied merchantmen in the turbulent, icy waters of the
Barents Sea. But now Field Marshal Hermann Göring's dwindling number of
fighters and bombers were urgently needed on the eastern front in support of
the attempted Stalingrad breakout. Russian re-supply would have to be crushed
by the Nazi surface and undersea fleet if it was going to be done at all. And
winter was the time to do it.
Like Churchill, Hitler fancied himself a master strategist and often
second-guessed his generals and admirals. Because of some British commando
landings in Norway he became convinced that the British planned to invade
Norway and that Sweden would then join forces with Russia and trap his land
forces in a gigantic pincer move. His naval commander-in-chief, Großadmiral
Erich Raeder dissented and correctly reasoned that the Allies' next move would
be an invasion of North Africa. Hitler disagreed and decided it was time for
his surface fleet to prove its mettle. For years he had railed against his
surface ship fleet, calling it a poor imitation of the British navy and a
breeding ground for malcontents and revolutionaries. But he was deeply
conflicted on the issue. While often referring to it as a useless liability, he
was placing an inordinate confidence in its ability to crush any Allied attempt
to invade Norway or re-supply the Russians . In truth, a megalomaniacal Hitler
had little understanding of naval operations and strategy. And his long
distrust of the Kriegsmarine would come to a head on the morning of 31 December
1942.
The Allied convoy designated JW51-B sailed from Loch Ewe in Scotland on 22
December. It consisted of 14 merchant ships and tankers carrying over 200
tanks, about 2,500 trucks, 125 aircraft, 18,000 tons of fuel oil, 13,000 tons
of aviation fuel and 54,000 tons of miscellaneous products. It was escorted by
six British destroyers under the command of Captain Robert St. V. Sherbrooke.
(Sherbrooke was a direct descendant of Lord St. Vincent who had been knighted
after his victory over the Spanish fleet in 1797). Hitler had issued strict
orders to Admiral Kübler, who was the commander in charge of his northern
sector that, since the navy now had the major responsibility for containing the
ability of the Allies to re-supply the Russians it should pursue this cause
vigorously, but great caution should be shown "even against enemies of equal
strength" because it was "undesirable for the capital ships to take any great
risks". The Führer informed Kübler further that he wished to be kept up-to-date
on the details of all naval operations because he could "not sleep a wink while
the ships are operating". Hitler's concern was mystifying since he had
regularly calumniated the German Navy as peopled by slackers and whiners. It
was doubly puzzling because the encirclement of his 230,000 troops in the
Stalingrad pocket did not seem to disturb his slumber in the slightest.
Furthermore, the words of equal strength could be interpreted a multitude of
ways. A destroyer with a skilled commander and a well-trained crew can be of
equal strength to a cruiser commanded by a craven martinet with an
undisciplined crew. So a confusing order requiring vigorous combat coupled with
extraordinary caution was bound to have untoward consequences. As any junior
naval officer might have told him, great naval battles are not won by extremely
cautious men.
Actually, the German Naval Staff devised an excellent tactical plan for dealing
with the re-supply convoys. It was dubbed Operation Regenbogen (Rainbow). It
provided for the pocket-battleship Lützow and the heavy cruiser Hipper to sail
from the base at Altenfjord along with an escort of six destroyers. They were
to separate into two groups during the night. The Lützow would be 75 miles
south of the Hipper early the next morning. The two ships would then turn
eastward along the convoy's course, each ship with her three destroyers spread
15 miles apart. When the convoy was sighted, the Hipper group would attack
first from the north. This would draw the escorts to the north and force the
convoy to turn south directly into the range of the pocket battleship Lützow.
The Hipper would speedily dispatch the much more lightly-armed escorts, while
the Lützow would enjoy a turkey shoot in sinking the merchantmen. The Lützow
and its six destroyers were commanded by Admiral Oskar Kummetz. What Kummetz
did not know was that the previous convoy, JW51-A, which had arrived safely in
Murmansk, had been protected by the SHEFFIELD and the JAMAICA, two cruisers
under the command of Rear Admiral R. L. Burnett, who was a veteran of the
Arctic convoys. And these cruisers were now patrolling the area between the
Kola peninsula and the North Cape (the precise route that convoy JW51-B was to
follow).
