|
Operation Husky: The Allied
Invasion of Sicily, 1943
by Thomas E. Nutter
Aspects of the Allied Invasion of Sicily, 1943
VI. THE POST-LANDING BATTLE IN BRIEF
While the Seventh Army encountered heavy weather and generally stiffer
resistance, the degree of resistance varied from beach to beach. The landings
at Scoglitti were virtually unopposed, and the beachhead was established ahead
of schedule. The 1st Infantry Division encountered heavy opposition at some
beaches and very little at others. 3rd Infantry Division met opposition only
sporadically.[258]
In less than two days, 15th Army Group landed a total of about 80,000 men,
7,000 vehicles, 300 tanks and 900 guns, along with sufficient supplies to
maintain all of these men and their equipment. As to the latter, for the first
time the Allies made use of the amphibious DUKW, a vehicle which,
according to Eisenhower, "more than any other technical factor, solved the
problem of large-scale maintenance over the beaches." The work of the DUKWs
was augmented almost immediately by the capture of several small ports. The
Allies seized and reopened Licata on D-Day; they also took possession of
Syracuse on that day, and by D+3 that port was receiving the ships of the D+3
convoy and their 16,000 troops, who discharged in less than 4 hours. The Allies
also took the port of Augusta on D+3.[259]
The Allies had expected to lose up to 300 of the 2000 vessels employed in the
initial assault. In the event, in the British zone only 3 transports and a
hospital ship ("fully illuminated") were sunk, while in the American sector 2
destroyers, 2 submarine chasers and 6 landing craft were sunk, and 20
additional landing craft were damaged. Such minimal losses as were suffered
resulted from the fact that the Allies enjoyed overwhelming air superiority.
Enemy air activity was limited and quickly repulsed. The enemy attacked the
American ships 89 times in the first three days of the assault. Allied aircraft
drove off 26 of these attacks before they reached their targets, and
successfully engaged most of the remaining attacks over the Allied ships.[260]
In the first week of operations, the Seventh Army engaged both Panzer-Division
"Hermann Goering" and 15. Panzer-Grenadier-Division, including most of their
tanks. These German forces launched four counterattacks before July 16, of
which by far the most significant was that which occurred on July 11. On that
day, German tanks penetrated to within 1000 yards of the 1st Infantry Division
beachhead at Gela, and were driven off by a "devastating combination of rocket
guns, anti-tank grenades, tanks, artillery, and naval gunfire, which knocked
out between 10 and 16 of the 40-50 attacking tanks." The Germans began to
withdraw after the failure of these counterattacks, successively disengaging
from the Seventh Army front between July 17 and July 20, and moving into
positions opposite the Eighth Army.[261]
Once the Allied armies were well established ashore, Eisenhower relinquished
responsibility for direction of the campaign to 15th Army Group commander
General Alexander and his subordinates, Patton and Montgomery. This was
consistent with orders issued by Admiral Hewitt, commanding Western Naval Task
force. Hewitt operated under so-called "joint agreements of the U.S. Army and
Navy", under which in amphibious operations the naval commander commanded until
the commanding general of the land forces had established his command post
ashore. This latter step was regarded as taken when all of the assault forces
had landed and established a beachhead of 10,000 yards in depth, so that the
supply system of the landing force was operating in a normal manner. Hewitt's
experience in HUSKY suggested to him that Army notions of amphibious
operations had not kept pace with those of the Navy, particularly with regard
to the question of command and responsibility in such operations. Indicative of
this was the fact that plans issued by Army commanders had set forth directives
governing the disposition and use of naval craft, including firing and target
schedules for vessels in Hewitt's task force. These misconceptions, according
to Hewitt, stemmed from the fact that Army officers believed that they were in
a position to exercise extensive authority while afloat, a circumstance which
he attributed at least in part to the fact that the term "Headquarters Ship",
in place of the proper term "Flagship", had come into Army parlance,
particularly when referring to the vessel on which the commanding general of
the landing force was embarked. The plan that these forces were intended to
follow called for an advance up the east coast of the island by Eighth Army to
the port of Messina, the ground campaign's major objective. During this
advance, the Seventh Army was to protect Licata, Ponte Olivo, Biscari and
Comiso, and to guard Eighth Army's left flank against enemy attack. Eighth
Army, then, was to attack through Catania and Gerbini, while Seventh Army
merely broadened its beachhead. As early as D+9, however, these plans were
fundamentally reversed. The Germans concentrated their forces against the
British and held them up in the Catania area, while Seventh Army moved "largely
against Italians" northwest toward Palermo to cut the island in two.[262]
The Germans halted the advance of the Eighth Army at Catania on July 20,
holding the British in position there until August 4. The principal German
units engaged included the Panzer-Division "Hermann Goering" and 15.
