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Bomber Command
by Brian Grafton
Against the Wall: Britain in September, 1940
By September of 1940, the war in Europe should have been over.
The Allied armies had been overpowered, first in Norway and then, very rapidly
indeed, in Holland, Belgium and France. The "Miracle at Dunkirk", the final act
of a strategic and tactical rout which began in the Ardennes, had deposited
330,000 bedraggled troops in Britain with weapons little larger than rifle
calibre. Britain herself was open for invasion, defended only by over- and
under-aged Local Defence Volunteers[1] armed with little more than pitch-forks
and hunting rifles and by scattered commonwealth troops with few weapons,
haphazard training and no combat experience.
At sea, the Royal Navy had had mixed success and was still a major force. The
loss of Courageous and the early embarrassment of U-47's success in Scapa Flow
had been off-set by the hunting down of Graf Spee. But the fall of Europe to
the Wehrmacht and the loss of the French fleet had drastically skewed the role
the Royal Navy was expected to play in any European war (keeping the sea-lanes
open; and blockade). With all of the coastline from Sweden to Spain at her
disposal, the Kriegsmarine had a substantially increased opportunity to sever
England's lifelines to her commonwealth and empire and starve her into
submission. The Royal Navy had neither the weapons, the ships, the tactics nor
the personnel to conduct effective counter-measures to the threat the U-boats
presented, a bleak reality that was not to change for three years. At the same
time, the threat from surface raiders would keep many of Britain's capital
ships hog-tied at Scapa for years to come.
In the air, things were rather more complex, but essentially no better.
Defensively, Britain had an increasingly powerful fighter presence in their
Hurricane and Spitfire squadrons. Churchill was prepared to squander them over
the battlefields of France, [2] which would have left England relatively naked
to the coming onslaught by Goering's Luftwaffe. Only Dowding's [3] persistence
in retaining them for the defence of England kept the squadrons on English
soil. They were to prove enough, just enough, to keep the Luftwaffe from taking
command of the skies and opening England to invasion. But by the end of the
summer of 1940, Fighter Command was battered both from the growing German
offensive and because of a vicious internal dispute. [4] By
mid-September, 11 Group would have no reserves to meet the Luftwaffe assault.
Offensively, the RAF had Bomber Command. [5] The beginning of the war
found Bomber Command in a rather sorry state. Bomber development had suffered
as a result of the financial catastrophe of the 1930s: bombers were expensive
to build. Still, RAF Bomber Command did have aircraft. Chief amongst them was
the Vickers Wellington (the "Wimpey"), designed by Barnes Wallis. [6] But there
were many others: the Whitley; the Battle; the Blenheim; the Hampden. The
Battle in particular was obsolete or obsolescent at the beginning of the war;
its use came at high cost in lost air crew for pathetic or non-existent
results.
Plans for more sophisticated bombers were in the works: the Stirling, the
Halifax and the Manchester were bigger, faster, had greater range and
substantial bomb loads. But in September of 1940 they were still in the future;
the first Lancaster [7] was not to fly until early 1941.
Bomber Command was not entirely idle during the 'phony war' of 1939/40 or the
furious German assault on France and the Low Countries in May, 1940. Bomber
Command had attacked German military installations such as Wilhelmshaven and
Heligoland, but with disastrous results and at great cost. By early 1940 it was
clear that RAF bombers could not defend themselves against fighter attack.
Tactically, the Blenheims and Battles were thrown at Wehrmacht columns
advancing through France. They were slaughtered, and without a shred of the
success achieved by the Ju 87 [8] to mark their passing.
Finally, Britain was in a desperate financial situation. The 'Cash and Carry'
policies enacted by Congress favoured the British cause, in that goods
purchased from the U.S. had to be carried in ships under the purchaser's
registry. Since the sea lanes to Britain were still open, the "carry" policy
worked in their favour (as was probably intended by Roosevelt). But British
funds and foreign reserves were being fast depleted, and these could not be
replaced.
At the end of the summer of 1940, then, Britain's future was bleak. The
remnants of a once-proud army were dragged home after an unquestionable defeat;
the navy was unable to keep the English Channel open, and faced increased
threats from both U-boats and surface forces capable of attacking from any
number of bases along a greatly increased shoreline. Fighter Command was
battling fiercely with the Luftwaffe, and watching its pilot reserve shrink
daily. Bomber Command was incapable of taking the war to the enemy. For all her
vast commonwealth and empire, Britain was facing bankruptcy. It is not too
difficult to understand why Hitler offered his "appeal to reason", or why U.S.
Ambassador Joe Kennedy was shipping his daughter back to the States while
announcing to anyone who would listen that the British were finished.
The British did not listen. They fought back. Their chosen weapon, in truth,
their only viable weapon, was Bomber Command. Churchill himself summed it up
nicely on September 3, 1940:
The Navy can lose us the war, but only the Air Force can win it. Therefore our
supreme effort must be to gain overwhelming mastery of the air. The Fighters
are our salvation, but the Bombers alone provide the means of victory. [9]
This is the story of what the bombers provided, and how they provided it.
Between the Wars
In the years after World War I, the relative
merits of bombers and fighters were strongly debated. Douhet's dictum was the
benchmark, rendered by Stanley Baldwin in English as "the bomber will always
get through". Douhet and his followers, adherents, or fellow visionaries -
Trenchard in Britain and Mitchell in the U.S. among them - argued early in the
inter-war years that in any future war swarms of bombers would assault the
enemy at home, and so devastate its population that maddened, deranged
civilians would demand their government sue for peace.
The primary means of defense, then as now, was to destroy the bombers before
they reached their targets. Fighter aircraft, by whatever name they were called
[10] would be needed to defend the homeland by shooting down attacking enemy
bombers. Failing that - and many believed that fighters would fail - other
anti-aircraft devices would be expected to destroy the enemy either before they
reached the target or over the target area.
It was a compelling debate, upon which the fate of nations might literally
depend. [11] The defeat of the bomber became one focus of research, and many
improbable avenues were explored. One of the most improbable avenues, the
search for a death ray that might boil the blood of enemy pilots, lead - very
indirectly - to one of the most significant developments of the war: RDF, or
radar.
