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Operation Husky: The Allied
Invasion of Sicily, 1943
by Thomas E. Nutter
Aspects of the Allied Invasion of Sicily, 1943
V. HUSKY in Execution
A. Pantellaria and Initial Landings
Eisenhower's first task in preparation for HUSKY was the reduction of
the nearby island of Pantelleria, a small, volcanic island of forty-two square
miles in area. It had been effectively closed to foreigners since 1926 while
the Italians improved its defenses. It quartered a garrison of 10,000 men and
possessed RDF stations and numerous airfields, so that it constituted a
potential source of danger to the Allied force which would assault Sicily.
Pantelleria had but one possible landing area, at the northwest end of the
island near Porto di Pantelleria. As with most other Mediterranean islands, the
terrain of Pantelleria is hilly, the highest point being found on Montagna
Grande at 2,743 feet. The island's northern end included an airfield capable of
handling four-engine bombers and a hangar 1100 feet long including an electric
light plant, water supply and repair facilities. Pantelleria could accommodate
more than eighty aircraft. Perhaps more importantly, it had over one hundred
gun emplacements.[92]
The fact that enemy aircraft could make use of the airfields on Pantelleria, if
only for the purpose of monitoring the movements of Allied shipping, meant that
maximum tactical surprise for HUSKY might well be in jeopardy. The
island also housed a refueling station for Axis submarines. The capture of the
island would not only deprive Axis forces of these advantages but also provide
the Allies with additional airbases, and therefore the opportunity to cover
Sicily in a way not otherwise possible. Having concluded that these purposes
were worth securing, Eisenhower resolved to take the island. The method he
selected was a massive air bombardment, a course of action that would avoid the
problems which would confront landing attempts on the island's poor beaches.
The Allies committed the entire NASAF to the operation, with the exception of
the two wings of RAF Wellingtons. Since much of NATAF was to take part in the
invasion, the Allies used only part of it for this operation. The result was
that the Allied air forces numbered something less than 1000 aircraft, while
their Axis opponents fielded a like number.[93]
The Allies commenced their air assault, and a complementary naval blockade, on
May 18. By the end of May the Allies had succeeded in cutting the island off
from any source of reinforcement or resupply. The air assault so disrupted the
Axis forces and their infrastructure that after two weeks it was impossible for
them to maintain any serviceable aircraft. Between June 6 and June 11 the
Allies bombed the island virtually around the clock, culminating in a raid
carried out by 1100 Allied aircraft. The enemy's ineffectual efforts to defend
the island against the Allied onslaught did little more than cost him 60
aircraft. On June 8 the Royal Navy launched a full scale bombardment of Porto
di Pantelleria.[94]
The Allies smothered the Axis gun positions on the island on the night of June
10/11. The landing craft began their assault at 10:30 AM on June 11, during
which the Luftwaffe tried unsuccessfully to thwart the attack with large
formations of fighter aircraft. The supporting naval forces began firing at
shore targets thirty minutes later. Shortly thereafter the assault craft came
ashore. The Axis forces surrendered six hours later. In the next few days the
rest of the surrounding islands fell to the Allies.[95]
The air plan for HUSKY required that the main body of NAAF apply
maximum force against the Axis forces until D minus 7. At the same time,
however, it was to support the build up for the invasion as well as interdict
the enemy's lines of communication. Until the end of June the Allied air forces
remorselessly bombed Axis airfields and the ports on Sicily. There were
nineteen large airbases and a dozen newly developed fields on the island. The
Allies attacked not only the bases around Catania, Gerbini, Comiso and Biscari,
but also the bases in the western portion of the island. The Allied air forces
also made attacks on Sardinia and Greece, and on enemy marshalling yards,
supply depots, and ports along Italy's western coast.[96]
The Allies began heavy attacks on Messina and its corresponding ports across
the straits on 18 June. More attacks followed throughout June and early July
over Sicily, southern Italy and Sardinia. These were intended, in addition to
their obvious military purposes, to confuse the enemy as to the Allies'
ultimate intentions. The Axis forces responded without substantial effect. The
Allies began the final phase of their pre-invasion air assault on July 2, for
the purpose of eradicating any possible intervention by Axis air forces from
Sicilian bases during the invasion. In addition, while Allied medium bombers
subjected the airfields on eastern Sicily to intense bombardment, Allied
strategic bombers assaulted southern Italy. As a result, by the eve of the
invasion there were only two fully operational enemy airfields on Sicily. The
