|
Operation Husky: The Allied
Invasion of Sicily, 1943
by Thomas E. Nutter
Aspects of the Allied Invasion of Sicily, 1943
I. The Allied Strategic Debate
HUSKY [1] was an operation born in controversy. During the so-called
Second Washington Conference in the early summer of 1942, an acrimonious debate
raged between the British and their new American allies over the future
strategic course of the war against the European Axis powers. General George C.
Marshall, Chief of Staff of the United States Army, espoused the view that the
Allies could successfully confront the European Axis only by means of an
amphibious invasion of Western Europe, and that consequently no operations
which might detract from this goal should be undertaken.[2] In a sharply worded
memorandum to President Franklin Roosevelt, Prime Minister Winston Churchill
attacked Marshall's position:
No responsible British military authority has so far been able to
make a plan for September, 1942 which had any chance of success unless the
Germans become utterly demoralized, of which there is no likelihood. Have the
American Staffs a plan? If so, what is it? What forces would be employed? At
what points would they strike? What landing-craft and shipping are available?
Who is the officer prepared to command the enterprise? What British forces and
assistance are required? If a plan can be found which offers a reasonable
prospect of success, His Majesty's Government will cordially welcome it and
will share to the full with their American comrades the risks and sacrifices.
This remains our settled and agreed policy . . . . But in case no plan can be
made in which any responsible authority has good confidence, and consequently
no engagement on a substantial scale in France is possible in September, 1942,
what else are we going to do? Can we afford to stand idle in the Atlantic
theatre during the whole of 1942?[3] Of course, the Allies did
not "stand idle" during 1942. In November of that year, American forces came
ashore in French North Africa to join with the British to begin the process of
driving the Axis from the African continent. Nevertheless, the controversy over
the primacy and urgency of an invasion of Western Europe to Allied strategy
continued, finding its next venue at the Casablanca Conference, conducted in
that North African city between January 14 and January 23, 1943. The Casablanca
Conference produced a decision favoring Operation HUSKY . In
preparation for the Conference, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff promulgated a
memorandum setting forth their basic strategic concept for 1943 in December,
1942.[4] Their view was that the "primary effort" of the Allies should be
directed against Germany by rapidly building up in the United Kingdom
sufficient forces for a land offensive against Germany in 1943. With regard to
North Africa, the U.S. Chiefs believed that once the Axis had been expelled,
the Allies should establish large air bases in North Africa for the purpose of
beginning "intensive" air operations in order to drive the Italians out of the
war. However, only forces sufficient to secure the Allied position would remain
in the theatre; the remainder would be sent to the United Kingdom to take part
in the invasion of Western Europe.
The British position on the matter of North Africa was quite different. It was
conditioned by British concern over the perceived perils of invading a European
continent still indisputably under German mastery. One member of the British
Chiefs of Staff, John Slessor, took the view that there was no hope of
establishing a substantial force on the mainland, to say nothing of confronting
and defeating the Wehrmacht, "until German resistance had been softened up from
the air." The previous September, Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Portal, the
British Chief of Air Staff, had produced a memorandum in which he set forth his
position on the future course to be followed by the Allies for the remainder of
the war. There were three alternatives available, namely (a) to invade Western
Europe precipitously, with as much force as could be mustered in a short period
of time, sufficient to overcome the Wehrmacht; (b) to crush German resistance
through the air, only after which would invasion be undertaken; or (c) a
mixture of (a) and (b), in which both air and land forces would be amassed,
without a specific invasion plan. Both Portal and Slessor favored the second
approach, although they saw themselves and their allies pursuing the third. The
second view became the official position of the British Joint Planners in
October, 1942
The first of the military meetings associated with the Casablanca Conference
convened on January 14, 1943 with Marshall urging a general agreement on the
distribution of Allied effort between the Atlantic and Pacific theatres. Four
days later the meetings continued, with "an apparently wide divergence of
opinion on basic strategy." According to Slessor, "[T]he morning's discussion
did not go at all well and at times became uncomfortably warm." The sensitive
topic of the Allies' German policy generated all of the energy. After the lunch
break, however, the parties were able to agree upon a memorandum, drafted by
Slessor, which cleverly balanced the efforts of the Allies in the major
theatres.
