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Operation Husky: The Allied
Invasion of Sicily, 1943
by Thomas E. Nutter
Aspects of the Allied Invasion of Sicily, 1943
V. HUSKY in Execution
B. The Naval Experience (Part 2)
By mid-morning of the next day, July 11, the operational staff had reached the
point where it could no longer tolerate the situation on shore, and ordered
that YELLOW, GREEN and RED beaches be relocated to
an area just northwest of Scoglitti. Because some of the pontoon causeways on
the original beaches were "well secured in place" and thus difficult to move,
the LSTs continued to unload there. Phillips reported, however, that this
decision did not retrieve the situation:
"The unloading conditions at the new beaches...were no better and possibly
worse as far as landing boats were concerned as the old beaches. There were
however exits for moving Army equipment inshore at the new beaches. Boats were
stranded rapidly on the new beaches, and the beaches became congested for
unloading. The Shore and Beach Parties were scattered and uncertain of the
location of the various beaches. After darkness loaded boats from the ships
were being sent back."[186]
At 10:00 PM orders were issued to stop utilizing small boats for unloading
during the night. These craft were to be loaded and ready to move ashore at
daybreak. In any event, many of the small boats had returned from the beaches
never having been unloaded in the first place. Nighttime unloading operations
were confined to larger landing craft, but interruptions occurred as a result
of aircraft, presumably of Axis origin, dropping flares and bombs.[187]
The passage of the night did not improve matters. During the night, at least
one LST reported receiving no assistance in unloading. The task could only be
accomplished with the aid of Seabees. The condition of the new beaches at
daylight on July 12 was no better than it had been on the original beaches two
days before. Phillips reported that:
"Stranded boats practically prevented the loaded boats from coming in and
unloading. LCI(L)s were available for salvage work, but were not being properly
used. Approximately forty small landing boats and 3 LCT(5)s were lying off the
new beaches waiting to be unloaded. The unloading of the boats at the beaches
at this time was being done mostly by ship's personnel instead of the Shore
Party..."[188]
Despite its travail, Phillips' Transport Division One managed to be completely
unloaded by 8:00 PM on July 12, with the exception of the USS ALCYONE.
The plight of the latter vessel induced an order requiring each other ship in
the Division to send it a salvage party consisting of three men per boat
stranded on the beach. Each salvage party included two officers. Transport
Division One was not permitted to depart the landing zone until the ALCYONE
was completely unloaded. Because of the severity of the ALCYONE's situation,
however, this order was changed, and the remaining ships in the Division formed
a convoy, with nine escort destroyers, for Oran. The Division arrived at Oran
without incident on July 15.[189]
The landing craft assigned to the transports under Phillips' command suffered
heavy casualties in the invasion of Sicily. Phillips recited a litany of
reasons for this outcome. Apart from the obvious physical causes, Phillips
believed that his losses were caused by generally poor seamanship among the
boat crews, which had been "turned out in mass production"; a tendency of
officers to believe that a beach party would take care of their stranded boats,
which led these officers to fail to make sufficient effort to help themselves;
the fact that beach parties were composed of personnel who were not experienced
seamen; poor discipline on the beach; and failure of the beach and shore
parties to make use of available personnel. Phillips' recommended solution to
this situation was to give command of the beach "from the high water mark to at
least 100 yards inshore" to a Navy Captain "of great experience in seamanship",
whose command would likewise be comprised of men with great experience at
sea.[190]
Phillips' recommendations were generally supported by A. G. Kirk, Commander
Sixth Amphibious Force, in his report on the HUSKY operation to the
Commander in Chief, United States Fleet, dated September 13, 1943. On the
subject of the training of boat crews, Kirk noted that the aim of the
Amphibious Force was to supply trained crews for eight transport divisions. In
view of the suddenness with which the HUSKY operation was laid on,
however, he noted that it "is lucky that in this instance the requirements were
for only four transport divisions." Kirk had strong words on the subject of the
role of Army officers in the loading of transports bound for invasion
deployment.
There is a general tendency on the part of the Army command thus far
encountered to distrust AFAF Army Staff Officers and prefer their own. Enough
qualified Transport Quartermasters must remain with the AFAF to keep the art of
combat loading alive, and to permit early training of the Transport
Quartermasters of the selected Army Division. There should be enough of them to
permit adequate supervision of loading plans and actual loading sufficient to
enable the Force Commander to actively control the actual loading in the light
of his experience. The Army can no longer be permitted to combat load the ships
of this Force, with no naval say so except as to stability. The Navy must
remain in full control of all loading.[191]
L.B. Schulten, the Commanding Officer of the USS DOROTHEA L. DIX, one
of the transports assigned to Task Unit 85.1.1, embarked with his ship from
Newport News, Virginia on June 4, 1943. On board was the 2d Battalion of the
179th Regimental Combat Team, 45th Infantry Division. The DIX proceeded
to Sicily and dropped anchor shortly after midnight on July 10, 1943 upon
arrival at Transport Area One. Although the DIX had been unable to hoist out
its landing craft on July 9, as originally planned, it nevertheless was able to
place all of its boats in the water, in seaworthy condition, by about 3:45 AM
on July 10.[192]
The DIX loaded out the 2d Battalion in 36 boats divided into four
landing waves. There were no casualties among the nearly 1000 men who went
ashore in these four waves and according to Schulten "[E]very wave hit the same
and correct beach", namely GREEN Beach Western Section. All of
Schulten's wave commanders complained of the inexperience of the boat crews,
the inefficiency of the beach party, the slowness of the infantry to leave the
boats, and the absence of salvage crews.[193]
The DIX managed to unload its troops, as well as a thousand tons of
cargo and 180 vehicles, in slightly less than 48 hours. No fewer than 10 of its
landing craft were lost on the beach, however, either as a result of being
broached or flooded. Schulten believed that most of these were beyond
salvaging.[194]
On August 5, 1943, R.L. Conolly, Commander of Task Force Eighty-six, provided
the Commander in Chief, United States Fleet, with his narrative of events on
the JOSS attack force, as well as his comments and
recommendations.[195] Task Force 86 began its preparation and training for HUSKY
at the Advanced Amphibious Bases in North African Waters in early April,
1943, even though it lacked its full complement of landing craft. Together with
units of the U.S. 3d Infantry Division, the Task Force completed its final
training, mounting and staging in the Bizerte-Tunis area. During this final
training phase, the Task Force practiced ship-to-shore movement, support boat
and support wave procedure, pontoon drill, and individual task group and task
force operations. During June, there were group exercises, a navigational
problem and a full scale rehearsal employing the JOSS Army Assault
Task Force. This final phase of training, particularly in the area of
communications, was retarded by the very late arrival of much equipment and
personnel from the United States, as well as the sinking of two LSTs, both
loaded with equipment and stores.[196]
At the Advanced Amphibious Training Bases, all of the landing craft taking part
in the operation were overhauled, altered and repaired as necessary. At the
same time, these craft were used almost continuously for transferring of
equipment and supplies to new bases at Bizerte and Tunis. Nevertheless, only
one of the 275 landing craft and escorts assigned to proceed with the JOSS
Attack Force failed to depart in convoy for Sicily because of mechanical
failure.[197] In the event, 38 LSTs, 54 LCIs and 80 LCTs took part in the
invasion with the JOSS Attack Force, along with an additional 24
British landing craft.[198]
Task Force 86 sailed for Sicily at about 9:00 AM on July 7, 1943.
