The Battle of Rorke's Drift
by Gilbert Padilla
The Two Armies
By the middle of the nineteenth century Great Britain held two colonies in
southern Africa, the Cape Colony and Natal. These stretched from the southern
tip of the continent (the Cape) upwards along its eastern coast (Natal). In the
interior of the region were two independent Boer republics, the Orange Free
State and the Transvaal. Among these European enclaves were the remnants of the
original African nations, the strongest of which was the Zulu kingdom, just
north of Natal. To Sir Henry Bartle Edward Frere, the British government’s High
Commissioner for Southern Africa, this simply would not do. To Frere, the
fiercely independent Zulus posed a serious threat to the policy of
"Confederation", which he advocated. The object of this policy was to ensure
stability by bringing all of these groups under British control. In 1877
Britain annexed the Transvaal, thereby inheriting a border dispute with the
Zulu kingdom (Zululand, or KwaZulu). Further, in 1873 King Cetshwayo kaMpande
had initiated a series of internal reforms with the goal of revitalizing and
strengthening the Zulu nation. To remove this perceived threat to the authority
of Queen Victoria, Frere determined to orchestrate a military confrontation
with the Zulus for the express purpose of breaking their power. To the British
Army commander in the region, Lieutenant-General Sir Frederic Thesiger, 2nd
Baron Chelmsford, this seemed a task that would require neither much time nor
much effort. Chelmsford estimated that King Cetshwayo could muster an army of
over forty thousand warriors, but this was a part-time citizen force armed with
mostly traditional weapons, i.e., spear and shield. No matter what training or
discipline such soldiers might possess, both Frere and Chelmsford judged them
no match for a well-trained, well-equipped, and well-led modern professional
army.
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First Day Preparations
In the morning of 22 January, Chard received orders for his unit of engineers
to report to the Central Column's camp at the foot of a monolithic, sphinx-like
mountain called Isandlwana, about ten or twelve miles east of the drift in
KwaZulu. Unsure whether the order was meant to include him personally, Chard
obtained permission from Spalding to accompany his men and get the orders
clarified.
Chard rode ahead of his men, who were riding in a wagon containing tools. He
reached the camp about midmorning and quickly learned that he was to remain at
Rorke's Drift to work on the ponts, keep the road to Helpmekaar serviceable,
and supervise the entrenching of expected reinforcements. While he was at
Isandlwana Chard observed that Zulus were "moving on the distant hills, and
apparently in great force." (1) During his return trip Chard met his men. He
made them get out and walk to the camp, and returned with the wagon and driver
to Rorke's Drift. To his regret, he found out later that all of his men were
killed that day. Upon returning to Rorke's Drift late in the morning Chard
reported to Spalding. The latter was about to leave for Helpmekaar to hurry
along the reinforcements, already long overdue. Almost as an afterthought
Spalding asked Chard whether he or Bromhead was senior. Chard didn't know.
Spalding then consulted his Army List and spoke the fateful words, "I see you
are senior, so you will be in charge, although of course nothing will happen,
and I shall be back again this evening early." (1) He then rode off, leaving
Chard to take his place in history.
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The Battle Begins
The iNdluyengwe pressed its attack ferociously. From about four hundred yards
on, however, the Martini-Henrys of the defenders exacted a devastating toll
from the ranks of the attackers. Even so, the Zulus came within fifty yards of
the barricades before their charge faltered in the face of the fire from the
defenders behind the mealie bag barricade, abetted by a murderous crossfire
from both buildings. The Zulus quickly discovered that the lack of cover made
this the most dangerous part of the British perimeter to assault. The
iNdluyengwe therefore veered to its left, around toward the front of the
hospital, where the rocks, brush, and tall grass provided excellent cover, and
paused momentarily. The fire of the defenders was so effective that one could
trace the path of the iNdluyengwe by the bodies left in its wake. The remainder
of the amabutho, married veterans who were perhaps somewhat slower than the
more youthful iNdluyengwe, joined them, along with Prince Dabulamanzi. He had
led the impi across the Mzinaythi in defiance of the King's orders because they
had been the tactical reserve ("the loins") at Isandlwana. They had seen no
action there and were therefore not allowed to join in the looting of the camp.
In the light of this, it must have seemed a small thing to lead a quick raid
across the river to allow his men to "wash their spears" in the blood of the
garrison, plunder the supplies stored there, and return to their homes covered
with glory. He doubtless relied on his relationship with the King, along with
the anticipated victory and spoils, to shield him from any negative
consequences.
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The Hospital and Perimeter
In the lore of the Battle of Rorke’s Drift the fight for the hospital has
gained almost epic status, a veritable "battle-within-a-battle." This is
understandable for several reasons. One is that the occupants of the hospital
fought alone, cut off from the rest of the garrison, without even an
opportunity to replenish ammunition. Indeed, the absence of interior hallways
or doors meant that they were initially cut off even from each other. Another
is that with only six non-patients to mount a defense, the odds against them
were even greater than for their comrades (the "David and Goliath" factor).
Also, the "blue-collar" natures of the defenders – all were privates, without
so much as a single NCO – is appealing to many. There was a sergeant present,
Robert Maxfield of the 24th Regiment, but he was a patient, delirious with
fever, and thus unable to make any kind of contribution. The cramped conditions
guaranteed that much of the combat would be hand-to-hand, which captured the
imagination of the public. In addition, the "time bomb" of the burning roof
greatly added to the sense of urgency. All in all, the use of the word "epic"
in describing this portion of the battle is more than understandable.
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Aftermath and Casualties
At 05:00 Chard sent out patrols to assess the situation and collect Zulu
weapons. He also ordered the thatched roof of the storehouse removed (the Zulus
had tried mightily but unsuccessfully to ignite it) and the walls of the
hospital torn down to prevent the Zulus from using them as cover should they
return. The garrison was astounded. Zulu bodies were everywhere. They
counted over three hundred fifty around the station. This is not an accurate
reflection of Zulu casualties, however, since bodies were found for weeks
afterward on the Shiyane and along the Zulus’ route home, where many of their
wounded had obviously expired after the battle. Most estimates of Zulu dead run
from five to six hundred, which seems more reasonable.
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Written by Gilbert Padilla. If you have questions or comments on this
article, please contact Gilbert Padilla at:
mrp95020@yahoo.com.
Copyright © 2002 Gilbert Padilla
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