Why France Lost the Seven
Years' War in North America
by Andrew Wright
France and England were traditional enemies. In North America alone they have
fought each other in four different wars. But it was not until the
Seven Years' War (1756-63) that the issue of who controlled the continent was
settled once and for all. During that struggle Great Britain finally made the
conquest of New France a priority and invested enough men and equipment to
accomplish its aim. With the help of the Royal Navy, New France was effectively
cut off from reinforcements, while at the same time it allowed the British to
build up the necessary strength in the thirteen colonies to destroy the French
presence in North America. British Naval Supremacy coupled with England's
escalation of the war in North America sealed the fate of New France during the
Seven Years' War.[1].
In order to understand what happened in North America during the war, it is
necessary to understand that the conflict there was only one part of, what some
historians view, as the first real global war. Britain and France not only
fought in North America, but in India, Europe and on the seas. Given so many
theatres of war, each with differing degrees of importance, it was necessary
that nations had to choose priorities.[2].
It was easy for England to set priorities. Thanks to her island status and the
supremacy of the Royal Navy, it was unnecessary for Britain to field a large
conventional army to defend its shores or to fight in Europe. Since the United
Kingdom's greatest interest was in sea trade and amassing colonies, it was only
natural that the war at sea and in the colonies got preference. The only
problem was that she was obliged to protect the Kingdom of Hanover, which was
technically in Union with England. Britain solved this problem by making an
alliance with Frederick the Great of Prussia, who was arguably the greatest
General of the time. They also financed a German Army to fight in Hanover as
well as sending a few troops of their own.[3].
France had a harder time setting priorities. As one historian noted: The
"French court was divided between those who favoured concentrating on naval and
colonial warfare, and those who favoured a war in Europe and felt that a naval
war was secondary to the seizure of Hanover."[4]. France was traditionally a
continental power that had tried to conquer Europe on several occasions. There
were Frenchmen during the 17th Century like Louis XIV's venerable adviser
Jean-Baptiste Colbert who advised building a colonial empire to increase
France's power and wealth, but they were strictly in the minority.[5]. Given
such a dedicated and powerful enemy as Britain with her Royal Navy it was not
completely insensible to concentrate on Europe. If the French court can be
censured for faulty policy, it is not because they set bad priorities, but
because they did not set priorities at all. By juggling multiple aims the
French risked defeat in all of them. In the end the French did not have the
necessary strength to subdue Hanover, reinforce their colonies, protect their
trade, and invade England. Needless to say, the lack of "unity of purpose" in
France's Grand Strategy would have a drastic affect on New France.
However, despite the confusing war policy dictated by Paris, the French forces
in North America began the first few years with a string of victories. Before
the stranglehold of the Royal Navy cut off all contact from France and allowed
the British to heavily reinforce the thirteen colonies, France more than held
its own in the struggle. In the first few years the French used Native allies
to compensate for their lack of numbers and in general understood frontier
tactics better than the British and American forces. They defeated several
British and American forces as well as capturing various frontier posts thanks
to the utilization of interior lines of communication and to no small thanks to
the French Commander Louis-Joseph de Montcalm.[6].
Montcalm was a skilled and courageous soldier with considerable military
experience. He improved the defences at Fort Ticonderoga, captured and
destroyed Fort Oswego in 1756, forced the capitulated of Fort William Henry in
1757, and successfully defended fort Carillon despite being outnumber five to
one. While he was an honourable man, his reputation was smeared when some of
his Native allies attacked the defenceless British force that was allowed to
withdraw from Fort William Henry. Eventually Montcalm would witness the turn of
the tide as the British gained the upper hand after capturing Louisbourg and
advancing deep into the Ohio Valley. He finally met his fate in the Battle of
the Plains of Abraham where he was mortally wounded.[7].
British fortunes started to improve during 1758. By the summer they had amassed
around 42,000 British and colonial troops in North America while one quarter of
the Royal Navy, operating off the coast, effectively cut off New France from
any reinforcements.[8]. Also, despite the incompetence of General James
Abercrombie during the Battle of Carillon in 1758, the British and Americans
troops had improved their tactics and adapted to their surroundings.[9].
Besides the supremacy of the Royal Navy, two events during the year tipped the
balance in Britain's favour. The first was the capture of Fort Frontenac, which
served as a major supply depot to the French forts in the Great Lakes and Ohio
region. With its capture the communications between Quebec and the western
forts were eliminated.[10] More importantly was the successful siege of
Louisbourg.