Apart from a variety of mechanical problems afflicting the landing craft, the
transit to the assault area was uneventful. Late in the afternoon of July 9,
however, the wind and sea became heavier, and although the Task Force's
formation was in good order, it was strung out because LSTs were having
difficulty making eight knots, LCIs were taking water and the smaller escort
craft were struggling. Signaling to the smaller craft had become problematical.
As a result, it was necessary for Conolly to "press the LSTs and LCIs during
the Approach" in order to assure that the boats would be in position for the
assault. Some of Conolly's LSTs had fallen so far behind that they lost sight
of the other ships, became separated and failed to anchor in the proper
transport areas.[199]
In addition to some of the LSTs, a number of the control ships acting as
escorts for them became separated from the Task Force. The result of this was
that these control vessels were not in their proper position in the assault
rendezvous area to assemble and lead the assault LCVPs to the beach. In
addition, the Task Force anchored farther out than the distance of 3.5 miles
from the beach set forth in the plan. The cause of this was thought to be the
fact that enemy searchlights constantly swept the approach area, giving the
false impression that the ships were closer than they actually were. The result
was a much longer run for the assault LCVPs than had been planned. The longer
run and the failure of some control ships to arrive in the rendezvous area
caused the LCVPs to arrive at the beach late.[200]
In the assault area, Task Force 86 was aided by the HMS SAFARI and the
U.S.S. BRISTOL, which braved enemy searchlights and the threat of
gunfire to flash signals for the attack groups allotted to YELLOW and
GREEN beaches. In fact, searchlights were an unnerving presence
throughout the landing phase for Task Force 86. At 2:50 AM five shore
searchlights illuminated the BISCAYNE and managed to keep their lights
trained on her. In the early stages of the landing, searchlights illuminated
not just the BISCAYNE, but BLUE and YELLOW beaches
and other vessels as well. Nevertheless, the enemy held their fire, and indeed
Conolly noted very little enemy gunfire on GREEN, YELLOW and
BLUE beaches throughout the landing.[201]
All of the LCVPs in Task Force 86 were in the water by 2:52 AM, and the first
two waves of them had landed on BLUE beach by 3:25 AM All was not
without complication, however. Scout boats were only able to assist on YELLOW
and GREEN beaches, although on the latter beach the scout did not
arrive in time to mark for the first wave of LCVPs. On BLUE and RED
beaches, however, there were no scout boats. These had been delayed in
launching, and were further delayed by longer than anticipated approach
runs.[202]
Beginning around 4:00 AM the enemy began to respond to the activities of Task
Force 86 in earnest. Conolly observed "continuous artillery and heavy machine
gun fire falling on Red Beach and approaches". Likewise, the first and second
waves on BLUE beach received machine gun fire as well as attacks from
enemy 75mm guns. At 4:30 AM the RED beach transport area came under
heavy air attack. In the midst of all this, and in spite of the absence of some
control boats and inadequate beach marking, most landing craft arrived on their
beaches in good order. Further, the JOSS force did not experience the same
salvage problem as those which overtook Task Force 85. Conolly reported that on
all of the JOSS beaches, a total of only 10 landing craft proved to be
unsalvageable.[203]
Shortly after 4:30 AM enemy aircraft dive bombed the BISCAYNE, but
without success. During the next half hour, Conolly watched as the U.S.S.
SENTINEL was hit in another dive bombing attack. The HMS SAFARI
and its escort were also attacked by enemy aircraft, but they escaped damage
and were able to shoot down two of their assailants. Meanwhile, RED beach
came under severe enemy artillery fire, so that an entire convoy of LCTs were
instructed not to land as scheduled. This situation continued for almost two
and a half hours, during which the Beachmaster on RED beach repeatedly
warned away landing attempts because of the intensity of the enemy fire.
Finally, the convoy of LCTs was ordered to land on RED beach
"regardless of cost". This assault, supported by naval gunfire and smoke,
carried the day, so that at about 8:00 AM "the situation on all beaches was
satisfactory". All LSTs were then ordered to the beaches for unloading.[204]
The rest of July 10 passed in frenzied activity. While some landing craft
continued to unload their cargoes at the beaches, other ships in Conolly's task
force engaged ground targets near Licata in support of the troops now moving
inland. At 10:30 AM the U.S.S. SENTINEL capsized, finally going
beneath the sea fifteen minutes later. At 11:00 AM Conolly received a report
that 3rd Infantry Division had captured Licata. Within the hour, General
Truscott had left the BISCAYNE for transport to Licata. By the
evening, the Port of Licata had been opened, and control of unloading
operations moved ashore. Conolly received an order to begin transferring
landing craft for use in the DIME and CENT areas.[205]
Beginning at about 8:00 AM on July 11 all of the beaches in the JOSS area
came under enemy dive bombing attack. One of Conolly's LSTs received a direct
hit. Its load of ammunition and gasoline exploded on deck. Enemy air attacks
were nearly continuous throughout the day, on both the beaches and the town of
Licata. These attacks, however, were without further effect on Conolly's ships.
Because of the ineffectiveness of the enemy assault, Task Force 86 was able to
complete its task of unloading stores on July 12. In the evening of that day,
it moved to the Gela area and dropped anchor.[206]
Captain R.A. Dierdorff, U.S. Navy, commanded the U.S.S. ELIZABETH C. STANTON
and Task Unit 81.2.3. The responsibility of his command was to deliver the 471
officers and 7500 men of 16th Regimental Combat Team to the beaches near Gela.
These troops embarked at Algiers on July 6, 1943 and arrived on station shortly
after midnight on July 10, after a passage marred by weather so severe that it
was doubted whether the invasion could be launched on schedule. However, the
weather moderated upon arrival, and the group's beaches, designated RED-2
and GREEN-2 , were promptly located by scout boats without detection
or opposition. Assault waves from the transports in Dierdorff's command were
promptly launched and began to arrive on schedule on the beaches.[207]
By 6:30 AM 16th Regimental Combat Team was reporting that it had successfully
completed its landing. Despite this auspicious start for the day, however, it
was in fact marked by vigorous enemy resistance. For while the Combat Team had
successfully gotten itself ashore, Dierdorff's task unit was fully occupied
during the next two days moving and unloading stores and equipment, activity
which drew considerable attention on the part of the defenders. At midday there
was fierce enemy shelling occurring on beach RED 2, and by late in the
afternoon the beachmaster was warning against any further unloading of LSTs on
beaches RED-2 and GREEN-2. Me-109s strafed and bombed both
beaches at about 5:30 PM, setting on fire at least one LST at the cost of one
fighter aircraft. The continuing shellfire convinced another of the task unit
commanders that RED-2 and GREEN-2 were untenable.[208]
July 11 was no better. Shortly before 7:00 AM a force of about 12 Italian
bombers attacked the transport area without casualties, in spite of very heavy
antiaircraft fire. The enemy managed to set fire to the U.S.S. BARNETT.
