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Operation Husky: The Allied
Invasion of Sicily, 1943
by Thomas E. Nutter
Aspects of the Allied Invasion of Sicily, 1943
III. The Invasion of Sicily and Allied Grand Strategy
On May 12, 1943, the same day on which the Allied field commanders approved the
final plan of invasion for Sicily, the Combined Chiefs of Staff met at the
White House with Roosevelt and Churchill. The latter began the discussion by
asserting that once HUSKY had been successfully concluded, the prime
objective in the Mediterranean must be to drive Italy out of the war by the
best available means. He recounted a litany of beneficial developments - closer
ties between the Allies and Turkey, enhanced activity on the part of Balkan
guerrillas, which would in turn require either a German retreat from the region
or the withdrawal of considerable German forces from Russia, and the
elimination of the Italian fleet - all of which would perforce transpire once
Italy were driven from the war.[14]
The Prime Minister spoke of additional post-HUSKY objectives. The
first of these Churchill termed "taking the weight off Russia." He pointedly
reminded his audience that there were 185 German divisions on the Eastern
Front. The "prodigious" effort that this required of Russia, at a time when the
western Allies were not fully engaged with the German Army, was making the
Allies beholden to Stalin. Churchill abhorred this condition and wanted to make
an end to it. In his view, the best means of doing so was to force Italy out of
the war, thereby requiring the Germans to devote a substantial numbers of
troops "to hold down the Balkans."[15]
The third objective, upon which both Churchill and Roosevelt agreed, "was to
apply to the greatest possible extent our vast Armies, Air Forces, and
munitions to the enemy. All plans should be judged by this test." Churchill
postulated that the HUSKY operation would be completed by the end of
August. What, he asked rhetorically,
should these [Allied] troops do between that time and the date 7 or
8 months later, when the cross-Channel operation might first be mounted? They
could not possibly stand idle, and he could not contemplate so long a period of
apparent inaction. It would have a serious effect on relations with Russia, who
was bearing such a disproportionate weight.[16] Roosevelt asked
the same question, but reached a different conclusion. He admitted having an
aversion to the idea of invading Italy, on the theory that this could lead to
an attrition of Allied forces that would favor Germany. It was nevertheless
true that approximately 25 Allied divisions were now committed in the
Mediterranean, a fact which raised the obvious question of how such troops
could be used in 1943, as opposed to being left idle. The easy solution would
be to commit these forces to an occupation of Italy, a notion that Roosevelt
thought ill-considered. Instead, a survey should be conducted to determine the
relative cost of such an occupation as opposed to the cost of achieving the
same result by mounting an air offensive from either Sicily or the heel and toe
of Italy. In any case, he pointed out, the Allies would have a surplus of
manpower, and these men should be immediately committed to the build-up for the
cross-Channel invasion of Europe. Roosevelt urged that the Allies now commit
themselves to an operation in northwestern Europe in the spring of 1944. This
approach, he said, was the best method of taking weight off Russia.[17]
On May 13, 1943, the Combined Chiefs of Staff convened at the Federal Reserve
Building in Washington, D.C. in connection with the Third Washington
Conference. Each of the Staffs brought with them their senior planning
officers, who were to attend the general discussions on global strategy,
including forthcoming operations in both Europe and the Pacific, and prepare a
detailed agenda thereafter. The first topic of discussion was the invasion of
Sicily.
General Marshall and General Sir Alan Brooke, Chief of the Imperial General
Staff, first considered the likely length of the Sicilian campaign. Brooke
opined that if the operation were launched on 10 July, it should be completed
within thirty days. Marshall advised that his planners had estimated that the
revised plan just approved might take until the middle of September.[18] Portal
immediately upstaged this quibbling over dates by offering his opinion that ".
. . the weakness of the new plan lay in its failure to seal the island to
reinforcements."[19] While Portal's analysis was astute, those present might
reasonably have concluded that his comments might have been better left unsaid,
particularly in view of the fact that the planning for Sicily was being
coordinated by his colleague Alexander.