During the 1920s and early 1930s the bomber-fighter debate was largely
contained within military and economic spheres. The British, for instance,
invoked a "Ten Year Rule" for approving military expenditures, based on the
probability of war in the next ten years. Events in Germany in 1933 changed the
rules. As was the case with all of Germany's armed forces, the growth of the
Luftwaffe was spectacular. By 1937, when a Dornier Do 17 bomber (the 'Flying
Pencil') equipped with special engines appeared at a Zürich air show, Douhet's
vision appeared to be a reality. There was not an operational fighter outside
Germany that could catch this Do 17; her flight marked a wake-up call to
western democracies. Even with the less efficient engines assigned her, the
early Do 17s flew at 220 mph, and could carry a bomb load of 750 kg. And they
had their own answers to any fighter that might stumble upon them: they carried
multiple machine guns to ward off attackers.
British bomber development was not far behind. In late 1937, the first Vickers
Wellington appeared, boasting a speed of 230 mph and a phenomenal bomb load of
4500 lbs. Of geodetic construction and largely fabric-covered, the 'Wimpey' was
a truly astounding aircraft, and would serve the RAF well for many years. She
too carried defensive armament in nose and tail turrets.
It is pointless, perhaps, to attempt to freeze time in this way. Bomber
development was amazingly rapid in all countries during the 1930s, In England
this was prompted largely by Germany's increasingly aggressive behaviour. In
addition to the Wellington, Britain introduced the Blenheim and Battle (both
light bombers), and the Hampden and Whitley (medium bombers). The United
States, with a wary eye on the growing military strength of Japan, was also
building: the B-17 'Flying Fortress' flew (unimpressively) in prototype in 1935
and was in production in 1939, the B-24 'Liberator' flew in prototype in 1939,
and the A-20 was in service with the French Armee de l'Air by early 1940. The
German Heinkel He 111 joined the Do 17 in military use by 1937, and performed
impressively with the Kondor Legion in Spain, where it was joined by the
amazing Ju 87, the 'Stuka'.
Even more extraordinary was the development of a new generation of fighter
aircraft. The Hawker 'Hurricane' and Supermarine 'Spitfire' in Britain, the
Messerschmitt Bf 109 and Bf 110 in Germany, [12] and the Bell P-39 Airacobra,
Curtiss P-40 and Lockheed P-38 'Lightning' in the U.S. were only some of the
fighters developed during the late 30s. Even in their early versions, all but
one of these were much faster than previous fighters, with maximum speeds
ranging from 320-380 mph. The exception was the early Bf 109, at 292 mph, but
by 1939 the 109E (the 'Emil') flew at over 350 mph. And this was just the
beginning. Four days before the September 1, 1939 invasion of Poland, the first
jet-powered aircraft was flown. It was German - a Heinkel 178.
In truth, the development of the stressed-skin, single-winged, multi-gunned
fighter signalled the end of the bomber's invulnerability, though this was
little understood or went unrecognized for some years to come. It was hard to
consider the bombers vulnerable when unopposed swarms of Luftwaffe aircraft
were reducing Warsaw to rubble.
Separate Visions: Britain and Germany
Germany's destiny, as proclaimed by her leader, was as a continental power with
status commensurate with her genius and with sufficient lebensraum for the
Volk, that semi-mythical assemblage of peoples who shared a cultural and
linguistic base that far outstripped national boundaries. By the lights of the
NSDAP, Germany's rightful coming of age was denied by the treachery of her
politicians at a time when her army was at its height in 1918, and by the
punitive nature of the Treaty of Versailles which established totally
iniquitous war reparations. Only the will of the people, following a strong
leader, could re-establish Germany's place, reunite the Germanic Volk, and
overturn the treaty restrictions to lead the country into her rightful future.
'Ein Volk, ein Reich, ein Fuhrer' was not just a Nazi slogan: it was a
distillation of Germany's vision of her future.
The remilitarization of the Rhineland in violation of Versailles took place
in1936, and Austria was quickly, dramatically and peacefully returned to the
fold in the Anschluss (1938). The Sudetenland and the remainder of
Czechoslovakia soon followed - to the lasting shame of Britain and France. But
the Munich crisis of September, 1938, and Chamberlain's pathetic cry of "peace
in our time", finally drew a line, at least with the people of Britain: after
Munich, appeasement was a shameful word. When Hitler's eyes turned towards the
ancient Hanseatic city of Danzig, France and Britain offered guarantees to
Poland in the event of German aggression.
It may seem almost fatuous to state that Germany's armed forces were designed
to attack. But the compelling vision of land and people first expounded in Mein
Kampf made some sort of war probable if not inevitable. If the Reich could not
grow peacefully, as it had in Austria and Czechoslovakia, then it must grow as
the result of a test of wills. And the additional land required to provide
lebensraum for the people must at any rate be obtained from others. To this
end, the military forces of the Reich were geared for conquest, for the rapid
and devastating subordination of the will of others to the requirements of the
German people.
The first two 'blitzkriegs' - the assault across the plains of Poland and the
magnificent armoured thrust through the Ardennes into the heart of France -
demonstrated the efficacy of using armour, infantry, artillery and air
bombardment in co-ordination. The Luftwaffe was not working independently; it
was an extension of the artillery arm of the Wehrmacht. This is so whether it
was razing Warsaw with wave upon wave of He 111s and Do 17s, using the Stukas
to silence enemy strong points, or strafing troops and civilians with Bf 109s.
The May 14 bombing of Rotterdam, so roundly condemned by the allies, is the
exception which proves the rule. The threat of bombing was certainly a
bargaining chip in surrender discussions with Dutch officials. The raid itself
was in all likelihood an accident hinging on a too-late recall and only
partially successful attempts by German officers already in the city to signal
the aircraft away. The use of glider troops in the spectacular assault on Eben
Emael was much more in keeping with German tactical use of air power.
The Germans were, in other words, using their air component as a tactical arm.
