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Operation Husky: The Allied
Invasion of Sicily, 1943
by Thomas E. Nutter
Aspects of the Allied Invasion of Sicily, 1943
V. HUSKY in Execution
B. The Naval Experience (Part 1)
The Allies spent the period between June 22 and July 4, 1943 carrying out
rehearsals of the assault landing and in special training of task groups. The
time was also used to install special equipment. Because of the proximity of
enemy aircraft and submarines, these rehearsals were not full scale.
Nevertheless, the Allies managed to conduct three complete naval rehearsals and
one combined rehearsal. Unfortunately, these were not always carried out with
the same craft, as other commitments, mechanical breakdowns and refittings took
some boats out of service. Even so, by the time HUSKY was commenced in
earnest, all craft had performed their roles at least once, and some had done
so several times. In addition, all brigades conducted individual combined
rehearsals, and many combined signal exercises were carried out.[117]
Admiral Hewitt commanded over six hundred ships and landing craft, one hundred
and thirty of which were allocated for escort, covering and fire support. On
July 9 the weather was unfavorable for convoys, with the wind velocity at about
35 knots and a moderate sea. The LSTs had difficulty making 8 knots, and the
LCIs and smaller craft were making heavy weather of it. The LCT convoy
proceeded independently and there was considerable doubt whether the LCT tank
waves would arrive at the assault beaches in time to support the infantry. The
JOSS Force LSTs and LCIs, in spite of the wind and sea conditions,
pushed on as hard as they could in order to meet H-hour. This resulted in some
LSTs lagging behind to the extent that they lost sight of the next group ahead,
so that some craft became separated from their proper groups and anchored in
the wrong area of the beachhead. The Control Ships, acting as escorts during
the approach, likewise became separated and were not in their proper positions
in the rendezvous areas to assemble and lead the assault LCVPs to the beach.
[118]
Three British submarines acted as beacons, taking up positions in the Gulf of
Gela on July 7. On July 8, low flying aircraft caused SERAPH and SHAKESPEARE
to dive; that evening, an E-Boat forced down SERAPH. These submarines
left for Malta on D- day; a JU-88 attacked SAFARI without success; SERAPH
rescued a US soldier fallen overboard.[119]
Opposition was light on all beaches with the exception of YELLOW, RED
2 and GREEN 2. The surf was about three feet high, and many
landing craft broached. In the CENT area, delays in loading boats
prompted the attack force commander to order postponement of H-Hour to 3:45 AM.
Landings were generally unopposed, due to the pre-assault cruiser and destroyer
shore bombardment. The 157th Regimental Combat Team landed on its assigned
beaches, moved inland and captured the designated initial objectives ahead of
schedule. The 179th Regimental Combat Team landed on the correct beaches, but
experienced delay in movement through the dunes because of extensive mine
fields. The 180th Regimental Combat Team gained its assigned D-day objectives
after completing a successful landing. However, the landing was not on the
correct beaches, and this caused delay in marching and forming up.[120]
In the JOSS area initial attack waves landed according plan in spite
of delay caused by bad weather. The landings were over the correct beaches
according to schedule in spite of some enemy fire. There was not much fire on
GREEN, YELLOW and BLUE beaches; however, there was
considerable artillery and machinegun fire on RED beach.[121]
In Admiral Ramsay's operational area, the LCT convoy for BARK EAST had
been held up by the weather and had eventually made BARK SOUTH,
arriving nearly six hours late. Similar convoys for ACID and for BARK
SOUTH were each about two hours late. The most timely was the LCT convoy
for BARK WEST , which arrived only thirty minutes late.[122]
The ships at the release positions in the British naval sector were apparently
not detected by the shore defenses, and the only difficulties experienced in
lowering and forming up landing craft were those imposed by the weather. The
defenses were taken generally by surprise when the assaulting formations landed
and there was little organized resistance on the beaches. A proportion of the
coast defenses were not, in fact, manned on that night; those that were manned
were, in the majority of cases, not stoutly fought. At first light there was a
certain amount of shelling from shore batteries, but these were effectively
dealt with by supporting monitors, destroyers and gun boats. The effectiveness
of the supporting fire from British naval forces was remarked upon by friend
and foe alike.[123]
Because of the late arrival of the LCT convoys the only LCTs to beach before
daylight were those at BARK SOUTH. The unloading of the ships was commenced
without delay, and proceeded satisfactorily, despite bad exits and soft sand in
the ACID sector and false beaches and soft sand at BARK WEST. Both the LST and
the LCI proved, in Admiral Ramsay's view, invaluable in their respective roles,
and he considered that the speed with which both vehicles and personnel were
landed was one of the principal factors in the success of the operation from
the naval point of view. Although at times the rate at which stores were
unloaded appeared to be disappointing, the totals unloaded for the beaches
were, in fact, greater than the planned figures.[124]
Neither BARK SOUTH nor BARK EAST were worked to capacity
during HUSKY. The LST, LCI and the DUKW fulfilled the highest
expectations of the British. They considered that the beach organizations
worked satisfactorily, and that the shortage of transport ashore to clear the
beach dumps resulted from the very quick forward advance of the army. Admiral
Ramsay observed, however, that "[T]his is not likely ... to obtain in future
operations undertaken against a more determined enemy."[125]
The general absence of enemy air attacks in Admiral Ramsay's sector was as
surprising in its extent and considerably greater than the British had been led
to expect. According to the Admiral, British ships were not attacked until
10:15AM on July 10 when the enemy raided the ships at ACID beach. On
subsequent days there were intermittent air attacks, principally on the East
coast, and an increasing number occurred at night. Ramsay considered it
fortunate that more damage was not done by these attacks; only three transport
ships and a hospital ship were sunk as a result of them. The enemy attacked and
sank the hospital ship TALAMBA and also attacked the ABA and
DORSETSHIRE, all of which were assailed while lying over five miles from
land and fully illuminated. Ramsay had ordered that all such hospital ships
remain darkened and with the fleet at night and that full illumination would
only be switched on when the ships were five miles clear of the beaches and on
passage to or from the assault area. After the sinking of the TALAMBA the
British kept all hospital ships with the fleet all night without lights.[126]
In the CENT area, destroyers were used to cover and support the
landing. They opened preparatory fire at fifteen minutes before H-hour; each
destroyer was assigned an area of responsibility and covered it with 5 inch
shells. As a result, 45th Infantry Division landed practically unopposed.[127]
Stores, ammunition and supplies were distributed along several miles of
beaches. Exits were few, difficult and mined. Several boats were lost on the
rocks of GREEN 2 and YELLOW 2 beaches and casualties were
sustained. In the DIME area, the beaches were heavily mined and
bulldozers, DUKWs and other vehicles were lost. In the JOSS area,
the GREEN beaches proved to be the most hazardous; the entrance was
rocky, and the shallowness of the beach made it impossible to retract or to
render assistance to those beached until succeeding waves landed. Most boats
were stuck on the sand. LSTs had great difficulty because of soft sand on RED
beach; so they were unloaded at either YELLOW or BLUE beaches
or in Licata harbor[128]
The original attack plan had called for the softening of the beach defenses by
paratroops, whose intervention was deemed vital to the success of the seaborne
assaults, so that the dropping of the paratroops effectively determined D-day
and H-Hour (July 10, 2: 45 AM, or two hours before first light). To Admiral
Hewitt's great regret, the plan was later changed, so that the role of the
paratroops became not the softening of the beaches, but the seizure of high
ground round Gela and the capture of the airfield at Ponte Olivo; the date and
time of the invasion, however, remained the same, even though Hewitt regarded
both as "unsuitable from a naval viewpoint". [129]
The Appreciation of FORCE 141 , which originally called out the role
of the paratroops, stated that the selected date would "afford the approach to
the coastline the cover of darkness". The fact was, however, that the assault
forces were required to make the approach to the beaches in a brilliant waxing
moon which would not set until the vessels had hove to in the initial transport
areas immediately under the coast defense guns of the enemy. These facts were
well known to the naval planners, who pointed out the fact that the moon phase
selected was most unfavorable for naval purposes. The date for the landing,
however, was not changed because it was reiterated that this phase of the moon
was most favorable to the dropping of the paratroops who were the only means
available to "neutralize the beach defenses opposing the seaborne assaults".