Thirty minutes later Dierdorff received warning of another enemy air attack,
and was ordered to proceed to seaward and maneuver independently to avoid
damage. Toward midday a lone Me-109 bombed and strafed the beaches. Two hours
later another swarm of enemy bombers appeared overhead, to be driven off
without incident by Allied fighter aircraft. At 3:45 enemy fighter bombers
again attacked the transport area, again without loss in spite of heavy
antiaircraft fire from ships. The enemy managed to hit the ROBERT ROLAND
in the vicinity of her no. 2 hatch, setting her afire. She blew up shortly
after 5:00 PM and burned throughout the night. Attacks by enemy aircraft
continued throughout the evening and night. Dierdorff's group finished
unloading on July 12 and set sail for Algiers that evening.[209]
Captain Dierdorff's observations and recommendations made subsequent to the
operation are revealing. He offered, for example, detailed comments concerning
the so-called Mark XIV sight mounted on anti-aircraft guns on the ships in his
task unit. Although Dierdorff had been initially impressed by the performance
of these gunsights on towed targets, he was disappointed in the results
obtained by them in the Sicily operation. He observed that:
Ships generally complained that this sight did not give sufficient
lead on fast flying Me 109s over Transport Area. The BETELGEUSE, which
had marked success against Japanese planes at Guadalcanal without them, desires
that hers be removed, and the former ring sight and tracer control be
restored.210 Dierdorff also had comments concerning other
equipment. Regarding the boats, the Captain referred particularly to the LCSS,
noting that its rocket racks were "quite susceptible to damage when boats are
being lowered or hoisted." He also complained that while all the other boats
were diesel powered, this type had a gasoline engine, which required the
storage of 5 gallon containers of fuel. And while the LCSS was rated for a
speed of 16 knots, Dierdorff indicated that he had calibrated it to be capable
of only 10.6 knots. Dierdorff also commented upon the performance of the LCVP.
While this boat suffered from weakness in its rudder and steering gear, which
caused them to be easily damaged and difficult to repair, Dierdorff had
particular praise for the Gray Diesel Engines with which they were equipped,
finding them "so outstandingly good that I believe the Gray people merit very
definitely some special recognition for the excellence, both of design and
workmanship. The engines are rugged, fool proof, and reliable, and are most
satisfactory propulsion units."[211]
Noteworthy are Dierdorff's comments concerning communications. The Captain
complained first about the so-called TBY radios, which were generally found to
be unreliable. This was for the reason that atmospheric changes easily caused
the sets to go off frequency, often requiring returning under adverse
conditions. Further, because there were not enough regularly trained radio
operators, reliance had to be placed on unskilled personnel for whom the
equipment was too sophisticated. More importantly, Dierdorff criticized the
communications plan for the operation. The Captain noted that the plan had
failed to make clear whether routine reports on unloading, casualties and the
like, should be transmitted in code or plain language. This resulted in such
messages being sent both ways, thereby exposing the codes to compromise.
Dierdorff particularly argued against the sending of reports regarding
unloading and casualties in plain language, since such reports "are of vital
concern to the enemy, enabling them to determine our losses, approximate time
ships will be unloaded, and then make plans accordingly." He also called for "a
workable system of air raid warning", namely a channel common to all vessels
equipped with anti-aircraft weapons. Because such a system had been absent in
the operation, Dierdorff's ships had fired on Allied aircraft because they had
relied only on their own ships' lookouts for aircraft identification.[212]
Dierdorff commented that it had been " a distinct pleasure to operate in a
Force in which a minimum of paternalistic supervision was imposed upon
individual units", pointing out further that except for changes dictated by the
tactical situation, " ships were permitted to work out their own salvation." He
also observed that relations with the 16th Regimental Combat Team and its staff
had been "very cordial", and that a spirit of teamwork had permeated at all
levels between Army and Navy personnel.[213]
In the execution of the operation Dierdorff pointed out that the unloading of
LSTs had been the major problem for his task unit. The LSTs had been afflicted
with casualties to ramps, a gentle beach gradient which had required the use of
pontoons, and the bombing, shelling and strafing of the beaches by the enemy.
Nevertheless, he found that in general the LSTs had performed well. He had
strong criticism, however, on the issue of fire discipline among anti-aircraft
gunners in the task unit. Dierdorff particularly mentioned that the fire
discipline of the smaller units was notoriously poor. They fired at anything
with wings on it, within or out of range. Stray shots from an unknown source
killed one man and wounded three in the BETELGEUSE on the night of
July 12th. The commanding officer and First Lieutenant of the THURSTON
were also wounded by a stray 20mm during the same attack.
Dierdorff believed that these dangerous deficiencies needed to be addressed
during the training period prior to an amphibious operation during which all
hands would take part in recognition drills coordinated by Navy and Army Air
Force personnel and featuring the overflight of various Allied aircraft types
at different altitudes and speeds. Dierdorff especially mentioned the problem
of protecting beaches against "low-flying hedge-hopping fighter bombers". Since
air cover was not an adequate solution to this problem, because of the tendency
of naval gunners to fire at everything in the air, Dierdorff recommended the
early use of barrage balloons and the immediate placement of anti-aircraft guns
on the flanks of the beaches.[214]
Dierdorff's most serious concerns related to the problems encountered ashore.
He noted, for example, that on the night of July 11-12 there were a number of
broached and swamped boats on GREEN -2 and RED-2 beaches,
resulting from the action of sea and wave and the "rather marked lack of Army
assistance in unloading boats". More generally, the Captain made clear that in
his view the central problem requiring "solution in the conduct of amphibious
operations" was the unloading of boats at the beaches and the moving of the
material unloaded to beach dumps. In Sicily, this problem was exacerbated by
poor organization and execution. He illustrated this by the following
commentary:
Quite a number of landing boats were lost during the current
operation almost solely because the Service Platoon of the Shore Party was
either conspicuous by its absence, or present in inadequate strength properly
and promptly to unload boats. This was especially true at night. As a result,
boats' crews had the double duty of endeavoring to hold their boats on a shoal
beach beset by sand bars and lashed by a considerable surf, and at the same
time to unload them. All too often the boats broached or swamped in the
process. Dierdorff regarded this problem as so severe that he
called for a joint Army and Navy Board to subject it to "the most rigorous
examination" with a view to correction.[215]
Captain Dierdorff hammered on the significance of the unloading issue. His
comments were ascerbic. After excoriating the command system used for the
unloading function, he suggested that
While the problem could perhaps be solved most satisfactorily by a
Lend-Lease arrangement with China to supply suitable Amphibious Labor
Battalions of coolies armed with gin poles, there are certain obstacles to be
overcome before this solution could be applied. One of
Dierdorff's proposed means for resolving this problem was to simply recognize
that unloading teams could not be expected to work round the clock without
respite and perform their task efficiently. Thus, it should be realized that
"after twenty-four to thirty-six hours of steady slogging through water and
sand, dodging bombs and strafing" the shore crews would not be at their best.
He advocated not only that the shore crews should be more adequately manned
than before, but that a policy be adopted which would prohibit the operation of
unloading details between 11:00 PM and dawn. He also urged that there be no
division of command authority between the Army and Navy on the beach---the
beachmasters should have complete command of everything occurring on the beach,
his authority terminating only when the troops moved inland.
Transport Division Five, commanded by W.O. Bailey on board the U.S.S. CHARLES
CARROLL , had a very rough experience in the HUSKY operation.