Their bombers - the Heinkels, the Dorniers, the Stukas - were neither designed
nor intended for strategic use. When the time came for the air assault on
Britain, the Luftwaffe had planes to spare, and they charged a frightful toll
during the hard nights of 'the Blitz' from September, 1940 to May, 1941. But
though their bomb capacity had increased quite dramatically, they were the
wrong planes in the wrong hands. Goering and his advisors had neither the
weapons nor the military insight to use the Luftwaffe in a strategic role.[13]
This was so in 1940, and remained so to the end of the war. Tactically, the
Wehrmacht remained the finest fighting force of the war until very near the
end, in part because of its ability to co-ordinate various branches of arms,
including the Luftwaffe.
Britain was in a very different situation from Germany. Together with her vast
dominions and colonies - what she continued to consider her 'empire' - Britain
had few wars to fight and little to prove. A relatively poor nation after the
economic, social and cultural drains of World War 1, Britain maintained the
appearance of the most powerful nation on earth through the inter-war years.
Through bluff, arrogance and the traditions of enlightened leadership she had
developed and continued to foster, Britain sought to maintain the status quo
with as little inconvenience and expense as possible. Her military mirrored
those aims. The Royal Navy had completed no major building programs, and relied
on an aging fleet to keep the sea lanes open and to maintain a presence
globally. Her army remained small by continental standards. Her air force was
torn between the jingoistic need to justify its continued existence as an
independent offensive service arm, as Arthur 'Boom' Trenchard had insisted upon
since the end of World War I, and the more practical requirement of maintaining
a defensive shield against aggression.
Germany's rise to power under the Nazis shook Britain's military and political
leaders to the core. Particularly after the Munich crisis, when the probability
of war became more certain, an Air Ministry assessment of military readiness
was less than sanguine, indicating that both Fighter and Bomber Commands were
unprepared for an early call to war.
Despite some innovative initiatives, neither command had sufficient trained
pilots. In Bomber Command, this extended to all other air crew: gunners;
navigators; wireless operators. The Voluntary Reserve, begun in 1937, had
helped address the lack of pilots, but not nearly quickly enough. And although
the RAF had a fine training school both for ground and air crew, the number of
bodies completing the training was below requirements. Exacerbating this, there
were insufficient aircraft to train even the pilots and crew they had. Aircraft
in existing squadrons were being cannibalized to keep other planes in
readiness; to remove yet more for training purposes could prove disastrous.
Bomber Command faced at least three additional difficulties. One was
theoretical, and would remain so until the first days of the war: based on
admittedly few training exercises, there was some indication that whenever
bombers and fighter faced each other as adversaries the bombers would be
bested. The second was largely technological: in 1939 there were no accurate,
reliable navigation aids. In simple terms, how does a pilot bomb a target if he
cannot find it? How does he find it at night? The third difficulty was related
to the second. Even if reliable navigation devices had been available, pilots
and navigators had simply not had enough experience flying through adverse
weather to be successful in the range of conditions to be expected in northern
Europe. Having been 'stood down' in inclement conditions during peacetime - a
sensible precaution in terms of crew and aircraft safety, though not exactly
forward-thinking when training for war - aircrew were totally unprepared for
the seasonal hazards of fog, snow, ice and cold.
Whatever the British would learn in 1939 about the limitations of their own air
power, there is every indication that they were still convinced of the
devastating power of a strategic enemy air force. Between Munich and the
beginning of the war, thousands of Anderson Shelters were distributed and
erected in back yards across the nation. Plans were put in place for the
evacuation of 1,500,000 children and mothers from London and other likely
targets. So many deaths were expected from bombing that the cost of wood for
coffins alone was deemed prohibitive, and it was decided that mass graves and
burning with quick lime would provide the only option to the nation. [14]
The Phoney War: September, 1939-April, 1940
On the day after Britain declared war, two operations would provide evidence of
how Bomber Command's three difficulties would affect strategic bombing, though
it would take time for Air Ministry staff to read the entrails. Of 15 Blenheims
sent to bomb warships at Wilhelmshaven on September 4, five never found the
target, five were lost to enemy action, and five returned to base. On the same
day, 14 Wellingtons were sent to Brunsbuttel, again against warships. Flying
through severe weather conditions, only six found the target. One plane
attacked with no success, three declined to attack in the face of heavy flak,
and two were destroyed by Luftwaffe fighters. The verdict was in, though the
Air Ministry would take some time to pronounce sentence.
One other issue arose during those first few months of conflict. In response to
a September 1 request by President Roosevelt, Britain and France agreed to
refrain from bombing undefended towns or targets where civilians could be
injured. [15] This was confirmed by the British Cabinet on September 11.
[16] Germany gave its support to Roosevelt's request September 18. Under
this constraint, as interpreted by the RAF, a warship tied to a dock should not
be attacked for fear bombs may hit the dock instead of the ship herself. This
would continue even after the German invasion of Denmark and Norway in April,
1940: RAF bombers were abjured from endangering Norwegian or Danish soil or
civilians, though their best chance of affecting the invasion forces was to
attack them at the docks while they loaded troops.
Throughout the winter of 1939/40, weather permitting, Bomber Command remained
active within the constraints. By day, Blenheims and Hampdens searched for
German naval vessels at sea. By night, Wellingtons and Whitleys peppered the
German countryside with propaganda leaflets. By April, 1940, when Air Marshall
Portal became head of Bomber Command just days before the Norwegian campaign,
certain facts were inescapable concerning the British bomber offensive:
1. British bombers had trouble finding their targets during daylight raids
except in good weather.
2. British bombers who found their targets were ineffective in hitting them.
3. The delivery of bombs was severely hampered by target restrictions.
3. Many British bombs were 'duds', ineffective when they struck targets.
4. British bombers could not defend themselves adequately against flak or
fighter opposition.
5. Alternative methods of delivering bombs (i.e., night bombing) compounded the
difficulties of daylight bombing, and added the difficulties of night
navigation, night bombing accuracy, and safe return to base.