The time for the landing (2:45 AM) had been fixed by the fact that it required
the paratroops about three hours from dropping time to assemble and carry out
their mission of the "softening of the beaches"; in fact, however, ultimately
the paratroops were directed away from the beach defenses.[130]
Since the softening of the beach defenses was vital to the whole plan, naval
planners then suggested the employment of naval gunfire against beach defenses.
This was not acceptable to the Army on the ground that "surprise" (a
"fundamental principle of war") was to be achieved in the assault. Since H-hour
required the Allied transports to be in the initial transport areas in
brilliant moonlight, the prospect was remote that the enemy would fail to
observe such a concentration of hostile shipping off his shores. It was
apparent, moreover, that any illumination of the Allied forces, either
accidentally by the Allies or purposefully by the enemy, would alert the enemy
and disclose Allied intentions. Further, since heavy Allied pre-invasion
bombing and the dropping of paratroops had preceded H-hour by almost three
hours, the idea that surprise could be preserved was illusory. It was the naval
viewpoint that surprise on the assault beaches was not feasible, and indeed not
necessary provided there was a rapid seizure of a beachhead.
Owing to the limited capacity of the LCVPs, many trips to and from the beach
were required to move any great quantity of supplies, creating operational
fatigue in boat crews. The LCVP was a reliable and rugged boat but easily
swamped upon beaching unless promptly unloaded. Many boats were ordered away
from congested beaches and returned to their ships without unloading. DUKWs
were loaded in LSTs and LCTs for the initial purpose of assisting in the
unloading of the combat loaders. The problem was that after the first trip to
shore, few of these vehicles returned to the ships for further loading, having
been diverted by the army for employment onshore. This diversion of the DUKWs
not only interrupted the unloading plan, but led to the loss of many DUKW
s.
The adoption of the so-called "Montgomery Plan" had serious implications for
the Western Naval Task Force. Not only were the beaches required for the Plan
inferior for the assault, but also the problem of maintenance reached serious
proportions. The beaches south of the Gela River, and particularly those south
of the Acate River, introduced unusual natural obstacles. These beaches were
backed by soft sand dunes, with undulations reaching a height of from 40 to 80
feet, for a distance of one-half mile to one mile from the sea. Barren slopes
and patches of thick shrub bordered the landward side of these vast dunes. Cart
tracks running parallel to the beaches lay between the shore line and the
nearest metalled road located from one to three miles from the sea. Exits from
the beaches to the hinterland were non-existent. The fact that many beaches
were flanked by groups of rocks, and all beaches were bordered to seaward by
bars or runnels, indicated that there would be difficulties in beaching landing
craft, and in preventing stranding unless unloading of the boats was
accomplished with special dispatch. The locale and condition of the landing
beaches thus suggested the need for reinforced Shore Parties, with particular
emphasis on road construction units to prepare exits from the beaches;
increased motor vehicle transportation to move stores from beaches to inland
dumps and to the advancing troops; and finally a greatly increased labor force
to quickly unload boats and craft at the beaches.[131]
In the event, the organization and operation of the beaches during the assault
phase presented some of the greatest difficulties in the HUSKY operation.
The recurring delay in getting boats unloaded after the first few hours of the
assault was present on all the CENT and DIME beaches, and to
a lesser extent on the JOSS beaches. From about noon on D-day to the
night of D+1, after the assault troops had reached inland objectives and were
well engaged with the enemy, demands for ammunition and equipment were
greatest. At the same time, the invasion force was inferior to the enemy in
artillery and possibly in infantry. It was at this critical period that boat
crews and shore parties fell behind in unloading, when the beaches became
congested, and when there was a grave danger of complete breakdown in the
supply system.[132]
Admiral Hewitt found the Beach Battalions to be the weakest link in the naval
organization, while at the same time faced with one of the most arduous and
difficult tasks.
During the assault phase of the operation the efficiency of the
beach parties was no better than that of the shore parties of which they were a
part. As the engineers of the shore parties became primarily involved in normal
combat missions, with little concern for the operation of the beaches, the
beach parties failed similarly in the prompt and full execution of their
responsibilities. There was no concerted effort made to carry out prompt
hydrographic surveys at first light on D day. Since thorough surveys were not
promptly carried out by all the beach parties, there was a dearth of channel
markers. This resulted in LCTs and LSTs standing in to beaches to unload
without any guidance as to favorable or unfavorable sites, resulting in the
grounding of some craft some distance from shore and causing delays in
beaching. In view of the dependence upon the successful employment of pontoon
causeways, the off-shore investigations should have been planned in detail and
executed promptly with the break of dawn. Since the beach party is not provided
a boat from which to carry out this off-shore work, beachmasters have had to
confiscate boats to do this work.[133] Hewitt pointed out that
while so-called traffic control boats were supposed to accompany supply boats
following the assault craft to the beaches, the traffic control boats failed to
materialize, leaving the supply boats to land without direction. As a result,
congestion on the beaches followed, a condition aggravated by the fact that the
loads remained unloaded, owing to the failure of the Shore Party to perform
this part of its task. In consequence, literally dozens of fully loaded supply
craft were swamped or stranded ashore, so that the beaches were unavailable to
following craft. Many supply craft sat unloaded for as long as 20 hours.[134]
Hewitt complained that there was a general lack of communication between the
Shore Party and vessels such as LSTs moving in to land. This was in part due to
the wide dispersal of Shore Party personnel over the beaches, where
"[D]iscipline, leadership, and control were absent." Changes were made to the
CENT beaches as many as eight times during the first two days of the assault,
on the ground that beaches with better exits were being sought. This
particularly irked Hewitt, who pointed out that the absence of suitable exits
had been "conclusively shown" during the preliminary planning stages for the
invasion. The planners had recommended that exits and roads would have to be
constructed by the Shore Party, and Hewitt claimed to have personally
recommended that the CENT area have available an enhanced corps of road
construction troops so that the problem could be resolved on D-day.[135]
Hewitt had under his command three navy Beach Battalions, one assigned to each
of the CENT, JOSS and DIME force beach areas. He
complained that because of the unsatisfactory conditions on these beaches,
including the fact that the Beach Battalions lacked the proper equipment, the
members of these units were engaged in pursuits not related to their main task,
including loading and unloading boats, trucks and ships, road building, serving
as gun crews, and acting as guards for POWs. The Beach Battalions stayed on
their beaches for periods of weeks performing tasks for which they were not
trained or equipped. Many of these troops were incapacitated by fever, malaria
and dysentery. Hewitt accordingly believed that in addition to being more
lavishly equipped, these units should be better trained. In particular, he
believed that they required "more navy life", meaning that they should receive
intensive shipboard training in order to instill in them "the necessary naval
background." They should be taught clean and orderly living in the
field, how to get along with little and make that little do, how to take care
of arms, equipment, and clothing and the necessity for doing so. Physical
fitness, military courtesy and discipline should be emphasized in this training
which should include overhead firing and other battle courses. These units are
seamen first, and they should be garbed in a distinctive uniform in order that
they may be distinguished on the beach. Helmets should be painted and marked so
as to identify them as members of the Beach Party.[136]
Hewitt was convinced that many of the problems on the beaches could be traced
to command issues.