A more general discussion of overall strategy ensued. After a series of
digressions into areas of lesser significance, the participants gradually
returned to the issue which most clearly revealed the area of principal
disagreement between the Allies, namely whether their strategy should
concentrate ultimately on Italy and the "soft underbelly" of Europe, or the
concept of a cross-channel attack. On the American side, King and Admiral
William D. Leahy, Roosevelt's personal Chief of Staff, expressed their view
that while "it was generally agreed that the elimination of Italy would have
extremely valuable results," it might be unwise to divert to or maintain in the
Mediterranean forces which could be used in a cross-channel assault or as a
prelude to such an attack. If we weakened our potentialities for a
cross-Channel assault by continuing to confine forces to the Mediterranean, it
might preclude a major effort against Germany on the Western Front.[20]
Brooke replied that "if we did not continue operations in the Mediterranean,
then no possibility of an attack into France would arise."[21] Seeing that the
discussion was now "getting to the heart of the problem," Marshall interjected
a passionate argument against remaining bound to a Mediterranean-centered
strategy. He noted that initial estimates of requirements were always exceeded.
The North African campaign, for example, "had sucked in more and more troops,"
the numbers of which had been ultimately limited only by the availability of
shipping. The tendency of a campaign to create a vacuum into which one's forces
flowed exacerbated the negative aspects of the maxim that once an operation was
undertaken, it must be backed to the hilt. In this vein, Marshall expressed his
deep concern that the landing of ground forces in Italy would create a vacuum
which would prevent the Allies from assembling sufficient forces in the United
Kingdom for a successful cross-Channel attack. If the Allies persisted in
undertaking further operations in the Mediterranean then for the rest of 1943
and most of 1944 they would be committed to a Mediterranean policy. According
to Marshall, this would prolong the Pacific war, and thus delay the ultimate
defeat of Japan, "which the people of the U.S. would not tolerate."[22]
Brooke expressed a diametrically opposed opinion, arguing that to cease
operations in the Mediterranean after the Sicilian campaign was concluded would
lengthen the war. The essence of his argument was that since Russia was the
only one of the Allies with substantial ground forces, the proper strategy for
Britain and the United States must be to assist her as much as possible. At
present, the western Allies could best do this by "continuing in the
Mediterranean."[23]
In answer to a suggestion by Marshall that eleven U.S. divisions could be made
available in the United Kingdom by April, 1944, Brooke launched into an even
more negative assessment. He asserted that
. . . these combined forces would only be sufficient to hold a
bridgehead and would not be large enough to debauch into the Continent. Now was
the time when action was required to relieve the pressure on Russia. No major
operations would be possible until 1945 or 1946, since it must be remembered
that in previous wars there had always been some 80 French Divisions available
on our side. Any advance towards the Ruhr would necessitate clearing up behind
the advancing Army and would leave us with long lines of communications. Our
air force in U.K. was at present largely on a static basis though it was being
converted now for use with the expeditionary force. The British manpower
position was weak, and to provide the necessary rearward services for
continental warfare, two of our twelve divisions now in U.K. would probably
have to be cannibalized.[24] Brook's remarks prompted Marshall
to inquire quite bluntly whether the British Chiefs of Staff regarded
operations in the Mediterranean to be the key to an Allied victory in the
European theatre of war. Portal replied that he and his colleagues believed
that unless the greater portion of the German Army were tied down in Russia or
the Balkans, an invasion force of twenty to twenty-five divisions would not be
able to achieve important results on the Continent. He went on to argue that
the capacity of the Allies to operate on the Continent in the future depended
upon their present ability to aid the Russians. But unless the Allies could
knock Italy out of the war in 1943, it would not be possible for them to
reenter northwest Europe the following year. Marshall flatly disagreed, stating
that if the Allies ever were to get sufficient forces in the United Kingdom for
the invasion, they must begin at once. "Further operations in the Mediterranean
would . . . create a vacuum which would constitute a drain on our available
resources."[25]
The British Chiefs were not persuaded by Marshall, and continued to press home
their attack. Brooke expressed his fear that a Russian collapse "would prolong
the war for many years." He urged that the Russians would benefit far more if
the Allies were to attack Italy immediately. Such a course was preferable to
preparing for cross-Channel operations that could not be a significant
consideration until the following year. In Brooke's opinion, the "problem" was
