Operation Husky: The Allied Invasion of Sicily, 1943
by Thomas E. Nutter
Strategic Debate
HUSKY [1] was an operation born in controversy. During the so-called
Second Washington Conference in the early summer of 1942, an acrimonious debate
raged between the British and their new American allies over the future
strategic course of the war against the European Axis powers. General George C.
Marshall, Chief of Staff of the United States Army, espoused the view that the
Allies could successfully confront the European Axis only by means of an
amphibious invasion of Western Europe, and that consequently no operations
which might detract from this goal should be undertaken.[2] In a sharply worded
memorandum to President Franklin Roosevelt, Prime Minister Winston Churchill
attacked Marshall's position:
No responsible British military authority has so far been able to make
a plan for September, 1942 which had any chance of success unless the Germans
become utterly demoralized, of which there is no likelihood. Have the American
Staffs a plan? If so, what is it? What forces would be employed? At what points
would they strike? What landing-craft and shipping are available? Who is the
officer prepared to command the enterprise? What British forces and assistance
are required? If a plan can be found which offers a reasonable prospect of
success, His Majesty's Government will cordially welcome it and will share to
the full with their American comrades the risks and sacrifices. This remains
our settled and agreed policy . . . . But in case no plan can be made in which
any responsible authority has good confidence, and consequently no engagement
on a substantial scale in France is possible in September, 1942, what else are
we going to do? Can we afford to stand idle in the Atlantic theatre during the
whole of 1942?[3]
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Struggle for an Allied Plan
General Eisenhower attended the Casablanca Conference only
briefly. On January 15, after a harrowing journey in which his B-17 lost two
engines, and he ended the trip in a parachute harness, he reported on the
progress of the campaign in Tunisia. The decisions of the Combined Chiefs of
Staff first came to his knowledge when he received his copy of the official
minutes of the conference. Eisenhower had anticipated that the Allies would
pursue some further action in the Mediterranean at the end of the Tunisian
campaign, so that even before the Casablanca Conference his staff had been
tentatively planning an operation against Sardinia and Corsica. The main effect
of this exercise was to convince Eisenhower that possession of Sicily would be
of much more significance to the Allies than the seizure of Sardinia and
Corsica, since control of Sicily would greatly facilitate control of the
Mediterranean shipping lanes. Broadly speaking, the decision of the Combined
Chiefs of Staff in favor of an operation against Sicily was taken in order to
secure Allied lines of communication in the Mediterranean, move the Italians in
the direction of abandoning the Axis, and assist the Russians by drawing away
as many German forces as possible. It was also hoped that the invasion would
persuade Turkey to enter the war on the side of the Allies. The Combined Chiefs
went so far as to tentatively set the date for the invasion during the
favorable period of the July moon, ultimately the period July 10 through July
14.
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Grand Strategy
On May 12, 1943, the same day on which the Allied field commanders approved the
final plan of invasion for Sicily, the Combined Chiefs of Staff met at the
White House with Roosevelt and Churchill. The latter began the discussion by
asserting that once HUSKY had been successfully concluded, the prime
objective in the Mediterranean must be to drive Italy out of the war by the
best available means. He recounted a litany of beneficial developments - closer
ties between the Allies and Turkey, enhanced activity on the part of Balkan
guerrillas, which would in turn require either a German retreat from the region
or the withdrawal of considerable German forces from Russia, and the
elimination of the Italian fleet - all of which would perforce transpire once
Italy were driven from the war.[14] The Prime Minister spoke of additional
post-HUSKY objectives. The first of these Churchill termed "taking the
weight off Russia." He pointedly reminded his audience that there were 185
German divisions on the Eastern Front. The "prodigious" effort that this
required of Russia, at a time when the western Allies were not fully engaged
with the German Army, was making the Allies beholden to Stalin. Churchill
abhorred this condition and wanted to make an end to it. In his view, the best
means of doing so was to force Italy out of the war, thereby requiring the
Germans to devote a substantial numbers of troops "to hold down the
Balkans."[15]
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Plans and Dispositions
On June 7, 1943 Eisenhower outlined his plan for the invasion of Sicily to the