Many of the failings...have been due to the lack of rank, experience, and
personality of the Beachmasters. Such officers become submerged in numbers and
seniority of the Army ashore. They lack the necessary rank and assurance to
stand up against the constant succession of conflicting requests, orders,
instructions and commands received on the spot from higher ranking Army
officers, who are interested in getting one particular task done, but have no
immediate interest in the overall beach task. Many high ranking Army officers,
not in the Shore Party, call upon the Beachmaster to subordinate his tasks in
the behalf of this seniors' peculiar interests, notwithstanding the
capabilities and limitations of the Beach Party. Naval officers of suitable
rank, experience, and quality can cope with such interferences and prevent
diversion of effort. The sole exception to this pattern was on
the JOSS beaches, where Group Commanders, all Captains and Commanders,
"were very effective in bringing the JOSS beaches from disorder to
efficiency."[137]
Similar complaints, in reference to the beaches in the British area of
operations, were made by Admiral Ramsay. He found that "[B]each parties were
not as well trained in the full scope of their duties as they should have been,
and this fact was adversely remarked on by senior army officers." According to
Ramsay, however, this deficiency was corrected by the time the operation took
place, so that "in general it may be said that the naval beach parties carried
out their duties very creditably." In spite of this success, however, Ramsay
echoed his American counterpart, recommending that in future beach parties be
commanded by Lieutenant Commanders, with senior Lieutenants "of character" to
assist them. Observing that the officers attached to the beach party on BARK
SOUTH were "very keen and hard working", he nevertheless concluded that
they "had not the personality, experience or seniority to take complete charge
of these beaches." The ability to take control of such a situation, especially
in the dark or adverse weather conditions, would be crucial to success in any
future similar operation. [138]
Operating in the Scoglitti area during the first four days of the operation was
Destroyer Squadron 15, commanded by one C.C. Hartman aboard his flagship, the
USS MERVINE . In addition to this vessel, the squadron included eight
other destroyers, all of them mounting 5 inch guns, as well as both 40mm and
20mm cannon. Prior to the assault, seven of the squadron's ships acted as a
screen for the transport groups, while the remaining two ships were on detached
duty, escorting LSTs from Tunis to the Scoglitti area. During the invasion,
three of the squadron's vessels served in a screening role with vessels from
another squadron, while the remainder of Destroyer Squadron 15 provided fire
support. Until July 13 the squadron's vessels continued to alternate between
screen duty and fire support.[139]
Late on the evening of July 9, as the squadron lay off shore at Scoglitti, the
weather was highly favorable for the invasion, as indeed it would be for
several days thereafter. Between 10:20PM and 11:35PM, Hartman's squadron stood
on station, prepared for the beginning of the assault. During that time, the
crews observed steadily increasing activity on the island, including repeated
incidents of heavy anti-aircraft fire, flare detonations, and even
searchlights. Hartman believed that most of this activity was directed at
Allied bombers and transport aircraft carrying Allied paratroopers. Indeed, one
flight of American bombers flew over the squadron at a height of less than 600
feet heading south, giving Hartman and his crews "quite a start." Fortunately
for the airmen, they had the presence of mind to switch on their running
lights, so that the ships held their fire.[140]
At about 3:00AM on July 10, after nearly an hour's delay, the assault vessels
began moving in. Between 3: 45AM and 4:20AM Destroyer Squadron 15 poured
supporting fire on the beach area, against non-existent opposition. The assault
waves were then safely ashore. Shortly thereafter, as small force of enemy
bombers attacked the transport ships, although apparently without much effect.
Hartman's ships continued to provide fire support, silencing even small caibre
guns or batteries. In fact, the firing of the squadron's own guns was perhaps
the most excitement experienced by the crews in the invasion. Neither the ships
nor the troops landing met with resistance from the enemy ashore, and the
enemy's naval forces made no appearance from the seaward side to harass
Hartman's men. So complete was victory for Destroyer Squadron 15 in the Sicily
invasion that it suffered no casualties whatever.[141]
The USS MONROVIA , commanded by T. B. Brittain, had what for her crew
must have been a particularly interesting experience during the first few days
of the HUSKY operation. Although the MONROVIA acted as a
transport vessel, it embarked with "the Naval Commander Western Task Force, his
operational staff, Fighter Control Group, the Commanding General Seventh Army,
his Deputy Commander, full staff and a large Headquarters Detachment of various
units. All together 126 officers, 670 men." The ship also carried many tons of
equipment, fuel and ammunition. The combination of so many dignitaries and so
much cargo meant that the MONROVIA was unable to directly participate
in the assault. Instead, it furnished boats, boat crews and boat officers to
two other vessels to assist them in getting the assault waves ashore. These
conditions also extended unloading operations over a period of three days, when
under normal circumstances the unloading would have taken half that time.[142]
The progress of the invasion in the sector of DIME Force on July 10 may be
glimpsed from the MONROVIA's activities on that day. At shortly after
midnight on July 10, MONROVIA moved into the transport area to which
it had been assigned and began to lower boats. At 8:43AM it anchored off the
island, and by 9:00AM it began to discharge cargo, and continued to do so for
the rest of that day. The next day, the MONROVIA continued to unload
cargo, and in the midmorning Admiral Hewitt debarked with some staff officers
for an inspection tour. During this day, however, MONROVIA was
attacked by enemy aircraft on three separate occasions, suffering some minor
damage. In one such attack, aircraft damaged and sank a merchant ship anchored
quite near the MONROVIA. [143]
July 12 was a particularly noteworthy date for the crew of the MONROVIA.
At 6:30AM that morning, General Eisenhower came aboard for a conference with
Admiral Hewitt and General Patton. The Supreme Commander and his staff stayed
aboard for approximately one hour and twenty minutes, shortly after which MONROVIA
completed unloading its cargo. Shortly before noon, however, Vice Admiral Lord
Louis Mountbatten and his party came aboard and stayed for two hours. At
approximately 5:00PM General Patton and his staff and equipment disembarked,
and an hour later the MONROVIA joined a convoy and its destroyer
escort to leave the area.[144]
At least as far as the MONROVIA was concerned, the resistance offered
by the enemy in the DIME force sector appears to have been minimal.