The British Chiefs prepared two lengthy memoranda in which they set out their
own arguments for how the war should be prosecuted in 1943.[5] They suggested
that two alternatives were available, namely (a) to concentrate on building up
a force in the United Kingdom "of sufficient size to invade the Continent," or
(b) to "devote our main effort towards undermining the foundations of German
military power" while simultaneously building up forces in the United Kingdom
for a "return to the Continent as soon as German powers of resistance have been
sufficiently weakened." The first of these alternatives corresponded to the
American plan, and the British Chiefs had no hesitancy in criticizing it in no
uncertain terms:
. . . the adoption of this strategy would mean a relaxation of
pressure on the Axis for 8 or 9 months with incalculable consequences to the
Russian Front and at the end of the period no certainty that the assault on
France could, in fact, be carried out. Or even if it were carried out, that it
would draw out land forces from the Russian Front. The British
plan, then, contemplated the application of continuous pressure on the Axis by
all available means. With reference to North Africa and the Mediterranean
region, the British plan meant that every effort would be made to drive Italy
out of the war, so as to stretch the Wehrmacht to its limits. In contrast to
the American concept, which called for Allied consolidation in North Africa and
its use as a base for air strikes against Italy and Germany, the British scheme
required the seizure of Sicily or Sardinia in order to increase the pressure on
Italy.
President Roosevelt and the American Joint Chiefs of Staff had prepared for the
Conference at a White House meeting on January 7, 1943.[6] In response to
Roosevelt's suggestion that "we should meet the British united in advocating a
cross-Channel operation," General Marshall made the revealing statement that
"there was not a unified front on that subject, particularly among our
Planners." Marshall went on to say that while the American Chiefs favored an
invasion of Western Europe over any Mediterranean operation, "the question was
still an open one." The Chiefs specifically discussed the alternative
Mediterranean targets of Sicily and Sardinia. Interestingly, while Marshall
rejected both choices in favor of an assault on the Brest Peninsula, both
Admiral Ernest J. King, Chief of Naval Operations, and General Henry H. Arnold,
Chief of U.S. Army Air Forces, indicated a preference for an attack on Sicily.
The ambivalence of Marshall and the other American Chiefs was openly displayed
nine days later at a meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Marshall began
the discussion aggressively, saying that the Combined Chiefs should "reorient"
themselves "and decide what the 'main plot' is to be. Every diversion or side
issue from the main plot acts as a 'suction pump.'"[7] Marshall urged that
while an operation against Sicily looked advantageous because of the "excess
number of troops in North Africa," the role of such an undertaking in the
overall strategic plan should be determined before a final decision was made.
Notwithstanding this expression of disdain for the Sicilian invasion by
Marshall, and persistent questioning by the other American Chiefs regarding the
availability of sufficient landing craft, by the end of the meeting the
Combined Staff Planners had been directed to "reexamine the British plan for HUSKY
. . . and to calculate the earliest date by which the Operation could be
mounted " (emphasis added). Two days later, the Secretaries of the
Combined Chiefs of Staff circulated a memorandum setting forth the Combined
Chiefs' recommendations for the conduct of the war in 1943.[8] In this
document, the occupation of Sicily is specifically called for, while provision
is made for assembly in the United Kingdom of forces sufficient to re-enter
Europe "as soon as German resistance is weakened to the required extent."
On January 22, 1943 the Combined Chiefs established the high echelon of command
for the Sicilian campaign, identifying General Dwight D. Eisenhower as the
Supreme Commander, with British General Sir Harold Alexander as his Deputy
Commander-in-Chief. Two additional British officers, Admiral Andrew B.
Cunningham and Air Chief Marshal Arthur W. Tedder, were named Naval and Air
Commander respectively. The Combined Chiefs further instructed Eisenhower to
set up a special operational and administrative staff, with its own Chief of
Staff, for the planning and preparation of the invasion.[9]
- - -
Copyright © 2003 Thomas E. Nutter
Written by Thomas E. Nutter. If you have questions or comments on this
article, please contact Mr. Nutter at: tenutter@gmail.com.
About the author: Tom Nutter is in his 25th
year of practicing domestic and international patent, copyright and trademark
law, and is the Managing Partner of an intellectual property law practice in St. Louis, Missouri. He holds
the Masters and Doctorate degrees in diplomatic/military history from the
University of Missouri. His interests include railroad history as well as
European and American military history in the Nineteenth and Twentieth
Centuries. He lives in St. Louis with his wife, three children and two German
Shepherd dogs, Caesar and Cleopatra.
Published online: 03/01/2003.
|
|