Allies had eradicated the Axis airfields at Gerbini, and driven half of the
enemy's Sicilian based aircraft to Italy. The Allied air assault cost the Axis
forces about a thousand aircraft. As the invasion approached, the Allied air
forces disposed of 4900 operational aircraft of all types, while their
adversaries could counter with only about 1600 aircraft based not only on
Sicily, but also in such relatively inconvenient places as Sardinia, Italy and
southern France.[97]
As noted previously, the naval plan for HUSKY called for landings by
British forces from the United Kingdom, the Middle East and Tunisia, and by
American forces from both the United States and North Africa. Admiral
Cunningham had designated Vice Admiral H. K. Hewitt as commander of the Western
Naval Task Force. Rear Admirals A.G. Kirk, J. L Hall and R. L. Conolly
commanded the US landings in the CENT, DIME and JOSS
sectors respectively. Admiral Cunningham designated Admiral Bertram Ramsay, the
hero of Dunkirk, to command Eastern Naval Task Force. Ramsay nominated Rear
Admiral Troubridge to command the British landings at ACID NORTH, ACID
SOUTH and BARK EAST. For the commander of the British assault
at BARK SOUTH, Ramsay chose Rear Admiral R.R. McGrigor. He installed
Rear Admiral Philip Vian as commander in the BARK WEST sector.[98] His
selection to direct the activities of FORCE H was Vice Admiral A.U.
Willis.
The invasion of Sicily began in North Africa with the embarkation of British
and American paratroopers aboard transport aircraft and gliders, bound for
delivery over Sicily during the night/early morning of July 9/10, 1943. Allied
commanders had been somewhat apprehensive about this part of the HUSKY
operation, because of their own lack of experience in directing paratroopers
under combat conditions, and because the transport/glider stream would in part
pass over the naval convoy, filled as it was with nervous anti-aircraft gunners
anticipating the unfriendly arrival of Axis aircraft. The misgivings of Allied
commanders turned out, in the event, to be well justified.
The plan for the Allied airborne assault on Sicily called for the simultaneous
flight of more than 350 aircraft and more than 130 gliders to transport about
5000 paratroopers to Sicily, over an approach of 400 miles. On D-1, the British
paratrooper contingent was to land in two zones near Syracuse, descending in
137 gliders between 10:10 PM and 10:30 PM. One force was to land in the western
suburbs, while the other was to come down to the south of the city, its purpose
to secure the canal bridge and railway, and prevent their demolition.
Approximately one hour later, the 82nd Airborne Division was to drop from 220
C-47s at a point about four miles inland and six miles east of Gela, so as to
control the beach exits in the landing area of the U.S. 1st Infantry Division.
Both of these forces were required, according to the plan, to traverse somewhat
circuitous routes in order to arrive at their drop zones.[99]
The conditions under which these airborne landings took place served to enhance
their inherently dangerous qualities. The scant quarter moon was due to set
shortly before midnight, thereby affording the landing force little in the way
of visual support. Such little light as this moon did provide, and the
navigational aids available to the aircrews, upon which they relied under
conditions of radio silence, were eroded by weather conditions. During the
afternoon and evening a strong wind had begun to blow, and by midnight it was
blowing 40 miles per hour aloft. This caused both the British and American
forces to become disoriented, some of both groups missing their first visual
checkpoint at Malta. The aircraft began to straggle after one another in mixed
formations, their approach being further inhibited by enemy flak. In addition,
the preliminary air assault had resulted in fires and attendant smoke,
obscuring final check points for the landing force.[100]
In the British sector these unfortunate circumstances led to even more
unfortunate results. Many tow pilots released their charges prematurely, with
the result that the British naval forces in the Eastern Task Force saw "the
depressing sight of large numbers of gliders floating in the water" at 5 AM on
D-day. About 47 gliders met their fate in this way; indeed, only 12 of the 137
gliders landed in the target zone, with the remaining 75 scattered in the
southeastern part of the island. Similarly, the American parachutists were
dispersed over a 60 mile pattern between Licata and Cap Noto.[101]
In spite of this rather dubious beginning, the Allied airborne troops performed
well. A British force of only 8 officers and 65 men held the canal bridge south
of Syracuse until 3:30 PM on D-day, and by that time only 4 officers and 15 men
had not become casualties. They were just withdrawing when a relief force from
the landing forces arrived to drive the enemy away from the bridge, which
remained intact. The tiny force of paratroops stayed on to defend the bridge
while the British 17th Infantry Brigade, 5th Division, advanced across it.