For example, in discussing the conduct of his officers and men, Brittain noted
that "[T]hey made their landings and disembarked their troops in the face of
such opposition as was present on the assigned beaches." Only two members of
the ship's crew were wounded, neither of them seriously, and the crew expended
relatively little ammunition. The only damage suffered by the MONROVIA
was to its engine room, sustained when a bomb from a Heinkel 111 exploded in
the water on the ship's port side. This damage was minor, and the crew quickly
repaired it.[145]
Brittain recommended one of his crew, seaman second class Thomas B. McMonagle,
for the Navy Cross in connection with his actions during the assault. The story
of this seaman's bravery is an interesting one. However, it also illustrates
the relatively light enemy resistance encountered in the DIME sector.
McMonagle was the coxswain in command of MONROVIA'S Boat 31. He landed
his boat at the appointed beach, during which operation he was wounded by enemy
machine gun fire. Most interestingly, his commanding officer then reports that
"[T]he Army boat team refused to embark even though the ramp was down and the
boat well beached." In view of this, McMonagle backed the boat off the beach,
silenced the enemy machine guns with his boat's weapons, and then relanded the
boat farther down the beach. The seaman continued to maintain control of the
boat and returned her to the ship to which he had been assigned, all the while
refusing to be relieved by his crew. Only when he was overcome by weakness
would he relinquish control of the boat.[146]
The story of seaman McMonagle further shows that the Axis troops did not offer
a blistering defense in the DIME area of operations. McMonagle, after
all, was able to beach his boat twice, encountering only enemy machine gun
fire, and silencing even that with his own weapons, and apparently without
assistance in the form of naval gunfire or air support. It seems unlikely that
McMonagle and his men were successful in killing all of the enemy machine
gunners from the deck of a moving assault craft; the more plausible explanation
is that they abandoned their posts after having first offered token resistance.
The most interesting aspect of the McMonagle saga, however, would seem to be
the refusal of the Army boat team to leave Boat 31 in the face of enemy
resistance. Obviously, these assault troops would have been raised to a fever
pitch by their commanders, since this was to be the first American landing
against a defended shore in the European theatre. One would expect such men to
be eager to leave the landing craft under any circumstances---unless it was
obvious that the enemy was not resisting elsewhere, and a safer point of egress
could therefore be found. It is curious also that the troops "refused" to leave
the boat, meaning not only that they declined to obey the commander of the
vessel, namely McMonagle, but also that they remained recalcitrant in the face
of an order from the man in charge of the party, whether he was a commissioned
or non-commissioned officer. It is, of course, unthinkable that the man in
command of such a landing party would be in any way implicated in such a
refusal to disembark. Finally, it is noteworthy that Brittain, in his report of
the incident, does not call for an investigation of its circumstances and the
punishment of the perpetrators. Surely some punishable offense---cowardice in
the face of the enemy, insubordination, dereliction of duty all come to
mind---was at least arguably committed by someone on Boat 31. It therefore
seems odd that Brittain did not seek charges against men who apparently failed
to obey their orders after McMonagle had been wounded obeying his.
C.W. Harwood, a Captain in the U.S. Coast Guard, commanded the USS JOSEPH T.
DICKMAN, as well as a task group consisting of the DICKMAN, H.M.S.
PRINCE CHARLES and H.M.S. PRINCE LEOPOLD, both of the Royal
Navy, and a small fleet of landing craft. Harwood's group had the task of
landing 1st Ranger Battalion, 4th Ranger Battalion, 1st Battalion 39th
Engineers and 83d Chemical Warfare Battalion on the beach at Gela on July 10.
The group encountered heavy weather during the day of July 9, 1943. While these
conditions did not directly affect the DICKMAN or its landing craft,
it may have indirectly affected the course of the invasion in the Gela area by
delaying the arrival of two of the group's control ships.[147]
The DICKMAN group approached the beach at Gela safely and surely
through the use of a submarine beacon. After experiencing some difficulty in
obtaining an accurate reading of its position relative to the shore, the DICKMAN
launched a marking boat which found and marked the center of the beach. DICKMAN
began lowering landing boats at 12:45 AM. There were thirty such boats in all;
twenty-six had been preloaded with troops before being lowered, while the
remaining four boats, preloaded with equipment only, received their troops by
means of nets over the ship's side. The DICKMAN completed lowering the
landing boats at 1:25AM. Captain Harwood then held the boats nearby while he
awaited the arrival of the primary and secondary control boats. After waiting
unsuccessfully for another thirty minutes, Harwood directed the boats to
proceed without the control ships.[148]
Fortunately, the control boats arrived as the landing vessels moved toward the
shore. As a result, all of the boats landed on the correct beach, but were
thirty minutes behind schedule. The enemy greeted the boats with some machine
gun fire, as well as with light cannon fire. Casualties among the boat crews
included five wounded and one killed. An Army officer was also killed while
still aboard his landing boat. In general, however, the troops crossed the
beach without suffering many casualties. The enemy directed its fire at the
boats, and at least two of them were damaged. Support boats silenced many of
the enemy weapons by firing rockets.[149]
The DICKMAN and its landing boats began unloading on July 10, and
continued until they were finished at 8:00PM on the next day. The enemy
subjected the DICKMAN to assault from the air on the morning of 11
July. This attack was without effect, but the enemy launched another such
attack at about 4:00PM on the same day, using a large formation of bombers. The
DICKMAN suffered some superficial damage from this bombing attack, and
six of her crew were slightly wounded. There was yet a third attack by enemy
aircraft approximately forty minutes later, but no bombs were dropped near the
DICKMAN. However, a nearby transport vessel, the SS ROBERT ROWAN,
was struck by at least one enemy bomb and caught fire. The DICKMAN took
aboard 92 survivors before the ROBERT ROWAN exploded. One of the DICKMAN'S
landing boats shot down an enemy fighter plane near the beach with its own
machine guns. Despite this success, however, the repeated enemy air attacks led
Harwood to the rather gloomy conclusion that "it is unlikely that a determined
enemy plane assault could have been beaten off."[150]
Cruiser Division Thirteen spent an eventful five days during the assault phase
of the invasion of Sicily. The Division formed a part of a Cover and Support
Group for the JOSS attack force which assaulted the southern coast of
Sicily in the Gela-Licata area. The Group comprised Cruiser Division Thirteen,
including the cruisers BROOKLYN and BIRMINGHAM, as well as
Destroyer Squadron Thirteen, which consisted of the destroyers BUCK,
ROE, SWANSON, NICHOLSON, LUDLOW, WOOLSEY,
WILKES, BRISTOL and EDISON. L. T. DuBose commanded
the Group from his flagship, the cruiser BROOKLYN .[151]
DuBose's Group made its approach to Licata without incident. Shortly after
2:00AM on July 10 the several ships in the Group took their stations for close
fire support along the coast before Licata. At about 3:00AM, however, the
destroyers ROE and SWANSON collided, resulting in serious
damage to both vessels. DuBose directed them to proceed to Malta for repairs,
and their places were taken by the BUCK and LUDLOW, which had
previously been assigned to screen BROOKLYN and BIRMINGHAM ,
respectively.[152]
Throughout the assault phase, the members of the Group had great difficulty in
communicating with their individual shore fire control parties. Because of such