how best to compel the Germans to withdraw substantial forces from the Eastern
front. As between the alternative solutions under discussion, a prompt attack
in the Mediterranean would promise immediate favorable results, as compared
with a proposed invasion of northwestern Europe in 1944, "which might not even
then be possible."[26] Marshall responded by suggesting that continuous Allied
air operations in the Mediterranean would cripple the Italians and tie down
large numbers of German troops, since the enemy command could not safely ignore
the peninsula as a potential Allied invasion route. He returned once again to
the theme that land operations in the Mediterranean would needlessly prolong
the European war, thereby further delaying a decision in the Pacific. In the
face of this, however, the British remained adamant. Portal said that the
Italians could not be knocked out of the war through air action alone, and that
in any case, "[O]ur object was to assist Russia, and we must achieve this
object as early as possible."[27]
The obstinate attitude of the British Chiefs of Staff on the question of
Mediterranean land operations reflected the position of the Prime Minister. In
a telegram to President Franklin Roosevelt dated April 5, 1943, Churchill
provided the President with a copy of a memorandum that the former had directed
to the British Chief of Staffs Committee "as a channel for thought and
planning." In it, Churchill assumed that the Sicilian invasion would begin no
later than July 10, and that the Allies would outnumber the Axis forces by a
factor of two to one. Based on these "givens," he concluded that the battle for
the island would last a week, "after which one might reasonably expect that the
bulk of the enemy's forces would be destroyed, captured or driven into the
mountains."[28]
For the Prime Minister, the most important issue raised by this scenario
involved the future deployment of Allied forces in the aftermath of this
success. Churchill was ready with an answer, and expressed it vigorously in the
memorandum. He began by placing the Sicilian operation in the context of his
vision for the prosecution of the war:
Hitherto the capture of HUSKY-land has been regarded as an
end in itself; but no one could rest content with such a modest and even petty
objective for our armies in the campaign of 1943. HUSKY -land is only
a stepping stone, and we must now begin to study how to exploit this local
success.[29] Although Churchill then urged consideration of
every possible alternative for the employment of Allied troops, it is clear
from his memorandum that such alternatives did not include preparation for a
cross-Channel attack in the following year. Indeed, the only alternatives that
he discussed were an operation in the Eastern Mediterranean, including an
attack on the Dodecanese in an effort to bring Turkey into the war on the side
of the Allies, or an assault on Italy, Sardinia and Corsica. Which of these
paths the Allies should follow would be dictated by the extent to which the
Germans remained engaged in Italy. In Churchill's opinion, however, even if the
Italians remained in the war and were able to rely on German assistance, the
Allies should attempt to gain lodgments on both the heel and toe of Italy as
soon as they had concluded their operation in Sicily. Churchill concluded the
memorandum, and his message to Roosevelt, by stating that "the mere capture of
HUSKY -land will be an altogether inadequate result for the Campaign of
1943."[30]
The disagreement at the highest level was shared by those who would command the
forces with whose anticipated idleness after the conclusion of HUSKY Roosevelt
and Churchill were so concerned. On May 14, 1943, General Walter Bedell Smith,
Eisenhower's Chief of Staff, presented the Combined Chiefs of Staff with a
memorandum comprised of two papers both of which were directed to the question
of what operations should be undertaken following HUSKY. The
Operations Division of Allied Force Headquarters in Algiers had drafted the
first, which represented the views of both General Eisenhower and Admiral
Cunningham. Air Chief Marshall Tedder had prepared the second, intending it to
be a dissenting opinion. Eisenhower expressed the view that after the
conclusion of HUSKY there would be two courses of action available to
the Allies, either an invasion of Italy or the seizure of Sardinia and Corsica
as bases for Allied air operations. He and Cunningham favored the latter,
because it would not commit the Allies to the mainland and the possibility of
"a major campaign the duration and requirements of which it is not possible to
foresee." Tedder said that he could not agree with either the paper or its
conclusions because it exaggerated the value of Sardinia to the Allies and
underestimated the difficulties which would attend its capture, while it
ignored the value that Italy would have for the Allies as an airbase for heavy
bomber attacks on most of the vital industrial production centers in
Germany.[31]
The British Chiefs of Staff presented their own memorandum to Roosevelt and
Churchill on May 14, in which they set forth their recommendations for Allied
operations between the completion of HUSKY and the invasion of France.