This Division, operating as Task Unit 85.2.2, left Oran on July 5, 1943. It
arrived in its assigned transport area at 12:15 AM on July 10 and dropped
anchor. The task unit was an hour behind schedule as a result of bad weather on
the approach. While the heavy seas, which were caused by a northwest wind "of
almost gale velocity", had diminished by the time the task unit had arrived off
Sicily, the wind and sea were still heavy enough to make it very difficult to
lower and load boats for two hours after their arrival. Bailey's task unit was
to assault beaches GREEN-2 and YELLOW-2 .[216]
Between 3:30 AM and 4:00 AM all units of the groups' Fire Support Group,
including the U.S.S. PHILADELPHIA and HMS ABERCROMBIE,
shelled GREEN-2 and YELLOW-2. The CARROLL's primary
control vessel departed for the beach at 3:45 AM At about 4:00 AM parachute
flares began to fall, first in the CENT area to the north, and then
illuminating Bailey's transport area. At 4:40 AM enemy aircraft attacked the
task unit in the face of heavy anti-aircraft fire. Several bombs landed near
the CARROLL , at distances from 600 to 900 yards.[217]
Control boats from the U.S.S. THOMAS JEFFERSON got off course, causing
waves to land not only on GREEN-2 and YELLOW-2, but also on
the rocks between YELLOW-2 and an adjoining beach, BLUE-2.
Some of the CARROLL's waves also landed near BLUE-2, although
others landed on the proper beaches. At 6:00 AM the task unit began to move
toward inshore anchorages with the THOMAS JEFFERSON in the lead. At
6:15, however, the JEFFERSON and her sister ships came under heavy and
accurate shellfire and "retired to the original Transport Area at full speed."
The task unit was able to move to the inshore anchorage at 7:36 AM[218]
On July 10 unfavorable surf and beach conditions caused the stranding of many
landing boats, causing unloading to be considerably slowed. Nevertheless, a
large number of vehicles and most personnel were landed. At about 5:00 PM the
task unit moved to inshore anchorages off Scoglitti, in order to unload on BLUE
beach and RED-2 beach. However, unloading proceeded slowly after RED-2
was found unusable and BLUE beach was limited to the discharge of
vehicles because of inadequate shore party to unload other cargo.[219]
The CARROLL and her sister ships endured attacks by enemy aircraft
late on July 10 and then again early on the morning of the following day, but
without incident. At 10:00 AM on July 11 Bailey received an order to relocate
his task unit so that it would be unloading on beaches BLUE, YELLOW
and RED, as well as on YELLOW-2 , all in the area of
Scoglitti. Nevertheless, unloading continued to go slowly because of limited
beach facilities and the fact that Bailey's unit could not get assistance from
any shore parties. Only large landing craft could be used. During the afternoon
enemy aircraft attacked the beach, but were driven off by anti-aircraft fire
and Allied fighters.[220]
With the coming of darkness an intense struggle with the enemy began. Shortly
before 8:00 PM the CENT area went on red alert. Some of the ships
fired on high altitude Allied aircraft. About an hour later Bailey observed a
tremendous explosion and fire at sea; at about the same time parachute flares
illuminated the entire DIME area to Bailey's northwest, and he
observed a large amount of anti-aircraft fire and some falling bombs. Then the
CENT area was also illuminated by parachute flares. Bombs began to fall
in and around the task unit, followed by more parachute flares.
From about 2240 up to 2300 both over land and sea the area in the immediate
vicinity of Scoglitti and our ships was a holocaust of low flying planes,
anti-aircraft tracer fire, and shrapnel, with a great number of ships and shore
batteries opening fire at low elevations and thereby endangering other ships in
the area. It is doubtful whether one ship in this task unit escaped being hit
by anti-aircraft fire several times.[221]
The worst was yet to come. At about 10:45 PM a large and unidentified aircraft,
flying at low altitude to seaward, passed over the U.S.S. SUSAN B. ANTHONY
and close aboard the PROCYON. The two ships shot the plane out of the
sky, and it crashed near the PHILADELPHIA. Shortly, another similar
plane also flying seaward "passed over the beach and was subjected to intense
fire." The aircraft, which turned out to be a C-47, turned on its running
lights and landed in the water. The CARROLL rescued its crew. Bailey
saw at least five other aircraft go down near the beach during the night.[222]
Bailey's task unit passed the next two days without incident, leaving Sicilian
waters on July 13 and arriving in Oran three days later. The controversy began
forthwith. The commander of the CARROLL was sharply critical of the
performance of the Control Vessel assigned to his ship. His wrath was
particularly directed at the officer in command of the Control Vessel, who
"seemed intelligent and eager to cooperate." Moreover, the CARROLL's Commanding
Officer had placed aboard the Control Vessel his most experienced "ship to
shore" officer, with the understanding that his advice would be followed by the
Control Vessel's commander. These expectations were not met. First, the boat
commander refused to anchor in the rendezvous area. This resulted in "continual
confusion in the rendezvous circle by his backing and filling in an endeavor to
keep station." Next, he was duly informed that the CARROLL was
anchored about eight hundred yards south of her assigned position, but
nevertheless proceeded to the beach as though this condition did not exist,
ignoring on the way further instructions to change course so as to get to the
point of departure. His failure to follow orders contributed to the fact that
the second, third and fourth waves landed on the rocks between YELLOW-2
and BLUE-2 .[223]
Mishaps plagued the Control Vessel of the THOMAS JEFFERSON as well. It
took its proper station and anchored in the rendezvous area, receiving its
proper course to the beach from the THOMAS JEFFERSON in a timely
fashion. The Control Vessel's path to the beach was carefully tracked by radar.
However, at the same time the Control Vessel arrived at the line of departure,
the THOMAS JEFFERSON received a report that the first wave had landed
ashore. It was then discovered that what was thought to have been the Control
Vessel on the radar plot was in fact a destroyer.[224]
The contribution made by the task unit's Support Boats was also problematical.
One Support Boat Division "could hardly be considered much support during the
entire assault landing." Four of the boats in the Division either failed to
show up at all or were so late in arriving as to be useless. Of the two
remaining boats, one had inoperative rocket projectors while the other was "in
a sinking condition." Therefore, this Division offered no fire support
whatever. The second Support Boat Division, although not at full strength,
"carried out the assignment and mission to the letter, maintaining patrol
stations, screening the boat waves and delivering an effective barrage fire,
which apparently caused the beach defense to lose any stomach they might of had
for opposition."[225]
Bailey offered comprehensive comments concerning all aspects of the operation.
In addition to calling for more time to be allowed for the approach to the
transport area, to allow for bad weather and its consequences, he opined that
Scout Boats were the "weakest link in our chain" and should be more
purposefully designed and equipped. He commented further that "[F]ailure of
this boat to properly indicate the desired beach may well end at sometime to
disaster to an operation." Such boats should be of such heavy construction that
they could serve as salvage boats as well. Bailey particularly urged that
beaches be selected that were suitable for both assault landing and unloading.
He also stressed the obvious, learned from harsh experience, that it is
"impractical and unsatisfactory to shift beaches after the operation has once
started." Bailey also called for specially designed salvage craft, one assigned
to each transport vessel. He praised the LSTs and LCTs, particularly the
latter, and called for their expanded use.[226]
Bailey's staff also contributed comments on the operation. They also called for
more time to be allotted for the approach to the transport area, since one of
the effects of being under unrealistic time constraints was to generate
confusion and weaken the hitting power of the assault. The staff likewise
implicitly criticized the effectiveness of the scout boats, calling for them to
be especially designed and equipped for the task. Pointed criticism was also
offered regarding control boats:
Control Vessels must be especially trained in their duties and
preferably should be an integral part of each transport division. It is not
sufficient that they herd, lead and dispatch waves of boats but that they do it
by leading them to the correct line of departure and send them to the correct
beaches. The staff also reported that "[F]rom the CENT operations
it would appear that we have much to learn before we can successfully unload
equipment and supplies over beaches after the assault." They also criticized
inadequate preparation and equipment for salvage and traffic control, both of
which directly contributed to rendering beaches congested and nearly unusable.