War Department. In addition to the elaborate air plan, which called upon each
of the various air commands in the Mediterranean area to contribute to either
the build-up or the invasion itself, Eisenhower described a series of
simultaneous seaborne assaults, assisted by air landings, to capture the
seaports of Licata and Syracuse and the airfields between these cities, in
order to lay the groundwork for operations against the airfields at Gerbini,
Catania and Augusta. Patton's Seventh Army would be aboard the ships of the
Western Naval Task Force, commanded by U.S. Admiral Hewitt, while the Eastern
Naval Task Force, commanded by British Admiral Bertram Ramsay, would convey
Montgomery's Eighth Army. The latter was to operate in the eastern sector, and
had as its objectives the port of Syracuse and the airfield at Pachino. Its
XIII Corps was to land south of Cap Murro Di Porco with 5th Division on a
two-brigade front, 50th Division on a one-brigade front and 3d Commando. XXX
Corps would operate on three sides of Passero, where the 231st Brigade, 51st
Division would advance on a one brigade front, while Canadian 1st Division
would do so on a two brigade front, next to the 40th and 41st Royal Marine
Commandos. XIII Corps was to move on to the port and airfield at Augusta,
thence to the airfields at Catania and Gerbini. XXX Corps would effect a
junction with the right flank of U.S. Seventh Army. This American force was to
land at Cap Scalambri, Scoglitti, Gela and Licata. II U.S. Corps, comprising
the 1st Infantry Division and 45th Infantry Division, would take the fields at
Biscari, Ponte Olivo, Gela and Comiso. At the same time, 3d Infantry Division
and an armored Combat Command from 2d Armored Division would capture the port
and airfield at Licata, the rest of the 2d Armored Division remaining in
reserve. Admiral Hewitt later reported that the placing of the 1st Infantry
Division and 45th Infantry Division (corresponding to CENT and DIME
landing forces respectively) under II U.S. Corps command created "many
difficulties".
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Pantelleria Landings
On June 7, 1943 Eisenhower outlined his plan for the invasion of Sicily
to the War Department. In addition to the elaborate air plan, which called upon
each of the various air commands in the Mediterranean area to contribute to
either the build-up or the invasion itself, Eisenhower described a series of
simultaneous seaborne assaults, assisted by air landings, to capture the
seaports of Licata and Syracuse and the airfields between these cities, in
order to lay the groundwork for operations against the airfields at Gerbini,
Catania and Augusta. Patton's Seventh Army would be aboard the ships of the
Western Naval Task Force, commanded by U.S. Admiral Hewitt, while the Eastern
Naval Task Force, commanded by British Admiral Bertram Ramsay, would convey
Montgomery's Eighth Army. The latter was to operate in the eastern sector, and
had as its objectives the port of Syracuse and the airfield at Pachino. Its
XIII Corps was to land south of Cap Murro Di Porco with 5th Division on a
two-brigade front, 50th Division on a one-brigade front and 3d Commando. XXX
Corps would operate on three sides of Passero, where the 231st Brigade, 51st
Division would advance on a one brigade front, while Canadian 1st Division
would do so on a two brigade front, next to the 40th and 41st Royal Marine
Commandos. XIII Corps was to move on to the port and airfield at Augusta,
thence to the airfields at Catania and Gerbini. XXX Corps would effect a
junction with the right flank of U.S. Seventh Army. This American force was to
land at Cap Scalambri, Scoglitti, Gela and Licata. II U.S. Corps, comprising
the 1st Infantry Division and 45th Infantry Division, would take the fields at
Biscari, Ponte Olivo, Gela and Comiso. At the same time, 3d Infantry Division
and an armored Combat Command from 2d Armored Division would capture the port
and airfield at Licata, the rest of the 2d Armored Division remaining in
reserve. Admiral Hewitt later reported that the placing of the 1st Infantry
Division and 45th Infantry Division (corresponding to CENT and DIME
landing forces respectively) under II U.S. Corps command created "many
difficulties". He believed that it was neither desirable nor feasible to place
the CENT and DIME naval forces under one command. For one
thing, the CENT transports arrived in the theatre from the United
States under naval command. The overlay of the Army Corps command had no naval
equivalent, thus causing needless conflict. There was also trouble with the
echelon of the air command for the campaign. While an air officer on the same
echelon as the Naval Commander, Western Naval Task Force, and Commanding
General, Seventh Army, was established, the air officer lacked authority to
order aircraft into the assault area. The naval and army officers in question
also lacked authority to direct the use of aircraft to support the assault
force. This command arrangement was "not conducive to success".