Against this rather bleak catalogue, there was one glimmer of hope. Pilots and
air crew were gaining valuable experience in night flying and navigation, and
they were gaining familiarity with their equipment. Occasionally there were
tremendous losses, particularly when bombers and fighters met. But morale
remained high, and to the beginning of the Norwegian campaign losses to Bomber
Command were only 4.1 percent. [17] The obverse was less comforting:
there was very little offense in the bomber offensive.
At the same time, Britain could tally the German ledger and draw their own
conclusions:
1. German bombers appeared to be effective in raids against cities (the
destruction of Guernica was a still a recent event, and Warsaw had been
severely battered).
2. German aircraft of all types had proved to be effective against forces in
the field (as demonstrated by the rapidity of Poland's defeat).
3. German bombers seemed capable of finding and damaging their targets.
It is possible that Britain misread the auguries in all this. Guernica was,
particularly in the scale of things in the broader war, a minor success against
no air defense. Warsaw demonstrated the use of German bombers as long-range
artillery, rather than providing proof that "the bomber would always get
through". This may not have been obvious at the time: blitzkrieg was a new and
frightening phenomenon, and the Germans were never slow to exaggerate their
successes for propaganda purposes.
France and the Low Countries: May-June, 1940
 When
the Germans began their two-pronged attack on the West on May 10, plans were in
place for the bombers. Ten squadrons of Fairey Battles in France, attached to
the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) as the Advanced Air Strike Force (AASF),
would provide tactical support to the army; they would be supported by the
Blenheims of 2 Group, who would remain based in England. The 'heavies'
(Hampdens, Wellingtons and Whitleys), their flight no longer restricted by the
neutral air spaces over the Netherlands and Belgium, would disrupt
communications and transportation directly behind the German front.
Significantly, the 'heavies' were initially restricted to bombing west of the
Rhine: the proscription against bombing undefended land and civilians remained
in place until May 15, the day after German bombers hit Rotterdam.
The story of the AASP is a sorry one. The crews - they stand with the torpedo
bomber crews at Midway - deserve far more recognition for their courage than
they have received. Committed to daylight attacks, they were slaughtered in
planes that had no business at the sharp edge of battle.
Counting aircraft destroyed or written off, 40 per cent of the Battle sortees
had been lost on 10 May, 100 per cent on 11 May, 62 per cent on 12 May. Within
forty-eight hours the number of serviceable bombers in the AASF had shrunk from
135 to 72. [18]
The Battles were withdrawn from daylight service on May 14, with losses at 50
percent.
The Blenheims of 2 Group fared better, but only marginally. On May 14, two
squadrons (24 aircraft) attacked the bridgeheads near Sedan. Five were lost to
flak, and two others made forced landings. Three days later, 82 Squadron lost
11 of 12 aircraft. Henceforth, the Blenheims would fly with fighter protection
when available: for the RAF in May, 1940, unsupported daylight bombing finally
became too expensive.
From May 15 to June 25, there was only one night when Bomber Command aircraft -
predominantly 'heavies', though with some Blenheims - were not in the air. The
rapid collapse of the Allied armies - Holland surrendered on May 14, Belgium on
May 28, and the BEF was gone by June 4 - curtailed the strategic use of the
'heavies': they were directed to attack German troop concentrations as often as
they attacked German industry and synthetic oil plants.
When they did bomb industrial targets, their success was often minimal. The
operations for June 18/19 could be considered typical in many ways:
69 aircraft - 38 Whitleys, 26 Wellingtons, 5 Hampdens - were sent to oil
targets at Hamburg, Bremen and in the Ruhr and to railways at many other
places. 2 Whitleys and 1 Wellington were lost. Hamburg reports 9 fires, 6 of
them large ones, 1 civilian killed and 6 injured. [19]
For the most part, the 'heavies' undertook night operations singly: a squadron
may be assigned a target and an alternate, but each aircraft would often choose
its route and time of departure. Formation flying was out of the question, and
"streaming" was two years in the future. The 69 aircraft flying on June 18/19,
it is worth noting, were attacking a number of targets over a large area.
On June 17, France sued for "peace with honour". The terms were ratified on
June 21, to become effective June 25. The Battle of France was over.
As the RAF regrouped for the coming battle, there was little to cheer about.
From all commands, total aircraft losses were close to 1000, with Bomber
Command itself losing about 145. The lessons of the six weeks were very similar
to those of the 'phoney war':
1. The light bombers of Bomber Command were outclassed and outdated.
2. Daylight bombing by 'heavies' could only be accomplished with adequate
fighter coverage, except at the cost of prohibitive losses.
3. Night bombing cut the loss rate, but dramatically reduced the ability to
find targets.
4. Night flying - navigation, target acquisition, return to base - remained
challenging for all but the finest crews.
Crews that hit their targets at night were buoyed by their success, which was
positive for morale. Also positive was the perceived lack of fighter threat at
night. Flak, however, was considered fierce.
If the loss of aircraft were not enough, the cost in personnel was also high.
Almost 700 aircrew lost their lives, and at least 230 were taken prisoner. This
placed a tremendous burden on Training Command, who had to meet the dual
challenge of rebuilding Bomber Command and strengthening Coastal Command while
meeting the more urgent demands of Fighter Command, who would carry much of the
burden in the coming weeks. The 'pipeline' of trained aircrew from the CATP was
still a long way in the future.
Fighter Command
 Whatever
dates are chosen, the events of the summer of 1940 are normally described
collectively as the Battle of Britain. Sometimes the start date is given as
early July, with the start of what the Germans called the Kanelkampf (Channel
Battle), the attempt to close the English Channel to British shipping. Others
choose to mark the beginning at August 12, the eve of Adlertag (Eagle Day),
when the Luftwaffe began its systematic attacks to eliminate the RAF from the
skies of Britain. Some say the battle lasted only until September 6, after
which the Luftwaffe concentrated on the bombing of London (and, later, other
cities), while September 15 is celebrated as Battle of Britain Day. All agree
that the Battle was over by September 17.