Contemporaneously, the American paratroops held the high ground in the Gela
area to prevent enemy reinforcements from reaching the beach, an action
credited with speeding the subsequent advance from the beachhead by 48
hours.[102]
Even the widely dispersed paratroop forces gave a good account of themselves.
The British 1st Airlanding Brigade, which landed in the southeast, attacked the
Italian posts vigorously, thereby disorganizing the beach defenses and
reserves. Elements of the U.S. 505th Parachute Regimental Combat Team achieved
decisive results. Its 3rd Battalion seized the high ground near Vittoria and
held it against German tanks until relieved by the landing forces. The 2nd
Battalion captured the town of Marina di Ragusa, making contact with the U.S.
45th Infantry Division on D+1. As a result of these aggressive activities, the
505th RCT captured 20-30,000 Italian prisoners.[103]
Attached to the 505th RCT as naval gunfire liaison officers were Ensigns G. A.
Hulten and R. M. Seibert, both of whom were qualified parachutists and had
volunteered for duty with the 505th RCT. They had both received three weeks
training with their assigned unit before the invasion. Enemy gunfire killed
Hulten shortly after the paratroops touched down; Seibert survived to report
his experience.
Hulten and Seibert were the only naval liaison officers attached to the entire
Regimental Combat Team, even though pre-invasion intelligence had shown that
tanks and reserve troop concentrations could be expected in the landing area.
To make up for this obvious shortcoming, "the Regiment agreed to supply
material and assistance as required." The shortage of Navy personnel, however,
was not the only difficulty to be overcome. The Regimental Combat Team had
failed to assign to the naval officers a separate radio or crew for
communicating with the ships lying offshore. In fact, the liaison officers
could only perform their tasks indirectly, since all radio transmissions had to
be made on the 505th RCT's network. Hulton and Seibert could only reach their
base ship, the U.S.S. BOISE , through the 7th Field Artillery
Regiment. Finally, although it had originally been intended that the two
ensigns should act as a team for spotting and directing fire, on the eve of the
invasion the Regimental Combat Team assigned one officer to the First Battalion
and the other to the Third Battalion, thereby reducing their
effectiveness.[104]
The task of the 505th Regimental Combat Team was to land at a road junction
near Niscemi and secure both the road and the surrounding high ground in order
to forestall movement of enemy troops toward the beach. It was also to seize
and mine nearby bridges and assert control over local secondary roads and a
neighboring rail line. In the event, what befell the 505th RCT was typical of
the fate shared by many of its sister units. The pilots missed their
navigational landmarks, and after circling once in an effort to locate the
correct drop zone, disgorged the paratroopers along a 25 mile strip in a
southeasterly direction, almost to San Croce de Camerina. One of the aircraft
near Seibert was shot down, thereby fully illuminating the landing area, so
that enemy troops arrived on the scene in very short order. The paratroopers
were naturally quite disorganized by these events, and there was continuous
sharp skirmishing throughout the night as the Americans tried to collect
themselves and in the process came in contact with Axis patrols. Another
consequence of the miscarried drop, in addition to the presence of thoroughly
alerted enemy troops, was that the paratroopers were unable to remove all of
the equipment bundles to the Combat Team Command Post. As a result, the
Regimental Combat Team did not establish communications on schedule.[105]
Following these initial engagements, the enemy counterattacked in earnest with
tanks and supporting infantry, "threatening to annihilate our own infantry and
to break through to the beach." The 505th RCT managed to retrieve the
situation, however, by making contact with the Shore Fire Control Party
attached to the 45th Infantry Division, which was operating in the same general
area. By this means Seibert's unit was able to direct naval fire against the
tanks and disrupt the enemy's infantry assault. It was necessary, however, for
suitable anti-tank guns to be brought forward before the attack could be turned
back and the lost ground recovered. [106]
These initial airborne landings, while suffering from the effects of the
weather, nevertheless enjoyed a considerable measure of success. Subsequent
airborne operations, in particular that of the 504th RCT on the night of D+1 in
the area of Gela, did not fare as well. This flight, which had been postponed
one day from its original scheduled launch, suffered immediately from the fact
that the invasion fleet rimming the southeastern shore of the island received
insufficient warning of its approach. In addition, the flight course now
followed the actual battle front for 35 miles, and the Allied antiaircraft
gunners on both land and sea had now become accustomed by two days of air
attack to shoot on sight. Added to this was the unfortunate circumstance that
the air transports approached the ships shortly after an enemy air raid. In the
resulting "friendly fire", 23 transports were shot down, and the half of the
remaining aircraft so badly damaged that they eventually had to be scrapped.
