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Bomber Command
by Brian Grafton
Introduction
The Allied armies had been overpowered, first in Norway and then, very rapidly
indeed, in Holland, Belgium and France. The "Miracle at Dunkirk", the final act
of a strategic and tactical rout which began in the Ardennes, had deposited
330,000 bedraggled troops in Britain with weapons little larger than rifle
calibre. Britain herself was open for invasion, defended only by over- and
under-aged Local Defence Volunteers[1] armed with little more than pitch-forks
and hunting rifles and by scattered commonwealth troops with few weapons,
haphazard training and no combat experience. At sea, the Royal Navy had had
mixed success and was still a major force. The loss of Courageous and the early
embarrassment of U-47's success in Scapa Flow had been off-set by the hunting
down of Graf Spee. But the fall of Europe to the Wehrmacht and the loss of the
French fleet had drastically skewed the role the Royal Navy was expected to
play in any European war (keeping the sea-lanes open; and blockade). With all
of the coastline from Sweden to Spain at her disposal, the Kriegsmarine had a
substantially increased opportunity to sever England's lifelines to her
commonwealth and empire and starve her into submission. The Royal Navy had
neither the weapons, the ships, the tactics nor the personnel to conduct
effective counter-measures to the threat the U-boats presented, a bleak reality
that was not to change for three years. At the same time, the threat from
surface raiders would keep many of Britain's capital ships hog-tied at Scapa
for years to come.
Read More...
1941
On December 7, the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbour, forcing the Americans into
a war with Japan. Meeting a commitment he had made to the Japanese ambassador
earlier in the year, and despite advice to the contrary, on December 11 Adolf
Hitler declared war on the United States, thus bringing the U.S. into the
European war. These events form the backdrop against which Bomber Command
played its role in 1941. It was the hardest year that Bomber Command was to
face. Strategically, the goals of Bomber Command did not change with the
changing year. Synthetic oil production facilities continued to receive top
priority early in the year because it was thought Germany's oil supplies were
dwindling. Enemy-held ports and harbours; always the easiest targets to find;
continued to receive attention. General industrial areas were still target
options when weather or ground haze made precision bombing impossible. During
the long winter months in northern Europe, there were many nights when
industrial urban targets were the only ones that were realistically available.
Operationally, however, Bomber Command's targets shifted according to the
requirements of the nation or the whim of its leaders. By late February, the
slaughter of merchant ships in the Atlantic, coupled with the continued threat
posed by Kriegsmarine surface vessels ( Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, and Tirpitz
were the main concern), caused new directives to be issued for bomber assaults
on U-boat pens and capital ships along the entire Atlantic coastline, from
Norway to the Bay of Biscay. The Blenheims, for their part, were to share their
time between "hit-and-run" raids ("Circuses") against towns in France and the
Low Countries and; after the end of April; attacks on enemy coastal shipping
("Channel Stop").
Read More...
1942
Between the departure of Peirse (January 8) and the arrival of Harris (Feb.
22), Bomber Command was under the interim command of Air Vice-Marshal Baldwin,
commander of 3 Group. It was on Baldwin's "watch" that Scharnhorst, Gneisenau
and Prinz Eugen humiliated the Royal Navy by sailing in daylight through the
English Channel from Brest on their way to safer harbours. Scharnhorst and
Gneisenau had arrived in Brest in April, 1941, where Prinz Eugen joined them on
June 1 after separating from Bismarck on May 24. Because of the threat to
shipping they represented, their presence was of great concern to the
Admiralty. Bomber Command had attacked them countless times since their
arrival, without success, though 22 Squadron of Coastal Command had disabled
Gneisenau in a suicidal torpedo raid on April 6, 1941 When the German ships
sailed from Brest just before midnight on February 11, they did so with a
modest escort of 13 motor torpedo boats and five destroyers, and with
expectation of air cover for most of their journey. They sailed in foul weather
; a sensible precaution ; and they steamed into the English Channel. The Royal
Navy did not see them. Coastal Command did not spot them (reportedly because of
problems with their air-to-ship radar). The radar stations along the coast of
Britain noted them and ignored them. Not until 11:30 a.m., when the ships were
almost entering the Straits of Dover, were they spotted accidentally by a pilot
with Fighter Command and reported to the authorities. Two hours later, at 1:35
p.m., the first aircraft of Bomber Command were airborne: by this time
Scharnhorst, Gneisenau and Prinz Eugen were through the Straits of Dover.
Between 3:00 p.m. and 6:00 p.m., 242 sorties were flown by Bomber Command
against the ships, though many aircraft could not locate them because of the
inclement weather. In addition, elements of Coastal and Fighter Command,
together with Fleet Air Arm "Swordfish", joined in the attack. So did the Royal
Navy, with World War I destroyers and MTBs. No damage was inflicted. Only later
did Scharnhorst and Gneisenau strike mines dropped by 5 Group aircraft and
incur some damage. By daybreak of 13 February all three ships were safe in
German ports.
Read More...
Copyright © 2001 Brian Grafton. All rights reserved. Duplication of text
or materials in any form prohibited except with the express written consent of
Brian Grafton.
Written by Brian Grafton. If you have questions or comments on this
article, please contact Brian Grafton at:  bg@briangrafton.com.
Published online: 09/20/2001.
* Views expressed by contributors are their own and do not necessarily represent
those of MHO. |
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