The settlement at Louisbourg had a powerful fortress as well as a formidable
naval base. By all accounts it was the strongest fort in North America and was
even given the title "The Dunkirk of North America" after the immensely
fortified French port in the English Channel. It served two purposes: The
protection of the St Lawrence valley, and thus the Heartland of New France from
naval incursions, as well to provide a base to "raid the sea lanes between New
England and Britain."[11] If the British wanted to invade Quebec via an
amphibious assault Louisbourg would have to be eliminated. To accomplish such a
task the British amassed "39 ships with about 14,000 sailors, and a further
landing force of 12,870 soldiers."[12] This gave them a comfortable superiority
over the French who had "10 French ships with 3,870 sailors, and another 3,920
soldiers inside the fortress itself."[13]
On June 8th, 1758 the British landed on Freshwater Cove to the southwest of the
fort. During the next few weeks until mid-July the British cleared all the
positions and trenches outside the fort. Once established, just outside
Louisbourg's walls, the British were able to bombard the town directly. With
the help of the Royal Navy, which cut Louisbourg off from any reinforcements as
well as providing fire support to the troops, the British laid down a punishing
bombardment. Faced with mounting casualties, the destruction of much of the
settlement, and little hope of relief, the French Commander made overtures to
surrender, which were eventually accepted on the 1st of August.[14]
With the capitulation of Louisbourg opening the St Lawrence to the Royal Navy
and the vulnerability of the Western French forts after the capture of Fort
Frontenac, the British finally had the initiative they needed to conquer New
France. 1759 was destined to be the climax of the war in North America. The
British decided to make a three pronged invasion on the Heart of New France.
One army advanced towards Montreal from Fort Frontenac, another advanced from
Fort William Henry to first take Fort Carillon and then meet up with the first
force in Montreal, and the final assault came from the sea as the British moved
up the St Lawrence River towards the Centre of Gravity of the French Empire in
North America (Quebec City).[15]
Of the three objectives, Quebec City was the most significant. While the other
two advances by land made steady progress, they did not capture Montreal in
1759, nor would its capture have been as important as the fall of Quebec City,
the capital and primary port of New France. In charge of this fateful
enterprise was a young British General named James Wolfe.
General James Wolfe was a more controversial character than Montcalm. Some
historians consider him a military genius, while others credit his high rank
due to powerful connections.[16] He has been portrayed as a passionate and
merciful man who refused to shoot a wounded highlander at Battle of Culloden as
well as a callous and barbaric man who "burned villages all up and down the St.
Laurence in defiance of the current rules of civilized warfare."[17] Given such
controversy it is not a surprise that some view the Quebec campaign as "a damn
near thing," to quote the Duke of Wellington, while others think it was one of
the most brilliantly executed operations in military history. What was
undisputable was General Wolfe's courage and his role in the Battle of the
Plains of Abraham leading to the capture of Quebec City.
One June 21, 1759 Wolfe, along with his armada of ships and men, arrived near
Quebec City. Quebec City was fortified and sat on top of a cliff. "The French
under Montcalm, planned to defend Quebec by holding the escarpments along the
north shore from the Montmorency falls, below Quebec, at least as far as Ste
Foy, upriver from the citadel."[18] Unfortunately, for the French, this left
the British with the south shore which they used to Bombard Quebec without
mercy during the whole summer. However, Montcalm's plan was not to meet the
English and fight them, but wait until winter came and forced them to withdraw.
An abortive assault by Redcoats against the Montmorency Falls was repulsed with
significant casualties in late July, and from then on Wolfe became more
desperate as time went by. While Wolfe continued the bombardment of Quebec,
ships were sent to scout regions of the St Lawrence around Quebec to find a
viable place to climb the cliffs. Finally, during the night of 12-13 September,
a good spot around Anse-aux-Foulons was found. Thanks to the incompetence of a
local commander the cove was unguarded and Wolfe led his army up the cliff
towards the Plains of Abraham.[19]
The Battle of the Plains of Abraham is seen by many as the decisive moment in
North America during the Seven Years' War. While the British formed up on the
Plains of Abraham Montcalm ordered part of his force to meet them in battle.