These unfortunate circumstances were compounded by a wide dispersal of the
parachutists from Gela to the east coast, resulting from faulty navigation. The
unscheduled arrival of these troops in the Allied zone of operations led to
fatal confusion. The 1st Infantry Division G-2 report carried the 504th RCT as
an unidentified German parachute regiment. In a move to the Allied rear area,
the 504th RCT suffered casualties in excess of many units in combat. Twenty to
twenty-five percent of the 5000 American parachutists involved became
casualties. Admiral Hewitt laid the responsibility for this incident at the
feet of the air force. According to Hewitt, while the air force had informed
the navy of the inbound and outbound routes for the transports "by dispatch to
the forces at sea", the navy never received these plans in writing. Indeed, air
force planners had not submitted the issue of transport routing in the assault
zone to the navy and army commanders, so that the latter could consider the
implications of the plan. Hewitt's view was that the route ultimately selected
was unsuitable to the navy. Even more egregious, however, was the fact that
"this unilateral decision" about transport routes was unassailable by the naval
commander, since he became aware of it only after the imposition of radio
silence. In consequence, according to Hewitt, the paratroop transports arrived
over the naval transports from the same direction as the enemy "simultaneously
with enemy dive bombers". [107]
A later British airborne operation encountered similar problems. For reasons
not known, the routing of this mission was delayed, and so therefore was
notification of it to the convoys along the route. The force consisted of 2,000
men in 31 gliders and 105 troop carriers. Twenty-six of the aircraft returned
early because of engine trouble or the intense flak over the drop zone. What
now ensued over the Allied fleet was not pretty. A "most confusing air defense
situation" was reported between 9:30 PM and midnight by the Senior Officer of
the HMS WISHART , in escort of a follow-up convoy near Syracuse. This
was due to the fact that while news of the approach of friendly aircraft had
been communicated to the escort force during the afternoon of D+3, it had not
been relayed to all of the ships by dark. This situation was complicated by the
presence of enemy aircraft in the area at the same time. In consequence, the
merchant ships opened fire on the transports as they flew directly overhead.
Allied antiaircraft fire accounted for eleven airplanes, and damaged a
considerable number more.[108]
In spite of these tribulations, the British force successfully prosecuted its
mission, which was to seize and hold a bridge over the Simeto river, thus
securing for the landing troops the only exit from the high ground into the
plain of Catania. The airborne force was able to marshal 200 troopers with 5
anti-tank guns, and these were able to capture the bridge and remove its
demolition charges. While eventually these men were forced to retire, the
bridge was shortly recaptured by elements of the XIII Corps, still in its
intact condition.[109]
While both Patton and Montgomery later testified to the significance of these
airborne operations to the overall success of the entire enterprise, those
successes had been achieved at substantial cost. In order to decrease the
chances that such a sequence of events would not in future be repeated,
Eisenhower appointed a board of review concerning the matter on July 23.[110]
In anticipation of the invasion, Admiral Cunnigham moved to Malta on July 4,
and Eisenhower and Alexander followed him there on July 7. According to
Eisenhower, his chief anxieties were the weather and enemy reconnaissance. He
reported that he and his staff had expected to have lost surprise by the
morning of D-1, it having been assumed that, notwithstanding the successes of
the Allied air strikes, the enemy should have acquired knowledge of the
invasion fleet through their reconnaissance aircraft. On that day, moreover, it
was known that two German aircraft had seen part or all of the invasion fleet.