A fundamental premise of the memorandum was Churchill's argument that once
Sicily had been conquered, Allied forces in southern Europe could not stand
idle for nine or ten months until preparations for the invasion of France had
been completed. The British Chiefs, in a surprisingly forceful statement of
their strategic view, declared that the Allies must force Italy to capitulate
by means of a "relentless" attack. Indeed, they stated flatly that an Italian
surrender, "more than any other single event, would hasten the early defeat of
Germany." The fall of Italy would require the Germans to withdraw significant
forces from Russia to defend the Balkans, Greece and France, thus setting in
motion a chain of events whose ultimate effect would be the collapse of the
Third Reich. They therefore recommended that preparations be made for an
invasion of the toe of Italy immediately after the conclusion of HUSKY,
and that in addition General Eisenhower have available alternative plans for an
operation against the heel of Italy, and for the capture of Sardinia. The
Chiefs also spelled out a plan for occupying essential portions of Italy in the
event of its collapse after HUSKY . They closed their memorandum with
the statement that "[I]f we take these opportunities, we shall have every
chance of breaking the Axis and of bringing the war with Germany to a
successful conclusion in 1944.[32]
The conceptual battle over war fighting strategy was well articulated in a pair
of memoranda prepared by the respective British and American Joint Planning
Staffs. The British submitted their paper, entitled "British Plan for the
Defeat of Axis Powers in Europe," to the Combined Chiefs of Staff on May 17,
1943.[33] It was a highly detailed analysis of the strategic and tactical
elements that would be necessary to defeat the Axis in Europe as soon as
possible. It began with a lengthy section on the proposed invasion of
northwestern Europe. The cast of mind of the British planners was capsulized in
paragraph 21 of the first section:
21. After a successful HUSKY the greatest aid we could give
to Russia, and thereby inflict greatest injury which could be done in Germany,
would be to tear Italy from the Axis.[34] With this premise in
mind, the British planners spent the remaining two substantive sections of the
memorandum detailing the sequence of anticipated Allied operations in the
Mediterranean after the completion of HUSKY and the bearing that these
operations would have on Anglo-American preparations in the United Kingdom for
the forthcoming cross-Channel attack. In their conclusion, they summarized the
British plan for defeating Germany, beginning with the following commentary:
55. To concentrate our efforts after the completion of HUSKY
solely upon ROUNDUP (codename for an early invasion of the continent with
minimal forces) is to forego the initiative to the enemy for some months, to
adopt a defensive attitude on land and to allow Germany to concentrate for the
defense of France and the Low Countries against our invasion.
56. Our plan for the defeat of Germany is therefore:
a. To eliminate Italy . . .[35] The means enunciated
to achieve this goal was a combination of air action and either an invasion of
the Italian mainland or landings in both Sardinia and Corsica. The British
planners gave April, 1944 as the target date for an invasion of northwestern
Europe under this scenario.
The contrasting view of the American Joint Staff Planners could be seen in the
very title of their memorandum, "Defeat of Germany from the United Kingdom,"
which they provided to the Combined Chiefs of Staff on May 18, 1943.[36] The
language in which they couched the "problem" addressed by their memorandum also
betrayed the fundamentally different viewpoint which the Americans brought to
the issue of Allied strategy after the conclusion of the HUSKY operation:
1. To present a plan for the defeat of Germany (showing the course
of operations and their feasibility) by concentrating the biggest possible
invasion force in the United Kingdom as soon as possible.[37] Likewise,
among the significant assumptions made by the American planners were the
notions that the Allies would conduct no amphibious operations in the
Mediterranean after the close of the Sicily operation, and that Allied air
operations in that theatre would be limited to the protection of shipping and
the bombing of Italy.
The Americans made themselves quite explicit as to the position of Italy in
their plans in their analysis of general strategic considerations for the
European and Mediterranean theatres in the years 1943 and 1944. In order to
achieve their objective, the American planners considered four points to be
essential, namely: (a) the bomber offensive from the United Kingdom; (b) the
maximum build-up of forces in England, for the purpose of invading northwestern
Europe in the spring of 1944; (c) keeping Russia in the war; and (d)
maintaining air operations in the Mediterranean at a minimum after HUSKY
, so as not to prejudice the bomber offensive, the pre-invasion build-up and
the invasion itself. These elements were at the heart of the American concept
for the defeat of Germany, which was in turn based upon several premises,
prominent among which were the following:
a. Defeat of the Western Axis by means of an invasion from the
Mediterranean is unsound strategically and logistically.