Because of the ice floes, JW51-B was sailing single file on 30 December
approximately 230 miles from the North Cape when it was spotted by Lieutenant
Herschleb aboard the U-354. Because Hitler had so involved himself in the
convoy operations, Admiral Raeder took a personal role and ordered his task
force to get underway immediately. Under direct orders from Hitler, the message
included the phrase "Procedure on meeting the enemy is to avoid a superior
force, otherwise destroy according to established protocol"--it was still
another message not calculated to inspire heroic action.
The Battle
The drama began to unfold at 0830 on the morning of 31 December. The
FLOWER-class corvette HYDERABAD was on the starboard quarter of the convoy when
her captain spotted two shapes on the horizon that could only be destroyers. He
had been advised that two Russian destroyers were moving west to assist in the
escort, so he took no action. The same ships were sighted by the OBDURATE ten
minutes later, but this time her captain advised Sherbrooke "Two unidentified
destroyers bearing west, course north". Sherbrooke signaled "Investigate", but
lamp signaling takes time and OBDURATE's captain had anticipated the order and
was already swinging around. By 0915, OBDURATE had sighted three destroyers and
flashed a challenge. There was no reply, which might not have been suspicious
if they had been Russian, but suddenly one of the German ships opened fire. The
British ships immediately began to go into a formation previously ordered by
Sherbrooke. ONSLOW, OBDURATE, OBEDIENT and ORWELL steamed in the direction of
the gun flashes, while ACHATES, which was between the convoy and the enemy
began a smokescreen of black smoke from her funnels and white smoke from smoke
floats.
A half hour later, Sherbrooke made out a large ominous-looking shape in the
haze and it was heading straight for him. Finally, it made a turn to port which
enabled him to identify it. There could be no doubt. It was the Hipper, a hulk
about seven times the size of his flagship. Courageous as his four 1,540 ton
destroyers might have been, they were no match for her eight 8-inch guns.
At 0930, Admiral Burnett's two cruisers began making flank speed to join the
fray. Meanwhile, the Hipper brought all guns to bear on ACHATES, which made a
perfect target because it stood out in contrast to its own black smokescreen.
It took crippling damage with the loss of 40 men plus her captain, Lt.
Commander A.H.T. Jones, but then Hipper shifted its guns to the ONSLOW and
ORWELL. Both ships were now darting in and out of the snow squalls and smoke.
The dazzle camouflage patterns of British ships sometimes made them easier to
spot but in this circumstance it worked to their distinct advantage. Gunners
aboard the Hipper had difficulty in finding targets in the dappled gray haze
and the superiority of British fire-control radar was now making a difference.
Meanwhile, the plucky ACHATES continued to protect the convoy with her
smokescreen. Finally, at 1254, with a 60-degree list, a trawler came alongside
to take off the surviving 80 crewmembers. At 1314 the brave little ship
capsized and sank.
It was beginning to appear to Sherbrooke that the Germans had no great lust for
battle. Instead of steaming toward the targets, bringing all forward guns to
bear and presenting a smaller silhouette, Kummetz seemed to retreat and hide in
the smoke and squalls while inching his way to the northeast. His log entry on
the occasion tells the story: "Only quick action can solve the problem of
danger from torpedo attacks and this has to be considered in the light of my
orders not to take any serious risks." Nevertheless, his evasive actions had
the effect of causing the British to react as the German Naval Staff had
predicted. The convoy was now turning away to the southeast behind a
smokescreen right where Kummetz knew the
Lützow would be waiting to spring the trap. Sherbrooke decided to shadow the
Hipper with his own ship plus the ORWELL, maintaining the threat of the torpedo
fire that was Kummetz's only fear from two British destroyers. The rest of his
flotilla was dispatched to guard the convoy. He knew that as long as he could
keep the Hipper preoccupied, it would be unable to break through to endanger
the convoy. The Hipper and Sherbrooke's destroyers exchanged inaccurate gunfire
made difficult by the poor visibility, frozen ammunition racks and the constant
icing-up of gun barrels. Finally, Hipper turned northward in an attempt to draw
the British destroyers after him. When this failed, he turned back and with
clearing weather conditions was able to score some solid hits on the ONSLOW.
One hit shattered a surface radar antenna and caused thousands of splinters to
pepper the bridge. One struck Sherbrooke in the head, smashing a cheekbone and
causing his left eye to hang loose from its socket. For a few moments no one on
the bridge knew of his injury because he kept giving orders in an even voice.
Another officer nearby found himself covered in blood and thought he had been
hit, but soon noticed that it was Sherbrooke who had been severely wounded. In
the finest British "stiff upper lip" tradition, Sherbrooke refused medical
attention until finally command of the flotilla was passed to Lt. Commander D.