The Supreme Commander also received reports that the German forces on the
island were moving purposefully about, apparently having raised the alarm on at
least the western half of Sicily. Nevertheless, by the time the assault
actually went in, the command staff was convinced that both tactical and
strategic surprise had been achieved, as evidenced by the fact that the enemy
troops defending the beach areas quite obviously had received little if any
warning of the armada's approach. The weather, as it turned out, was the area
about which the Supreme Commander could rightly have been concerned. A strong
northwest wind began to blow on the night of D-1, and its effect on the
airborne operations has already been noted. The wind blew at thirty-five miles
an hour in the zone of the Western Naval Task Force, and while this posed
obvious and continuous problems for the landing force, it also had a
deleterious effect on those enemy forces defending the beaches.[111]
While the weather conditions caused delays in the arrival of some of the
landing craft, notably in the area of the 45th Infantry Division, where the
assault was delayed by an hour, nonetheless the supporting naval gunfire was
devastating to the enemy. Likewise, Allied aircraft pounded the enemy from
Gozo, Malta and Pantelleria, and on D-Day 1200 fighter sorties were flown. Both
heavy and medium Allied bombers continued to strike Axis airfields and
communications. The Allied air effort was aided by the early capture of enemy
airbases at Pachino and Gela on D-Day, Comiso on the night of D+1, and Ponte
Olivo and Biscari on D+2. An RAF fighter wing relocated to Pachino on D+3.[112]
Eisenhower went ashore at Licata on July 12 after having visited Admiral Hewitt
aboard the USS MONROVIA. "There was hardly a shell or a bomb to be
heard, and the outstanding impression was one of complete serenity. Landing
craft were proceeding on their lawful occasions from ship to shore; it looked
more like a huge regatta than an operation of war." Thus convinced of the
successful launch of the invasion, Eisenhower returned to Tunis via Malta.[113]
Eisenhower later observed that "[T]he landings in general did not encounter
serious opposition. Shore batteries did not put up vigorous resistance; some
were not even manned at the time of attack; those which caused trouble were for
the most part quickly silenced; there was sporadic rifle and machine gun fire."
The British in particular enjoyed favorable conditions. The 5th Division and
50th Division encountered only light resistance; the 231st Brigade got ashore
and inland very quickly, and the 51st Division "had no particular difficulty".
Canadian 1st Division "got ashore against indifferent opposition and were able
to press quickly inland." A British Commando force made "a perfectly
coordinated assault on one of the coastal batteries, only to discover that the
guns were dummies."[114]
So weak had been the Italian opposition, in fact, that Admiral Ramsay cautioned
that "the success of the assaults in HUSKY cannot be considered as a
reliable guide to what may be attempted or achieved elsewhere."
The assaults in HUSKY were uniformly successful due to the
low state of preparedness of some of the coast defenders and the lack of
resolution showed by those who were alert. They are thus only of limited value
for the deduction of lessons for the future. It is believed that the poor
showing of the Italians on the day was largely due to their being overwhelmed
by the weight of our initial assaults, delivered as they were with a
considerable degree of local tactical surprise.[115] Admiral
Ramsay observed that casualties to shipping and amongst landing craft were
considerably less than had been anticipated and allowed for. He considered this
to be due to: (a) the very high degree of air superiority achieved, (b) the
efficiency of the anti-submarine organization, and (c) the unexpected
attainment of a considerable degree of tactical surprise. Ramsay concluded that
tactical surprise had resulted from a combination of circumstances, namely the
adoption of a waxing moon period for the assaults, the lack of enemy air
reconnaissance on D-1 day and a prolonged period of "alert" preceding D Day,
and the unexpected high wind that arose on the afternoon of D-1. These factors,
Ramsay believed, had lulled the enemy coast defenses into a false sense of
security.[116]
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Copyright © 2003 Thomas E. Nutter
Written by Thomas E. Nutter. If you have questions or comments on this
article, please contact Mr. Nutter at: tenutter@gmail.com.
About the author: Tom Nutter is in his 25th
year of practicing domestic and international patent, copyright and trademark
law, and is the Managing Partner of an intellectual property law practice in St. Louis, Missouri. He holds
the Masters and Doctorate degrees in diplomatic/military history from the
University of Missouri. His interests include railroad history as well as
European and American military history in the Nineteenth and Twentieth
Centuries. He lives in St. Louis with his wife, three children and two German
Shepherd dogs, Caesar and Cleopatra.
Published online: 03/01/2003.
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