* * *
e. We further believe: that the elimination of Italy is not a prerequisite for
the creation of conditions favorable for ROUNDUP; that the elimination of Italy
may possibly be brought about without need of further amphibious operations in
the Mediterranean, by a successful HUSKY and an intensified bomber
offensive against Italy - in fact Italian defection might precede HUSKY;
that if, after HUSKY , Italy has not surrendered or collapsed, the
advantages to be gained in eliminating Italy by conducting further amphibious
operations are not worth the cost in forces, shipping, amphibious equipment,
and time; . . .
f. Experience in TORCH and in preparation for HUSKY has shown that
once an operation, even though admittedly secondary, is directed, the desire to
insure its success leads to increasing demands for greater and greater forces .
. . .[38] In view of the foregoing, it is not surprising that
among the conclusions reached by the American planners was that Mediterranean
operations subsequent to HUSKY should be limited to the air offensive,
because any other operations would drain off forces necessary for the
pre-invasion build-up, "thus needlessly prolonging the war."[39]
The Combined Chiefs discussed the HUSKY operation and the problem of
Italy in general at their meeting of May 18, 1943 in Washington.[40] Although
technically the Chiefs had received both memoranda prepared by the respective
Joint Planning Staffs, only the British memorandum was on the agenda. As a
result, the Chiefs ultimately deferred action on the issues at hand until both
memoranda could be studied further by the American Chiefs. In spite of this,
the rift between the Western Allies over the Mediterranean question made itself
apparent. General Marshall pointed out inconsistencies in the British position,
noting that the British memorandum began with the assumption that an April,
1944 cross-Channel operation would be impossible, but concluded with the thesis
that an April, 1944 target date could be agreed upon, provided that
Mediterranean operations were undertaken in the interval. Brooke replied that
it was the British view that an April, 1944 deadline could not be met unless
Mediterranean operations were undertaken. The British Chiefs believed that such
operations would influence the strength of German opposition to be encountered,
and would in fact be essential in creating a situation in which an invasion of
northwestern Europe could take place. According to Brooke, the German build-up
of forces in western Europe would greatly exceed that of the Allies if
Mediterranean operations were not undertaken to divert German reinforcements.
In the British calculation, forcing Italy out of the war would be the key
element in wasting German reserves and allowing the concentration of Allied
forces for the Continent to exceed that of the enemy.[41]
Marshall was unrelenting. He said that he was "extremely doubtful" whether the
contemplated Mediterranean offensive, if successful, would permit sufficient
forces to be made available in the United Kingdom to exploit that success. He
expressed his concern that Mediterranean operations might of necessity be of a
greater magnitude than expected, with the result that the forces necessary for
the cross-Channel invasion would be reduced. In that event, the Allies might
only be capable of an operation that contemplated no opposition from the enemy.
In reply, Brooke suggested that at most the Mediterranean operations would
reduce the Allied concentration in the United Kingdom for cross-Channel
operations by three and a half to four divisions. In his view, this was a
"cheap price" to pay for the diversion of German strength that would be caused
by knocking Italy out of the war. He said that eliminating Italy from the war
was the best way of rendering aid to Russia in 1943. Finally, he challenged
Marshall's thesis that an Italian operation would lead to a continuous and as
yet incalculable drain on Allied resources by arguing that the operations
visualized for the Mediterranean theatre were not interdependent and that the
"cost value" of each such operation could be individually assessed at the
appropriate time. Before voting to table the British plan in favor of further
study, Marshall expressed his apprehension that the cost of the British plan
"had been assessed too low since the wish might have been the father to the
thought." He pointedly remarked that once the "momentum" of the contemplated
Mediterranean operations was started, it "would be difficult to check.[42]
The Combined Chiefs reconvened on the following day, May 19, 1943 for three
separate meetings. In the first of these, held at 10:30 in the morning, they
discussed in detail the separate papers prepared by the British and American
planning staffs.[43] This meeting was one of unique importance, not only
regarding HUSKY , but for the entire subsequent course of the Allied
war effort. It was marked by great intensity on both sides.
Admiral Leahy began the proceedings by asking for the comments of the British
Chiefs on the substance of the paper submitted by the United States planners.