C. Kinloch on the OBEDIENT. Forty-seven men had been killed or wounded on the
ONSLOW and for his valor, Sherbrooke was later awarded the Victoria Cross. On
the Hipper, Kummetz was unaware of having dealt the crippling blow as he turned
his attention to the OBEDIENT, which had impudently opened fire first. A short
but inconclusive exchange ensued, during which Kummetz apparently recalled his
orders to avoid unnecessary risks.
While this was a case of a heavy cruiser pitted against a destroyer, he had to
be well aware that the destroyer had eight unexpended torpedoes, while his ship
was inadequately armored. Also, British 8-inch shells consistently detonated
while German shells were notoriously unreliable.
To compound Kummetz's dilemma, Admiral Burnett's cruisers SHEFFIELD and JAMAICA
appeared seemingly out of nowhere. The SHEFFIELD opened fire first, straddling
Hipper with several salvos before getting her range and then scoring a damaging
hit. Kummetz attempted to swing around and make smoke but before he could do so
Hipper took two more hits. Again immobilized by Hitler's restrictive orders, he
decided he was already in deep trouble for taking what the Führer would
consider an unacceptable risk, so he ordered a cease fire and a speedy
withdrawal of all units. But Burnett suffered no such reluctance to engage. At
1133, the German destroyers Friedrich Eckholdt and Richard Beitzen mistook the
SHEFFIELD and the JAMAICA for the Hipper and Lützow and attempted to link up
with them. Before the German commanders could realize their error, every gun on
the two British cruisers opened up.
Being closer in, the Friedrich Eckholdt was hit directly amidships and sunk
within less than two minutes. The Richard Beitzen escaped unharmed. This
distraction had taken the British cruisers to the north of the convoy and
caused them to lose contact with the Hipper which was now hustling westward to
join the Lützow. Meanwhile, Captain Stänge aboard the Lützow identified several
possible targets in the convoy through the mist and smoke. The nearest was
three miles away and the farthest seven. Though the range of his guns was 15
miles he fired 87 11-inch and 75 6-inch rounds without scoring a direct hit.
Stänge had missed the sort of opportunity seldom presented to a naval
commander.
Ironically, Admiral Kummetz's Operation Rainbow tactic had worked. The Hipper
had served as a decoy to attract the escorts and the convoy had then turned
southward directly into the path of the pocket battleship Lützow, just as
expected. But both German heavyweights were timidly fought, although it must be
admitted that they had been hampered by periods of poor visibility. As he
retreated toward the naval base at Altenfjord, Stänge noted sadly in his war
diary, "As we withdrew from the battle scene, it was hard to escape the feeling
that, even though the situation appeared to be in our favor, we were unable to
get at the convoy and scored no successes whatsoever."
Conclusion
At his Wolfsschanze headquarters, Hitler impatiently awaited news of Operation
Rainbow. At 1147, the U-354 sent an ambiguous message reporting great success.
Kummetz observed radio silence on his way back to Altenfjord, but after he
anchored a series of operational mishaps prevented his report from being
transmitted until late the following afternoon. By that time, Hitler had
learned the news gleefully reported by the BBC. Ignoring the fact that his own
contradictory orders were largely to blame for the timorous behavior of his
commanders, he excoriated the blameless Admiral Krancke who had the misfortune
to be the navy's representative at the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht Hauptquartier
(the rough equivalent of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff). The failure of the
operation was bad in itself, but Hitler interpreted the tardy report as an
insubordinate unwillingness to report bad news.
Großadmiral Raeder, who by this time knew what awaited him, was summoned to OKW
headquarters, and Hitler's tirade began anew. With veins standing out on his
neck he began a peroration which lasted nearly an hour and a half. This
operation only confirmed what he had instinctively felt all along--that the
surface fleet was completely useless and that it was poorly staffed and ineptly
commanded. The three battleships Tirpitz, Schleswig-Holstein and Schlesien, the
two pocket battleships Admiral Scheer and Lützow, the battle-cruisers
Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, the heavy cruisers Hipper and Prinz Eugen, and the
light cruisers Emden, Köln, Leipzig, and Nürnberg would all be decommissioned
and summarily scrapped. To the extent possible their guns would be converted to
land use. Henceforth, the largest navy ship would be a destroyer and all
emphasis would be on the u-boat fleet. Raeder was ordered to come back with a
plan of implementation.