The battle did not last long and can be briefly described. The English had a
slight but not significant numerical advantage and both sides advanced towards
each other to deliver volleys of fire. The French fired at 130 yards and failed
to deliver significant damage to the British line. While Montcalm's army
continued to advance and fire sporadically, the disciplined British held their
fire as ordered by Wolfe and waited until they were within 40 yards of their
enemy. Thereupon they delivered a volley described as "the most beautiful
volley in the history of warfare."[20] A second volley caused more damage and
from then on the battle was irretrievably won for the British. The remaining
French withdrew to Quebec City which surrendered on the 18th of September. The
battle itself lasted 30 minutes, left both commanders mortally wounded, and
resulted in about six hundred casualties on both sides.[21]
While the Battle of the Plains of Abraham is often associated with the end of
the war in North America, in reality hostilities continued for another year. In
the early spring "a large French force of 8,500 men arrived from Montreal"[22]
and laid siege to English held Quebec City. The new British Commander,
Major-General George Murray met the French force outside the city and was
soundly defeated in the Battle of Sainte-Foy. Fortunately, for the British, he
was able to retreat back into the city and hold onto it until the Royal Navy
arrived to relieve him, "forcing the French to lift the siege and retreat
towards Montreal."[23] Once again, the Royal Navy had exercised a decisive
influence upon the conflict.
The end was finally in sight as three British armies descended upon Montreal
during the summer of 1760. "By 6 September the three armies had converged and
surrounded the island of Montreal, and on 8 September the French garrison
surrendered to General Amherst."[24] New France had fallen, and the war in
North America was over.
To understand the defeat of France in North America during the Seven Years' War
it is necessary to look at both how and why they were defeated. It is easy to
recognize how they lost. In the latter years of the war they lost most of the
battles and sieges which inevitably meant the losing of their forts, cities and
consequently New France. But why they lost these battles is the key to their
defeat and ultimate downfall.
Two factors, more than anything, explain why the British were able to conquer
New France. Firstly, the Royal Navy dominated the seas. The war in the colonies
was dependant upon men and supplies shipped from the mother countries. Not only
did the domination of the oceans mean that one nation could reinforce their own
colonies, but it also meant that enemy nations could not. The British were able
to win naval supremacy by building and capturing more ships, blockading the
French fleet in its ports, and capturing French trade.[25]
The Royal Navy played a decisive role in North America. It allowed the British
to heavily reinforce the Thirteen Colonies, as well as denying reinforcements
to New France. It helped the English during the Siege of Louisbourg by landing
troops and providing fire support. Finally, it ferried troops into the St
Lawrence and helped Wolfe in his siege of Quebec City. In fact, it could be
argued that New France's fate was secured in the Northern Atlantic, rather than
at the Battle of the Plains of Abraham. After all, it was the arrival of the
Royal Navy in the spring of 1760 that secured Quebec City from French
intervention.[26]
The other factor in the subjugation of New France was England's decision to
invest enough men and equipment to further their goal of annexing the French
Empire in North America. This could not have been done without the aide of the
Royal Navy, but it was still of vital importance. The French may have had too
small a population in the Americas to ever dream of conquering the Thirteen
Colonies, but in three previous wars they had managed to hold their own and
maintain a significant presence on the continent. This time Britain made the
war in the North American Theatre a priority and amassed the necessary power to
force an indisputable decision. As mentioned above, by the summer of 1758 the
British had 42,000 troops and one quarter of their Navy deployed in and around
America. The French were hopelessly outnumbered and forced onto the
defensive.[27]
With their huge numerical advantage the British went onto the offensive and
started unravelling New France. First they took Fort Frontenac and severed the
lines of Communication between the Western Forts and Quebec, and next they took
Louisbourg, opening the St Lawrence to invasion. Then they struck at the heart
of Quebec, seized Quebec City, and held it until relieved. Finally in the
summer of 1760 three British Armies marched on Montreal and forced it to
surrender.
