THE UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II
by Rich Anderson
 
Transportation and Logistics

The U.S. Army transportation and logistic network performed prodigious feats in World War II. Millions of tons of food, weapons, and equipment, and millions of men were transported to every corner of the globe. Supplies were moved by ship to ports in the war zones and then to forward supply bases. Quartermaster units attached to the armies then moved the supplies forward to corps supply dumps. Divisional quartermaster units then, in turn, moved the supplies forward and distributed them to units. Ground transport was by railroad, truck, and, in many theaters, mule-pack and man-pack. Ammunition supply was performed in a similar manner, except that it was the responsibility of the Ordnance Corps.
 
In general, most types of supply were plentiful. Food, clothing and general equipment items were usually plentiful. However, gasoline (petrol), oil, and lubricants (called POL, a term inherited from the British) and ammunition tended to be in short supply at many times in most theaters of war. POL could be difficult to get forward, container trucks and trailers worked well for unit distribution, but were inefficient for long hauls, as was the case in Europe. The solution in Europe was PLUTO (for pipeline under the ocean), a POL pipeline (actually a number of separate pipelines) laid across the English Channel and with a terminus that eventually reached to Belgium. In the Pacific, it was often a simple matter of tying up a tanker to a pier and pumping fuel directly into trucks on the dock.
 
Ammunition, particularly artillery ammunition, tended to be a much more pernicious problem. In the early stages of the Army's expansion there were plans calling for a high priority in the production of 105mm shells of all types, inasmuch as these were the standard, general-support divisional field piece. Ammunition for heavier guns was accorded a lower priority, under the assumption that mobile warfare would reduce the utility of large, unwieldy and relatively immobile large artillery pieces. Unfortunately, a number of factors then intervened. First, congressional criticism was raised over large over stocks of all types of artillery ammunition that had accumulated in Tunisia in 1943. The Army was pressured to scale back production, particularly of 105mm ammunition. Secondly, the perceived need for an expansion of the heavy and medium artillery was mirrored by an expansion of the production facilities for the heavier types of shells. The expansion in heavy shell production was facilitated by converting light ammunition production to heavy. Thus, by late 1943 priorities had shifted radically. Many plants were retooling for other production, while some 105mm plants were closed completely. Events in France and Italy in mid 1944 then changed all the assumptions again. The fierce German resistance in the bocage of Normandy and in the Appenine Mountains of Italy placed a premium on all types of ammunition - just as stocks of 105mm ammunition began to shrink. Rationing was instituted (and extended to most other types of mortar and artillery ammunition), and captured German weapons and ammunition were utilized against their former owners. By 1 January 1945 the entire ETO stock of 105mm ammunition was reduced to 2,524,000 rounds, a twenty-one-day supply according to War Department planning factors, which were widely acknowledged to be too optimistic. The poor flying weather encountered in Europe in the fall and winter exacerbated this near-disastrous situation: Allied airpower was not always available to take up the slack. Although emergency measures in theater and in the U.S. improved matters, artillery ammunition shortages were to remain a chronic problem until the end of the war in Europe.