Raeder couldn't believe that Hitler was serious--that the fleet he had
assembled through much hard work and sacrifice would simply be sent to the
scrap heap. So the plan he came back with was one last hurrah for the German
fleet. In it he pointed out that Hitler's order would free up only about 300
officers and 8,500 rated sailors. The resulting scrap steel would meet only
one-twentieth of Germany's requirement for one month. It would also divert
7,000 workers urgently needed elsewhere. Furthermore, the effect of all this on
the submarine fleet would be minimal. For example, even if all the steel were
to be used in building u-boats, only seven new boats could be built per month.
And if the guns were to be used as coastal batteries, the first would not be
ready for at least a year. In addition, most of the men made available would be
unsuited to u-boat service. Therefore, Raeder argued, "I am convinced that the
smaller nucleus fleet of destroyers would be unable to accomplish the task
assigned to it. The decommissioning of our major assets will hand the enemy a
substantial victory at no cost and will be seen by them as a lack of resolve."
Hitler would have none of it. At this point, Göring, who was always eager to
protect the Luftwaffe's interests at the expense of the other armed services
pointed out that it required a large complement of fighters to shield the ships
from enemy attack while they swung uselessly at their anchors in Norwegian
fjords. And these planes were urgently needed on the eastern front. Raeder soon
recognized that Hitler was not amenable to reason and in private conference
reluctantly submitted his resignation. On 30 January 1943 he gave up his
command and was given an honorary job as inspector-general.
Although the ambitious Admiral Dönitz was among the most junior admirals in the
navy, he was the commander of the u-boat force, so it was no surprise to anyone
that he was named Raeder's successor. Like some U.S. Air Force generals who
have argued that wars can be won entirely by air warfare, Dönitz had argued
that u-boats could win the war against the Allies. But it took no more than a
few months before he was himself arguing that the Tirpitz and the Scharnhorst
should be retained. Hitler had a great deal of confidence in Dönitz because his
u-boats were producing results, and the two ships were reprieved. Later, the
rest of the capital ships were spared as well, ignominiously declared
"obsolete". Ironically, the next time Scharnhorst sailed, it would be to attack
a convoy escorted by the ONSLOW, the ORWELL, the SHEFFIELD, the JAMAICA and the
battleship DUKE OF YORK Admiral Burnett's cruisers first sighted the
Scharnhorst and in a completely one-sided battle she was sunk by the DUKE OF
YORK.
Against his own ingrained convictions, Hitler had allowed himself twenty years
before to become convinced that a German surface navy could checkmate the power
of the British high seas fleet. But for his own lack of resolve, he might have
succeeded.
The Battle Line
German Naval Forces
Admiral Kübler, Commander, Northern Sector
Vice Admiral Kummetz, Commander Task Force
"Lützow" - Pocket Battleship
"Hipper" - Heavy Cruiser (Damaged)
"Friedrich Eckholdt" - Destroyer (Sunk)
"Richard Beitzen" - Destroyer
Z-29 - Destroyer
Z-30 - Destroyer
Z-31 - Destroyer
British Naval Forces
Admiral Torey, C-in-C, Home Fleet
Rear Admiral R. L. Burnett, Cruiser Command
Capt. R. St.V. Sherbrooke, Destroyer Command
"Sheffield" - Light Cruiser
"Jamaica" - Light Cruiser
"Onslow" (flag) - Destroyer (Damaged)
"Obedient" - Destroyer
"Obdurate" - Destroyer
"Orwell" - Destroyer
"Oribi" - Destroyer
"Achates" - Destroyer (Sunk)
"Northern Gem" - Armed Trawler
"Vizalma" - Armed Trawler
"Hyderabad" - Corvette
"Rhododendron" - Corvette
"Bramble" - Minesweeper (Sunk)
Copyright © 2003 Irwin J. Kappes
Written by Irwin Kappes. If you have questions or comments on this
article, please contact Irwin Kappes at:
ijkapp@yahoo.com.
About the author:
Mr. Kappes served in U.S. Navy on destroyers in the Atlantic and
Pacific during WWII. He holds an MBA from Boston University and retired after a 32 year advertising career with the Du
Pont Company. He was also a retired Vice President with United States Hosiery. He is married and his hobbies include painting,
writing, and travel. His hometown is New Castle, PA. and presently living in Tinton Falls, NJ.
Published online: 6/13/2003.
* Views expressed by contributors are their own and do not necessarily represent
those of MHO.
|