British naval power and England's massive commitment of forces to North America
explain why the French lost the war there. The French Navy was consistently
outfought by the Royal Navy and spent most of the war in her ports, leaving New
France vulnerable and unsupplied. Meanwhile, Britain sent enough men and
supplies, with the help of the Royal Navy, to North America to make sure the
fate of New France was secured. With hindsight it is hard to see how the French
could have won the war in the Americas. With such a small population in New
France it is not realistic to belief she could have conquered the thirteen
colonies. Additionally, it is just as unlikely that the French Navy could have
gained naval supremacy and heavily reinforced her colonies. During the war,
even with Spain's late entry, France and Spain only managed to build or capture
6 ships compared to Britain's 69. The best France could have hoped for was a
stalemate guaranteeing her previous possessions. Unfortunately, for the French,
England had the means to conquer New France, and during the Seven Years War in
North America she also had the will.[28]
Show Footnotes and
Bibliography
Footnotes
[1]. Allen Greer, The People of New France (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 1997), 109-10.
[2]. Daniel Marston, The Seven Years' War (Oxford: Osprey Publishing,
2001), 1.
[3]. Ibid., II; 13.
[4]. Ibid., II; 31.
[5]. Alfred Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power upon History 1660-1783 (New
York: Dover Publications, 1987), 70-74.
[6]. David J. Bercuson and J.L. Granatstein, Dictionary of Canadian Military
History (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1992), 196.
[7]. Wikipedia article on Montcalm: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Montcalm
[2006, March]
[8]. Ibid., I; 109.
[9]. Wikipedia article on "The Battle of Carillon:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Carillon [2006, March]
[10]. Ibid., II; 48.
[11]. Ibid., VI; 118.
[12]. Wikipedia article on Louisbourg: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Louisbourg
[2006, March]
[13]. Wikipedia article on Louisbourg: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Louisbourg
[2006, March]
[14]. Ibid., II; 48.
[15]. Marcel Trudel, Introduction to New France (Toronto: Holt,
Rinehart and Winston of Canada, 1968), 97.
[16]. Wikipedia article on James Wolfe:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/James_Wolfe [20, March]
[17]. Ibid., I; 110.
[18]. Ibid., VI; 163.
[19]. Ibid., VI; 163.
[20]. Wikipedia article on "The Battle of the Plains of Abraham:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Plains_of_Abraham [2006, March]
[21]. Ibid., II; 58-60.
[22]. Ibid., II; 67.
[23]. Ibid., II; 67.
[24]. Ibid., II; 67.
[25]. Ibid., II; 30.
[26]. Ibid., I; 109.
[27]. Ibid., II; 31.
Bibliography
Daniel, Marston. The Seven Years' War. Oxford: Osprey Publishing,
2001.
Greer, Allan. The People of New France. Toronto: University of Toronto
Press, 1997.
Bercuson, David and Granatstein, J.L. Dictionary of Canadian Military History.
Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1992.
Mahan, Alfred. The Influence of Sea Power upon History 1660-1783. New
York: Dover Publications, 1987.
Trudel, Marcel. Introduction to New France. Toronto: Holt, Rinehart
and Winston of Canada, 1968.
Porch, Douglas. Wars of Empire. London: Cassell, 2001.
Willson, David. A History of England. Hinsdale, Illinois: The Dryden
Press Inc, 1972.
Fowler, William. Empires at War. Vancouver: Douglas & Mcintyre,
2005.
Parkman, Francis. Montcalm and Wolfe. Markham, Ontario: Penguin Books,
1984.
Wikipedia article on Montcalm: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Montcalm [2006,
March]
Wikipedia article on "The Battle of Carillon:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Carillon [2006, March]
Wikipedia article on Louisbourg: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Louisbourg [2006,
March]
Wikipedia article on James Wolfe: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/James_Wolfe
[2006, March]
Wikipedia article on "The Battle of the Plains of Abraham:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Plains_of_Abraham [2006, March]
Copyright © 2007 Andrew Wright.
Written by Andrew Wright. If you have questions or comments on this article,
please contact Andrew Wright at:
auchinleck4ever@gmail.com.
Please take the time to visit Andrew Wright's site at
www.section117.com
About the author:
Andrew Wright is attending his second year at the University of Regina,
majoring in History and minoring in Political Science. His hobbies include
reading, writing, politics, history, Halo (X-Box) and other strategy games like
Chess, Axis and Allies etc. He has lived in Regina, Saskatchewan, Canada most
of his life, but have also lived in London England for a year and travelled
around Europe including: United Kingdom, France, Germany, Holland, Belgium,
Italy, Greece. He has an extensive military history book collection (500 or
more books). He is the author of After Iraq: A Year in the Middle East.
Published online: 7/08/2007.
* Views expressed by contributors are their own and do not necessarily represent
those of MHO.
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