Or nearly all. Some claim that the Battle of Britain was a creation of
Churchill's rhetoric, and was kept brief and shining to celebrate the bravery
'the Few' and manufacture a much-needed morale boost; some argue that the
Germans continued to pound Britain with relative impunity until the spring of
1941 - the period the British call "the Blitz" - and that the attacks on
Britain ceased only with the requirements for Barbarossa, the assault in the
east originally set for May, 1941. By the lights of this last argument, it is
as if there was never really a battle at all: it was a matter of expedience
that, since the troops and planes were on the shores of the Atlantic and only
20 miles from England, Germany should test British mettle. Since the test was
'inconclusive', and since the troops and planes were needed elsewhere and
Britain would in any case be starved by the U-boats and surface raiders, it was
sensible to get on with more important matters. [20]
It seems plain, however, that - however bleak it was for Britain by September
15, whether for the military (totally defeated in France), the Royal Navy
(unable to keep the Channel open, and with an immensely increased burden to
assume) or the RAF (with Fighter Command losing the battle of numbers,
particularly for pilots) - Britain had won a victory. The Wehrmacht wanted to
invade, and was not given the opportunity; the Luftwaffe could not wipe the RAF
out of the skies. By whatever name we call the struggle over England in the
summer of 1940 - and "Battle of Britain" certainly seems both accurate and
appropriate - the German armed forces had suffered their first reverse. In a
contest of wills, Nazi Germany had not had its way.
The Boffins' War: Part I
While the Battle of Britain is not strictly speaking part of the bomber
offensive, Bomber Command (together with Coastal Command) had its role to play.
That role will be discussed in the next section. But at some point - and
because of its central role in the Battle of Britain, this seems a suitable
place - the most astounding device of the war must be introduced. That device
is radar.
The British used the abbreviation RDF (Radio Direction Finding), either as a
subterfuge or as a relatively accurate description of its function. The
Americans called it radar, the name that - like flak for anti-aircraft fire -
became an eponym. By whatever name it was called, it was one of the most
astounding developments of the war, a development that kept pace with the war
to provide ever more accurate means of finding, seeking, identifying and
directing weapons of war.
England was neither the first nor the only nation to develop radar before the
war. Germany had its Freya system, used to detect attacking RAF bombers in
1939, and its Würzburg, which was directing flak as early as May, 1940. At sea,
the U.S. Navy was exploring radar to assist in battle manoeuvres, while the
Germans had already equipped some of their ships with Seetakt. [21]
In Britain, RDF developed very quickly - and almost by accident. The time from
the first exploration of the concept of radar to its overpoweringly incisive
use during the Battle of Britain was only five years. For the British, however,
the impact of radar hinged on four other factors: timing; location; IFF
(another 'Boffin' development) and - to a large extent - serendipity. And
without RDF Germany would have won the war against England in the summer of
1940.
Briefly, those four factors were as follows. First, Britain was still working
out the bugs in their RDF in 1939. If the Germans had attacked prior to 1940,
radar would not have been available. Secondly, the fact that Britain is an
island, and knew where likely attack would come from made the placement of the
Chain Home (CH) and Chain Home Low (CHL) stations much more effective. CH
equipment was bi-directional: it did not have a moving head, and therefore
could look only in one direction (e.g., West) and on the reciprocal (e.g.,
East), which was masked. Hence the need for the plethora of towers ringing the
south and east coasts of the island. CHL radar had a rotating head, and was
adapted from Royal Navy investigations in the field. Third, an electronic
signature (IFF: Identification Friend or Foe) identifying a friendly aircraft
allowed ground personnel to distinguish British fighters from intruders.
Finally, the capabilities of RDF, primitive as they were in 1940, were combined
with the dedication of the Observer Corps., a vast network of communications
equipment, and surprisingly sophisticated evaluation, tracking and
communications networks to place Fighter Command's 11 Group in the path of
oncoming Germans. It provided Fighter Command with incredible advantages in the
battle, and explains why Luftwaffe aircrew were amazed, day after day, at the
appearance of "the last 50 Spitfires" the British could put in the air.
Radar, radar jamming and radar development will appear again and again in any
narrative of the air war - or indeed most parts of the war. It improved
night-fighter capabilities, searchlight and flak accuracy, defense against the
U-boat, ship-to-ship gunnery, the development of proximity shells, aerial
navigation, bomb delivery, and much else. Its discovery and development is one
of the great stories of the war - as important in its own way as the Manhattan
Project and the development of atomic weapons - and deserves separate
attention. [22]
Bomber Command
Even before the fall of France, the Air Ministry met to create policy and
directives for the coming battle. They were geared to an obvious end: to defeat
enemy intentions in the immediate future. For Fighter Command, the requirement
was clear: defend against the air assault that was imminent. For Bomber
Command, the directives of June 20 were two-fold: medium bombers were to attack
shipping, troop build-up and enemy airfields; 'heavies' were to focus upon
enemy aircraft production. Other targets were indicated as well, and
mine-laying ops ('gardening', in RAF slang), as opportunity arose.
For medium bombers, read Blenheims: the remnants of the 10 Battle squadrons
assigned to AASF were re-entered on the strength of Bomber Command, but the
aircrews were retrained for Wellingtons, while the Fairey Battles themselves
were largely turned over to Training Command. [23]
The Blenheims were directed to operate only under the cover of cloud if
unescorted, and their loss rate remained low under these conditions. When they
were attacked by fighters, however, their loss rate soared.
Over the course of the summer, the directives received by Bomber Command would
change with astonishing rapidity as new threats were perceived or new targets
gained priority. July 4 brought a concentration on shipping targets; July 13
called for renewed assaults on aircraft production. In truth, Bomber Command
was largely on the defensive, countering enemy moves, though as the summer
stretched on the attacks on oil, aircraft factories and warships continued.
Much of this activity was ineffective, and 'heavies' were losing more aircrew
than were lost to the enemy as a result of their bombing.