The staff's most telling commentary, however, was also its most general one:
We should revert to our original training systems; actually combat
load troops and equipment. Move to the training area and unload troops and
impedimenta over beaches. Simulate nothing. We are weak in beach discipline,
traffic control and the unloading and handling of loaded boats on the beach. Of
course, boats and equipment will be damaged, but it is infinitely better to
learn to cope with those conditions on friendly shores than to try to cope with
them under hostile attack. The next time we may not be facing an enemy who
lacks stomach for a fight.[227] Major General Troy H. Middleton,
commanding officer of the U.S. 45th Infantry Division, provided a set of
comments and recommendations on the HUSKY operation on July 31, 1943.
One of his primary recommendations from the experience of his unit in Sicily
was that it could have used a light tank company in lieu of one of the medium
tank companies belonging to the medium tank battalion that had been attached to
45th Infantry Division. In fact, Middleton's division traded the 1st Infantry
Division a medium tank company from one of the latter's light companies later
in the operation. Middleton's main concern in this matter was the greater
maneuverability of the light tanks. He said that he considered tanks to be "an
essential part of an infantry division", and said that their mere presence did
much for the morale of infantry units.[228]
Middleton praised the addition of the 2d Chemical Battalion to his unit for the
operation, while noting that their success was in spite of inadequate transport
equipment. On the other hand, self propelled 105mm howitzers specially brought
by the division from the US did not particularly prove their worth. Middleton
did not find it "essential" to use this weapon in place of medium artillery or
to provide them as alternative weapons.[229]
Middleton found a Quartermaster Battalion attached to his division as labor
troops to be sorely lacking in capability. He was more harsh still regarding
the detail of a combat force, in this case the 40th Combat Engineers, to
perform shore party work.
From the beginning this organization had a combat complex. The officers and men
of the regiment were a "rabble", when they joined the Division at Camp Pickett,
Virginia.
While some improvement was noted, I still consider them a very poor
organization and in general they performed mediocre service as Shore Party
troops. Shore Party duty is labor duty and only first class labor troops should
be assigned thereto.[230] The General was critical of the
logistics of the Sicily operation. For example, he pointed out that no combat
unit should be loaded in the U.S. In the case of his own division, he noted
that it embarked on May 28 and remained aboard ship until July 10, except for
one week in North Africa. Another reason for not loading in the U.S. was its
great distance from the theatre of action, which resulted in such anomalies as
carrying the wrong equipment and clothing. Finally, Middleton concluded that
amphibious training should occur near the theatre of operations, rather than in
such places as Virginia, where the 45th Infantry Division had trained.[231]
Carl F. Robison commanded LCI (L) No. 1. His boat came under enemy fire at
about 5:10 AM on July 10 near Graffi, from three emplacements with 24mm cannon
and two other positions, one with a 37mm and the other with a 75mm gun.
Robison's controls and communications equipment were shot out, so that the boat
approached the beach at low speed and essentially out of control. The ship
swung around until its stern was to the beach, forcing the soldiers to
disembark from the stern. Robison's boat stayed under fire until 6:45 AM His
number 1 gun crew fired off all of its 960 rounds at the enemy. Of Robison's
three remaining guns, only crew no. 3 managed to fire 300 rounds. One of the
remaining guns jammed on the first shot, while the other was silenced by enemy
action. Three of his crew were killed and three more wounded.
In spite of the evident severity of his ship's contact with the
enemy, Robison made the following very telling comments:
The opposition encountered was not very determined, many of their guns were not
knocked out and a large supply of ammunition was at hand. The guns on the bluff
over looking the beach were apparently abandoned at the first salvo by
destroyers of our fire support group. The mobile units farther back also
withdrew at this time...If the opposition had been a determined foe I do not
believe troops could have been put ashore without first laying down a barrage
and blasting the enemy out of their positions.[232] Robison's
colleague, Lieutenant H.G. Lippitt, was in command of U.S.S. LCI (L) Number 3.
On July 5, 1943 his boat embarked 166 officers and men of company H, 2d
Battalion, 7th Infantry Regiment of 3d Infantry Division in Tunisia. They
arrived in the JOSS area (RED beach) on July 10. Lippett's boat was in
the first wave, and as they approached the area was illuminated by searchlights
and flares. Lippett's wave, however, was forced to circle for a period of time,
waiting for the first wave of smaller boats to arrive. On their second approach
Lippitt's wave hit the beach about twenty five feet from shore in a heavy surf
and one and a half feet of water. The boats in Lippitt's wave had come under
machine gun fire from both flanks. Like Robison, Lippitt had to use his engines
to maintain the boat ashore. Both ramps were lost, and efforts to unload the
troops by rubber boat and ladder failed. The troops were only disembarked after
one of the ramps was located and placed back in working order. Lippitt's boat
returned to Tunisia and made a second trip to Sicily, delivering another 130
men to the Licata area on July 12.[233]
The experience of Richard W. Caldwell, commanding U.S.S. LCI (L) Number 5, was
a gruesome one. Number 5 took part in the assault on RED beach as part
of the JOSS force. At 3:30 AM on July 10 the boat took aboard the
commander of the 7th Infantry Regiment and his staff. Shortly after 4:00 AM
Caldwell moved toward RED beach, encountering a substantial delay
because the beach was not well marked. As the boat approached nearer the beach,
it came under fire from anti-aircraft and machine guns, and Caldwell had to
change course to avoid cannon fire. The beach was crowded with LCIs. At about
5:15 AM, under heavy shell fire, Caldwell's boat hit the beach about 150 feet
from shore. Almost immediately Number 5 lost its starboard ramp in a collision
with another LCI. The port ramp was then lost in the heavy surf. Efforts to
substitute for the ramps with ladders and special lines failed utterly. The
heavy surf, strong current and heavy equipment carried by the men made it
impossible for them to get ashore, and those who tried foundered. Caldwell saw
the corpses of soldiers, shot or drowned, floating in the surf. At 7:05 AM a
round from what Caldwell described as an 88mm gun struck his ship and exploded
inside one of the troop compartments, killing three soldiers instantly and
seriously wounding several others. Number 5's anti-aircraft guns put the enemy
weapon out of action. With the agreement of the regimental commander Caldwell
then broached his boat ashore and the troops were able to disembark over the
side. At about 8:00 AM Number 5 began taking on wounded. Caldwell and one of
his sailors removed what was left of one soldier's arm and applied first aid.
Caldwell and his boat stayed on the beach until about 3:00 PM, when it was
pulled off.[234]
Lieutenant Willard W. Ayres commanded U.S.S. LCI (L) Number 9, designated as
the wave leader of the first LCI (L) wave in the Gaffi Attack Group, part of
the JOSS Attack Force. Ayres' boat had aboard the wave commander,
Lieutenant Commander E.W. Wilson, and 138 men of the Headquarters Company, 2d
Battalion, 7th Infantry Regiment. Ayres' wave was to follow two waves of
assault troops on board LCVPs, whose job it was to destroy beach defenses. The
men aboard the LCI (L)s were to land and move inland immediately.