Brooke spoke for the British Chiefs. He prefaced his remarks by saying that a
consideration of the papers offered by both sides showed that there was
agreement among the parties on certain basic points, but that as to certain
others there were "differences of opinion which must be eliminated." After
briefly discussing the target date for cross-Channel operations, during which
he suggested that the previously selected date of April 1, 1944 be moved back
to May 1 or June 1, he moved on to the more divisive question of Italy. He
pointed out that while the American paper accepted the elimination of Italy as
a possibility, it had given no appreciation to the steps necessary to either
accomplish it or take advantage of it. Of far greater importance, however, was
the fact that the American paper contemplated a period of six to seven months
following HUSKY during which Allied forces would be essentially
inactive on land. This was clearly intolerable for Brooke, since in his view
1943 was "most critical" for Russia. The western Allies, he said, must do
everything in their power to help Russia, and a failure to use all available
forces for this purpose could not be justified.[44]
Brooke deftly tied together the Mediterranean operation, Germany's eastern
front, and the cross-Channel attack. He said that the Allies could, with the
forces then available in the Mediterranean, "achieve important results," give a
great deal of aid to Russia, and at the same time create a situation that would
favor an invasion of northwestern Europe in 1944. In this context, he offered a
sharp but subtle criticism of the American plan. He implied that the American
plan was so vague as to make it "difficult . . . to visualize the shape of
operations to defeat Germany." However, he said that the plan "appeared" to
contemplate the capture of such European ports as would permit a build-up of
forces directly from the United States. A study of this concept had shown,
however, that most of the capacity of such ports would be used up in supplying
the forces necessary to cover them. Using Cherbourg as an example, Brooke said
that provisioning the troops necessary to cover this port would be difficult
unless the Germans were very weak or could not locate reserves. To this end,
active Russian operations would be imperative. On the other hand, if the
Russians suffered defeats in 1943, the possibility of any landing in Europe in
the following year would be sharply reduced. This could be avoided by employing
limited forces in the Mediterranean for the purpose of forcing Italy out of the
war, an event which would tie up an estimated 20 to 30 German divisions.[45]
Brooke's remarks provoked a prolonged discourse by General Marshall in which he
offered a pointed and detailed critique of the British plan. He commented,
first of all, that the British view of port capacities was pessimistic, saying
that experience had shown that estimates of such capacities should in fact be
doubled. Speaking more generally of the British plan, he suggested that while
it magnified the intended results of Mediterranean operations, it also
minimized the forces that would be required as well as the logistic
difficulties that would be encountered. The British plan was overly optimistic
regarding the effect that enemy resistance would have on the operation.
Marshall reminded his audience that a relatively small German force had
seriously delayed Allied operations in North Africa, and said that a similar
German involvement in support of Italy "might make intended operations
extremely difficult and time consuming."[46]
Marshall then addressed the British plan paragraph by paragraph. He said that
paragraph 2a of the plan expressed the view that it would be essential for the
cross-Channel invasion to be of sufficiently large scale as would allow the
pace of the Allied build-up to compete with that of the Germans. In this
connection, a deteriorating situation for the Germans had been taken as a
given. According to Marshall, however, the initial aim of the invasion must be
not the immediate defeat of the German Army, but instead the establishment of a
bridgehead that would not only affect the enemy psychologically, but also
cripple the U-boat campaign and provide airfields on the Continent. This, in
turn, would give the Allies better bases for operations against the Germans,
thus facilitating the destruction of the Luftwaffe. These were immediate and
important results, said Marshall, and should be regarded as the Allies' first
objective, rather than an immediate advance on the Rhine. The British plan, he
suggested, did not give sufficient recognition to the devastating effect that
the Allied air offensive was having on Germany's overall war-fighting capacity,
as well as her ability to rapidly build up forces in western Europe.[47]
General Marshall pressed home his attack. While paragraph 7 of the British
paper addressed the limitations that the shortage of landing craft would force
on cross-Channel operations, it failed to point out that the contemplated
Mediterranean operations would further reduce the number of these all-important
vehicles. Paragraph 27 asserted that the oil fields in Ploesti could not be
attacked except from bases in Italy. In fact, Marshall pointed out, the Chiefs
had already discussed this issue and decided that bases already in Allied hands
would be sufficient for the mounting of such an attack. Paragraph 35
overestimated the willingness of the Italian people to deal with the Allies. A
more likely course of events, Marshall suggested, was that Germany would
support the Italians to the fullest extent possible, Allied plans would be
seriously delayed, the Mediterranean theatre would siphon off Allied resources,
"and we should find ourselves completely involved in operations in that theatre
to the exclusion of all else."[48]
Marshall turned to paragraph 38 of the British plan, which proposed that the
Allies should secure a bridgehead at Durazzo in the event that Italy collapsed.