The major turning point of the summer occurred when, after jettisoned German
bombs fell on London, Churchill demanded a raid on Berlin in retaliation. To
this point, Hitler had been firm in his refusal to allow Luftwaffe bombing of
London. But the accidental or misdirected release of bombs on cities and towns
was not that unusual despite prohibitions. Nevertheless, on the night of 25/26
August, Bomber Command conducted its first raid on Berlin.
As a raid, it was a failure. Berlin was shrouded in cloud and most of the bombs
missed the city: there were only two recorded injuries resulting from the
attack. Goering was humiliated by the raid, however, and Hitler was outraged,
particularly when a further raid occurred on the last night of August. On
September 7, the Luftwaffe was given the geen light and London came under
bomber attack: 'the Blitz' had begun. [24]
At about the same time, the build-up of invasion barges was accelerating, and
Bomber Command, with Coastal Command, was directed against the barges, troop
assembly areas and other critical targets such as the Dortmund-Ems aqueduct. By
September 21, Blenheims, Hampdens and Battles had destroyed just enough barges
(about one-eighth the almost 1900 assembled) to discourage the Wehrmacht from
attempting an invasion on the timetable first given by Hitler on 16 July. In
effect, the invasion threat was over. The aerial assault on London would
continue, and would spread to other British cities over the next eight months.
The Battle of the Atlantic would continue (in the U-boats' favour) for the next
two years. Allied troops would face the see-saw of North Africa, defeat in
Greece and Crete, and humiliation in the Far East. The fall of Singapore would
signal the end of empire. But for the moment, England was unconquered.
Ending the Year
While the threat of invasion was not entirely dissipated after September, there
was sufficient photographic evidence to suggest that the Wehrmacht had been
stood down. What remained was the Luftwaffe assault on British cities, which
continued well into 1941. Before it ended, a host of cities - Southampton,
Birmingham, Coventry, Liverpool, Glasgow, Plymouth, and Portsmouth among them -
would feel the weight of German bombs. A new verb would be added to the
language: 'to conventrize' or destroy a city by aerial bombardment.
In contrast to Bomber Command, the Luftwaffe had considerable success in
finding and hitting its targets. The Germans had developed two techniques,
Knickebein and X-Gerät, which were instrumental in bringing their bombers over
the target. [25] Knickebein was relatively simple and used equipment
already in place on German bombers. It was also relatively easy to disrupt, and
the British were successful in jamming it quite early. X-Gerät, on the other
hand, required more highly trained crews and more specialized equipment. It was
also more difficult to jam, and the British were not truly successful until
1941. In 1940, the use of X-Gerät fell to KG 100 (Kampfgruppe 100), a
specialist squadron who would mark the target for the following bomber stream.
In September, some saw Germany's assault upon London as an economic attack,
trying to destroy the London docks (the great weight of the bombing was in the
dock area). To others, the attacks were class-based, slaughtering the working
poor and leaving the wealthy relatively unscathed (the working poor lived in
the East End, in the vicinity of the docks). With the scope of German raids
increasing to encompass the provincial cities, however, it became apparent that
the attacks were simply designed to damage as many British cities and people as
possible. The British were undergoing a form of 'area bombing', a type of
bombing that the British were exploring for use by Bomber Command.
Area bombing, in its simplest form, is simply the bombing of an area of ground
rather than a specific target. To this point in the war, the British had had no
success with precision bombing: they lacked the bomb-sights and navigational
skill which, together, were the only means of bombing precisely. They had no
idea how inaccurate their bombing was; that would only be demonstrated late in
1941, with the Butts Report. By and large, British authorities believed,
however erroneously, that if bomber crews could find their target they would
hit the target. Perhaps they were assuming that they were having the same
success the German bombers were enjoying, for the Germans were certainly
hitting their targets.
On nights when targets were obscured by cloud or by lack of moonlight - in
other words, on more than 75 per cent of the nights - Bomber Command attacks on
generalized industrial targets became a permitted alternative. Since in wartime
any industry can be deemed a war industry, large industrial areas are
legitimate targets. Ancillary damage - damage to buildings adjacent or
proximate to industry - may be regrettable, but is to be expected: collateral
damage will always occur, with attendant loss of non-combatant life. Area
bombing is, by definition, imprecise.
The issue becomes somewhat more complex if the focus of the attack is shifted
even slightly. The people working in the industrial area may become the
focus of the attack, using the argument that a war industry cannot produce
without war workers. Killing the workers may indeed be a more effective means
of slowing or halting production than destroying the plants. The death of
workers then becomes not regrettable but a goal. This too is area bombing.
A third shift of focus is also possible. In total war, all enemy people are
part of the war effort. Therefore any enemy person is a legitimate target. In
effect, any place where there are concentrations of people becomes a legitimate
target. This too is area bombing. But it may also be described as
indiscriminate bombing.
Towards the end of 1940, questions concerning area bombing by Bomber Command
were still largely theoretical: not until early 1942 did policy include area
bombing as such. But those with power, or in a position to direct bombing
policy, could see in 1940 the effect of Germany's air offensive, and could
sense the strain on the morale of the British population. Popular history has
it that British morale never broke, and this is largely correct, but it was
cracked badly at Coventry and was put under severe strain elsewhere. The desire
of these leaders, from Churchill down, to generate the same pressures on
Germany, would be understandable. Their resolve could find its way into war
directives against the enemy. The execution of these directives would depend on
decisions made by Commander-in-Chief (C-in-C) Bomber Command.
Sir Charles Portal was C-in-C Bomber Command from April 4, 1940. He was
promoted to Chief of Air Staff on October 4 of the same year. A strong
supporter of area bombing, Portal was largely considered to be comfortable with
the bombing of civilians. While C-in-C, he was undoubtedly aware of the
ineffectiveness of current bombing policy, and was anxious to improve Bomber
Command's success rate. He would carry this concern to his new posting.
Portal was replaced as C-in-C by Sir Richard Peirse, who was much more
conservative. Coming to Bomber Command in October, 1940 from the Air Staff
(where he had been Vice-Chief), he was convinced that current bombing practices
were effective and should be continued. Peirse would carry Bomber Command
through its worst period, and would be relieved of his command in early
January, 1942. He would be replaced by Sir Arthur Harris.