a problem, the BROOKLYN reverted to firing on prearranged targets,
beginning at 4:42AM and continuing until 5:20AM. An unidentified enemy aircraft
attacked the BROOKLYN shortly after it had commenced firing,
straddling it with two bombs. On this occasion, as on many others over the next
four days, enemy aircraft approached without warning, having thwarted the
ships' radar by flying at low level. The Group provided supporting fire during
the first two hours after daylight. Although the cruisers were equipped with
their own spotter aircraft, they were not provided with adequate cover by
Allied fighter planes, and DuBose ordered their recall, fearing loss of both
the aircraft and their pilots. In spite of this difficulty, at 8:05AM the
Italian flag was removed from the Castel St. Angelo above Licata, and the
American flag hoisted up. About an hour later DuBose received an order to cease
firing.[153]
The remainder of the Group's stay in the invasion zone was rather ordinary, but
not without points of interest. On July 11 the BIRMINGHAM was assigned
a fire support mission off Port Empedocle, while the rest of the Group
patrolled in the landing area. The next day also passed without incident until
shortly after 10:00PM, when radar alerted the Group to the approach of hostile
aircraft. The ships maneuvered independently, and a stick of bombs missed the
BROOKLYN by about 200 feet. For the next twenty minutes the enemy
aircraft shadowed the BROOKLYN, but did not again attack. The enemy
again attacked the BROOKLYN from the air on July 13, with the same
lack of success. The rest of that day was spent patrolling and rendering fire
support. On July 14 there was some excitement when first the WOOLSEY and
then the BROOKLYN each detonated a mine. In neither case, however, was
the damage more than superficial, and by 2:45PM Cruiser Division Thirteen was
on its way to Algiers for fuel and ammunition.[154]
The destroyer USS MERVINE, under the command of D.R. Frakes, sailed
from Oran during the afternoon of July 5, 1943 as a part of Task Force 85
escorting a convoy to the theatre of operations for the invasion of Sicily. The
MERVINE did not encounter the enemy during this voyage, but did
experience rough seas on the afternoon of July 9, and a wind of force four from
the Northwest.[155]
The wind and sea in the assault area became calm after sunset. Between
approximately 10:30PM on July 9 and 2:00AM on July 10, the MERVINE observed
flares, searchlights and heavy anti-aircraft fire behind the beaches in the
vicinity of Gela. At 3:10AM the first wave of landing boats started for GREEN
2 Beach at a speed of six knots. At 3:48AM the MERVINE began
firing on an entire series of pre-arranged targets, and continued to do so
until 4:17AM. Between 4:30AM and about 5:07AM, enemy aircraft attacked several
nearby ships with bombs, and the MERVINE was able to take one of them,
a twin-engined German bomber, under fire, albeit unsuccessfully. The MERVINE's
captain was proud to report, however, that while neighboring vessels continued
to fire at covering Spitfires "throughout the day", believing them to be enemy
aircraft, his own crew refrained from such a potentially egregious error. The
MERVINE's forbearance on this account, Frakes admitted, was due to the
fact that the ship had received an officer specially trained in aircraft
recognition on leaving the US.[156]
The MERVINE was able to establish communications with its Shore Fire
Control Party shortly after 6:00AM, and thereafter destroyed an enemy gun
emplacement which had been firing on the beaches. However, this was the last
opportunity for the MERVINE to fire its guns. There were no further
requests for fire support, and at 2:30PM the MERVINE was attached to
the anti-submarine screen, and stayed with it until it left the invasion area
on July 13.[157]
Task Force Eighty-Five, also identified as the CENT Attack Force,
included the destroyer USS BEATTY, commanded by Commander Frederick C.
Stelter, Jr. The task force assembled off the isle of Gozo on July 9, and began
its approach to Sicily. Like her sister vessels, the BEATTY encountered,
after 10:00PM, increasingly favorable weather, with cloudless skies, force one
winds from the Northwest, and calm seas. These conditions obtained until at
least first light. Shortly after 11:30PM the crew of the BEATTY first
sighted transport planes when five of them passed close by at an altitude of
about 100-200 feet.[158]
At about 10:40PM anti-aircraft fire began around Gela and several other areas
in the CENT-DIME zone. The fire was quite intense and continued so
until after midnight, when it became more scattered. The enemy were also
observed using flares to advantage, especially against aircraft dropping
paratroops. The crew of the BEATTY began observing aircraft falling
from the sky in flames at 11:25PM.[159]
On arrival in the invasion area, the BEATTY undertook screening
operations with the transport ships until the latter were in their anchorage
area, and then took her station as part of a fire support group in the CENT-DIME
zone. While the BEATTY and her cohorts awaited the departure of the
first wave of invasion troops, the entire force was illuminated by two
searchlights located on the beach. The lights were eventually shot out, having
caused the fire support group great consternation, though little damage.[160]
Although the transports to which the BEATTY was assigned were
originally scheduled to depart for the beach at 1:51AM, in fact they did not do
so until 3:42AM, apparently because some of the landing boats could not be made
ready in a timely fashion. At 4:07AM one of the landing craft requested the BEATTY
and another destroyer, the USS COWIE, to open fire. The two ships then
fired on the landing zone for a period of six minutes, covering it with a hail
of projectiles. After completing this task, the BEATTY took up
anti-aircraft/anti-submarine patrol while it awaited contact with the shore
fire control party. At 4:20AM the BEATTY and other vessels in the
vicinity came under air attack by aircraft that could not be seen and were
undetectable by radar, because of their low approach. The enemy scored no
hits.[161]
First light occurred at 4:01AM, inaugurating a day of tension, anxiety and
intense activity for the crew of the BEATTY and her neighboring ships.
About an hour and a quarter later, two bombs from enemy aircraft landed in the
water, the first 2000 yards from the BEATTY's starboard beam, and the
second at approximately the same distance from her starboard bow. At 8:30AM the
BEATTY managed to contact its Shore Fire Control Team, attached to the
2d Battalion, 180th Regimental Combat Team, which reported that the landing was
successful, good progress was being made, and that fire support was not yet
needed. Thereafter, the activity of enemy aircraft was almost continuous.
Stetler reported that hostile planes would appear at the beachhead flying low
and fast from overland to strafe and bomb the invasion troops and then
disappear. The commanding officer of the BEATTY went so far as to say
that:
They maintained their nuisance value the entire period of daylight,
usually appeared in the temporary absence of our fighters and in general gave
an excellent account of themselves. The reason for the success
of the enemy fighters was that because of their low altitude, the ships could
not fire on them with impunity, for fear of injuring Allied troops. At the same
time, Allied fighters would not follow the enemy down, because when they did
so, they too were fired on by small craft and beach parties. At midmorning the
20mm cannon of the BEATTY contributed to the destruction of one enemy
plane which crashed inland after running the gauntlet of shipboard batteries.
At 10:46AM, however, the BEATTY's crew misidentified a P-51 as an
Fw-190 and discharged a barrage of machine-gun, 20mm and 40mm fire at it,
luckily without effect. Stetler characterized the incident as "excusable", in
view of the crew's state of anxiety, and the fact that the enemy aircraft were
"going about their business with no air oppostion."[162]
Air activity continued around the BEATTY after noon. The crew observed
two Fw-190s shoot down an Allied plane Southeast of Scoglitti at about 1:15PM.