Such an operation, in Marshall's view, would so completely commit the Allies
that subsequent operations of any significance would be rendered impossible as
a result of shipping and landing craft shortages. Marshall stated that the
summary of troop commitments set forth in paragraph 42 of the British plan
might well be an accurate estimate. It was "axiomatic," however, that all
military commanders invariably asked for more troops than had originally been
estimated as sufficient. The proposed Mediterranean operations would be no
different, and Allied commanders would soon be "overwhelmed" by demands for
more troops and equipment. The same was true of British estimates concerning
the shipping requirements necessary to support the Italian economy in the event
of that country's collapse. While the British had contemplated a maximum of 20
ships per month would be required for this task, it was more likely that twice
this number would be needed.[49]
Marshall also complained that the British plan had underestimated the number of
ships that would be required for the build-up of troops in the United Kingdom
for the cross-Channel attack. If operations in the Mediterranean continued
after HUSKY, the pre-invasion build-up in England would be curtailed
by a lack of sufficient escorts, even if enough troop and cargo ships were
available. And if the Allies mounted significant operations in the
Mediterranean after HUSKY , there would be no landing craft returned
to England for use in the invasion of the Continent. Marshall concluded by
saying that in general the British plan was too pessimistic concerning the
possibilities for successful cross-Channel operations, since it failed to take
into account the success of the Allied air offensive and its relationship to
the ground campaign. The British view of Mediterranean operations, on the other
hand, was overly optimistic in its assessment of the forces which would be
required, the strength of the enemy reaction and the magnitude of the logistic
problem.[50]
At this point the discussion became so heated that Marshall suggested that it
continue "off the record." As a result, all of the officers present, with the
exception of the Combined Chiefs of Staff themselves, withdrew from the
meeting. Brooke, though not altogether satisfied with the agreement ultimately
reached during this closed-door session, later said that it was "far better
than a break-up of the Conference."[51]
Unenthusiastic as the British Chiefs may have been about the end result, it was
their point of view which carried the day. The contentious meetings of the
Combined Chiefs produced a report, entitled "TRIDENT: Report to the President
and Prime Minister of the Final Agreed Summary of Conclusions Reached by the
Combined Chiefs of Staff," which they presented in final form to Roosevelt and
Churchill on May 25, 1943.[52] The report enunciated the overall strategic
objective of the Allies to be "the unconditional surrender of the Axis
powers."[53] Among the specific operations planned for 1943-1944 to achieve
this purpose were "Operations in the Mediterranean to Eliminate Italy from the
War." On this point, the report stated that the Combined chiefs had resolved to
direct General Eisenhower
. . . as a matter of urgency, to plan such operations in
exploitation of HUSKY as are best calculated to eliminate Italy from
the War and to contain the maximum number of German forces. Which of the
various specific operations should be adopted, and thereafter mounted, is a
decision which will be reserved to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
The report allocated to Eisenhower 27 divisions (19 British and Allied, 4
United States and 4 French) for post-HUSKY operations in the
Mediterranean. This was the entire complement of Allied forces then available
in the theatre, with the exception of 4 American and 3 British divisions, which
were to be withdrawn to the United Kingdom for use in cross-Channel operations,
and 2 British divisions, which represented the British commitment to Turkey. In
addition, the report assigned to Eisenhower's command over 3,600 aircraft,
including over 1,000 bombers of all types and approximately 2,000 fighters.[54]
At the operational level, General Eisenhower and his planning staff also
confronted the question of how to proceed against Italy following the
conclusion of the Sicilian campaign. In late April, the A.F.H.Q. planners
advocated the very scheme that was anathema to Churchill, namely the seizure of
Sardinia and Corsica, followed by a bombing offensive against the Italian
mainland from bases on these islands and Sicily. The purpose of this air
assault would be to drive Italy from the war, or in the alternative to lay the
groundwork for an amphibious invasion. The planners gave no consideration to
the notion of invading Italy from Sicily without the intermediate step of
conquering Sardinia and Corsica.[55]
While Eisenhower could do little else but side with his planners generally on
the subject of the practical aspects of prosecuting the war in the
Mediterranean, he was nevertheless convinced that the best strategy for the
Allies was a cross-Channel invasion directed at Germany through northern
France. Thus, although he considered with Marshall a variety of scenarios,
ultimately Eisenhower favored bringing an end to further offensive action in
the Mediterranean, if those operations might be expected to interfere with the
build-up for the invasion of France. In this Eisenhower was in fact supported
by his planners, who saw the proposed operation against Sardinia and Corsica in
a favorable light because they would require limited troop commitments, and
would allow the Allies the opportunity to move away from Italy if they so
desired.[56]
The point of view advocated by Eisenhower and the American planners was not
shared by their English colleagues. Tedder, for example, believed that the
Sardinian operation would be more costly than expected, and that it would not
yield the kind of air bases that would be of particular use against the Reich.