Harris would take command at a time when new bombers, new equipment and new
weapons were finally coming on-stream. He would remain C-in-C until the end of
the war. We will return to "Bomber" Harris later.
The State of Bomber Command
The final three months of 1940 were months of trial for Bomber Command. Air
Ministry directives continued to direct its aircraft against the same targets
it had had in the past. The October 30 directive mentions minelaying; rail
yards; selected Italian industrial areas; and synthetic oil production
facilities. To these it added an additional target - general industrial areas -
for nights when cloud cover might obscure specific targets. If the aim of
bombing synthetic oil facilities was to reduce the oil available to Germany,
the aim of hitting general industrial areas was to show the strength, power and
destructive capabilities of the RAF.
Unfortunately, Bomber Command was in no condition to meet the directives. Added
to the by now familiar litany of difficulties - targeting problems, navigation
difficulties, night landing fears, need for fighter escort, and weather
challenges - was the problem of staffing.
RAF losses since May had been large, and not just in Bomber Command. Fight
Command had lost heavily in the hard fighting against the Luftwaffe. Pilots
were the main concern; but ground crew had been hit hard as well during German
attacks on the Fighter stations of 11 Group. Coastal Command, faced with a
massive increase in the area for which it was responsible, was desperate for
multi-engined pilots.
Bomber Command was in no better shape. From July to October, 246 aircraft were
lost, over 100 more than the 143 lost in May and June. In addition, the Battles
were gone, and the replacement Wellingtons were slow in coming. Planes and
crews were drained to support North Africa and Greece. OTUs needed experienced
crews for training, and Coastal Command would borrow crews and planes whenever
possible.
Nevertheless, Bomber Command attempted to meet the directive of October 30.
Still optimistic that they could damage Germany's war-making capacity, they
pressed on with precision attacks on synthetic oil facilities and other
military targets. Nuisance raids were sent to Berlin, to little effect. Of
significance, however, is that area bombing of civilians was not pressed,
either because Portal was still prepared to try precision bombing or because
Peirse chose targets - such as coastal cities - which could be found more
easily and therefore bombed more precisely. Only once, at Mannheim on 18/19
December, was an urban civilian area targeted, in response to the razing of
Coventry.
Footnotes
[1]. The Local Defense Volunteers, or LDV, were intensely active and patriotic,
but were very low on the priorities list for supplies, uniforms and equipment
of any sort. Thus, they armed themselves with whatever weapons they could
muster, including fowling pieces, swords, pikes and scythes. During the 'phoney
war' the LDV was seen by many as a slightly comical organization; some wits
said that LDV stood for "look, duck and vanish". When Churchill came to power,
one of his first acts was to have their name changed to "Home Guard".
[2]. During the Battle of France, the French government pleaded with Churchill
for more fighter support. He was willing to provide any support he could to his
beleaguered allies, and did in fact promise that further squadrons would be
sent. He was later convinced that the aircraft were crucial to the defense of
Britain, and withdrew his promise. The planes were not sent.
[3]. Air Chief Marshall Sir Hugh Dowding, head of Fighter Command, is an easy
figure to poke fun at. Known, rather unkindly, as 'Stuffy', Dowding's career
was effectively over before he took command of Fighter Command. His persistence
in retaining the squadrons Churchill wished to send to France may have incurred
the latter's displeasure, but Dowding was the mastermind behind the aerial
defense of Britain in 1940.
[4]. The dispute between Dowding (and his 11 Group commander, Keith Park) and
Trafford Leigh-Mallory, commander of 12 Group (and Squadron Leader Douglas
Bader) was not just vicious and shameful. Given the battle in progress over
Britain, it was potentially suicidal. Instigated by Leigh-Mallory, it was
ostensibly a disagreement on means of engaging the enemy; because of the fame
and connections of Douglas Bader, who flew despite having lost both his legs
while "stunting" in 1931, the controversy was eventually raised in Parliament.
Largely because of Leigh-Mallory's attack, Dowding, the architect of Fighter
Command's success during the crucial summer months, was relieved of his command
in November, 1940, and was given 24 hours to vacate his office. Park, his
excellent subordinate, was sent to Training Command.
[5]. There were four major Commands in the RAF: Fighter Command; Bomber
Command; Coastal Command; and Training Command. In general terms, Coastal
Command focused its attentions on the sea, providing reconnaissance, convoy
protection and U-boat patrols. Training Command changed its name and structure
from time to time, but was in general responsible for advanced aircrew
training, both for operations (through OTUs ; Operational Training Units)
and for conversion to new aircraft as they made their appearance (through HCUs
; Heavy Conversion Units). Basic training (in gunnery, wireless,
navigation, and flying) was conducted increasingly in commonwealth countries
through the Commonwealth Air Training Program (often called by the British the
Empire Air Training Programme). There were other commands as well, such as the
AASF (Advanced Air Stiking Force) attached to the BEF in 1939/40 and the TAF
(Tactical Air Force) used largely for ground assault in 1943/45.
[6]. Barnes Wallis played a surprisingly large role in Britain's air war. The
Wellington was only the first of his successes. Later in the war he was to
design the spinning mine that was used by 617 Squadron, the famous "Dam
Busters" to breach the Ruhr dams. Later still Wallis designed two other bombs
; Tall Boy, and Grand Slam ; that demanded great precision-bombing to
be effective. They were used against railway tunnels, viaducts and other
targets, including the Tirpitz, later in the war.
[7]. The development of the Lancaster is a fascinating one. Essentially, one of
the three 'heavies' being developed by Britain ; the two-engined Manchester
; performed acceptably and had immense carrying capacity, but was plagued
with Vulture engines. By modifying the wing and installing four Merlin engines
in place of the two Vultures, one of the greatest bombers of the war was born.
[8]. By the summer of 1940, the Ju-87 (the famous 'Stuka') was past its prime,
though it continued in operational use almost to the end of the war. An easy
target when caught in air-to-air combat, the Ju-87 was unsurpassed as a
ground-support weapon, having the ability to place its bomb-load with
incredible accuracy. During the early summer of 1940, Stukas devastated British
convoys in the English Channel.