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The Naval Experience
The Allies spent the period between June 22 and July 4, 1943 carrying out
rehearsals of the assault landing and in special training of task groups. The
time was also used to install special equipment. Because of the proximity of
enemy aircraft and submarines, these rehearsals were not full scale.
Nevertheless, the Allies managed to conduct three complete naval rehearsals and
one combined rehearsal. Unfortunately, these were not always carried out with
the same craft, as other commitments, mechanical breakdowns and refittings took
some boats out of service. Even so, by the time HUSKY was commenced in
earnest, all craft had performed their roles at least once, and some had done
so several times. In addition, all brigades conducted individual combined
rehearsals, and many combined signal exercises were carried out.[117] Admiral
Hewitt commanded over six hundred ships and landing craft, one hundred and
thirty of which were allocated for escort, covering and fire support. On July 9
the weather was unfavorable for convoys, with the wind velocity at about 35
knots and a moderate sea. The LSTs had difficulty making 8 knots, and the LCIs
and smaller craft were making heavy weather of it. The LCT convoy proceeded
independently and there was considerable doubt whether the LCT tank waves would
arrive at the assault beaches in time to support the infantry. The JOSS
Force LSTs and LCIs, in spite of the wind and sea conditions, pushed on as hard
as they could in order to meet H-hour. This resulted in some LSTs lagging
behind to the extent that they lost sight of the next group ahead, so that some
craft became separated from their proper groups and anchored in the wrong area
of the beachhead. The Control Ships, acting as escorts during the approach,
likewise became separated and were not in their proper positions in the
rendezvous areas to assemble and lead the assault LCVPs to the beach. [118]
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Post Landing in Brief
While the Seventh Army encountered heavy weather and generally stiffer
resistance, the degree of resistance varied from beach to beach. The landings at
Scoglitti were virtually unopposed, and the beachhead was established ahead of
schedule. The 1st Infantry Division encountered heavy opposition at some beaches
and very little at others. 3rd Infantry Division met opposition only
sporadically.[258] In less than two days, 15th Army Group landed a total
of about 80,000 men, 7,000 vehicles, 300 tanks and 900 guns, along with
sufficient supplies to maintain all of these men and their equipment. As to the
latter, for the first time the Allies made use of the amphibious DUKW,
a vehicle which, according to Eisenhower, "more than any other technical factor,
solved the problem of large-scale maintenance over the beaches." The work of the
DUKWs was augmented almost immediately by the capture of several small
ports. The Allies seized and reopened Licata on D-Day; they also took possession
of Syracuse on that day, and by D+3 that port was receiving the ships of the D+3
convoy and their 16,000 troops, who discharged in less than 4 hours. The Allies
also took the port of Augusta on D+3.[259]
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Copyright © 2003 Thomas E. Nutter.
Written by Thomas E. Nutter. If you have questions or comments on this
article, please contact Thomas E. Nutter at:
tenutter@gmail.com.
About the author:
Tom Nutter is in his 25th year of practicing domestic and international patent,
copyright and trademark law, and is the Managing Partner of an intellectual
property law practice in St. Louis, Missouri. He holds the Masters and
Doctorate degrees in diplomatic/military history from the University of
Missouri. His interests include railroad history as well as European and
American military history in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries. He lives
in St. Louis with his wife, three children and two German Shepherd dogs, Caesar
and Cleopatra.
Last Modified on: 03/01/2003.
* Views expressed by contributors are their own and do not necessarily represent
those of MHO.
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