The first LCI (L) wave sortied from Sousse in North Africa. During its entire
passage to Sicily it encountered a strong northwest wind and extremely heavy
seas. This caused the LSTs in the Gaffi Attack Group to be an hour behind
schedule. This, of course, delayed the entire operation of the Attack Group.
The LCI (L) first wave left for the beach at approximately 2:45 AM with Ayres
in the lead of a V formation. The entire formation spent the next hour and a
half going back and forth, to and from the beach, because of uncertainty as to
whether the assault boats had gone to the beach. Ayres stopped the formation
about 800 yards from the shore and took soundings. There was no activity on the
beach until 4:40 AM when the enemy opened fire with 20 mm cannon and machine
guns. Ayres advanced toward the beach and dropped anchor 150 yards from shore.
Ayres lowered the ramps and all troops were disembarked by 5:00 AM, in the face
of continuous machine gun and small arms fire. Ayres' boat withheld its fire on
order from Commander Wilson, because the enemy positions could not be
identified. One of Ayres' crewmen was killed, and two soldiers wounded. Ayres
made an unsuccessful attempt to rescue LCI (L) Number 1 during its "magnificent
battle" with the enemy gun emplacements. Ayres and his boat returned to North
Africa after their failed rescue attempt.[235]
U.S.S. LCI (L) Number 10 acted as the headquarters ship for the Gaffi Attack
Group and flagship for the task group commander, Task Group 86.2. It carried
the commanders and staffs of both the 7th Regimental Combat Team and the Gaffi
Attack Group. Its commander was W. A. Drisler, Jr. Number 10's trip to the war
zone was eventful in itself. The ship left Bizerte after embarking its troops
during an air raid, bound for the staging area at Sousse. From there it
proceeded to Sicilian waters "through heavy chop", arriving with half of the
embarked troops in a state of seasickness. During the passage the
communications officer of the 7th Regimental Combat Team was swept overboard,
but miraculously recovered uninjured by another LCI.
Early on the morning of July 10, Drisler's boat transferred the staff of 7th
Regimental Combat Team to LCI (L) Number 5. For the next hour and a half, the
ship was under continuous air attack, but without incident. The rest of the day
was spent driving off more enemy air attacks and trying unsuccessfully to
rescue stranded LCIs. The next day was also heavy with anti-aircraft action.
Drisler's ship claimed to have downed at least one Stuka dive bomber.[236]
U.S.S. LCI (L) Number 209 was in the second LCI wave landing on beach 73, RED
beach, as part of the Gaffi Attack Group. The boat carried 130 officers and men
of Company L, 2d Battalion, 7th Infantry Regiment, and was commanded by
Lieutenant Kenneth E. Leake. Number 209 beached at 5:00 AM, approximately ten
yards from the shore and 300 yards from LCI (L) Number 1. The boat was under
fire from enemy machine guns, mortars and cannon, all directed from a steep
cliff overlooking the beach. Leake's boat refrained from returning fire for a
time, out of fear of endangering American troops. The boat finally opened up
with its no. 1 20mm cannon after it became apparent that the enemy positions
had to be reduced if the troops were to get ashore without heavy casualties.
Leake reported that the gun's first burst "disintegrated" an enemy soldier who
was unsuccessfully throwing hand grenades at the boat from a distance of 25
yards. The gun also eliminated two machine gun nests and several snipers. As a
result of this covering fire the infantry were able to disembark successfully,
only one of their number being mortally wounded between boat and shore. Leake's
craft escaped serious damage, and only one of its crew was slightly
wounded.[237]
Colonel H.E. Smyser, U.S.A., served as logistics representative on the staff of
Commander Amphibious Force, United States Atlantic Fleet, during the HUSKY
operation. He attended the invasion and follow-on operations in Sicily in that
capacity, and provided a written report of his observations, complete with
extensive photographs, on August 9, 1943.238
Discussing the experience of the 45th Infantry Division, which he noted
obtained its final objective of the first phase of the operation on D+5, Smyser
pointed out that "[D]irect hits by naval gunfire on gun emplacements and
concrete pillboxes contributed greatly to the rapid advance of the 45th
Division inland." Smyser attributed the fact that the "initial landings were
made practically without opposition" to the effect of this naval preparatory
fire.[239]
Smyser's report noted that initially the landing beaches were designated RED,
GREEN, YELLOW, GREEN-2, YELLOW-2 and BLUE-2.
On D-Day, however, Smyser and others from 45th Infantry Division G-4 arrived in
Scoglitti and conducted a beach survey. It was then decided to abandon RED,
GREEN and YELLOW as of noon on D+1and to establish six new
beaches, namely RED, GREEN and YELLOW north of
Scoglitti, RED-2 and GREEN-2 in the town of Scoglitti and YELLOW-2
south of Scoglitti. On the afternoon of D+1 it was decided to abandon the three
remaining original beaches and to concentrate on the beaches in the Scoglitti
area. The new beaches were organized and dedicated for certain purposes (e.g.,
RED and GREEN- ammunition; YELLOW-rations) in
anticipation of the arrival of a major supply convoy on D+4.[240]
In the area of the 45th Infantry Division Smyser found the organization of the
beaches to be generally inadequate. Debarkation points were poorly marked and
coxswains paid little attention to the markings that existed. Beach parties did
not check the arrival of supplies. Beach exit roads were inadequately improved,
even though adequate equipment for this purpose was available. Senior
commanders had trouble controlling shore parties because of inadequate
communication on and between beaches. The most serious problem was that
supplies piled up on the beaches and blocked exits. This problem was difficult
to resolve even though there was ample labor available for unloading, including
hundreds of Italian prisoners.[241]
Smyser found the performance of beach parties in Sicily to be a vast
improvement over beach party operation in TORCH. Some problems
remained. Among these were the obvious ones pointed out by many others---the
need for beachmasters, for example, to have appropriate rank. Smyser
recommended the ranks of Lt. Commander and Commander for regimental and
divisional beachmasters respectively. The mundane as well came in for
scrutiny---Smyser observed that the beach parties lacked waterproof covers for
their weapons, rendering many arms unserviceable. Most importantly, beach
parties should be armed with rifles, as opposed to the pistols with which they
had been issued. This problem had almost become of critical importance at Gela
and on the left flank of the 45th Infantry Division, where fortunately enemy
counterattacks did not penetrate to the beach.[242]
Smyser's comments on the operation and suitability of the various landing craft
used in Sicily are noteworthy. He classed together the LST, LCI (L), LCT and
LCM, finding all of them suitable, but singling out the LST as "outstanding in
performance and usefulness." On the other hand, the LCVP was found to be
"disappointing" in both operation and suitability, its primary drawback being
its undependability. Smyser noted that several hours after landing, an average
of about 70 of these vessels were constantly out of action on RED and
GREEN beaches north of Scoglitti. Most impressive to Smyser were the new
DUKWS, which demonstrated to him a superior ability for unloading any type of
ship. For Smyser, the DUKW "definitely is the best answer for the movement of
supplies from ships into organized beach dumps."[243]
Preparations for HUSKY had included provision for heavy casualties. In
the event, more than sufficient facilities, equipment and trained personnel
were on hand for the evacuation of those wounded during the landing phase. As
Smyser noted, "[P]robably never before in modern warfare were soldiers so
promptly evacuated from the battlefield or given such excellent care as on OPERATION
HUSKY."[244]
Smyser was particularly gratified by the success of palletized loading of
supplies . This was the first occasion on which this system was utilized, and
in Smyser's view it greatly facilitated both loading and unloading, and more
importantly, movement from shore to supply dumps farther inland. According to
Smyser, however, during his entire eight day stay on the island he was
constantly plagued by snipers shooting at him from nearby fields.245
Captain John H. Leppert, U.S.N., commanded Task Group 81.4. On D-4, Captain
Leppert arrived at Sousse with the LCI (L)s of DIME, CENT and KOOL, anchoring
out at dark. Because of the very large number of landing craft involved, and
attendant concerns about concentrating so many ships in the harbor, over the
next two days Leppert's unit went through a complicated disembarking and
reembarking procedure until all ships were loaded and anchored away from the
berths. In all, Leppert had 52 ships under his command.[246]
Just before midnight on July 8, 1943 Task Group 81.4 got underway from Sousse,
Leppert having first admonished his commanding officers that "if any ship
became high and dry it was still a fighting unit as long as it had guns and was
above the surface of the water." At dawn on July 9 the seas increased, so that
eventually Leppert's LCI (L) column had to increase its speed to maximum in
order to close with the transport column. Upon closing with the U.S.S.