[9]. D. Richards, The Hardest Victory, p. 69.
[10]. The British favoured the name 'fighter', having relinquished the older
term 'scout'. They also tended towards the use of names to designate their
aircraft, whether fighters or bombers, the name to be followed by a 'mark'
number to distinguish improvements in design or change of function (e.g.,
Spitfire Mk. XII; Mosquito Mk. IV).
The Americans entered the war calling their fighters 'pursuit' aircraft, which
(I suspect) explains the 'P-' designation (e.g., P-38; P-39; P-40; P-51). Their
bombers seemed to be separated slightly by function: the A-20 (for 'Attack'?)
v. the B-24 (for 'Bomber'), with a letter appended to signify modifications
(e.g., B-17G). Americans would also assign a name to their aircraft: the 'P-38
Lightning'; the 'P-51 Mustang'; the 'B-24 Liberator' and so forth.
American planes purchased by the British might be given new names: e.g., the
USAAF A-20G Havoc was designated the RAF Boston IV.
German aircraft took their names from the builder, and would usually
distinguish versions by adding a letter as a suffix, often followed by a
numeral (e.g., Focke-Wulf Fw 190F-9; Heinkel He 111E-3; Junkers Ju 87B-1).
Occasionally, other means of distinguishing various versions of German aircraft
were used: e.g., to the best of my knowledge the Dornier Do 217 is a much
updated version of the Do 17, and the final, high altitude version of the Fw
190 was designated the Ta152 in honour of the 190's designer.
For an explanation of the Messerschmitt designations, see note 3, below.
[11]. In many ways, the Strategic Defense Initiative(s) in the U.S. are a
continuation of the debate over whether the bomber will always get through. So
was Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD).
[12]. Willi Messerschmitt was a man unpopular with the Nazi regime, but two of
his designs - the 109 and 110 - were accepted by the Luftwaffe. Because his
factory was the Bayerische Flugzeugwerke, the designations became Bf 109 and Bf
110. With a change in company name to Messerschmitt A.G., subsequent designs
bore the Me designation: e.g., the Me 262 jet fighter, which threw such a scare
into B-17 crews.
[13]. The development of the Me 262 jet fighter is a case in point. When it
first began to appear against the B-17 and B-24 formations in late 1944, it
created havoc. Faster than all other fighters, the 262 was a very difficult
target, even for the agile P-51. Not only that but the turret gunners could not
track it, because their hydraulics were geared to much slower planes.
The Me 262 could have been made available much earlier in the war, when
experienced pilots and fuel were in more abundant supply, but the development
was held up in an attempt to make the plane function as a dive-bomber in
addition to a fighter. The impact of such a plane even one year earlier in the
war cannot be determined, but the allies were lucky that Nazi officials caused
its delay.
[14]. Harrisson, Living Through the Blitz, p. 26.
[15]. Middlebrook and Everitt, Bomber Command War Diaries, p. 19.
[16]. Goralski, World War II Almanac 1931-1945, p. 93.
[17]. Middlebrook and Everitt, Bomber Command War Diaries, p. 30. A note
concerning Bomber Command losses: they are accurate within their limitations,
but do not include many aircraft or crew lost in training, crash-landing, or to
friendly fire. Aircrew were aware of this policy as they counted their way
towards 30 ops, since they would be asked to train new crews at OTUs, where
crash rates could be high.
[18]. Richards, Hardest Victory, p. 46.
[19]. Middlebrook and Everitt, Bomber Command War Diaries, p. 53.
[20]. There is a tendency to treat this argument lightly, and to write glibly
about it. This is not my intention. In German eyes, Britain was no longer a
threat and could be left to wither, cut off from food, weapons and support.
[21]. After Graf Spee was scuttled in Montevideo harbour, the British who
examined her wreck were very concerned with Seetakt and the advances Germany
had made in radar.
[22]. There are excellent studies of radar's development. David Fisher's Race
on the Edge of Time) is excellent; Deighton's Fighter gives several pages to
radar in the Battle of Britain. More studies, capturing the complexities of the
subject in layman's language, would be appreciated.
[23]. The Battles were to return to active duty at least once more,
during the concentrated assault on invasion barges during the middle of
September.
[24]. 'The Blitz' became almost proprietary to the British, signifying the
German bombing of British cities, and a wonderful new verb, "to blitz", entered
the language. A Londoner whose home was destroyed by bombs would say he was
"blitzed". London was to be hit for 76 consecutive nights (with one exception,
in early November) during the autumn and winter of 1940, but German attacks on
London and other cities would continue into the late spring of 1941. Those
living in other cities, who didn't feel the weight of assault as London did,
would mark events by the date of attack, as this comment from a Liverpool
mother shows: "Our Pat, she was born in the [sic.] March, 1941, just before the
May Blitz." (Pete Grafton, You, You and You, p. 32).
[25]. Essentially, both Knickebein and X-Gerät involved the use of
radio beams which would guide an aircraft to a location where an intersecting
beam would signal the point of bomb release or the activation of timing
equipment. In 1940, both were well in advance of British techniques for target
marking. Even after the war, Churchill would pour scorn on Knickebein and
X-Gerät, citing their use as proof that Germans were only good at following
directions (see, e.g., Hastings, Bomber Command, p. 189). Yet later in the war,
Bomber Command would use a very similar technique, Oboe, for target marking and
would introduce the Pathfinder Force (PFF) and specialist squadrons (e.g.,
617). The USAAF would try a different technique, involving master navigators
and "Toggliers" to improve its ability to saturate a target.
Copyright © 2001 Brian Grafton. All rights reserved. Duplication of text or
materials in any form prohibited except with the express written consent of
Brian Grafton.
Written by Brian Grafton. If you have questions or comments on this
article, please contact Brian Grafton at:  bg@briangrafton.com.
Published online: 09/20/2001.
* Views expressed by contributors are their own and do not necessarily represent
those of MHO. |
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