Two hours later, Stelter observed enemy bombers over the DIME sector,
as well as a Ju-88 above the transport area, apparently on a reconnaissance
mission. Allied fighters did not intervene in either case. The enemy bombed the
beach in the DIME sector at 5:35PM, and at 6:47PM the crews of several LCTs
fired on friendly aircraft. Finally, between 8:40 and 9:00PM a very heavy enemy
bomb landed in the water quite close to the BEATTY, shaking her
"considerably", and two aircraft fell in flames behind the beach. As darkness
approached, Stelter could see twelve distinct fires ashore in the CENT
area, caused by heavy gunfire from ships, small craft and shore parties.[163]
An hour after sunrise on July 11 the BEATTY fired on a low flying
Me-110 that was retiring at high speed from a bombing attack in the DIME
sector. Although the plane was under heavy fire from other ships as well, it
managed to escape overland without damage. Thereafter, the BEATTY fired
its cannon almost continuously for over three hours at predesignated targets
ashore, under the direction of the Shore Fire Control Party. During this
sequence, Stelter's vessel fired 799 rounds, and was forced to cease firing
because of the depletion of its ammunition supply. The BEATTY took
station in an anti-submarine screen at 11:40AM, having been relieved by the USS
LAMB .[164]
At 7:00PM the BEATTY moved south of Scoglitti, taking up an
anti-aircraft/anti-submarine patrol while it awaited formation of a convoy to
which it had been assigned. Between 10:30 and midnight, the surrounding area
was alive with gunfire from both ships and the beaches. Flares illuminated the
transports just off shore, their effect being enhanced by a cloudless sky, a
half moon, and the dark background along the beaches. During this period,
Stelter observed at least ten aircraft crash into the sea in flames. Then, at
about 10:45PM, the crew of the BEATTY heard an aircraft approaching
the ship's starboard bow out of the dark over the beach from Scoglitti. The
aircraft could not be seen, and appeared to be making an unusual amount of
noise. Simultaneously, fragments from a five inch shell, fired at the plane by
another ship, struck the BEATTY on its starboard side, after the shell
detonated on impact in the water nearby. The aircraft then flashed across the
bow of the BEATTY at a height of about forty feet, narrowly missing
the forecastle, and crashing in the water about fifty feet from the ship.
During the plane's passage through the BEATTY's line of fire, the
vessel's 20mm battery managed to fire sixty rounds at it, before it was
identified as a C-47. Fortunately, the BEATTY was able to rescue the
aircraft's crew intact. It had already dropped its cargo of paratroops, in
spite of a gauntlet of fire thrown up by both friend and foe.[165]
A glimpse into the hazards that might have confronted the HUSKY invasion
force, particularly if the obvious landing beaches had been manned by a
resolute and well-equipped foe, can be obtained by considering the experience
of the USS FREDERICK FUNSTON and her crew. The FUNSTON was a
combat loader and carried 2,000 troops of the 45th Infantry Division to the
invasion zone, about six miles northwest of Scoglitti. The FUNSTON arrived at
its destination at about 11:00PM on July 9, 1943, and began launching landing
craft and support boats at about 12:30AM on July 10. Thereafter, the crew
worked continuously without respite at the task of unloading troops, supplies
and equipment, until at 6:00PM on July 13 the FUNSTON departed from
its position in the invasion area, having set a course for the naval base at
Oran.[166]
Although the FUNSTON completed its assigned mission, and did so with
dispatch and without damage to itself or its crew, nevertheless there occurred
a number of misadventures and incidents that highlighted the potential for
catastrophe present in the HUSKY operation. For example, the FUNSTON
possessed sixteen landing and support boats, no less than twelve of which were
stranded ashore during the operation and had to be rescued by the ship's
salvage party. As the FUNSTON's commanding officer reported, the loss
of these boats "was a prime factor in delaying vital supplies to the landed and
engaged troops." One reason for this situation was the deplorable condition of
the beach, the surface of which was rough and incredibly uneven for hundreds of
feet out to sea. In addition, the surf was very bad, so that many landing craft
broached or sank after having made only one or two trips to the beach.
Inability to handle the surf was in turn due to lack of skill on the part of
landing craft personnel, as well as to shortcomings in their equipment, which
was underpowered and difficult to handle.[167]
The FUNSTON's commanding officer generally praised the men under his
command, saying that "the behavior under fire, the untiring work in unloading
for a continuous sixty hour period, the determined spirit to get the job done
in the shortest possible time displayed by all hands was of the very highest
caliber." He also said that "[T]here was observed not a single case of
hesitation or reticence in the performance of any task, regardless of existing
conditions of war or battle."[168]
In spite of the tenor of these remarks, however, the FUNSTON's captain,
J.E. Murphy, felt compelled to disclose the darker side of the experience. The
more questionable actions of the men under Murphy's command occurred on the
beach, and included what Murphy termed "cases...of culpable inefficiency and
neglect of duty." Murphy described encountering landing craft fully loaded with
"such vital supplies as ammunition" abandoned by their crews on the beach.
Evidently, there had been a delay in unloading by the shore parties, and the
boat crew had simply "wandered off " rather than commence unloading on their
own. Murphy also found that other boats, stranded by the low tide, had been
abandoned by their crews. The same boats were later easily rescued under their
own power at higher tide by salvage parties. In still other cases, boats that
had been sunk or stranded were retrieved by the salvage crews, following which
the assigned boat crew would appear as if by magic to take over the vessel,
having observed the rescue from the safety of a nearby trench. Murphy was
distressed and frustrated by such conduct.
It seemed to be "the thing to do" to some crews when a little difficulty with
their boat was had, to dismount the machine guns, set them up inland and "pot
shot" at passing enemy planes of which there were considerable during the first
two days. Those things reflect on the basic selection and/or training of these
crews; something that the ship's officers in their short period of association
and intensive training with these crews cannot overcome. Unfortunately, the
above described cases could not be identified with the guilty personnel due to
the other numerous and vital activities going on.[169]
The reports of the FUNSTON's landing boat officers accompanied that of
Murphy, and are equally revealing about the details of the actual assault
landing itself. For example, Ensign R.R. Groves reported that on July 10, 1943
he was ordered to "ride to the line of departure" on board the Primary Control
Vessel of the USS CALVERT. The FUNTSON's boats were carrying
a large number of troops and supplies from the nearby CALVERT ; the
"Primary Control Vessel" was a boat detailed to each transport ship for the
purpose of controlling the progress of the assault craft. When Groves and the
Primary Control Vessel arrived at the line, the Ensign found that
"[T[hings...were very ragged".
The control vessel received orders to leave for the beach before the first four
waves were formed. After going approximately eight hundred yards orders were
received to report back to the CALVERT. Word was passed over the P.A.
system and a wide turn was made and the boats led back to the rendezvous area.
When the waves were again almost formed, the officer in charge issued orders
for all boats to report back to the CALVERT. Just after this word was
passed the CALVERT's Boat Group Commander came alongside saying shove
off for the beach; therefore boats were going both ways.