DICKMAN, his assigned transport, Leppert reverted to command of the
three ships in his LCI (L) division one, LCI (L)s 17, 188 and 189. By
continuing to press these vessels at maximum speed, which made the soldiers
aboard very sick, Leppert managed to keep up with the DICKMAN, despite
"considerable pounding" to his own ships.[247]
On the first attempt, LCI (L) Number 189 was the only one of Leppert's ships to
successfully beach. The other two boats became hung up on sand bars and had to
be retracted and rebeached. In addition to troops, Leppert's boats carried
supply carts weighing up to 400 lbs., and these caused a good deal of trouble
during unloading. In spite of these difficulties, unloading was successfully
accomplished, and during the afternoon of July 10 Leppert received orders to
depart for Tunis with 17 LCI (L)s. Leppert and 14 LCI (L)s returned to Sicily
on July 13 and delivered more troops to the DIME and CENT beaches
without incident.[248]
Among the boats under Leppert's command was LCI (L) Number 17, H.G. Stender
commanding. Stender's boat was Leppert's flagship, and in addition to the Task
Group commander and his staff, carried 200 men of Company A, 83d Chemical
Battalion, Major William S. Hutchinson, Jr. in command. Number 17 also carried
12 two-wheeled carts bearing 4.2 in. mortars, 12 additional carts filled with
mortar rounds, and 36 additional boxes of mortar ammunition. Stender and his
boat arrived in the DIME area at 9:30 PM on July 9. At 11:30 PM
Stender observed the effects of the US glider and paratroop attack near Gela,
and fifteen minutes later saw U.S. transport aircraft pass overhead on their
way to Africa without incident. At 2:30 AM on July 10 Number 17 fell in behind
the first wave of smaller craft headed for the beach, followed by LCI(L)s
Numbers 188 and 189.
After some considerable delay Number 17 dropped anchor about 200 yards from the
beach and 100 yards to the east of the pier at Gela. However, it struck a sand
bar about 15 yards from the beach and eventually a strong current broached the
boat parallel to the beach. Only with the aid of two LCVPs could Stender's boat
be freed, and not until almost 7:00 AM During its stranding on the sand bar
Number 17 became the target of enemy gunfire. Starting at about 5:15 AM three
batteries on Cape Soprano began firing. Stender believed these guns to be
German 88mm cannon, and 25 of their shells landed in the water near his boat
over the space of an hour and a quarter. Two rounds struck the ship, the first
a glancing blow and the second a more serious hit that exploded inside the
boatswain's locker. This shell did considerable damage but caused no
casualties.
Although Stender's boat managed to disembark all of its troops while stuck on
the sandbar, it could not disgorge its cargo because of the depth of the water.
It required another landing on GREEN beach to disembark the carts and other
cargo. After another trip to the beach with rations and ammunition, Number 17
returned to Tunis with Captain Leppert's convoy of LCI (L)s. There the boat was
repaired and refueled, and on July 13 it embarked another 180 soldiers,
including Brigadier General Norman D. Cota and elements of the 17th Field
Artillery, 809th Engineers and 15th Evacuation Hospital. Stender delivered
these troops to GREEN beach near Gela on July 14 without incident.
Number 17 returned to Tunis on July 15 for the final time, its crew having
suffered no casualties.[249]
LCI (L) Number 188 got underway from Sousse shortly before midnight on July 8,
1943. By morning the wind was from the north, causing the boat to roll
considerably, resulting in "general seasickness" among the embarked troops.
Nevertheless, the boat reached the transport area off Sicily very early on July
10, and went into the beach at 3:50 AM Like Number 17, however, the ship found
itself on a sand bar 17 feet from the beach, in about eight feet of water.
Despite repeated efforts to retract, the boat remained stuck fast.
Number 188 made the mistake of lowering both of her ramps on grounding, nearly
losing both of them. It was only through strenuous efforts by the crew that all
of the ship's cargo was eventually unloaded. This process consumed more than
three hours, during which time the boat was twice hit by enemy artillery
shells, resulting in injuries to one crewman and four soldiers. The boat's
commander had a generally negative impression of his human cargo.
The Army proved more of a hindrance than a help in the whole
operation. They lay on the deck in the passageways forcing our men to walk on
weather decks to move from Bow to Stern. They had no organization in handling
carts and they caused great delay by refusing to obey the orders of my officers
in trying to establish some order out of the chaos. When they did unload the
mortar carts they moved much too slowly and they were loathe to leave when
carts were off. A great deal of their equipment was left behind including
packs, signal flags and ammunition.[250] The third boat in
Leppert's small flotilla was U.S.S. LCI (L) Number 189, commanded by Lt. (jg)
Edward S. Dulcan. Like its sisters, Number 189 got underway from Sousse near
midnight on July 8, and encountered heavy seas the following morning. Although
the heavy weather caused some sickness among the troops aboard, Dulcan thought
the men were less affected than they had been in the pre-invasion rehearsals.
On the evening of July 9 the vessel made contact with the transports, which
were an hour behind schedule and therefore making greater speed than planned in
order to make up the lost time. In order to keep up with the transports, Dulcan
had to force his craft to maintain very high speed.
Although it encountered some machine gun and cannon fire, by 4:00 am. Number
189 was grounded about 20 yards off the beach in about four feet of water.
Dulcan then gave the order to disembark. This occurred at a "snail's pace" .
This was due partially to the fact that the starboard ramp quickly became
inoperative, and remained so in spite of the crew's efforts to repair it. This
required all the troops to debark on the port ramp, and this was completed at
5:10 AM, when Dulcan retracted and headed out to sea. He and his ship made two
more successful runs to the beach without incident.[251]
There were another sixteen boats under Leppert's command in Sicily. It is
indicative of the state of the Axis defenses on the island that virtually none
of them suffered casualties to either their crews or their embarked troops.
Indeed, many of their commanding officers expressly recounted how they
encountered no resistance whatever. Of those boats which actually fired their
weapons, many did so at aircraft that were safely out of range.