Panzer-Grenadier-Division, as well as two regiments from 1. Fallschirm-Jaeger
Division. Here the enemy enjoyed the benefits of difficult terrain, the plain
being criss-crossed by canals, drainage ditches and rivers, and German
observers being well placed on the foothills of Mount Etna. Under these
conditions the enemy were able to repeatedly pound the Eighth Army as it
attempted to move forward from its bridgehead over the Dittaino River and into
the plain of Catania. In order to bring maximum weight against the German
forces, who were bitterly contesting every foot of ground, and to exploit the
evident demoralization and weakness of the Italians, Alexander decided to make
Palermo the main axis of supply for Seventh Army, and to move that force into
line with Eighth Army for a breakthrough to Messina. Thus Seventh Army was to
push through Palermo to the north coast of the island, and then to push toward
Messina along two axes, the coastal road and the road
Petralia-Nicosia-Troina-Cesaro, which had formerly been designated as the
Eighth Army's northern axis of advance.[263]
Following extremely fast advances over open country, 3rd Infantry Division and
2nd Armored Division met at Palermo on July 22 and encountered little
resistance. The city surrendered at 10:00 PM. Next day Alexander issued an
order directing Seventh Army to maintain strong pressure on the enemy's
northern flank, moving eastward along the aforementioned twin axes, and leaving
only minimal forces in western Sicily. The Seventh Army was to begin its drive
on August 1. Alexander directed that supply bases were to be shifted to Palermo
without delay. Patton placed all non-divisional artillery of Seventh Army under
the command of II Corps, and moved 3rd Infantry Division and 9th Infantry
Division into the sector of II Corps. The air forces were directed to bomb
enemy communication and transportation systems in the northeast corner of the
island. Naval Task Force 88, including 2 cruisers and 4-6 destroyers, was to
operate along the island's north coast along Highway 133 to support Seventh
Army with naval gunfire as needed, and to land advanced ground units when
possible. Royal Navy ships were detailed to assist Eighth Army along the east
coast in the same way.[264]
While Eighth Army enjoyed the benefit of supply lines coming from Augusta and
Syracuse, both of which ports were in fair working order, the condition of
Palermo was less favorable. Port capacity had been reduced to about 30% by the
Allied bombing campaign, which had resulted in 44 vessels of all types having
been sunk in the docks and the channels. Although 12 ships were able to
disgorge the 9th Infantry Division there on August 1, it took another 30 days
to raise the capacity of the harbor to 60% of its former level. Seventh Army
was thus receiving supplies from both the west at Palermo and the south from
Gela and Licata, and on August 3 a beach was opened at San Stefano, and this
was used to supply the Army's advance for the next ten days. Following the
Army's advance, new beaches were opened for supply, and these allowed the quick
advance to continue in spite of the loss of road and rail facilities through
bombing and enemy demolition. [265]
On July 28 Admiral Hewitt created Task Force 88 for the purpose of supporting
the advance of Seventh Army by naval gunfire and effecting advance landings of
military units. The force comprised three cruisers, fourteen destroyers and
numerous smaller vessels. After the capture of Palermo on July 22, 45th
Infantry Division moved eastward along the northern coast toward Messina,
reaching Cefalu on July 24. The advance continued to the road junction north of
San Mauro on July 26, along Highway 113 to San Mauro on the following day,
thence to a position four miles east of the Tusa River on July 29. Some units
moved south to Mistretta, while others moved to the enemy flank near San
Stefano. The next day the advancing Seventh Army met strong resistance from
Panzer-Grenadier-Regiment 71. of 29. Panzer-Grenadier-Division. The destroyer
ROWAN supported the troops. On July 31 the 45th Infantry Division took
San Stefano. Using its own spotter plane, the cruiser PHILADELPHIA bombarded
San Stefano while being engaged by a 6 inch shore battery. The 3rd Infantry
Division replaced the 45th Infantry Division on the left flank of Seventh Army,
and advanced four miles east of San Stefano on August 1. On the night of August
2-3 the PHILADELPHIA, ROWAN and KNIGHT laid down
heavy fire on the coastal highway and on an enemy strongpoint near San Agata.