Although the boats to which Groves was assigned eventually made it to the beach
in good order, the situation continued to be difficult. Because of the rough
condition of the beach, compounded by the surf, better than half of the assault
boats were encountering difficulty in retracting. Even worse, when Groves'
vessel landed, it picked up men from the CALVERT and another ship, the
USS ARUNDEL . From these men Groves discovered that the assault boats
were all landing on the wrong beach. From that point forward Groves directed
the incoming boats to the "new beach", only to find that it was not correctly
marked. Groves observed that the traffic control boat assigned to this beach
was "never seen", and that those on the beach offered very little help in
either unloading or getting boats off the beach.[170]
One of Groves' colleagues, Ensign O.J. Barr, departed with him from the FUNSTON
at 12:30AM on July 10 and went at once to PC-542, the control vessel for the CALVERT.
After Groves had debarked, the crew of the control vessel told Barr that the CALVERT's
Scout Boat, with which Barr and his boat were to rendezvous, had left for the
beach an hour before. Barr then searched for the Scout Boat of another
transport, the USS NEVILLE, but failed to locate it. Barr patrolled in
toward the shore, until about 2:30AM, when he encountered the NEVILLE'S
Scout Boat. Together, they searched another half hour for the CALVERT's
Scout Boat, without success. The two craft then separated, but the NEVILLE'S
Scout reappeared a few minutes later, leading two waves of assault craft toward
the beach. Enemy resistance was light, no shots were fired at Barr's boat, and
after first light he was able to move ashore and assist in marking the
beach.[171]
Ensign Barr's boat thus apparently failed in its mission, through no fault of
its crew and commander, but rather as the result of the confusion that
evidently reigned in the sector. Barr and his charge transferred supplies from
the FUNSTON to shore on July 11 and 12; on the following two days the
ensign went aboard the FUSNTON to assist in unloading her holds. When
his ship returned to base, Barr reported to his commanding officer that in his
opinion the beaches to which the CALVERT and NEVILLE had been
assigned were "absolutely unfit" for operations by LCVs, particularly because
of a shallow sand bar that paralleled the beach for miles at distances from 10
to 150 yards offshore. This sand bar, and the running surf, swamped and
broached "numerous" LCVs. As to the boats which made it ashore, many of them
remained "sitting...waiting to be unloaded", in part because the shore party
was undermanned, but also because of poor marking of the beach, clogging of the
beach with boats that were unable to retract, and lack of proper traffic
control. All of this was exacerbated by the unwillingness of boat crews to tow,
and thus salvage, boats that had been broached. Barr reported making seven
trips to the beach, during all of which time he never observed a boat in
trouble being towed by one of her sister craft.[172]
Another boat officer from the FUNSTON, Ensign J.W. Auter, was assigned
to the CALVERT on D-day, and had a similarly disquieting experience.
Auter made three trips to the beach on July 10, and on the remaining days
stayed aboard the FUNSTON working with repair crews and unloading
supplies. The Ensign boarded the CALVERT at 1:00AM on July 10, only to
be informed that the boats from the first wave, to which he was attached, had
already been lowered into the water and were forming a rendezvous circle. Auter
then made an unsuccessful attempt to obtain orders for alternative action, and
then accompanied another officer in one of the sixth wave boats. When they
reached their rendezvous circle, however, they found that the first four waves
had left the area, and that the remaining boats were "moving in disorderly
circles, apparently without definite orders or purpose." Again, because Auter
and the other officers had not been given alternative orders, a long period of
time passed, and the disarray continued, until orders were received directing
the boats to form waves astern the secondary control vessel.[173]
Auter's first trip to the beach was "equally disorderly". In general, the boats
involved did not form waves or maintain station. The boat that Auter was in had
difficulty from the start as a result of poor loading; the vessel was too heavy
in the bow and listed to starboard, and as a result was swamped. The boat hit a
sand bar about 50 yards from shore, and because of its condition, the crew had
to drive it through the sand to the beach, even though they knew this would
mean that the boat could not be retracted. Auter found the beach itself to be
"very difficult" because of high surf and the lack of necessary markings. Auter
reported that these factors, as well as the unseaworthiness of fully loaded
LCVs in moderately heavy seas, contributed to the great number of boats left
abandoned on the beach. The most important element, however, seems to have been
the "SLOWNESS OF SOLDIERS leaving the boats", which caused the ramp to
be in the water longer than necessary, with the result that the boats were
filled with water.[174]
The experience of Ensign S.E. Frank, another boat officer on board the FUNSTON
and detailed for work on the CALVERT , illustrates the tenuous nature
of the HUSKY undertaking. Frank reported that after going aboard his
assault craft at 3:00AM, he encountered "much difficulty" in the rendezvous
area. The rendezvous circles were not well ordered, in part because the fifth,
sixth and seventh waves were "broken", and the primary control vessel
repeatedly left the area in which it was supposed to be. After cobbling
together a makeshift wave from assault craft left behind by the first four
waves, Frank followed the secondary control boat to the departure line. There,
he was once again delayed by the many boats broached on the sand bar. Although
Frank should have had a scout and raider boat to guide his wave to the shore,
he did not see them during the entire operation. As a result of all of this, it
was 5:30 AM and light before Frank and his wave hit the beach, thankfully
without opposition. Frank reported that the beach party had not properly marked
the beach. He also gave his opinion that the many boats lost on the beach
resulted from four factors, namely (1) the absence of adequate help to unload
the landing craft; (2) overloading of assault vessels; (3) the lowering of the
vessel's ramp before help was available to unload; and (4) the failure to test
motor vehicles before loading them in assault craft, with a view to having some
assurance that the vehicles would start once on the beach.[175]
Another combat loader engaged in the Sicily operation was the USS ANN ARUNDEL,
commanded by L.Y. Mason, Jr. It arrived on station off the coast of Sicily at
approximately 11: 45 PM on July 9, 1943, along with the USS NEVILLE and
other vessels in the attack force. Within a few hours it had all of its boats
in the water, and began disembarking troops and high priority cargo at shortly
after 7:00 AM. It began a shuttle to "NEVILLE Red Beach" that
continued almost without interruption thereafter, night and day, until the
ship's mission was completed. All of this did not occur without incident. The
ARUNDEL experienced numerous bombing attacks, and at one point all of
its LCVPs were stranded on the beach, apparently because of congestion and
slower unloading caused by the large volume of package cargo then being
deposited ashore. The ship's captain also reported a distinctly disconcerting
incident that occurred at 10:30 PM on July 11, when a "considerable" flight of
aircraft was in the area. These included both friends (transports with
paratroops) and foe, the latter dropping both bombs and flares. As a result of
the enemy presence, however, there was "a very considerable volume of
fire...put up by the transports." Mason estimated that at least five aircraft
were shot down, it being impossible to determine their origin.[176] The ARUNDEL
sailed from Sicilian waters at about 5:15 PM on July 13, having successfully
completed her mission, without substantial damage to the vessel or injury to
her crew.
One officer who had an opportunity to observe and comment upon the landing
phase of the Sicily invasion in the sector of the 45th Infantry Division was
W.B. Phillips, the Commander of Transports, Amphibious Force, U.S. Atlantic
Fleet. Phillips had his headquarters on the USS ANCON , from which he
directed twenty-one additional transport vessels divided into four divisions.