J. B. Freese, Commander Task Unit 86.1221, had 25 LCTs under his command, all
of which landed on YELLOW beach on July 10. All were fully loaded with
troops and equipment. All successfully delivered their cargo and personnel
without loss.[252]
Robert L. Coleman commanded U.S.S. LST Number 311, a part of LST Group One. His
boat sailed from Tunis as part of a convoy of LSTs in the JOSS and CENT
attack forces. Off Gozo Light the convoy divided, Number 311 joining the DIME
force. On July 10 it unloaded its cargo without incident. On the evening of
that day, it received a pontoon causeway from the U.S.S. HOPI and
immediately set about rigging it out on RED beach. With the causeway
nearly ready for use, Coleman's boat and two others, 370 and 312, came under
attack by three Me 109Fs. Two bombs landed near 312 and one near 311, the
latter breaking the lashings between the pontoons and causing half of it to
broach on the beach. This scattered the crew, and rigging commenced again only
after some delay.
At 6:30 PM the three boats were joined by U.S.S. LST Number 313, and five
minutes later the lot of them came under attack by three Me 109Fs. Number 313
suffered a direct hit from a bomb, which detonated the ammunition on board and
set fire to gasoline and vehicles. Needless to say, the explosion killed those
in the immediate vicinity. Those who survived began abandoning ship from the
bow and stern, some swimming for shore. Coleman's ship turned its hoses on
Number 313, but his craft was not close enough for the water to reach the fire.
One of the attacking aircraft crashed, a victim of anti-aircraft fire. Coleman
was forced to retract, "inasmuch as the explosions and heat from the wreck were
unbearable." A few minutes later Coleman maneuvered the bow of his ship against
the stern of Number 313 and was able to remove about 81 men. Others were
rescued from the water by man lines. During the entire rescue operation
Coleman's boat was showered with debris and shrapnel from the Number 313's
cargo. After finally retracting, Coleman delivered 25 badly wounded men to a
hospital ship. Coleman's boat anchored for the night in the transport area.
On July 11 activity began at just prior to 7:00 am, when enemy bombers attacked
the transport area, scoring a hit on the USS BARNETT . An hour later
Coleman's boat began disembarking men and cargo, enlisting the aid of another
LST to help unload. Starting at about noon, Number 311 and her sisters came
under fairly constant enemy air attacks for a period lasting over ten hours.
During this time Coleman's crew repeatedly engaged the enemy aircraft, for the
most part ineffectively, although one German aircraft was reported as a
probable kill. Late in the afternoon, during one of these attacks, Coleman
observed that two "Liberty" ships were hit by bombs. The first exploded and
sank, while the second caught fire and burned fiercely. Coleman's boat,
however, escaped damage, and his crew were uninjured.
Coleman's Executive Officer was James T. Smith, who authored his own report of
the action at Sicily. His observations corroborate those of his commanding
officer. His comments concerning the state of the defenses, however, merit
special attention.
The defenders were evidently taken by surprise because there seemed
to be very little resistance in the early hours of the invasion. In my opinion,
they were not quite able to comprehend just what was going on. The attacking
naval warships were very efficient in silencing and extinguishing the coastal
defense batteries and searchlights of the enemy. At 1100 the first enemy
resistance became apparent to us as the C.D. batteries began to shell the LSTs
312, 338 and 344 beached on RED No. 2 sector of Beach No. 67. There didn't seem
to be any enemy bombers in the vicinity although there were a few fighters now
and then.[253] U.S.S. LST Number 381, commanded by E.F.
Marcellus, formed part of Task Unit 86.1216 landing on RED 2 . It
unloaded troops and equipment on July 10, in spite of intense enemy air
activity. The following day it resumed this activity, finally unloading all its
cargo by about 3:00 PM From that time on until midnight the boat came under
consistent air and artillery attack, but without suffering damage. The
persistent enemy air attacks had one unintended result, namely the
predisposition of Navy gunners to fire at any aircraft, frequently before
identifying them. Marcellus observed this first hand when at about 11:00 PM he
saw an unidentified aircraft crash land in the water nearby. Marcellus sent out
an LCVP to look for survivors. The unidentified aircraft, which had been shot
down by Navy gunfire, turned out to be a U.S. Army transport plane from the 62d
Troop Carrier Squadron, 314th Troop Carrier Wing. The LCVP was able to rescue
only two survivors, 1st Lt. Donald A. Broadus and 2d Lt. Michael B. Webb.[254]
Colonel Eugene M. Caffey commanded 1st Engineer Special Brigade, which provided
three Engineer Shore Groups for the landings, each with one of three reinforced
infantry regiments, landing at Licata, Gela and Scoglitti. The Brigade numbered
about 20,000 men, and had two principal responsibilities, namely (1) the
landing of troops, equipment and supplies and the establishment of beach dumps;
and (2) the execution of all supply plans of the Seventh Army.[255]
There was little difficulty for the Brigade in carrying out unloading
operations as planned, because of "ideal weather... an almost total lack of
enemy interference after D+1, and ...the use of the small ports of Licata and
Empedocle." In fulfilling its obligations as the first step in supplying the
Seventh Army, the Brigade relied upon the Sicilian railroads, which had been
only slightly damaged and were being put back in operation as early as D+1, and
"were the decisive factor in the rapid pushing forward of the supply lines
because there were simply not half enough supply vehicles to have carried the
tonnage which the rapid advance demanded."[256]
Like many others, Caffey was very pleased with the DUKWS, finding that "their
performance was up to advance expectations." On the subjects of "basic
soldiering" and discipline in the Brigade, however, Caffey was less sanguine.
The operation showed the need for more and better instruction of the
individual officer and soldier. They need detailed instruction in clean and
orderly living in the field; how to get along with little and make that little
do; how to take care of arms, equipment, and clothing and the necessity for
doing so; their personal responsibility for government property of all sorts.
They must be taught and required to perform their individual duties. They need
the alertness that comes from physical fitness and insistence on military
courtesy and the smart performance of all duties. They need commanders of all
grades who know what to do, how to teach others, and who are possessed of the
physical strength to work all day and all night and the determination and the
moral courage to exact from their subordinates a full performance of all their
duties under all circumstances...
instant and instinctive obedience has got to be taught to all ranks. Too much
time is wasted in argument, discussion, and coaxing. It was found that
commanders of all grades in the Brigade were reluctant, for one reason or
another to take summary and certain action against the recalcitrant, the
laggard, and the neglectful and shiftless. Either they were lazy, ignorant, or
lacking in the necessary force of character or, based on past experience, they
felt that they would not be supported or would be adversely criticized. The
greatest need shown in this operation was the need of discipline on the part of
individuals and control on the part of commanders.[257]
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Copyright © 2003 Thomas E. Nutter
Written by Thomas E. Nutter. If you have questions or comments on this
article, please contact Mr. Nutter at: tenutter@gmail.com.
About the author: Tom Nutter is in his 25th
year of practicing domestic and international patent, copyright and trademark
law, and is the Managing Partner of an intellectual property law practice in St. Louis, Missouri. He holds
the Masters and Doctorate degrees in diplomatic/military history from the
University of Missouri. His interests include railroad history as well as
European and American military history in the Nineteenth and Twentieth
Centuries. He lives in St. Louis with his wife, three children and two German
Shepherd dogs, Caesar and Cleopatra.
Published online: 03/01/2003.
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