On August 3, the PHILADELPHIA, SAVANNAH, GHERARDI and
RHIND shelled the same area, enabling 3rd Infantry Division to reach a
position within two miles of the Furiano River.[266]
On August 4 Hewitt's forces observed a large concentration of enemy artillery
on the coastal road. That morning the 15th Infantry Regiment encountered heavy
resistance as it made an unsuccessful attack across the river under cover of
naval gunfire. The regiment then moved up the valley about two miles in search
of a more favorable route across the river. Later that day, as the 1st Infantry
Division attack on Troina gained momentum, Hewitt's task force brought the 7th
Regimental Combat Team and attached artillery in by sea in landing craft to the
area behind the 15th Regimental Combat Team, about one mile west of the Furiano
River and two miles west of San Fratello, in preparation for an attack on San
Fratello Ridge. At the same time, the cruiser SAVANNAH laid down heavy
shellfire on numerous targets, including San Agata, Cape Orlando and highway
113, as well as bridges and defiles in the area. The shore battery at Cape
Orlando returned the fire.[267]
During the night of August 4-5, the destroyers GHERARDI and RHIND
placed a bombardment on enemy positions near San Agata. On the following day,
the 3rd Infantry Division continued its attack toward San Agata with the 30th
Regimental Combat Team attacking San Fratello ridge from the southwest, while
the cruiser SAVANNAH and destroyers ROWAN and TRIPPE
took under fire enemy positions between San Agata and Cape Orlando. The shore
batteries near the latter point returned the fire. The next day the SAVANNAH
and ROWAN bombarded enemy positions ahead of US forces, who made an
unsuccessful attempt to gain a foothold across the Fruiano. On August 7 the
American ground forces encountered strong enemy resistance near the coast, in
the form of a counterattack north of San Fratello. The cruisers SAVANNAH and PHILADELPHIA
laid down heavy fire between San Agata and Cape Orlando on enemy
concentrations.[268]
Early in the morning of August 8 Hewitt's task force made an amphibious landing
in the rear of the enemy. The units landed consisted of one battalion of
infantry, one tank platoon and two batteries of field artillery, and debarked
near Terranova, six miles west of Cape Orlando. The cruisers PHILADELPHIA
and SAVANNAH and the destroyers WAINWRIGHT, RHIND, ROWAN and
TRIPPE supported these units. The landing broke enemy resistance in San
Fratello; 3rd Infantry Division occupied Mount Fratello and the towns of San
Fratello and San Agata. On August 11 the task force made another amphibious
landing in the enemy's rear, two miles east of Cape Orlando. On this occasion
the force consisted of one infantry battalion, reinforced with armored
artillery and tanks. The cruisers PHILADELPHIA and BOISE and
the destroyers ROWAN, RHIND and TRIPPE supported
this landing. The enemy met the landing with artillery emplacements and 20mm
guns in pillboxes on the beach; naval gunfire neutralized these positions. In
addition, the PHILADELPHIA broke up a German counterattack which
threatened the forces that had just landed.[269]
On August 12 the 3rd Infantry Division moved into Cape Orlando. Under cover of
gunfire from the cruiser BOISE, 30th Regimental Combat Team moved down
the coast road and took Brolo and Ficarra. That night, the destroyers BENSON
and PLUNKETT bombarded the coast road where enemy forces were
withdrawing. The next day 3rd Infantry Division continued to advance toward
Patti. The advance past Cape Calava, four miles northwest of Patti, was impeded
by a large crater blown in the road at the eastern end of the Calava tunnel
where the road had been carved from sold rock. The troops bypassed this
roadblock by embarking in LCTs with their artillery and vehicles and being
ferried around the cape to a point to the east of the road block.[270]
Early on the morning of August 16 Hewitt's task force made another amphibious
landing. The Admiral's ships landed the 157th Regimental Combat Team behind the
American lines to support the rapid advance of the 3rd Infantry Division. The
landing took place northwest of Barcellona, and was supported by the PHILADELPHIA,
BOISE, BRISTOL and KNIGHT; the destroyers WAINWRIGHT,
RHIND, ROWAN and TRIPPE provided a protective screen. That
night American patrols entered Messina, and occupied the town the following
morning.[271]
A number of amphibious landings were executed to aid American ground forces on
the north coast. In addition, the Navy employed seven LCTs in a ferrying
service to lift Army personnel, artillery and heavy mobile equipment from point
to point along the coast. These vessels were frequently subjected to bombing
and strafing by enemy aircraft. The Axis forces relied principally upon
demolished bridges, blown tunnels, roadblocks and mined roads to impede the
progress of advancing American forces. The Americans were able to nullify these
elaborate and thorough demolitions by the exploitation of sea communications-an
avenue not available to the enemy because of Allied control of the seas. In
this instance, the LCTs enabled the artillery and armor to keep pace with the
rapidly advancing infantry and maintain constant pressure on the retreating
enemy. If these sea movements had not been made, in Hewitt's view at least, the
progress of American heavy weapons would have been seriously delayed and the
momentum of the American offensive considerably retarded, thereby prolonging
the campaign.[272]
Admiral Hewitt's task force conducted its operations along the north coast of
Sicily within 200 miles of 15 enemy airfields, four of which were within 60
miles until the fall of Catania on August 5. As a result, enemy aircraft
repeatedly bombed and strafed the ships and craft operating off the north coast
until the middle of August. Admiral Hewitt made an effort to limit the time the
cruisers were to be in the gunfire support areas, in view of what the Admiral
considered to be the inadequate air coverage provided for his naval operations.