One of these, the Third Division, comprised of eight vessels, departed for
North Africa on May 10, 1943 with a full complement of invasion troops. The
remaining three divisions stayed in the Chesapeake Bay region for additional
training without troops. Final embarkation took place between May 24 and June
7, and on the following day the three divisions formed a convoy and departed
for Oran, Algeria, where it arrived on June 22.[177]
The period between June 22 and July 4 was spent in intensive preparation for
the coming invasion. These preliminaries included "a complete rehearsal
landing" on the night of June 24-25 and a joint Army/Navy conference on board
the USS LEONARD WOOD on July 3, at which the entire operation was
given a detailed review. Two days later three of the transport divisions left
Oran in the company of ten additional control vessels and made their way
without incident to the waters south of Malta. Finally, at 6:00 PM on July 9
the transport vessels under Phillips' command began their final approach to
Sicily from the area southwest of Malta. Transports, escorts and control
vessels of the so-called DIME task force were in the lead, while those
in the CENT task force followed.[178]
Phillips' convoy ran a parallel course to that taken by a convoy of the British
BARK force. The seas in the approach lanes thus became rather crowded. At about
6:15 PM the CENT and DIME forces deployed into five columns of ships, and about
an hour and a quarter later the convoy, its escorts and the control vessels
passed the Gozo Island lighthouse inbound for Sicily. However, the wind had
begun to blow at about 35 knots, kicking up a moderate sea and swell, so that
it began to appear that a successful landing could not be made. For an hour or
more, the convoy maneuvered at 50 degree turns in order to avoid other convoys
in the crowded and rough seas. By about 9:30 PM, however, the seas had settled
enough to permit the convoy to undertake its final approach course. As the
approach continued, Phillips observed intermittent gunfire ahead and on both
bows, as well as several flares dropped by enemy aircraft near the beach.[179]
According to the plan under which Phillips and his convoy were operating, the
disembarkation phase of the assault was to begin at 2:45 AM on July 10. The
operational plan, however, was based on the assumption that the landing force
would arrive in the so called Transport Area at least three and one-half hours
prior to disembarkation. This would permit the force two and one-half hours to
get out the landing boats and load and assemble the four assault waves, plus
another fifty-eight minutes to make the 10,000 yard run to the beach. The last
assault transport, the USS NEVILLE , did not arrive in the Transport
Area until fifteen minutes past midnight. The net effect of this was that the
convoy would have at least an hour less time to work with in order to meet its
established deadline. This situation was not made better by the fact that the
moderate sea and swell which was now being encountered was slowing down the
debarkation of troops, vehicles and equipment from the assault transports.
Moreover, the convoy was observing large fires ashore, a powerful searchlight
in operation, and anti-aircraft fire at various locations on the beaches. In
view of this, the task force commander extended H-hour for a period of one hour
to 3:45 AM.[180]
It may have been this delay in getting off the mark which ultimately caused the
confusion that infected the American beaches. At 2:45 AM the USS LEONARD
WOOD'S control vessel set off for its line of departure for YELLOW
beach with its first four assault waves. Eighteen minutes later the control
vessel for the USS FLORENCE NIGHTINGALE left for the GREEN beach
departure line, likewise with four assault waves. At about the same time
respective control vessels for the NEVILLE and CALVERT left
for the RED beach departure line. Assault boats from the FLORENCE
NIGHTINGALE and the LEONARD WOOD set off for the beach at about
3:36 AM. As a result of an erroneous calculation of their starting position,
however, the assault boats from the FLORENCE NIGHTINGALE landed not on
GREEN beach, as intended, but on YELLOW beach instead. Course
corrections were made to allow other boats from the FLORENCE NIGHTINGALE
to land nearer GREEN beach.[181]
Cover fire on beaches GREEN and YELLOW was provided by the
destroyers USS TILLMAN and KNIGHT, which commenced firing at
3:30 AM. Additional support was provided by eight support boats which
accompanied the first four assault waves from the LEONARD WOOD and the
FLORENCE NIGHTINGALE. These support boats laid down a "very effective"
rocket barrage as the first waves from each ship were about one thousand yards
from the beach. The landing of the first four assault waves was thus an overall
success, even though eight special beach marking scout boats that had been
assigned to mark RED, GREEN and YELLOW beaches were
"never seen" by the assault boats and their control vessels, leading Phillips
to conclude that the scout boats "had not proved of any advantage".
Nevertheless, the fifth, sixth and seventh assault waves appear to have gotten
to the beach without mishap, and most of the assault craft were successfully
recovered, even though the surf was running at four to six feet.[182]
At about 6:00 AM the transport vessels began to move to inshore anchorages,
after which they began to debark vehicles, equipment and supplies. This
procedure continued throughout the morning. By 10:00 AM, however, it became
apparent that the unloading process was in trouble, chiefly because of the
stranding of the ships' boats on the beach. Phillips assigned blame for this
condition to the inexperience of the crews, the high surf and the inability of
the shore party to unload the boats promptly. Organized salvage parties were
active on GREEN and YELLOW beaches, "but the rate of
stranding exceeded their efforts".[183]
An inspection party arrived at GREEN and YELLOW beaches at
3:00 PM to assess the situation. In addition to the surf running at 4 to 6 feet
high, they discovered a very small gradient which forced the boats to make the
final landing at low speed. This rendered the boats vulnerable to broaching
unless they were unloaded and retracted promptly. Out of a total of 157 boats
from Transport Division One, 76 were stranded, some containing vehicles which
could not be unloaded. The beaches were improperly marked, and the party could
only find the Beachmaster with difficulty. The beach parties were not coaching
boats into proper landing places. Salvage boats were available off the beach,
but no one from the beach party was there to direct them. At 5:30 PM a pontoon
causeway being used to unload on GREEN beach began breaking up, and
unloading was stopped.[184]
Because of the problems being encountered on YELLOW and GREEN
beaches, an effort was made to locate landing beaches for LSTs where pontoons
would not be necessary. This attempt failed, as did an investigation of
Scoglitti harbor, which was found to be suitable for unloading only amphibious
DUKWs . At 6:25 PM the officer in charge of the transports directed
officers and boat crews to stand by their stranded boats for the purpose of
assisting salvage parties. The transport commander also ordered each transport
ship to send its own salvage party to the troubled beaches. In spite of all
this, an attempt was made to continue unloading throughout the night, but this
was hampered by the lack of available boats and "the inability of the Shore
Parties to unload the boats". Flares and bombs being dropped by Axis forces
also hampered the operation.[185]
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Copyright © 2003 Thomas E. Nutter
Written by Thomas E. Nutter. If you have questions or comments on this
article, please contact Mr. Nutter at: tenutter@gmail.com.
About the author: Tom Nutter is in his 25th
year of practicing domestic and international patent, copyright and trademark
law, and is the Managing Partner of an intellectual property law practice in St. Louis, Missouri. He holds
the Masters and Doctorate degrees in diplomatic/military history from the
University of Missouri. His interests include railroad history as well as
European and American military history in the Nineteenth and Twentieth
Centuries. He lives in St. Louis with his wife, three children and two German
Shepherd dogs, Caesar and Cleopatra.
Published online: 03/01/2003.
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