Indeed, he and his associates on the British planning staff did not think in
terms of the cross-Channel operation as the ultimate goal of Allied European
strategy. Instead, they favored the large scale employment of air power, much
of it based in central Italy, along with the steady erosion of German fighting
power, to be obtained not only by bombing but also through direct and indirect
application of force in the Balkans. The British saw the key to Allied victory
in the removal of Italy from the war, rather than the cross-Channel invasion of
Europe.[57]
The British planners recommended invading the toe of Italy if Italy did not sue
for peace during HUSKY .. They did not see the successful seizure of
Corsica and Sardinia as necessary prerequisites for this. Their view was that
operations on the Italian mainland would be more likely to lead to the collapse
of Italy in 1943, and that this would open a land front capable of attracting
and holding a large number of Axis forces. For this purpose, they advocated
invading the toe of Italy before completion of the Sicilian campaign. This
would achieve the most immediate goal, namely the withdrawal of Italy from the
war.[58]
Churchill was not comfortable with the failure of the combined Chiefs of Staff
to conclude the TRIDENT conference with an explicit call for the invasion of
Italy in 1943. He therefore flew to Algiers to visit Eisenhower, taking General
Marshall, General Brooke and the Prime Minister's personal Chief of Staff,
General Sir Hastings L. Ismay, in tow. Churchill's purpose was to persuade
Eisenhower and his planners to select the Italian mainland, rather than Corsica
and Sardinia, as the target of invasion.[59]
Churchill convened a formal meeting to address his concerns on May 29, 1943.
The officers present included Eisenhower, Marshall and Walter Bedell Smith on
the American side, and Brooke, Alexander, Cunningham and Tedder on the British.
Marshall took the initiative, urging that Eisenhower establish two wholly
independent and fully staffed headquarters. They would be tasked to prepare
operational plans for the invasion of the Italian mainland and Corsica/Sardinia
respectively. When the situation in Sicily allowed, one of these headquarters
would be given the authority and the necessary resources to take action. The
parties then discussed the variety of possibilities that the Sicilian operation
might hold, as well as the uncertainties presented by the lack of solid
information concerning the respective attitudes of the Italians and Germans
about the coming fight. There was general agreement, including even by
Churchill, that the Italian mainland should not be invaded in the face of
strong resistance. Ultimately, Marshall's concept of dual headquarters
prevailed at this conference. In effect, Churchill's anxiety for a timely
invasion of Italy gave way in the face of situational logic. General
Eisenhower, the man who would likely lead such an invasion, demonstrated that
under the circumstances there were only three likely scenarios involving Italy,
namely: (1) an immediate collapse of enemy resistance on Sicily, in which event
the Allies should shift the assault to the mainland with dispatch; (2) stubborn
and prolonged enemy resistance on Sicily, a development that would result in no
Allied forces being available for an operation against Italy any time soon; and
(3) strong enemy resistance on Sicily nevertheless overcome by the Allies with
relative speed, a situation whose details were so unpredictable that no advance
planning could be made. Even Churchill was compelled to recognize that of these
three alternatives only the first offered the possibility of a quick Allied
initiative against the Italian mainland, and that possibility was slim at best,
given the presence of German units on the island.[60]
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Copyright © 2003 Thomas E. Nutter
Written by Thomas E. Nutter. If you have questions or comments on this
article, please contact Mr. Nutter at: tenutter@gmail.com.
About the author: Tom Nutter is in his 25th
year of practicing domestic and international patent, copyright and trademark
law, and is the Managing Partner of an intellectual property law practice in St. Louis, Missouri. He holds
the Masters and Doctorate degrees in diplomatic/military history from the
University of Missouri. His interests include railroad history as well as
European and American military history in the Nineteenth and Twentieth
Centuries. He lives in St. Louis with his wife, three children and two German
Shepherd dogs, Caesar and Cleopatra.
Published online: 03/01/2003.
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