The continuity of the air coverage provided for Hewitt's task force was, in his
opinion, inadequate to protect naval movements, and frequent enemy attacks were
pressed home without interception by Allied fighters. The thin fighter cover
provided was apparently due to an insufficient number of available aircraft to
meet all air requirements. Hewitt complained that communications with fighter
air coverage were inadequate. He believed this situation to be due largely to a
lack of indoctrination in procedure and lack of experience on the part of both
ship and air force personnel. Communications between naval commanders and the
air force control stations were poor. This was aggravated by the fact that the
air support command was not located at army corps headquarters, whence requests
for gunfire missions originated. This resulted in loss of time in arranging for
fighter cover and on some occasions, resulted in none being furnished.[273]
Catania and Troina fell during the first week of August, shrinking the front
from 170 miles to about 45 miles and enabling Seventh and Eighth Armies to
coordinate their attacks. Meanwhile, the enemy's flanks remained open to attack
from the sea, and the Allied air forces were able to concentrate their attacks
on an ever narrowing corridor of escape. Catania was softened by almost a week
of heavy air bombardment, during which time over 530 bomber sorties were flown
against the city. This isolated the city, and its defenses collapsed when
Eighth Army, and in particular British 78th Division, seized Centuripe, thus
forcing a general withdrawal. Meanwhile, between August 1 and August 6, Seventh
Army was fighting an extremely bitter battle for Troina. Even though the
Germans were subjected to 365 fighter-bomber sorties during the period, they
still managed to organize 24 counterattacks against the American ground forces.
[274]
Because of destruction caused by Allied bombing, enemy demolition, and the
emplacement of countless booby traps, the advance along the north coast road
was an extremely difficult one. The enemy had destroyed nearly all of the
bridges between Palermo and Messina, necessitating frenzied activity by Allied
combat engineers. It was, however, a series of so-called "end runs" by Allied
naval forces "which largely frustrated the enemy's delaying tactics and ended
by driving him from the island". Naval Task Force 88 and 3rd Infantry Division
executed an amphibious landing on August 8 at San Agata to place themselves in
the flank of German positions at San Fratello. The latter had halted the
advance for the previous four days. Another amphibious landing was made on
August 11 at Brolo, near Orlando, inhibiting German attempts to reorganize a
defense system along the Naso-Cap Orlando line. Further amphibious landings
were made on August 16, but these were unable to prevent the enemy's
precipitous retreat. On the following day, the Allies entered Messina, thereby
concluding the campaign. The campaign had cost the enemy 164,000 dead, wounded
and captured (32,100 of whom were German), as compared with less than 20,000
Allied casualties of the same type. The enemy also lost 78 tanks and armored
cars, 287 pieces of artillery and 3500 vehicles.[275]
According to Eisenhower, the Eighth Army "earned fresh renown" in the campaign,
and Seventh Army had "distinguished itself by the vigor and brilliance of its
fighting and its relentless pursuit action". The seminal lesson of the
campaign, according to its supreme commander, was the potential for airborne
operations. In spite of all of the difficulties which they had encountered, the
blame for which Eisenhower shouldered himself, the Allied airborne troops had
"contributed markedly to success". He concluded that "[W]e must exploit our
position of superiority in air power, superiority in air transport, and
availability of trained airborne troops to combine these assets with
superiority in other fields, notably command of the sea and in armored forces.
By so doing we can apply crushing, sudden and devastating blows that will
hasten the final downfall of Nazidom".[276]
- - -
Copyright © 2003 Thomas E. Nutter
Written by Thomas E. Nutter. If you have questions or comments on this
article, please contact Mr. Nutter at: tenutter@gmail.com.
About the author: Tom Nutter is in his 25th
year of practicing domestic and international patent, copyright and trademark
law, and is the Managing Partner of an intellectual property law practice in St. Louis, Missouri. He holds
the Masters and Doctorate degrees in diplomatic/military history from the
University of Missouri. His interests include railroad history as well as
European and American military history in the Nineteenth and Twentieth
Centuries. He lives in St. Louis with his wife, three children and two German
Shepherd dogs, Caesar and Cleopatra.
Published online: 03/01/2003.
|
|
